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O verv iew  o f  th e  re se a rc h  p ro b le m  a n d  
su m m a ry  o f  fin d in g s
T h e  re a l  is  fra g ile  a n d  in c o n s ta n t:
its  law  is re s tle s s  c h a n g e :
th e  w h e e l o f  a p p e a ra n c e s  tu r n s  a n d  tu r n s
o v e r  its  f ix e d  ax is  o f  t im e .
[E s f ra g ile  lo  re a l  y es in c o n s ta n te ;  
t a m b ie n ,  s u  ley  el c a m b io , in fa tig a b le : 
g ira  la  r u e d a  d e  la s  a p a re n c ia s  
s o b re  el e je  d e l  t ie m p o , s u  fijeza .]
Octavio Paz, A  tree within  
(Arbol adentro), pp. 14-15.
. . . c h a n g e  is c o n c e iv e d  p a r t ly  as th e  c o n t in u o u s  t r a n s f o rm a t io n  o f  th e  
o n e  fo rc e  in to  th e  o th e r  a n d  p a r t ly  as a cy c le  o f  c o m p le x e s  o f  p h e n o m ­
e n a ,  in  th e m se lv e s  c o n n e c te d ,  s u c h  a s  d a y  a n d  n ig h t ,  s u m m e r  a n d  
w in te r .  C h a n g e  is n o t  m e a n in g le s s  -  i f  i t  w e re , th e r e  c o u ld  b e  n o  
k n o w le d g e  o f  i t  -  b u t  s u b je c t  to  th e  u n iv e r s a l  law , ta o .
Richard Wilhelm, Introduction, The I  Ching or Book o f Changes, p. Ivi.
The scientific study of change is an oxymoron. Science attempts to 
observe and classify, to demarcate and delimit, to specify and contain. 
Change resists classification, limitation, and containment. Things change 
and nothing remains the same. If observed a sufficiently long period 
of time and with sufficient patience, everything in the entire uni­
verse changes. Change must be a fundamental property of all things -  
just as the concrete features that appear to us at any moment can be called 
properties of things. The universe unfolds from the big bang. An embryo 
becomes an adult. M ountains are pushed through the earth’s crust and 
then erode.
The quoted excerpts on the opening pages suggest that change may 
obey universal laws. The idea of a law of change also appears to be an 
oxymoron. There is at least one way that change can be lawful. This can 
occur if the pattern of change repeats itself. T he simplest example is the 
repeating pattern of the seasons of the year. Depending upon your global 
latitude, the “same” pattern of seasons repeats every year, albeit with
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variations from one year to the next. This type of change is cyclical. 
There is clearly something lawful about seasonal cyclic change: a set 
sequence of seasons related to the inclination of the earth’s axis with 
respect to the sun.
Historical change, on the other hand, does not at first appear to be 
lawful. It is a continuously unfolding process from one generation or 
event to the next. While the atmospheric climate is cyclical, the earth 
registers the cycles historically with wind and water erosion. Global 
warming and ice ages are probably examples of atmospheric changes 
that are historical, built over time by an accumulation of past events. 
Geologists and climatologists, however, seek laws of historical change in 
these domains by searching for hidden repeating cycles with the “con­
tinuous transformation of one force into the other” (see opening quote 
from the I Ching).
In this book, we set out to ask whether the historical changes mani­
fested in die development of interpersonal relationships contain hidden 
cycles, patterns, or laws. All humans go through the life cycle, moving in 
a known sequence from one developmental stage to the next. Even 
though we are studying change across a well-known developmental suc­
cession in early infancy, the occurrence of particular developmental 
stages in a particular sequence is not the type of law that we seek to 
uncover. Rather, we are searching for laws of change that could be 
applied to the developmental transitions between any two stages of 
the life cycle, or between any two stages of relationship growth (stages 
like acquaintance, friendship, and intimacy or dating, engagement, and 
marriage).
Research on the problem of change processes in development has 
been facilitated by recent advances in dynamic systems theory within 
developmental psychology and historically grounded qualitative methods 
in life history research. Based on these advances, we present a method 
called relational-historical research on developmental change pro­
cesses in interpersonal relationships. Relational-historical research rests 
on three premises: that the developing relationship (not the individual) is 
the unit of analysis, that change emerges from but is not entirely con­
strained by the patterns of the past, and that developmental process is 
best revealed by making frequent observations within a particular case 
before, during, and after a key developmental transition.
In this work, we studied developmental change process in interper­
sonal relationships using mother-infant dyads. In particular, we studied 
the developmental transition, around four months of age, from primarily 
face-to-face communication to communication about and with toy 
objects. In this transition, mother-infant dyads use face-to-face play as
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the historical background from which to launch a triadic relationship: 
infants’ exploration of the object world in the company of their mothers.
We make the working assumption that his developmental transition 
may serve as a model for many other relationship changes in which 
exclusive focus on the dyad is replaced by an addition beyond the dyad: 
the birth of a child for a married couple or the addition of a new member 
into an existing group. This work may also be a model for the introduc­
tion of a new or “foreign” topic into an existing relationship. This may 
be, for example, an interpretation in psychotherapy or a suggestion for 
an innovative way of relating in a romantic couple.
The relational-historical research used here focuses on the description 
of change in dyadic communication from the perspective of the history 
of that communication within the dyad. We used a multiple case-study 
design of thirteen infant-mother dyads, when the infants were between 
the ages of two and seven months. Each dyad was videotaped for ten 
minutes weekly while interacting spontaneously with a set of age- 
appropriate toys. Relational-historical research combines quantitative 
analyses of developmental trajectories and behavior sequences with 
qualitative descriptions of the historical emergence of change and 
stability within dyads.
In this study, we focus on observable patterns of communicative 
behavior rather than on each participant’s subjective experience. Inter­
personal relationships have regularly recurring patterns of communica­
tion called frames (See Chapter 3). Frames are segments of co-action 
that have a coherent theme, that take place within a particular location 
(in space or in time), and that involve particular forms of mutual co­
orientation between participants. The coherent themes involve shared 
meanings or goals, implicit or explicit, about the nature and course of 
the communication. Examples of frames are recurring topics in conver­
sation and interaction rituals such as bedtime stories. Frames recur 
repeatedly over weeks and months and are reconstituted dynamically 
and dyadically each time they reappear.
The communication between these mothers and infants was coded 
into four frames that form the basis for the data analysis in this study. 
The social frame was coded when the topic of communication was 
face-to-face play without objects. The guided object frame was coded 
when mother took an active role in demonstrating and scaffolding the 
infant’s use of objects. The non-guided object frame was coded when 
the infant played with objects without the m other’s direct assistance but 
with her ongoing attention and verbal commentary. The social/object 
mixed frame was coded when elements of both face-to-face play and 
guided object play appeared at the same time, as when a m other used a
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toy to touch the infant’s face or body while vocalizing in an expres­
sive m anner typical of the social frame. These frames are illustrated in 
Figure 0.1.
By way of preview of our main results, we found that there was a three- 
part historical sequence of the change process: historical frames, devel­
opmental bridging frames, and the emergence of new frames. 
Depending upon the dyad, the historical frames were either the social 
or the guided object frames. The bridging frames were either the social/ 
object mixed frame or the guided object frame, and the emerging frame 
was the not-guided object frame for all the dyads. This is represented as 
the following sequence:
(Pi) (Historical »— Bridging) => (Bridging «-* Emerging)
Figure 0.1. (a) Social frame (mother and infant engaged in face-to-face 
play without objects), (b) guided object frame (mother demonstrates 
objects while infant observes), (c) social/object mixed frame (mother 
uses object socially, as in tickling the baby with the toy), (d) not-guided 
object frame (the infant explores the object while mother observes).
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In this sequence, the inner bi-directional arrowheads represent real­
time transitions between frames, such as when a guided object frame is 
immediately followed by an instance of the social frame. The bold 
unidirectional arrowhead represents the developmental time sequence. 
Thus, before the bold arrow, the dyad spends most of their time in 
historical and bridging frames and makes regular realtime transitions 
between them. After the bold arrow, the dyad spends most of their time 
in emerging and bridging frames and makes regular transitions primarily 
between these two frames. We considered a particular target frame to 
serve the function of bridging if it met four criteria:
• If realtime transitions between frames in any observation session were 
more likely between the target frame and the historical frame, or 
between the emerging and the target frame, as compared to the 
likelihood of realtime transitions directly between historical and 
emerging frames.
• If the target frame became predominant in duration in the weeks in 
between when the historical frame was predominant and later when 
the emerging frame becomes predominant (A bridging frame, there­
fore, “touches” and mediates between historical and emerging frames 
both in realtime and in developmental tim e).
• If the target frame contained some elements of the emerging frame of 
mother-infant-object communication, yet it occurred developmentally 
before the emerging frame becomes the predominant pattern.
• If the target frame contained elements of the historical frame, yet 
it occurred developmentally after the historical frame became the 
predominant pattern.
Bridging frames arose spontaneously in all of the dyads and bridging 
appears to be a process that serves several developmental functions. 
First, bridging frames point toward the future since they always con­
tained some elements of the emerging frame of mother-infant-object 
communication. Second, bridging frames also contained elements of 
the historical frame, thereby carrying the relational history within them. 
In most cases, the social/object mixed frame served as the bridging 
frame. During this frame, the dyad uses objects as if they were part of 
social play -  such as m other tickling the baby with the object -  and not as 
objects for exploration. Bridging frames, therefore, seem to buffer the 
developmental transition from the old to the new by creating an inter­
mediate frame having elements of past and future. We argue that 
bridging frames provide communicative stability that allows the dyad 
to try out the future actions without having to suddenly let go of the 
historical stable patterns to which they have become accustomed.
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T he accompanying series of photos (Figure 0.2) illustrates a realtime 
transition, in a single observation session for one dyad, between the 
guided object frame (the historical frame), the social/object mixed frame 
(the bridging frame), and the not-guided object frame (the emerging 
frame). Note that the bridging frame of “kissing” the baby’s face with the 
object serves as a transition between the m other’s demonstration of the 
object and the infant’s taking hold of the object.
Some models of change derived from dynamic systems theory 
suggest that developmental change occurs in sudden jumps called phase
Figure 0.2. A realtime transition from the guided-object (historical) 
frame, to the social/object mixed (bridging) frame, to the not-guided 
object (emerging) frame. The bridging frame, in which the mother uses 
the toy to “kiss” the infant’s face, mediates the realtime transition 
between the historical frame in which mother is demonstrating the toy 
while the infant observes and the emerging frame in which the infant is 
holding the toy while the mother observes.
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shifts or catastrophes, and that during this period of change the system 
experiences a relatively chaotic form of variability. In our data, although 
the developmental trajectories of some individual frames indeed had 
rather abrupt increases or decreases, our results on bridging frames 
suggest that for the developing relationship as a whole -  the multiple 
frames taken as a complex communication system -  developmental 
transitions need not be precipitous or chaotic. T he fact that every dyad 
in our sample showed some form of bridging suggests that social systems 
capitalize on their complexity to create relatively smooth developmental 
transitions: literally to make bridges between the old and the new.
Our concept of bridging may apply more generally to many differ­
ent types of relationship change. Consider romantic relationships, for 
example. The general model could be applied in the following ways:
(Historical — Bridging) —- (Bridging *-+ Emerging)
(Courtship *— Betrothal) —► (Betrothal — Marriage)
(Marriage *— Pregnancy) — (Pregnancy — Parenting)
Most societies have some finite period of betrothal, such as an engage­
ment period marked by rituals such as engagement rings, wedding plan­
ning, and parties, prior to marriage. Perhaps society has simply discovered 
the importance of bridging courtship and marriage and thus developed a 
culturally standardized bridging period. In the model above, we refer to 
conversational frames about courtship, betrothal, and marriage as well as to 
the ongoing formal state of being betrothed or married. In the case of 
pregnancy, bridging occurs by the fact of biology but it still serves the same 
ftinction: a window’ of time in which couples can make the developmental 
transition to include a new family member. In addition, in the historically 
prior period, conversational frames about pregnancy are more likely to 
occur and make realtime transitions with conversations about the everyday 
occurrences of married life, than are conversations about parenting.
In therapeutic and educational relationships there is likely to be a 
bridge between the known and the new. Psychotherapy clients are un­
likely to accept the intensity of their own feelings of loss, separation, or 
trauma unless they can first feel as if there is emotional safety in the 
relationship. Therapists can create a bridging frame around acceptance 
and empathy that bridges the emerging reconstructive work that cre­
ates new patterns of thinking and feeling for the client. Teachers must 
package new knowledge in ways that students can see its relationship 
to what they already know. They must create a set of supports and 
encouragements that keep a student working hard toward an emerging 
understanding that they do not yet possess.
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Coming back to our results, we further found that there are different 
types or levels of change in relational-historical systems. First there are 
realtime transitions between frames, that is, when the dyad shifts from 
one to another frame. These were brief but recognizable periods in 
which actions from the prior frame were either deleted, included, or 
overlapped with the next frame during the transition. We also found 
transitions between different actions within the frame, actions that could 
be considered variations on the theme of the frame. These changes 
between the actions that constitute this variability, however, do not 
change the frame but rather serve to constitute the realtime dynamics 
of what is usually done during a particular frame. We call this type of 
change ordinary variability or level 1 change. Level 1 change in both 
frames and transitions are forms of stable change, change that maintains 
the frame or transition in realtime. Level 1 change shows how even 
regularly recurring patterns in communication are always dynamically 
changing even as they remain “the same.”
To illustrate level 1 change, imagine a pair of friends that share a frame 
for meeting regularly for lunch. They show level 1 change because they 
do not always eat in the same restaurant, nor do they always meet on the 
same day of the week. These things change while the frame remains 
the same. For them, the variability in time and location is ordinary, an 
accepted part of the frame.
Figure 0.3 illustrates level 1 change for one of our mother-infant 
dyads. T he m other holds and demonstrates to the infant a series of 
different toy objects. T he toys change and the actions with the toys vary 
to some extent, but the guided object frame -  in which m other holds the 
toy and the infant watches -  remains unchanged.
Level 2 change is defined as an innovation within the ordinary 
variability of the frame dynamics. An innovation is a novel action 
appearing for the first time over the history of observations of a particular
Figure 0.3. Level 1 change, or ordinary variability, during the guided 
object frame. The mother demonstrates different toys while the infant 
observes.
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type of frame. We discovered that at its first appearance, the innovation 
has the effect of maintaining the ordinary, level 1 variability even as it 
introduces a new element into the frame. At this level, an innovation 
does not significantly alter the ordinary variability within the frame when 
it first occurs.
For the pair of friends with a regular lunch frame, level 2 change is a 
change that is more out of the ordinary for the couple. This could occur 
in many different ways. They may decide, one time, to go to a really 
expensive restaurant that was not part of their ordinary pattern. Or, they 
may decide to meet for dinner, or to go for a walk after lunch. So long as 
the participants perceive the change as substantially different from what 
they shared before, it can be called level 2 change. W hen it first occurs, 
level 2 change typically does not alter the general pattern of the frame: 
the act of meeting together regularly and talking to each other.
Figure 0.4 illustrates level 2 change during the guided object frame in 
one of our mother-infant dyads. In the previous set of photos from the 
guided object frame, the m other demonstrated a series of toys while the 
infant watched. In these examples the m other attempts briefly to place a 
toy into the infant’s hand. The infant, however, did not hold the toy for 
long and the m other quickly resumed the ordinary variability (level 1 
change) of the guided object frame. These level 2 innovations, therefore, 
did not change the basic pattern of the guided object frame in the session 
when they first appeared.
We found, however, that some innovations appear to become 
“amplified” in subsequent sessions, developing into a new predominant 
pattern of ordinary variability within the frame and replacing the prior 
regime of ordinary variability. W hen this occurs, a “significant change” 
in the system arises. These “significant changes” constitute level 3 
change or developmental change. This finding also shows that in all 
cases that we observed, the origin or source of significant changes in 
frame dynamics is the appearance of innovations in earlier sessions. We 
write this developmental process as follows
P 2 level 1 —> level 2 —> level 3
Our analysis of levels of change leads us to suggest that innovations are 
a way in which the relationship tries out novel actions but without a 
serious alteration of the current pattern of ordinary variability. If these 
novel actions are accepted or ratified by the members of the dyad upon 
subsequent occasions, they become amplified in importance to the dyad 
gradually replacing the old pattern. Innovations are seeds that may 
change the ordinary variability within frames and that have the potential
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to alter the dynamics of the other frames in the entire relationship 
system.
When developmental change is observed, as indicated by a significant 
increase or decrease in the duration of frames in the system, it is typically 
accompanied by a permeability of the frames: frames incorporate innov­
ations from other frames and, as a result, new frames form while histor­
ical frames dissolve. This is part of the dynamics that occur during the 
bridging period. For the friends who shared lunch and perhaps went out 
to dinner together, this dinner might have been a one-time event and 
their relationship may have continued in the same lunch-time pattern 
without a significant developmental change. On the other hand, the
Figure 0.4. Level 2 change, or innovations, during the guided object 
frame. Mother attempts to put a toy into the infant’s hand and the 
infant reaches. On another occasion, mother offers toy and infant takes 
it. Each of these instances was a divergence from the ordinary variabil­
ity of the guided object frame. In each case, the frame dynamics quickly 
return to the ordinary variability of demonstrating objects while infant 
observes.
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dinner may precipitate more intimacy in the couple, which may lead to 
sharing more dinners and evenings together. A level 3 change may occur 
in which a friendship relationship develops into a romantic relationship. 
According to our findings from the mother-infant dyads, we would 
hypothesize that this kind of developmental change could not have 
occurred without the ratification of some prior innovation that moved 
the couple to greater levels of intimacy.
Where do innovations come from? Which of the participants intro­
duces them? What determines whether they are ratified or discarded by 
the participants? How do they lead to developmental change? These are 
all questions that will be addressed in our research. The answers have 
implications for many different types of relationship change.
In our lunch date couple, perhaps the innovation arose spontaneously 
as part of a playful “what if?” dialogue that developed during one lunch­
time meeting. Perhaps one participant spent months getting up the cour­
age to take the risk toward more intimacy. Perhaps the other one was 
nonverbally communicating the desire for this to happen. Everything then 
depends upon how the dinner is experienced. A host of verbal and non­
verbal communicative exchanges, emotions, and the creation of a shared 
goal to move to a new level of intimacy may be part of a process of 
amplification of the innovation that may carry the relationship forward.
In psychotherapy, some of the most successful innovations arise in a 
co-discovery process between client and therapist. When the therapist 
allows the client to discover their own understanding, and is present and 
supportive of the client’s discoveries, a shared “dyadic state of con­
sciousness” can emerge during a highly emotional “now mom ent” 
(Stem, 1998; Tronick, 1998). There is something about the shared 
moments of discovery -  their emotional resonance perhaps — that play 
a role amplifying the innovation into real developmental change.
Microsoft CEO Bill Gates was quoted widely in newspapers on July 
30, 2004 saying, “One thing about innovation is we've got to make sure 
it maps to what the consumer sees as value.” Gates suggests that for a 
technological innovation to lead to a successful new product or service 
(a level 3 change), it must be first ratified by a substantial number of 
consumers. N ot only that, the manufacturer must be in touch with 
the consumers in the process of creating the innovation, to make sure 
that they are making an investment in the product’s development that is 
likely to pay off. With the most successful business innovations, there is a 
constant dialogue between maker and consumer and a strong intention 
to maximize the chances for ratification. This ratification sets off a 
process by which the original innovation, a small seed, can become
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amplified into a widely used and distributed product, a product that may 
significantly alter the consum er’s relationship with the world.
Finally, our case history approach also revealed that each dyad de­
velops their own style of communication reflecting different ways in 
which their history was retained or discarded as they changed. Dyads 
developed unique communicative routines within frames and individual 
infant’s styles of relating to objects and to m other appeared to form 
out of the initial conditions of the communication system during the 
earliest observations. We conclude that the historical dynamics of rela­
tionship change must be part of a complete understanding of individual 
development.
Our findings suggest a new way of looking at all forms of interpersonal 
relationships -  including friendships, romantic partnerships, therapeutic 
alliances, employer-employee relationships, and even larger groups, or­
ganizations, and society as a whole. If the laws of change we found in our 
sample generalize in some form to other relationships, we may be able to 
understand how change for the better may be facilitated and change for 
the worse may be a%,oided. In the Epilogue, we shall speculate on the 
implications of our work for all forms of hum an change in relationships. 
Parenting, training, education, and clinical applications can all benefit 
by a clearer understanding of when and how to create innovations that 
most effectively lead to desired developmental change. In situations in 
which people’s development has been restricted or compromised in 
relationships -  as in abusive and coercive relationships, or in insecure 
attachments -  our model may suggest ways of introducing innovations 
and creating bridges across emotionally threatening territory in thera­
peutic relationships. The goal is to understand processes that may lead 
to a reconstruction of more developmentally healthy ways of relating.
Outline o f this book
In Chapter 1, we introduce our relational perspective and review theor­
etical perspectives on early development that have inspired our work. 
These theoretical perspectives all focus on the person-in-relation. They 
include Piaget’s theory, Vygotskian sociocultural theory, Gibsonian eco­
logical theory, and dynamic systems theory. Chapter 2 is a review of the 
literature on the developmental transition, around the age of four 
months, of infants’ relationship to objects, both alone and in the social 
context. Chapter 3 presents a relational-historical theoretical perspective 
that integrates these other theoretical influences and applies them to the 
study of relationship change. Chapter 4 presents an outline of a rela­
tional-historical research methodology: frame analysis, quantitative and
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qualitative analysis, and the case study method. Chapter 5 gives the 
research propositions that guide the methods and analysis. In Chapter 
6 we cover methodological details of the present study, such as the 
subjects, procedures, coding, and data analysis. Chapters 7 - 1 1  present 
the results, and Chapter 12 provides a summary and interpretation of 
findings. T he Epilogue brings us back to taking a broader perspective on 
the process of change in relationships, where we explore applications to 
other forms of relationship change in clinical, educational, and cultural 
processes.
1 R e la tio n sh ip s  as d ev e lo p in g  system s: 
th e o re tic a l fo u n d a tio n s
In this introductory chapter, we begin with an overview of our basic 
theoretical orientation toward relationships. Relationships are not simply 
a thing to be studied and understood. Rather, we view all of nature as a 
system of interconnected relationships. In that sense, everything is part 
of a nexus of relationships: there are no “individuals” but only persons- 
in-relation. Second, we review a group of developmental theories that 
have their foundation in diis relational world-view.
Overview o f the theoretical orientation
A  relational perspective on development
The foundational principle of this book is that people develop in relation 
to others and to their environments. A full grasp of a relational pers­
pective m ust involve each person in their local relationships (family, 
work, school) and in relation to the sociocultural system. Here, however, 
we take a relatively simple relationship system -  mother and child -  and 
use it as a model system for revealing some of the details of how all 
relationships change over time. In the Epilogue, we shall elaborate ways 
in which our findings can be generalized to other relationships but 
the reader is encouraged to explore their own implications throughout 
the book.
People are not “themselves” in isolation but become fully realized 
as whole human beings in relation to others (Beebe & Lachman, 2002; 
Collins, 1999; Fogel, 1993; Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1987; Lyra & 
Winegar, 1997; Overton, 2002; Sander, 1977; Stem , 1985; Tronick, 
1998). The categories that people use to describe and to operate on 
the objective environment have developed from a shared understanding, 
derived from live interpersonal communication, of the world (Beebe & 
Lachman, 2002; Lyra, 1998; Rommetveit, 1990; Trevarthen & Aitken, 
2001; Tronick, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978).
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Like individuals, relationships develop over time as observed by 
changes in patterns o f communication, emotional closeness, feelings 
of mutual intimacy, and attachment (Bahktin, 1988; Baxter, 1994; 
Bowlby, 1969; Duck, 1991; Fogel, 1993; Gottm an, Murray, Swanson, 
Tyson, & Swanson, 2002; Lyra & Winegar, 1997; Markova, 1990; 
Rawlins, 1983; Werner, Altman, Brown, & Ginat, 1993). In this work, 
we study developmental change and stability in thirteen mother-infant 
dyads videotaped weekly during free play between two and seven 
months of age. We docum ent the changes in the regularly recurring 
patterns of communication between weeks for each dyad.
Regularly recurring patterns in a communication system are called 
consensual frames (see Chapter 3). Consensual frames (or simply, 
frames) are recurring segments of socially shared co-action that have a 
coherent theme, that take place in a specific location (in space or time) 
and that involve particular forms of mutual co-orientation between 
participants (Bateson, 1955; Fogel, 1993; Goffinan, 1974; Kendon, 
1985). The coherent themes involve shared meanings or goals, implicit 
or explicit, about the nature and course of the communication. 
Examples of frames are greetings, topics of conversation, conflicts, or 
in the case of this study, different forms of mother-infant social play. The 
period between two and seven months was chosen because mother- 
infant relationships undergo a well known developmental transition 
from frames for face-to-face social play without objects to frames for 
object-directed social play.
The choice of frames as the unit of analysis in this study is guided 
by theory and research from a dynamic systems perspective. In this view, 
complex systems, such as the mother-infant dyad, develop regular and 
repeating patterns of co-action called attractors that are qualitatively 
different from each other (Kelso, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Human 
locomotion, for example, has a number of attractors such as crawling, 
walking, and running. In communication research, frames provide an 
essential macroscopic level of analysis in which patterns of change with 
development can become as apparent to observers and participants 
alike. This macroscopic level differs from the microscopic level of 
specific actions such as smiling, reaching, or demonstrating a toy.
In this study, we show how the four frames we have identified for 
this communication system have systematic developmental trajec­
tories in their durations and systematic changes in their qualitative 
meaning for the participants. Frames allow developmental change to 
become visible and understandable in a way that a sole focus on mi­
croscopic changes in realtime behavior cannot provide. Although micro­
scopic changes may be difficult to observe or their significance may
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be easily ignored, through the use of frames, we are able demonstrate 
how less observable microscopic changes may lead to major qualitative 
developmental changes in the relationship.
A n  historical approach to relationship development
O ur research is focused on the process of change, and specifically on 
how the relationship changes from earlier to later frames. An historical 
approach to development suggests that change grows systematically out 
of earlier periods. How does the history of the system affect its future? 
This can only be answered by observing the same relationship at rela­
tively frequent intervals over a period of time in which that relationship 
is likely to change developmentally.
According to a dynamic systems perspective, change in the macro­
scopic regularities, the attractors of the system, is most likely to occur 
when the ordinary variability within the attractor exceeds the ability of 
that attractor to maintain its dynamic stability. When ice is heated, 
molecules move faster and eventually break the bonds of the ice crystals, 
which eventually shift the system into a different attractor: water. In this 
kind of physical system, change is related to the increase of a simple 
physical parameter of temperature. It is possible to capture the history 
of the system by its prior temperature.
Communication, on the other hand, is an informational system. Com­
munication is not bound solely by the physical laws of motion but rather 
by relationships in which actions may signify a complex set of mean­
ings and/or other actions (Fogel, 1993; Pattee, 1997). In other words, 
communicative actions change peoples’ behavior not by a physical 
force but because those actions have a certain “meaning” that is shared 
by the participants. The sequence of bases in the DNA molecule works 
in the same manner: each type of sequence communicates to the cell to 
manufacture a different type of protein. The genetic code is therefore 
informational.
Communication systems cannot ever be reduced entirely to quanti­
tative variables and the methods for studying communication as a dy­
namic system will necessarily diverge from those used for the study of 
primarily physical systems. The history of a communication system is 
captured by the frames for shared meanings of the co-participants. 
Change in the system must be understood in terms of informational 
differences: that which, from the perspective of the participants, appears 
novel in comparison to prior shared meanings.
An historically grounded developmental psychology focused on 
change processes in social or cognitive meaning systems was the hallmark
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o f  the work of Piaget, Vygotsky, and other mid-century developmen- 
talists. The historical approach has been applied more recently using 
microgenetic research designs (Bruner, 1983; Fogel, 1990; G ranott & 
Parziale, 2002; Lavelli, Pantoja, Hsu, Messinger, & Fogel, 2005; 
O verton , 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 1991) such as narratives of life 
histories (cf. Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992) and frequent observations 
o f  within-case developmental change from a dynamic systems perspec­
tive (Fogel, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1993; van Geert, 1998). Infant- 
m other dyads are excellent subjects for microgenetic life history research 
because they undergo major developmental changes in a relatively 
short period of time: over months instead of years.
Although Piaget, Vygotsky, and others set a research agenda for the 
study of historical change processes, only a small num ber of developmen- 
talists have followed in their footsteps (Lemer, Dowling, & Chaudhuri, 
2005; Overton, 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 1991). Historical research is 
difficult to do, requires detailed observations on individuals, in-depth 
qualitative analysis to understand changes in meaning and a relatively 
small number of individuals (as exemplified by Piaget’s case studies on 
his own three children). Developmental psychologists have tended to 
focus on normative and experimental research because it is believed 
to be more generalizable to the population, more understandable to 
funding agencies and journal reviewers, and because the readily avail­
able research toolkit is the most complete for these research designs.
Recent advances, however, have given developmental scientists new 
tools for the study of change processes. This study relies on an eclectic 
combination of some of these new tools. There now exist a new class o f 
statistical models (called hierarchical linear models or multilevel models; 
cf., Prosser, Rasbash, & Goldstein, 1991) that allow researchers to exam­
ine developmental trajectories, made by tracking a key measure over 
frequent observations, for the group as a whole and for each individual. 
There have also been recent improvements in qualitative research 
methods, giving new credibility and rigor to the use of narrative descrip­
tions of observed behavior and life history narratives (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000; Polkinghome, 1995). Finally, there have been theoretical ad­
vances that provide new models for the study of change process, most 
notably, the dynamic systems perspective. According to that pers­
pective, when the unit of analysis is the within-case developing system, 
the process of developmental change is best revealed when research is 
focused on key developmental transition periods (Chen & Siegler, 2000; 
Fogel, 1990; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991). By conducting intensive obser­
vations before, during, and after a key developmental transition, we can 
observe the dynamics of change. These new quantitative and qualitative
methods fit perfectly with the focus of dynamic systems on change over 
time in the qualitative macroscopic attractors.
Transitions in relationship development
From a dynamic systems perspective, development is conceptualized as 
the re-organization of prior attractors and the emergence of new ones as 
the system moves through a developmental transition (Fogel & Thelen, 
1987; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Our study is focused on the developmen­
tal transition around the fourth month of the infant’s life, as the mother- 
infant relationship shifts from stable face-to-face play frames to stable 
object-directed play frames.
From the perspective of individual (rather than relational) develop­
ment, the existence of a developmental shift around the age of four 
months is well documented (see Chapter 2 for a review of the literature). 
Piaget’s (1952; 1954) detailed case studies of the process of sensorimo­
tor development in his own three infants are the most detailed descrip­
tions of developmental process during this period. Piaget, however, 
focused on infants in relation to objects but did not explicitly include 
the role of the adult. We will follow Piaget’s example in the use of 
detailed case study methods, but our cases will be mother-infant dyads 
with and without objects. We present data from thirteen mother-infant 
dyads observed for twelve consecutive weeks during this particular 
developmental transition. We also complement our quantitative des­
criptions of frequencies and durations of frames and other behavior 
patterns using multilevel models with narrative descriptions. These data 
are intended to docum ent that each of the frames makes systematic 
changes in quantity and quality across the four-month developmental 
transition.
Since we have weekly videorecordings of each dyad beginning at one 
month of age, we took the onset of visually guided reaching as a marker 
for the developmental transition. T he emergence of reaching changes 
the character of the mother-infant relationship. It shifts the focus from 
the m other's demonstration of visual and auditory properties of objects 
to the infant’s tactile exploration of objects with the m other’s assistance. 
We focused our coding and analysis on the six weeks before and six 
weeks after the acquisition of visually guided reaching. In this way, we 
were able to focus on the same developmental transition in our subjects, 
independent of age. In our study, we track the historical changes in 
infant’s and m other’s actions in parallel with changes in the relational 
frames. Also following Piaget’s example, we write narrative descriptions 
of communicative actions using a qualitative analysis on four of the
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thirteen dyads, and we examine these in conjunction with the detailed 
coding and quantitative sequential analysis of the data from the whole 
sample. In Chapters 4 and 6, we discuss further our methods of analysis.
Sum m ary
This study is based on a relational-historical perspective of devel­
opment. The unit of analysis for the relationship is the communi­
cation frame. We use a case study method in which we can understand 
the details of the history of each developing relationship. We des­
cribe changes in relationship frames as each dyad passes through the 
developmental transition from face-to-face to mother-infant-object 
communication.
Theoretical foundations
The relational-historical research that guides our work has been influ­
enced by a num ber of related theoretical perspectives. We review the­
ories that focus on one or both of the following criteria: (a) a relational 
mutuality between individual and environment, and (b) a focus on 
historical change within the developing system. Specifically, we review 
the theory of Piaget, sociocultural theory inspired by Vygotsky, the 
ecological psychology of J. J. and E. Gibson, and dynamic systems theory 
as applied to developmental psychology. It is not our intention to explain 
these theories in depth. For more details, the reader can consult a 
number of very thorough reviews (Bruner, 1982; Fogel, 1993; Kaye, 
1982; Melkman, 1988; Michaels & Carello, 1981; Rogoff, 1990; Thelen 
& Smith, 1994; Wertsch, 1991; Wood, 1980).
Piaget's theory
Schemes and development. For Piaget (1952; 1954), schemes are 
conceptualized as patterns of action or thought that emerge out of the 
relationship between person and environment. As patterns of action 
vis-a-vis the environment, schemes are relational procedures. They are 
the way in which the person engages with and comes to “know” the 
environment. Mere associations between stimulus and response cannot 
explain the relational aspect of schemes because there is no motive for 
changing the schemes and thus developing. Piaget’s motive for change 
was disequilibration. The individual perceives that something is missing 
or incomplete in the relationship. T he person orients his or her activity 
toward that facet of the relationship that is more likely to realize their
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intention. In many cases, people actually discover new intentions 
through the dynamics of exploring their relationship with the environ­
ment. Piaget describes examples such as when a baby who is kicking 
the side of her crib notices that the kicks make the mobile move, and 
then she continues to kick with the newly found intention of moving 
the mobile.
Schemes develop by a process of assimilation and accommodation. 
In the process of adapting to disequilibrating perturbations from the 
environment, people assimilate novelty into historical schemes and ac­
commodate those schemes to aspects of the environment that are them­
selves perceived as meaningful to the individual because of some prior 
historical relationship. As schemes become more articulated and dif­
ferentiated in relation to the environment, they become at the same time 
more linked to other schemes — both new and historical schemes — 
through integration of schemes within the individual. In addition, the 
person becomes more completely linked with the environment through 
the increasingly complex set of relational schemes. Thus, changes in any 
single scheme alter the systemic organization of schemes in the whole 
system. New sub-stages of development -  new ways of relating to the 
environment -  arise through system-wide re-organization processes 
(Piaget, 1954).
Implications. Unlike the other theorists reviewed here, Piaget sought 
to explain the developmental transition that occurs around four months. 
According to Piaget’s model, during the first two sub-stages of the 
sensorimotor period (reflexes and primary circular reactions) infants 
are focused primarily on constructing knowledge about their own 
bodies. T he onset of the third sub-stage (secondary circular reactions 
and coordination between schemes) occurs around four months. In this 
sub-stage, infants show the first signs of deliberately affecting objects 
in the environment. This transition involves the integration of schemes 
for acting on the self with schemes for acting on the environment.
T he first actions in relation to any particular object, according to 
Piaget, are discovered by chance, that is, they are accidentally assimi­
lated to an available scheme. By repeating “interesting” discoveries (a 
discovery that is only partially assimilated), the infant adapts action to 
the characteristics of the object by accommodation of the scheme in 
order to better assimilate the discovery. Although Piaget conceptualized 
schemes as relational-historical structures, he only reported on the 
infant’s relationships with objects, failing to consider the role o f social 
partners. Piaget did not explicitly recognize that the guidance of the 
caregiver created opportunities for the infant to make “chance” discov­
eries. Although the writing of his case examples makes clear that the
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parents played an important role in the infant’s development, Piaget 
did not integrate any of this data into his constructivist theory.
Nevertheless, Piaget’s theory has important implications for our study 
because it suggests that the acquisition of new schemes is best under­
stood as a relational-historical process. There is also an analogy between 
schemes and frames. Piaget frequently pointed out that schemes were 
dynamic and open to change. This is similar to our view of frames as 
stable attractors in a dynamic relationship system. In this study we will 
use Piaget’s case study approach, his focus on historical analysis, and 
we will analyze functional actions on objects and people indicative of 
developing sensorimotor schemes. This will be done before and after 
the developmental transition to the third sensorimotor substage. We 
also borrow Piaget’s use of qualitative research methods, relying in part 
on detailed narrative descriptions of patterns of mother-infant com­
munication in order to capture the sequential complexity of these pro­
cesses. Finally, Piaget’s observation that developmental change often 
involves the re-organization in the relationship between all the schemes 
in the system will inform our observations of developmental changes 
in frames.
Sociocultural theory
T he social relational-historical aspects of development have been elab­
orated in more detail in sociocultural theory. Although research based 
on sociocultural theory has focused primarily on children after they 
acquire language, its principles can be extended to the problems 
addressed in this study.
Microgenesis and culture. T he sociocultural perspective recog­
nizes mutuality in the individual-environment relationship, and it is 
explicit in including the social environment as part of the relational 
system in which the child develops. In this perspective, development 
arises in the process of co-construction that occurs through social trans­
actions (Bruner, 1983; Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Fogel, 1993; Kaye, 
1982; Mead, 1934; Rogoff, 1990; Valsiner, 1987; Vygotsky, 1978).
According to Vygotsky, development of the individual takes place 
within a microgenetic context of m om ent-to-m om ent transactions with 
people and cultural objects. Development is a “complex dialectical 
process, characterized by periodicity, unevenness in the development 
of different functions, metamorphosis or qualitative transformation of 
one form to another, intertwining internal and external factors, and 
adaptive processes” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 21). These microgenetic devel­
opments are set within the context of sociocultural history. In other
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words, the specific microgenesis depends upon how and when the indi­
vidual enters into the stream of cultural history that includes tools and 
technologies, values and practices (Cole, 1985; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 
1987; Wertsch, 1985).
Although cultural factors in development are thought to emerge 
primarily once language is acquired (Vygotsky, 1978), there are many 
features of the sociocultural process that structure the microgenesis of 
hum an infancy. The immaturity of hum an infants requires not just an 
adult caregiver but a cultural system of infant care practices. Patterns 
of behavior, beliefs, and infant care tools make up this cultural system. 
Infants partake in this cultural system, not through the mediation of 
symbols and language, but through dynamic features of perception 
and action such as gazing, co-acting, imitating, and nonverbal dialogues 
(Bril, 1986; Fogel, 1993; Kaye, 1982; Reed, 1991; Schaffer, 1984; 
Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Trevarthen, 1978; Zukow-Goldring, 
1997).
The sociocultural perspective shows how children actively organize 
their own development with the guidance and support of skilled partners 
and in the context of the cultural technologies and practices available 
to them. In the “zone of proximal development” (ZPD), where children 
are just beginning to develop skilled action, they can perform activities 
in the company of an adult that could not be accomplished alone 
(Valsiner, 1997; Vygotsky, 1978). Children can be viewed as apprentices 
because they develop through shared problem solving with the skilled 
partner, participation in everyday activities, supportive structuring, and 
later transfer of responsibility (Kaye, 1982; Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; 
Schaffer, 1984). Other models of guidance based on Vygotsky’s concept 
of the zone of proximal development include Bruner’s (1983) notion of 
scaffolding and the one-step-ahead model articulated by Heckhausen
(1987).
Sociocultural theory suggests that developmental change processes 
involve the “transformation of participation” (Rogoff, 1997). The ZPD 
includes the idea that children can move from old ways of acting into 
new ways of acting via the guidance from social partners. Rogoff (1990) 
describes this as building bridges from the known to the new, in which 
the caregiver links new knowledge to what the child already knows 
(1990). One of the functions of the ZPD, then, is the “construction of 
novel forms in anticipation of possible future conditions of organism- 
environment interchanges” (Valsiner, 1997, p. 29). This requires some 
idea, often on the part of the more mature guide, of the possible future 
and the ways in which bridges to that future may be co-constructed. This 
process of linking past to future within changing patterns of activity
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is called bridging (Camaioni, Aureli, Bellagamba, & Fogel, 2003; 
Granott, Fischer, & Parziale, 2002).
Sociocultural approaches thus emphasize that adult-infant inter­
action is a jointly constructed process, even after the child gains mastery 
over a domain. This view is clearly articulated in Rogoff’s (1990) notion 
of appropriation. As contrasted with internalization of skilled action 
derived from earlier social experiences (Vygotsky, 1978), tlie child ap­
propriates forms of participation in larger spheres of sociocultural acti­
vity. Action becomes skilled not so much in the sense of being internal 
or independent but in the sense of increasing the range of participation 
as an equal partner in social systems. Appropriation, therefore, places 
the developing individual within the sociocultural process of communi­
cation at all times and preserves the mutuality between individual and 
sociocultural environment.
Tools. The sociocultural perspective, in addition to highlighting the 
role of adults in children’s development, focuses on the structuring 
features of tools and technologies. According to the Vygotskian view, 
tools are considered to be cultural devices that facilitate, mediate, and 
amplify the individual’s transactions with the social and physical en­
vironment. Tools and technologies extend the body into the environment 
in order to use or discover something about the environment (Dewey, 
1896; Heft, 1989; Ihde, 1979; Smitsman, 1997; Vygotsky, 1978). A tool 
such as the writing system facilitates the continuing acquisition of higher 
order cognitive skills such as classification (Goody, 1989; Scribner & 
Cole, 1981). Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the forms of action and 
thought observed to occur in humans from the sociocultural systems in 
which the individual is embedded: both are part of a single system.
Cultural tools can also become objects of acting and knowing. If tools 
are simply facilitators, mediators, and amplifiers, they should be theor­
etically “transparent” to the user. This, however, is not always the 
case (Ihde, 1979). A metal rod that is too heavy, for example, will still 
allow one to poke at a fire, but the weight of the rod imposes itself on the 
tactile experience. In such a case, the tool becomes a meaningful part of 
the experience of its use. When focusing on the cultural tool as an object 
of exploration, people (acting alone or jointly) can discover structure 
within the cultural system and use these discoveries to generate creative 
uses of the cultural system (Lock, 1980; Locke, 1993).
Infant toys are cultural rather than natural objects (Fogel, 1993; 
1996). In cultures in which infants are exposed to objects in the social 
context before and during the acquisition of reaching and object ma­
nipulation skills -  and this includes the majority of cultures (Bakeman, 
Adamson, Konner, & Barr, 1990; Sorenson, 1979) -  those objects are
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designed to afford actions the infant is capable of performing or learning 
to perform in the company of an adult. A rattle, for example, is readily 
graspable once an adult transports it to the infant’s hand and has easily 
perceived consequences of action (the sound it makes). Toys (indeed all 
cultural objects) have remained in the culture over time because their 
uses can be readily perceived (Fogel, 1993). Archeological and historical 
evidence suggests that rattles, balls, and other squeezable, shakable, and 
manipulable toy objects -  such as the objects used in the study pre­
sented here -  have been part of the culture of childrearing at least since 
the earliest agricultural settlements over 10,000 years ago (Greenleaf,
1978).
Im p lica tio n s . We follow the basic assumption of sociocultural theory 
that individual development occurs entirely within communicative and 
cultural contexts and that “individual” action is inherently sociocultural 
in its origins. In the case of the pre-reaching infant’s relationship to 
objects there is a ZPD in which adults structure object related activity. 
Before the acquisition of visually guided reaching, infants in most cul­
tures are exposed to objects (toys, maternal jewelry, body parts, clothing, 
or hair, etc.) that are brought within reach and sight by adults. After the 
acquisition of reaching and/or grasping, the infant has more opportunity 
to further explore objects with parental assistance. According to 
Vygotsky (1978, p. 30), “the path from object to child and from child 
to object passes through another person. This complex hum an structure 
is the product of a developmental process deeply rooted in the links 
between individual and social history.”
Sociocultural theory also directs our attention to the dual level analy­
sis of microgenesis and macrogenesis. We assume that macrodevelop- 
mental change (over months and years) is explainable as arising from 
the process of microdevelopmental (realtime) interactions. We study the 
role of culture in the early mother-infant relationship as we examine the 
structuring activity of the parent and the structuring effects of infant 
toys in the communication system. In other words, we supplied infants 
and mothers with commercially available (and therefore culturally stand­
ardized) toy objects and we observed their effects on both infant and 
m other joint action. In the next section we describe the implications of 
Gibsonian ecological theory as an additional approach to understanding 
how objects structure the perception and action of the users.
Ecological theory
A ffordances. In the perspective of James and Eleanor Gibson, know­
ledge about objects is directly available through systems of perception
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and action that have evolved phylogenetically to allow mutuality be­
tween individual and environment (E. Gibson, 1988; J. Gibson, 1966,
1 9 7 9 ). Ecological psychology, based on J. J. and E. G ibson’s thinking, 
suggests that individual and environment are “mutually constraining 
components of a single system” (Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1982, p. 46). 
One cannot describe the individual without reference to the environ­
ment and one cannot describe the environment without reference to 
the individual. A central concept that reflects the idea of mutuality is 
aflbrdance. AfFordances are functional relationships between the in­
dividual and the environment, what the environment “offers the 
animal” (J. Gibson, 1979, p. 127), and are directly perceived through 
action.
Starting from the Gibsonian ecological perspective, some have pro­
posed that developmental change is the result of the “education of 
attention” leading to the perception of more differentiated affordances. 
Through individual exploratory activity, one can educate their own 
attention to perceive dynamically stable modes of action with respect 
to the environment (Kugler et al., 1982; Newell & M cDonald, 1993; 
Thelen, 1989). The education of attention can also be social, as in 
directing a child’s attention to an affordance or creating joint affor­
dances. Adults typically structure the physical environment in such 
a way as to highlight affordances in relation to the infant’s level of 
ability and motivation (Lockman, 2003; Lockman & McHale, 1989; 
Michaels & Carello, 1981; Reed, 1982; Ruff, 1984; Smitsman, 1997; 
Zukow-Goldring, 1997).
W hether attention is educated via the infant’s own exploratory activity 
or guided by others, there is an important distinction between Gibson 
and Piaget. At no time, from the Gibsonian point of view, is the infant 
left to chance discovery: the infant’s actions are always taken in rela­
tion to the perceived affordances of the environment even if such affor­
dances are rudimentary. Exploration, however, leads to an increasingly 
sophisticated knowledge of the world as perception and action serve 
to regulate and guide each other (E. Gibson & Spelke, 1983; Kugler, 
Kelso, & Turvey, 1982).
Thus, although both Piaget and the Gibsons are relational thinkers, 
the form of the relationship is somewhat different. Piaget’s constructiv­
ism suggests that children can make the environment conform to their 
own activity, as in fantasy play in which the object’s properties are only 
loosely coupled with the child’s construal and activity. T he Gibsonian 
perspective adopts a “natural realism” in which the existing affordances 
of the world “out there” can be known through active engagement, 
exploration, and guidance (Fogel, 1997). The two views are compatible,
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however, with respect to the role of the active child who engages in a 
dynamically changing relationship with the world.
Research on sensorimotor development from a Gibsonian perspective 
has shown, for example, that different objects afford different kinds of 
action. Affordances become more differentiated with age. N ot only do 
actions become more coordinated through experience with objects but 
there is an increasing intersensory integration (e.g., vision with touch) 
with respect to objects (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1991; Butterworth, 
1981; Fogel, 1993; 1997; E. Gibson, 1988; Hofsten & Ronnqvist, 1988; 
Lockman & McHale, 1989; Reed, 1982; Rochat, 1989; Ruff, 1984; 
Smitsman, 1997; Zukow-Goldring, 1997). Some of these studies are 
reviewed in Chapter 2.
Implications. The Gibsonian perspective is applied to our work in 
conceptualizing and coding of infant’s and m other’s actions on objects. 
Our categories for infant and maternal action are defined by the affor­
dances given by the toy objects that we used in the study. Thus, our 
categories of both infant and maternal actions on objects include reach, 
grasp, manipulate, shake, and squeeze. We also chose toy objects that 
provided variability in their affordances and in the perceptual modality 
needed to generate that affordance. Objects used vary in shape, texture, 
graspability, softness, and whether or not they make a sound. We also 
coded gaze toward objects and various forms of tactile modalities 
(manual and oral) in order to examine intersensory integration.
The social education of attention is a concept that overlaps with 
sociocultural theory. From  both theories we can expect to see mothers 
guiding infants toward object-specific affordances. In addition, however, 
the affordances of the cultural object may constrain action for both 
members of the dyad. Thus, what appears to be a tutorial by the parent 
may be the emergent result of mutually creative co-action between 
partners of different skill levels, facilitated by a cultural tool that motiv­
ates and constrains the social co-activity (Fogel, 1993; 1997). It is likely 
that both infant and parent action are guided by the cultural ecology, 
the tools and practices of which create opportunities for communication 
and relationship development.
D ynam ic systems perspective
Self-organization. T he dynamic systems perspective is another ap­
proach to conceptualizing the mutuality of individual and environment. 
A key concept is that organized patterns of behavior -  such as schemes or 
frames -  emerge from the mutual relationship between constituents 
coming from the individual and the environment and are not the result
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of a prior (maturational) or a teleological (end-state) program or plan 
within the individual. The dynamic systems perspective does not make 
a distinction between constituents from the individual and from the 
environment. Both sets of constituents are part of the same system and 
enter into the formation of attractor patterns (Fogel & Thelen, 1987; 
Thelen & Fogel, 1989; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 1987; Thelen & Smith, 
1994).
S elf-o rg an iza tio n  occurs as constituents act together to constrain 
the multiple possible actions of other constituents so that the complex 
system coheres into stable relational patterns called a ttra c to rs  (Kugler, 
Kelso, & Turvey, 1982; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Action schemes, 
emotions, cognitions of the individual, and frames of the social system 
can be conceptualized as attractors (Fogel, 1993; Lewis, 1995; Thelen, 
Kelso, Sc Fogel, 1987). Some attractors that emerge through self­
organization are d ynam ica lly  stable. This means that although they 
are dynamically changing processes that occur in time, they preserve 
dieir integrity across a wide variety of conditions. The concept of dy­
namic stability replaces the concept of structure, habit, and association 
in traditional theories of psychology (Capra, 1996; Fogel, 1993; Thelen 
& Smith, 1994).
The concept of attractors reveals that dynamic systems models focus 
on the behavior of the collective, the system as a whole, in relation to the 
individual components of that system. In the collective organization, 
attractors are qualitatively different modes of system organization 
(Kelso, 2000). This means that there is no simple numerical index that 
would distinguish one attractor from another. Take the example of the 
states of H 20  (ice, water, and steam). Although these states change 
with temperature, which can be expressed as a number, the collective 
behavior of the states differs in qualities. Ice has crystals and water does 
not. Water and steam have dynamic flow patterns and stable ice 
does not. Thus, the differences between the states of water can most 
fully be expressed as qualitative differences.
In dynamic systems approaches based on quantifying the physical 
parameters of systems, attractors are expressed mathematically as a well 
in a field of potential energy, i.e., once in the well, it takes energy for 
the system to leave the attractor. A stable attractor is represented as a 
relatively deep well o f potential energy. Other attractors are less stable 
(less deep) and the system will spend relatively less time in them (Thelen 
& Smith, 1994).
These quantitative models fit the behavior of most dynamic systems. 
Once in a potential energy well, the collective is likely to stay there for 
some period of time, giving the appearance that the collective attractors
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are stable. A system near the top of a well is relatively unstable and 
quickly returns to the same or another well. As temperature is increased 
from —100° C to 0° C, for example, H 20  remains solid. Between 
0° C and 100° C, it remains liquid, and above 100° C it becomes a 
gas. Within only a few degrees around 0° C and 100° C we can observe 
H 20  in a transitional state, as it makes a shift from one stable attractor to 
another. So, for most temperatures, H 20  is in one or another qualitatively 
different stable attractor.
W hen a dynamic system is in a stable attractor, it is functioning in an 
energetically conservative mode where it maintains its equilibrium. In 
order to change from one attractor to another, for the system to re­
organize, energy is required to move the system far from its equilibrium 
state. As water is heated, for example, there is an increasing disorganiza­
tion of the water’s movements, a relatively chaotic state. At some point, 
however, boiling water begins to form rolling patterns that more effi­
ciently move the heat energy from the bottom of the vessel to the surface 
of the water where it can convert to steam. The water “finds” a new 
pattern of self-organization that most effectively “dissipates” the heat 
energy. In this kind of “dissipative” system, new patterns of order -  
attractors -  emerge as systems seek to conserve energy in far-from 
equilibrium states (Capra, 1996).
The inter-individual relationships that account for the collective be­
havior in dynamic systems, however, cannot always be modeled quanti­
tatively in terms of physical parameters. In some cases, individual 
components communicate via in fo rm a tio n  rather than by physical 
forces. An alternative perspective on dynamic systems theory focuses 
on information rather than the physical features of the system (Pattee, 
1987). Information, not amount, distinguishes interpersonal communi­
cation systems from physical systems. Facial expressions, for example, 
alter the behavior of social partners and change the organization of action 
in a communication frame. A tiny facial movement requiring little energy 
can induce large expenditures of movement energy in the social partner, 
as when a smile elicits a partner’s heart rate changes and movements 
of approach. Intracellular communication via the different sequences 
of bases in DNA, and neural communication via different neurotrans­
mitters are other examples of informational dynamic systems (Oyama, 
1985; Pattee, 1987).
This information approach has an emphasis on the mutuality be­
tween constituents which change as they enter into relational processes, 
altering their identities in order to establish the ground for a relation­
ship. In digital and electronic systems, information is usually thought of 
as discrete bits having a concrete value (either “on” or “off” in a binary
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system typical of most computers). A dynamic system, however, requires 
a completely different conceptualization of information that is not fixed 
in advance and not “transm itted.” Rather, information created in the 
process of communication is always dynamically related to the current 
state of the entire developing system (Oyama, 1985).
In a social system, for example, long-term social partners develop 
unique patterns of speech and expression that are informative to each 
other but not shared outside the relationship. T he terms of endearment 
for a romantic couple (sweetie, lover, honey, etc.) along with non-verbal 
gestures, to take a more concrete example, have evolved historically from 
the couples’ affectionate encounters. These words and gestures signify 
or “mean” that entire history of affection. They are informative in the 
sense that they often re-create particular feelings and may engender 
further states of intimacy. They are also dynamically alive each time they 
are used. “Honey” can be spoken with love, anger, or impatience and 
those affective tonalities arise spontaneously (are created dynamically) in 
the act of communicating. “Honey,” in other words, does not always 
mean the same thing.
Because constituents change in relation to each other, each constitu­
ent reflects in some way the collective attractors of the system; each 
constituent implies all the others. This property of dynamics systems has 
been called implicate order (Bohm, 1980). Constituents of an at­
tractor share an implicate relationship. All the attractors in the same 
system also imply each other, giving the system as a whole a coherent 
identity.
The type of actions observed in a greeting frame (whether people bow, 
shake hands, hug, or kiss, and the relative warmth of those patterns), 
for example, is related to the intimacy of the dyad during conversational 
and other types of frames. Although each of the frames retains its own 
coherence and identity, in some way, they are related to each other and 
share in a meta-collective identity as different aspects of the same rela­
tionship. T he dynamic system of the hum an body is similar. Skills 
manifested in the skeletomotor system are reflected in the neurological 
system and vice-versa. T he histories of the neural and m otor systems 
imply each other as well. T he effects of traumas as well as training are 
distributed across all the systems of the body, each of which implies the 
other. Traum as at the periphery affect the brain, circulation, the immune 
system and these effects can be both short-term and long-term (Schore, 
2003).
Transitions in realtime. One unique feature of the dynamic systems 
perspective is its focus on transitions, the way in which the system 
changes over time. How do systems move from one attractor to another
in realtime? In the case of interpersonal relationships, how does the 
system move from one frame to another, such as between a face-to-face 
play frame and a social-object play frame? In some dynamic systems 
accounts (Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1982; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 
1987), transitions from one to another attractor occur because random 
variability creates a few highly energetic occasions during which the 
system can jump out of the equilibrium of its attractor well and move 
quickly into a nearby well.
Stabilization and transitional processes have been conceptualized in 
terms of feedback between constituents. Negative feedback, or regula­
tion, works to maintain changes of constituents within the boundaries of 
the attractor. It fosters a stable coupling of constituents (Edelman, 1987; 
Lewis, 1995; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Transitions, on the other hand, have been conceptualized as positive 
feedback which occurs when a change in constituents is amplified in a 
way diat takes the system beyond the boundaries of the attractor and far 
from equilibrium (Lewis, 1995; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).
In the re-organization of the cell from DNA, to take an example of 
an information system, the activation of particular combinations of 
amino acids in the environment of the cell can cause the cell to make a 
transition from one type to another type, as when normal skin cells 
develop wound tissue due to an injury (Pattee, 1987). This example 
of skin cells reveals that in complex informational systems, not all of 
the constituents are active at all times. There is always some addition 
and deletion of constituents that occurs within the same attractor 
configuration depending upon local conditions.
This is also true during the early stages of prenatal development. Very 
early in development, all the cells are similar and all contain the same 
set of genes. Ultimately, however, these cells will form into different 
organs and structures of the organism. This is in part due to the location 
of the cell. Different physical and chemical environments will activate 
a different set of genes which in turn will activate different proteins to 
be manufactured. During face-to-face play, for example, mothers and 
infants shift gaze toward and away from the partner, they alternate 
between smiling and non-smiling, they may or may not vocalize, and 
yet the face-to-face attractor can remain stable across these variations. 
A face-to-face frame can occur when participants mutually gaze, or 
mutually smile, or mutually vocalize, or by many different combin­
ations of these behaviors depending upon the history of communication 
between participants.
Under certain conditions, however, some additions and deletions 
will evoke a transition to another attractor. If the behavior of a system
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within an attractor is dynamically changing in realtime, then a realtime 
transition between attractors can be thought of as a change in the pattern 
of change. In informational terms, systems make transitions when the 
change in the pattern of change is noticeable to the constituents. Infor­
mation is generated, then, when a system notices a difference, what has 
been described as “a difference that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1979; 
Oyama, 1985). A change can only make a difference from the perspec­
tive of the participants’ history of communication within the system, 
otherwise, how would the system notice the difference?
Developmental information . . . has a developmental history . . . Information is 
a difference that makes a difference, and what it ‘does’ or what it means is 
thus dependent on what is already in place and what alternatives are being  
distinguished (Oyama, 1985, p. 3).
Thus, when the infant ceases to smile (a change in one constituent of 
face-to-face play) but continues to gaze at the mother, the mother may 
not interpret the change in infant smiling as a difference that makes 
a difference, that is, as a difference that would precipitate a realtime 
transition to another frame. She may continue her efforts to repeat the 
infant's smile in order to maintain the frame. Now assume that the infant 
stops smiling, and instead of continuing to look at the mother, the 
infant also turns away to look at a toy. This combination of actions that 
have been added to the system may or may not be perceived as a 
meaningful difference by the participants. If it is a difference that makes 
a difference, the m other can follow the infant’s gaze to an object, retrieve 
the object, and the system will transition into a social object play frame. 
In either case, the grounds for a transition are based on what the 
participants notice in relation to their history of communication.
Developmental change. Given the inherent stability of attractors, 
how does the system change from one attractor to another? In realtime, 
some informational difference that makes a difference pushes the system 
out of one attractor and into another. In development, however, the 
entire system of attractors (schemes, frames) -  the collective behavior 
of the system - changes. It is not necessarily a m atter of changing from 
one to another available attractor but it is the creation of new attractor 
patterns and the loss of others, and in addition, the emergence of a new 
implicate order. Development is the destabilization, re-organization, and 
re-stabilization of the collective system of historical attractors (Fogel, 
1993; Lewis, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994).
Because dynamic systems are historical, however, available attractors 
serve as resources for the system to create opportunities for change. The 
same idea is contained in Piaget’s thinking: that some chance discovery
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may eventually change the system of schemes via assimilation and ac­
commodation. It is also likely that historical transitional processes in 
realtime are implicated in the process of change. The system must be 
able to make transitions in realtime from historically stable attractors 
into newly forming attractors whose stability is not fully established 
(Fogel et al., 1992; Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Pantoja, 1996).
The problem of the emergence of new forms is at the very core of 
developmental inquiry. How does something new emerge from some­
thing that has been there in relatively stable form? Dynamic systems 
theory recognizes the emergence of novelty as a fundamental feature of 
organized systems. Non-biological systems, such as chemical reactions 
and the physical universe, develop over time because novel variability 
provokes the system into new stable attractors that are neither planned 
nor pre-programmed (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Weimer, 1987). 
A growing num ber of thinkers have embraced the idea that spontaneous 
emergence is at the heart of behavioral and psychological change. This 
concept has also been called discovery, creativity, construction of nov­
elty, and transformation (Carvalho & Pedrosa, 1998; Eckerman, 1993; 
Fogel, 1993; Gottlieb, 1992; Lewis, 1995; Lock, 1980, 2000; Lyra, 
1998; M ohoney & Moes, 1997; Nelson, 1997; Overton, 2002; 
Schore, 2003; Stern, 1998; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Tronick, 1998; 
Valsiner, 1997; 2001).
T he idea of emergence rejects the notion that all development is 
planned or programmed and embraces the idea that chance and indeter­
minism are fundamental to all dynamic systems. It is because of these 
chance events that systems produce novelty. Novelty, generated sui 
generis within the system is thought to be the seed of developmental 
change. This concept alone distinguishes dynamic systems perspectives 
from other theories of developmental change. The indeterminacy in 
dynamic systems can produce historically unique trajectories that partly 
account for the formation of individual differences (Fogel, 1990; Fogel
& Branco, 1997; Fogel, Lyra, & Valsiner, 1997; van Geert, 1997; 
Kellert, 1993; Thelen, 1990; Valsiner, 1997). Informational approaches 
to dynamic systems perspectives can help us understand why historical 
changes (in people, groups, or societies) can never exactly repeat, why 
every social system is unique, and why these differences are contingent 
on the dynamics of the communication process and not always amenable 
to prediction (Fogel, Lyra, & Valsiner, 1997; Gould, 1977).
If we take a historical perspective on change so that we can observe 
particular systems at frequent intervals before, during, and after key 
developmental transitions, we are more likely to find and describe the 
emergent processes that bring about developmental change (Fogel,
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1990; Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1982; Lewis, 1995; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984; Thelen & Smith, 1994). This is because the often 
fortuitous contingent series of events that give developmental change 
its unique character are most likely to be observed during transitional 
periods (Fogel, 1993) and we are more likely to observe such events 
with frequent observ ations on the same individuals.
Implications. With respect to early infant development, the dynamic 
systems approach has been applied to motor development (Beek, 
Hopkins, & Molenaar, 1993; Savelsbergh & Kamp, 1993; Thelen & 
Ulrich, 1991), to cognitive development (van Geert, 1994; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994; Valsiner, 1997; 2001), to communicative and emotional 
development (Camras, 1991; Carvalho & Pedrosa, 1998; Eckerman, 
1993; Fogel, 1992; Fogel, 1993; Fogel & Thelen, 1987; Fogel et al., 
1992; Lewis, 1997; Lyra, 1998), and to relationship development 
(Fogel, 1993; Gottm an et al., 2002). With regard to the application of 
dynamic systems theory to the study of change in communication 
systems, physical-quantitative models have had limited success in captur­
ing the element of information inherent in interpersonal communication. 
This is because dynamic information cannot be quantified: it is based 
on the perception o f differences at a particular point in time in the context 
of the entire system. In this work, we use qualitative-information models 
alongside quantitative models.
For the study presented here, we conceptualize the system as the 
mother-infant relationship in the context of toy objects. We make the 
assumption that communication frames are attractors in a relational 
landscape. We describe the co-occurring processes within frames and 
in realtime transitions between frames.
In dynamic systems theory, the unit of analysis is the particular system 
observed repeatedly over time. In our case, each dyadic relationship 
becomes the focus of a case study and we present both narrative des­
cription on four dyads and statistical analyses of the developmental 
trajectories of the durations of each of the frames on all thirteen dyads. 
Within-dyad trajectories of frames across twelve weekly observations 
are also compared with trajectories of specific infant and maternal action 
schemes. The focus of the quantitative analysis, therefore, is not differ­
ences between frames at a single point in time but the shape of the 
developmental trajectory -  flow of the system through time -  of the set 
of frames vis-a-vis the developmental trajectories of “individual” actions 
on objects (Fogel, 1990; Thelen, 1990).
According to a dynamic systems perspective, the process of system 
change is best revealed through the study of transitions. Here we exam­
ine transitions between frames in both realtime and developmental time.
For the latter, we explore the changes in the mother-infant relationship 
in six weekly observations o f mother-infant-object play before, and six 
weekly observations after, the acquisition o f visually guided reaching. 
During periods o f developmental transition, particular events may make 
more o f a difference in the shaping of the future o f the system than if the 
same events occurred during stable (non-transitional) periods.
Sum m ary
Piaget’s theory focuses on the historically grounded emergence o f  
schemes within the individual infant. Sociocultural theory specifies some 
of the means by which social processes are coordinated with the devel­
opment of individual action. Sociocultural theory sets development 
within the broader context o f the cultural system. Gibsonian ecological 
psychology focuses on the functional affordances of actions on objects 
and the social and individual education o f attention related to those 
affordances. The dynamic systems perspective is a general model of 
change and stability in complex systems. Combined with insights from 
the other theories, a dynamic systems perspective offers a model to study 
change over time in the organization o f the system. Following a review 
of the literature in the next chapter on the developmental transition 
that occurs around four months, we combine these ideas with respect 
to the articulation o f relational-historical research on developmental 
change in Chapters 3 and 4.
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2 M o th e r - in fa n t  re la tio n s h ip  d e v e lo p m e n t  
in  th e  firs t  six m o n th s : f ro m  fa c e -to -fa c e  p la y  
to  o b je c t p la y
In this study, we apply a relational-historical perspective to the study o f  
the developmental transition from face-to-face to mother-infant-object 
play in early infancy. In this chapter, we review the literature on that 
transition. In the first part o f this chapter we review the literature on 
infant’s early relationships to objects. We focus on the changes in infant 
object manipulation skills before, during, and after the acquisition o f  
visually directed reaching: the “individual” hallmark of this developmen­
tal transition. In the second part of this chapter, we review research on the 
development o f social play with and without objects during this deve­
lopmental period. In the final part o f  this chapter, we review evidence 
related to the development o f individual differences in object-directed 
skills that emerge following this developmental transition.
The individual perspective
A great deal o f research has been done using normative and experimen­
tal approaches and focusing on infants’ acquisition of perception and 
action with objects. This section is a brief review o f the findings from this 
perspective -  on perception o f objects, reaching, manual and oral explor­
ation -  especially as they regard changes during the period between two 
and seven months.
Perception o f objects
A developmental transition occurs between three and four months, when 
infants begin to perceive moving objects as whole units (Baillargeon, 
1987; Kellman & Spelke, 1983; von Hofsten & Spelke, 1985). If part of  
an object is blocked from the infants’ view, for example, they recognize it 
when it is no longer obscured. Around the same age, infants acquire 
sophisticated visual expectancies for object shape and for events in a
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visual series, such as by scanning dashed-line patterns as if  they were 
solid lines (Bom stein, Krinsky, & Berasich, 1986; Burnham, 1987; 
Caron, Caron, & Carlson, 1979; Fagan, 1979; Gibson, Owsley, Walker, 
& M egaw-Nyce, 1979; Haith, Hazan, & Goodman, 1988; Kellman, 
1984; M cKenzie, Tootell, & Day, 1980; VanGiffen & Haith, 1984). By- 
six months, and perhaps a few months earlier, infants can recognize 
objects by touch as well as vision (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1991; Lockman 
& M cHale, 1989; Palmer, 1989; Ruff, 1984; Steele & Pederson, 1977; 
Steri & Pecheux, 1986). Cross-modal transfer between touch by hand 
and vision begins between four and six months o f  age (Gottfried, Rose, 
& Bridger, 1977; Harris, 1972; Rose & Ruff, 1987; Ruff, 1984; Ruff & 
Kohler, 1978; Streri & Pecheux, 1986; Streri & Spelke, 1989). By the 
age o f four months, therefore, infants can detect objects as whole entities 
in both visual and tactile modalities. Beginning at four months and 
increasing thereafter infants have the ability to coordinate visual and 
tactile sensations for the purposes o f  object exploration.
Reaching
Visually directed reaching is a smooth approach to a nearby seen object 
with the fingers either opening or closing prior to contact with the object. 
Other terms used for this skilled action are goal directed reaching, 
visually guided reaching, and prehension. In this report, we will simply 
use the term reaching to refer to the developm ental^ more mature form 
of action.
Reaching emerges between three and five months (Piaget, 1952; 
Bushnell, 1985; von Hofsten, 1984; White, Castle, & Held, 1964). Once 
a mature reach develops, infants no longer need to focus all their atten­
tion on the object and can coordinate their reaching with other motor 
and perceptual actions such as looking at mother or other objects 
(Bushnell, 1982; Butterworth, 1981; Field, 1976; Mathew & Cook, 
1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994; von Hofsten, 1984).
M anual exploration
Generally, looking at objects appears to be a mode o f exploration at all 
ages. Under two months, infants explore objects using palmer grasping 
with one hand, and rotating. Once grasped, objects are either brought to 
the mouth, brought to midline, or dropped (Kamiol, 1989; Piaget, 1952; 
Piaget, 1954; Rochat, Blass, & Hoffmeyer, 1988; White et al., 1964). By 
the third month, infants begin to use finger movements to explore their 
own hands and clothing. Between two and four months, infants translate
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Table 2.1. Developmental sequence o f object manipulative actions in the first 
half year
Age (Months) Action
0 - 2 Mouth, grasp, rotate
2 - 4 Translate, shake, squeeze, two-hand grasp
4 - 7 Hand-to-hand transfer, two-hand coordination, hand-mouth coordination
objects (move them from one place to another), shake or vibrate them, 
and hold objects with two hands, often for the purpose o f bringing them  
to the mouth, and more often for holding larger compared to smaller 
objects (Karniol, 1989; Piaget, 1954; Rochat, 1989).
At four months we see the beginning o f coordinated activity between 
the hands, and between hand and mouth. Infants transfer objects be­
tween hands, they coordinate both hands by holding the object with one 
hand and manipulating it with the other, and they alternate between 
manual and oral exploration (Bushnell, 1985; Hatwell, 1987; Karniol, 
1989; Piaget, 1954; Rochat, 1989; White et al., 1964). Also, after five 
months, infants develop rhythmical actions applied to objects, including 
rotating, squeezing, and shaking (Thelen, 1981). These findings are 
summarized in Table 2.1.
These actions of manual exploration are sometimes, but not always, 
accompanied by looking in a pattern called examining behavior (Belksy, 
Goode, & M ost, 1980; Fenson, Kagan, Kearsley, & Zelazo, 1976; Ruff, 
1986). Examining behavior, the coordination between vision and ma­
nipulation, has been shown to occur when six-month-old infants are 
introduced to novel objects that differ from previously habituated objects 
in either shape or texture, but not in color (Steele & Pederson, 1977). 
When object manipulative actions are used, they appear to be adapted to 
the affordances o f objects. Grasping, fingering, and rhythmical move­
ments are believed to be particularly useful for perceiving texture, shape, 
hardness, and temperature before the age o f six months (Bushnell & 
Boudreau, 1991).
Oral exploration
Object exploration with the mouth is present from the newborn period. 
Infants can systematically detect shape differences using the mouth only 
and in some cases can transfer that knowledge o f shape to other modalities 
(Butterworth, 1986; Rochat, 1989). Between three and five months, 
infant reaching appears to be partially regulated by the motivation to
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make oral contact. If infants’ hands are held down at their sides, they will 
lean toward an object and attempt to make oral contact (Rochat & 
Bullinger, 1994). At six months, mouthing continues to be used system­
atically in object manipulation. Infants tend to mouth objects that are 
smooth rather than fuzzy (Fenson et al., 1976; Palmer, 1989; Ruff, 1984).
Sum m ary
In summary, around the age o f four months, infants are becoming 
skilled in reaching, grasping, and manipulation both by manual and 
oral exploration o f objects. According to our review o f the literature in 
both perception and exploration of objects, it seems clear that there is a 
developmental transition around four months in which the infant’s 
relationship with objects makes a relatively rapid change. What ac­
counts for this developmental transition? Investigators using an indi­
vidual perspective have assumed that it is spurred by a neurological 
shift that occurs as infants gain experience with perception and action 
on objects. This must certainly be the case but it may not be the 
whole story. As we discussed earlier, objects are typically presented to 
infants by adults. Based on sociocultural theory, one might suspect 
that object-directed skills are formed in the relational ecology o f  
adult-infant communication.
The relational perspective
Before infants can successfully reach for objects on their own, objects are 
brought to them by their parents and/or other adults and they play a role 
in presenting objects in ways that make it easy for infants to reach for 
them and to appreciate their affordances. When presenting a rattle to a 
pre-reaching infant, for example, a mother may hold it by the handle and 
shake it to highlight the noise. She may also place the handle in the 
infant’s hand and shake the infant’s hand to make the rattle sound.
In the real world, infants rarely encounter objects alone. Objects are 
always embedded into a sociocultural system. Before infants can acquire 
objects by reaching, objects are either encountered accidentally or when 
adults bring objects to infants. Accidental encounters in the first few 
months are almost always because adults place objects in the vicinity of 
infants. During this period, infants have limited locomotor ability (see 
Table 2.2) For most infants, reaching is acquired before independent 
sitting and around the time when infants’ only locomotor and postural 
achievement is rolling over.
For human infants early in the first year, therefore, the primary means 
to acquire experience with objects is with the assistance o f another
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Table 2.2. M otor chronology during the first eight months o f  life from Denver 
Developmental Screening Test (D D S T ) (Frankenburg, Dodd, Fandal, 







Rolls over 2.8 (2.3-3.8) 2.5 (2.0-7.0)
Grasps rattle/cube 3.3 (2.5-3.9) 3.7 (2.0-7.0)
Reach, one hand 3.6 (2.9-.5) 5.5 (4.0-8.0)
Sits w/out support 5.5 (4.8-6.5) 5.2 (4.0-8.0)
Pulls self to sit 6.1 (7.6-9.3) 8.2 (6.0-11.0)
Finger thumb grasp 7.1 (8.3-9.1) 7.0 (5.0-9.0)
person. After the acquisition o f reaching, infants can act more independ­
ently upon objects. The achievement, however, does not necessarily 
make object skill less social as it is acquired through social exchanges 
with another person (often times the primary caregiver) and carries its 
social history within it (Silva, 1998).
The research literature suggests that there is a developmental transition 
in the mother-infant relationship around four months that corresponds 
with the developmental transition in perception and action, reviewed 
above. Object-directed social play develops from a historically prior 
period o f face-to-face social play that begins in the early months o f life 
and involves mutual facial and gaze orientation, smiling, and positive 
vocalizations. Between the ages of three and six months, object- 
directed social play takes up an increasing share o f the dyad’s free 
play time, eventually supplanting but not totally eliminating face-to- 
face play (Cohn & Tronick, 1987; Kaye & Fogel, 1980; Keller & 
Gauda, 1987; Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira, 1994; Super & Harkness, 
1982). In this report, we explore the developmental process by which 
the mother-infant relationship changes from a predominant focus on 
face-to-face play into a predominant focus on object-directed social 
play. At the same time, we track the infant’s relationship with objects 
in the context of mother-infant social play.
This developmental transition involves a change from a primarily 
dyadic form o f communication to a triadic form. We know that infants 
under six months are capable o f sustaining triadic communication. 
Research on mother-father-infant triadic communication shows that 
young infants are remarkably sensitive to patterns o f communication 
between mother and father, and to whether or not they are included in 
that communication (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999). By
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comparison, mother-infant-object communication can be expected to 
be within the cognitive abilities of the young infant.
In the remainder o f this chapter, we shall review literature suggesting 
that from the early months o f life, the development o f perception and 
action is part o f a sociocultural process. We suggest that infant develop­
mental change and individual differences are best understood from a 
relational-historical perspective. Objects are not things in themselves for 
infants in the first half year. Objects are enlivened by their embeddedness 
in social activities and become part o f the infant’s world through their 
incorporation into the historical process o f the development o f the 
parent-infant relationship.
A  sociocultural perspective on infant object-directed skill
development
A number o f investigators have interpreted the infant’s growing skills 
with objects in a way that is consistent with sociocultural theory. In this 
view, infant developmental transitions arise as a joint enterprise of 
mutual regulation within the infant-caregiver relationship. Adamson 
(1995), Fogel (1993), Kaye (1982), Mahler (Mahler, Pine, & 
Bergman, 1975), Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira (1994), Sander (1962), 
Schaffer (1984), Stern (1985), and Trevarthen (1978) have observed 
changes in the mother-infant dyad across the developmental transition 
in which the infant’s attention shifts from a focus on affective ex­
changes with the mother to an inclusion o f the object into the direct 
social play with the mother.
For Sander (1962), for example, the dyad begins with a period of  
“initial regulation” and around four months moves to a period o f “recip­
rocal exchange,” in which new coordinations with objects emerge in 
caretaking and in play. The first four months for Mahler (Mahler 
et al., 1975) are “symbiotic,” where, by virtue o f  shared rhythms and 
emotional sharing, the infant does not distinguish self from mother. 
This is followed by a period o f “differentiation” in which the baby begins 
to look away from the mother, engages in relatively independent activ­
ities with objects while checking back visually to ensure or enlist the 
mother’s support.
Trevarthen describes the period between two and three months as 
primary intersubjectivity. During this period, mother and infant create 
highly coordinated dialogues in which “it is difficult to perceive any 
content in the communication except the exchange itself” (Trevarthen, 
1977, p. 241). During this period, infants have their first experience o f  
sharing emotions and intentions with another person. Beginning in the
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fourth month, Trevarthen noted the shift o f the relationship as “in­
fants making persistent refusals o f  their mothers’ approaches by with­
drawing gaze from them and looking pointedly elsewhere” (p. 254). This 
change marks the onset o f the period o f that Trevarthen called the 
“epoch o f gam es,” in which the infant’s achievements in the area of ob­
ject perception and manipulation are integrated with the mother-infant 
communication.
A similar view is advanced by Schaffer (1984) as the change from 
face-to-face interactions in which “the topic arises from the dyad itse lf’ 
(p. 79), to topic sharing interactions in which mother and infant must 
learn to coordinate their action with respect to topics outside the dyad. 
This change begins around four months with the onset o f infant object 
manipulation skills. Infants and mothers learn to coordinate their gazing 
to an external object and infants begin to follow the movements o f  the 
mother’s hands and her gaze direction. This is similar to Kaye (1982), 
who describes this change as a shift from “shared rhythms” (mutual 
cycling of attention and expression) to “shared intentions” (the mother 
serves as supporter o f the infant’s acuons and provides guidance when 
needed).
Both Schaffer and Trevarthen view this developmental transition as 
the beginnings o f a phase of development that will culminate, at the end 
of the first year, with the onset o f  infant referential pointing and lin­
guistic naming. The period from four until seven months, when objects 
are first brought into the mother-infant relationship, is thought to be the 
origin o f these later developments in social coordination and mutual 
understanding.
Research on injant-object interaction in the social context
Object play in both human and non-human infants is typically embed­
ded in a social ecology. Object play in kittens, for example, is more likely 
to occur in the presence o f other kittens. If one kitten has an object, this 
inhibits the play o f other kittens. While this seems to be non-social, the 
bystander kitten will watch until the kitten possessing the object leaves it, 
after which the bystander will approach the object. Objects, therefore, 
are mediators o f  social regulation. A similar pattern occurs when kittens 
possess prey or watch their mothers hunt. T he style o f mother’s hunting 
appears to influence the kitten’s willingness to approach prey. It seems as 
if “cats like to be watched playing” and also “like to be seen with prey” 
(Egan, 1976, p. 164).
In Japanese Macaques, infants and juveniles in a free ranging group 
account for about 95 percent o f object contacts even though they make
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up only 30 percent o f the population o f the group. Everyday handling of 
objects consists of brief grasping and mouthing. When another monkey 
is present, the object becomes a focus for chasing and wrestling. Typic­
ally, only one animal has the object at a time (M enzel, 1976). Similar 
patterns have been observed in chimpanzees (Goodall, 1971; Menzel, 
Davenport, & Rogers, 1976; de Waal, 1989). As in kittens, objects offer 
opportunities for unique forms o f social relationship.
IKung (African hunter-gatherer society) infants observed in natural 
situations begin independent play with objects at the same time as 
infants elsewhere, between three and four months. Unlike adults in 
industrial societies, IKung parents do not engage in object play with 
their infants until they are eight months old, and then only for offering 
and receiving objects from infants. When a four-month-old infant picks 
up an object, adults typically ccase their social play with infants. This 
inhibitory effect need not be considered non-social. Since the infant’s 
play is always in close proximity to adults, adults often watch the infant 
playing with the objects and will return smiles and vocalizations the 
infant makes during object play (Bakeman et al., 1990).
The importance o f the social context for object skill has been well- 
documented in Western samples for infants older than six months. In a 
longitudinal study o f social play in the United States, monthly videotapes 
were made o f mother-infant-object interacuons between eight and six­
teen months. Results show that objects are frequently introduced within 
social games, and that during games infants show a higher level o f play 
than when tested alone with the objects (Hodapp, Goldfield, & Boyatzis, 
1984). Zukow-Goldring (1997) finds that mothers of six-month-olds 
highlight object affordances for infants by moving objects in ways that 
amplify the child’s perception of those affordances. Lockman and 
M cHale (1989) examined the social context o f object play in six-, 
eight-, and ten-month-old infants. They found that both infants’ and 
mothers’ activity was adjusted to the affordances o f objects and that 
mothers often demonstrated object affordances before the infant ac­
quired them. A study o f six infant-mother dyads at seven, ten and 
thirteen months found that the uses o f  objects develop systematically 
within frames for sociocultural communication (Moro, 1999). The  
amount of maternal scaffolding o f object play at nine months predicted 
Bayley M DI and vocabulary at fifteen months in a sample o f thirty infant- 
mother dyads (Stevens, Blake, Vitale, & M acDonald, 1998). In general, 
for infants older than six months, exploring objects with an adult guide 
enhances infant attention and manipulation o f objects (Lockman, 2003).
There are only a small number o f studies o f objects in the social 
context for infants under six months. Research on a sample o f thirty
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dyads observed at five and eight months (Danis & Saules, 1994; Findji, 
Pecheux, & Ruel, 1993; Pecheux, Findji, & Ruel, 1992; Ruel, 2000) 
shows that mother and infant actions on objects depend upon the rela­
tional context in which the action takes place. There are different pat­
terns o f co-action that correspond to what we have called frames. In a 
one-hour laboratory observation, four frames were discovered in this 
sample: infant care, a social frame, an object play frame, and infant 
alone. By five months, the object play frame takes up about one-third 
of the time while the social play frame takes only half o f that 
percentage. Focused attention on objects is considerably higher when 
the infants and mothers are engaged in joint object play than when the 
infants are alone or in social play. There are large individual differences 
in the duration o f each frame and in the quality o f attention within the 
frames. Finally, mothers are more successful at achieving joint attention 
using familiar, compared to unfamiliar objects. These results support 
the idea that frames reveal relational-historical processes that regulate 
joint transactions with familiar objects. Different patterns o f joint atten­
tion to objects at five months have been found for play compared to 
teaching frames (M cCollum & Stayton, 1988).
In an experimental study, pre-reaching infants were given a series of 
play sessions at home wearing “sticky mittens” that allowed toys to be 
picked up even though the infants were not yet able to reach and grasp. 
Compared to a group o f infants who did not receive this enrichment 
program, laboratory tests revealed that the enriched infants showed more 
object engagement and more sophisticated object exploration strategies 
(Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002). This study reveals that a speci­
fic form o f sociocultural mediation, providing pre-reaching infants with 
a tool for grasping objects, enhanced their skills with objects. Although 
our study uses naturalistic observations, individual differences in object 
skill may be related to inter-dyad differences in the scaffolding provided 
in the context o f the social communication about objects.
Trevarthen (1978) found that objects were incorporated into mother- 
infant games as early as four months. The single dyad that Trevarthen 
studied had differentiated frames o f  purely social face-to-face play and o f  
socially-mediated object play as well as smooth transitions between 
them. Lyra and Rossetti-Ferreira (1994) found that during the third 
month o f life, objects are introduced into an already available frame o f  
mother-infant face-to-face play. During infant and mother mutual gaze 
and sharing o f positive expressions, mothers attempt a frame transition 
by introducing objects according to the infant’s level o f interest in the 
objects. The objects, when first introduced, are highlighted as “figures” 
against the relational “background” of the face-to-face play frame. It is
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on the basis o f this shared history of face-to-face play that the object 
becom es incorporated into the expanding spiral o f the relationship dia­
logue. The “shared nature o f the dyadic exchanges, which exhibit a de­
gree o f mutual knowledge which mediates each partner’s actions, can be 
understood as an historical process o f transformation-construction” 
(Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira, 1994, p. xx).
In this perspective, realtime transitions to object play frames can only 
be introduced to the extent that they are meaningful with respect to 
historical frames. Mothers do this by following the infant’s gaze as it 
shifts from her face to objects, by introducing objects to the infant in 
the space between mother and infant, and by “highlighting” objects for 
the infant through movement and sound. Once object play becomes the 
main focus o f the mother-infant interaction, beginning around the age 
of four months, the face-to-face frame does not disappear but rather 
becom es “abbreviated.” While playing with objects, for example, the 
infant may pause briefly to look at mother and smile, as if to include her 
in the play by referring to an abbreviated form o f the earlier face-to-face 
frame (Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira, 1994; Lyra & Winegar, 1997). These 
findings make it clear that the developmental emergence o f social object 
play is part o f a complex relational-historical process.
These findings also suggest that individual differences in the infant’s 
perception and action on objects are related to interdyad differences in 
the process o f  communication about objects. The historically established 
communication frames at any point in time exert a powerful influence on 
the subsequent developmental transformations within the dyadic rela­
tionship system (Fogel, 1993; Hsu & Fogel, 2003). Through a historical 
transformation process, each dyad develops a different set o f frames in 
which objects are explored (Fogel & Lyra, 1997). Thus, we can expect to 
find individual differences in the amount o f time spent in different types 
of frames, in the types o f  activity within each frame, in the patterning of 
transitions between frames, and in the developmental trajectories o f the 
frames over weeks. According to Gray, “the action of the mother and 
action o f the child, vis-a-vis each other and an object o f reference, 
change, and change in relationship to each other as the child develops” 
(Gray, 1978, p. 163).
Sum m ary
Research suggests that early exposure to objects occurs in the context of 
the early adult-infant relationship. Research in this area, however, is 
relatively less detailed than research on infants observed with objects 
without the company of the adult, especially in the first year o f life.
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Another way to examine the role o f  the social context for the develop­
ment o f infant object-directed skills is to study how variability in the 
social and non-social context contributes to individual differences in 
object-directed skills. In the next section, we review work on individual 
differences in object-directed perception and action.
The relational perspective on interdyad differences
Relatively little is known about individual differences in object explor­
ation before six months. Moderate stability has been found for individ­
ual differences in sustained attention to objects during the first year 
(Kagan et al., 1971; Ruff & Lawson, 1990; Ruff, Lawson, Parrinello, & 
Weissberg, 1990). In addition, measures o f sustained attention to objects 
during exploratory play in the first year are reasonable predictors o f  
preschool-age problem solving, language comprehension, level o f pre­
tend play, Bayley M DI, and Stanford-Binet IQ scores. This is the case 
even after variables such as maternal encouragement, SES, education, 
and infant medical risk are partialled out (Colom bo & Mitchell, 1990; 
Kopp & Vaughn, 1982; Rose, Feldman, Wallace, & McCarton, 1989; 
Ruff, 1990; Tamis-LcM onda & Bornstein, 1989).
On the other hand, more is known about the relationship o f styles o f  
parent-infant communication and the development o f individual differ­
ences in infant exploration o f objects. Caregiver styles o f interaction with 
infants under six months o f age, particularly with respect to strategies of  
directing infant attention and action toward objects, have been shown 
to predict individual differences in sustained attention to objects.
For infants with high durations o f  sustained attention, caregiver 
actions are related to the objects to which the infant is currently 
attending or to which the infant has most recently attended. Caregivers 
o f these infants are more likely to have structured strategies for guiding 
the infant’s object exploration such as pointing, demonstrating, instruct­
ing, and highlighting specific features o f objects. For infants with low 
durations o f sustained attention, caregivers more often interrupt the 
infant’s object engagement by presenting a different object, performing 
an unrelated action, inserting bids for face-to-face play into periods of 
infant object-focused activity, or they are less likely to provide structu­
red experiences o f guidance for the infant’s play with the objects. By the 
end o f the first year and into the second year, low sustained attenders 
have mothers who are more socially active during object play (Belsky, 
Goode, & M ost, 1980; Brighi, 1997; Gray, 1978; Landry & Chapieski, 
1989; Landry, Chapieski, & Schmidt, 1986; Landry, Garner, Swank, & 
Baldwin, 1996; Lawson, Parinello, & Ruff, 1992; Parinello & Ruff,
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1988; Pecheux, Findji, & Ruel, 1992; Rolfe-Zikman, 1987; Schaffer & 
Crook, 1980; Sigman & Beckwith, 1980; Tamis-LeM onda & Bornstein, 
1989).
These results suggest that there are at least two groups o f infants and 
mothers. In one group the focus is on sustained attention to objects and 
on maternal support o f object exploration. In the other group, the focus 
is on social play and infants show relatively less attention to objects with 
relatively less systematic exploration o f objects.
Some o f the studies that focus on the infant alone suggest that the 
differences in attention to objects are due to early endogenous atten- 
tional patterns o f  the infants. This dispositional explanation is based on 
the assumption that the individual infant is relatively stable over time 
and the mother fits into the pattern by providing stimulation that is 
either object or social focused. The alternative explanation is that the 
effect is due to the mother. In this view, maternal encouragement o f  
attention to objects and her scaffolding o f  infant attention and explor­
ation, lead to more “positive” outcomes such as sustained attention, 
object focus, and advanced language development. Some studies find 
statistical interactions between maternal and infant measures but do 
not offer evidence for how such interactions may contribute to develop­
mental change. These individualistic views favor one or the other 
member of the dyad, or the simple interaction between them, as being 
the cause of the later outcome.
We were only able to locate one study in the literature in which there 
was an attempt to understand the emergence o f individual differences 
in object attention from what we have called a relational-historical 
perspective. In this perspective, individual differences are seen as arising 
out o f the negotiations between mother and infant, a result o f the 
historical process o f change in the relationship and not a unidirectional 
or bi-directional linear product of one partner or the other. In a study 
o f spontaneous mother-infant-object interactions from three to five 
months of age, Gray (1978) used a qualitative approach to describe 
the relational features o f early object play in two mother-infant dyads. 
The following is a description of infants Kathryn and Ruth and their 
mothers at three months.
Kathryn’s mother first played socially with the baby, tickling her, talking to her, 
responding to her vocalizations and changes of facial expression, until the baby 
had reached a state of vigorous motor activity, happy smiling to the mother and 
long intonated vocalizations . . .  A t this point the mother introduced the rattle, 
markedly reducing her own vocalizations, including her responses to the baby’s mvn 
behavior. Such responses as did occur were always short, excited, whispered
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comments on the baby’s activity in respect of the rattle, rather than longer, fully 
intonated utterances she used earlier (p. 167, emphasis added).
[Ruth’s] mother moved the rattle almost constandy around the baby's visual 
field, continually shaking it. Ruth . . . made swiping movements at the rattle. . . 
the mother responded to these movements by briefly moving the rattle nearer to the 
striping hand, but the task of reaching for the rattle was not otherwise scaffolded for the 
baby. ■ ■ Consequently, unlike Kathryn, Ruth’s visual fixation frequently shifted 
away from the ratde to the mother. Indeed, this mother actively attempted to 
gain the baby’s attention away from the rattle to herself (p. 169, emphasis 
added).
Kathryn progressed over the next few months to a high level o f 
sustained attention to objects and Ruth became more socially oriented. 
What is clear from both of these examples is that the object is embed­
ded into the ongoing relationship system and is not something that is 
isolated as the focus o f activity independent o f that system. Also, indi­
vidual differences in object play are linked to the relational history o f  
object-related exchanges.
We have highlighted in italics (not in the original) the actions relevant 
to transitions between face-to-face and social object play. Kathryn’s 
mother was able to make smooth transitions between social and object 
play by co-regulating her activity with respect to changes in the infant’s 
gaze and movements. Each play frame was equally developed and 
equally important in the flow of the relationship. Ruth and her mother 
showed a preference for social play, and this became the dominant focus 
of their relationship. Transitions to object play frames were not well 
developed, tending to return the dyad to social play.
Sum m ary
The studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that the development of  
perception and action in the first half year of life may occur as a socio­
cultural and relational process. A number o f studies converge on the 
finding that individual differences in attention and object-related skills 
are related to patterns o f mother-infant communication. On the other 
hand, the evidence for this link is based on group correlation coefficients 
that explain only a limited portion o f the variance. With the exception of 
the study by Gray, there are no relational-historical studies. In the work 
presented here, we attempt to document the process o f developmental 
change across this developmental transition by making weekly observa­
tions o f mother-infant play within dyads. We examine the developmen­
tal coordination between changes in the dyad’s communication and 
changes in the infant’s actions on objects.
3 R e la t io n a l-h is to r ic a l re s earch  o n  
d e v e lo p m e n ta l ch an g e
In this chapter we intend to show how interpersonal relationships can be 
conceptualized as dynamically developing systems. We first define rela­
tionships as systems of organized and patterned flows o f communicative 
co-activity called frames. Next, we describe relational-historical research 
on developmental change, hypothesizing three main processes by which 
frames re-organize to make way for the emergence o f new frames. Finally, 
we discuss implications o f this approach for understanding the develop­
mental transition in the mother-infant relationship from face-to-face to 
mother-infant-object play.
Relationship fram es and transitions
A relationship is a developing communication system encompassing 
action, physiological processes, and the psychological meaning o f those 
processes to each individual. When we use the word relationship, there­
fore, we are talking about a living, developing system. Relationships have 
been observed to move through various phases o f development includ­
ing initial attraction, familiarization, intimacy, commitment, distancing, 
rejuvenation, and dissolution (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Bowlby, 1969; 
Gottman et al., 2002; Knapp, 1984; VanLear & Trujillo, 1986). Pan of 
the developmental process is the emergence o f new dynamically stable 
attractors (see Chapter 2) o f patterned communicative action called 
frames.
The ability to identify frames seems to be part o f the basic social 
perceptual abilities with which humans, and most social animals, are en­
dowed. Research on social perception suggests that observers are better 
at detecting the global aspects of communication than at identifying 
the precise beginnings and endings o f discrete action units (Ginsburg, 
1985; Newtson, 1993). Ethological research also shows that socially 
living animals have evolved highly sensitive social perceptual skills that 
allow them to detect and respond to global features o f social action. 
Thus, most social animals can recognize and react appropriately in
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particular kinds o f communication frames such as greeting and leave 
taking, threat and defense, attachment behavior, dominance, and coope­
ration (Ekman, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Tomkins, 1962; de Waal, 1989). 
Neuroscientific research suggests that the brain has evolved to develop 
and identify categories that have adaptive significance for the individual 
(Edelman, 1987; Thelen & Smith, 1994).
The concept o f frame as applied to communication systems was used 
first by Bateson (1955), to describe the ways in which individuals enter 
into mutual agreement regarding the meaning o f a pattern o f action. In 
research on rough-and-tumble play in juvenile animals and humans, 
Bateson described the formation o f a mutual agreement that “this is 
play,” rather than a fight. This agreement ensures the mutual consent to 
engage in a highly arousing communication that otherwise might be 
taken to have aggressive connotations. According to Goffman (1974), 
frames are context-specifying patterns within social systems.
In our definition, based on that of Kendon (1985), frames are seg­
ments o f  co-action that have a coherent theme, that take place within a 
particular location (in space or in time), and that involve particular 
forms o f mutual co-orientation between participants. The coherent 
themes involve shared meanings or goals, implicit or explicit, about the 
nature and course o f the communication. Although frames are recog­
nizable and observers can agree when asked to code frames in a com ­
munication system (see next chapter), frames are not readily defined. 
The problem is that there is a good deal o f variability within the global 
features o f the pattern. Attachment frames, for example, differ accord­
ing to the age o f  the child and the development o f the relationship. 
Young infants cry to express the need for parental proximity, year-old 
infants approach the parent, and older children can express attachment 
needs by asking for attention or talking about feelings (Sroufe, 1977). 
Most observers, nevertheless, can recognize all these as instances o f  
attachment.
There seems to be no consistent rule by which participants recognize a 
set o f actions as constituting one or another frame, nor is there a specific 
quantity o f  action that distinguishes one frame from another. Lacking 
a consistent objective criterion for a frame, one must conclude that an 
unobservable process o f  information creation intervenes (Bateson, 1955; 
Fogel, 1993). A particular set o f actions, perceptions, and physiological 
processes, occurring in a particular context must be interpreted by the 
participants as being informative to distinguish this or that frame. In 
other words, following Bateson’s contribution to information theory, 
some differences make a difference and others don’t. All we can do at 
this point is to focus our effort on recognizing patterns o f co-activity in
which “differences that make a difference” are documented in detailed 
ways by observers.
Because frames are informational, they “exist” in the relationship 
between the observer and the data o f social action; they are not concrete 
in the same way that a specific behavior is concrete. The more the 
observer is familiar with the data, in our case the more the observer 
repeatedly views the videotapes, the more likely it is that a distinction 
between different frames will become clear. We make the assumption 
that there is likely to be a convergence between our familiarity with the 
data over time and the research participants’ familiarity with their own 
partaking in their relationship. Although we may only be able to com ­
pletely answer this question by sitting down with the mothers and asking 
them to identify frames we have previously identified, we document their 
behavior in detail and invite the reader to agree or disagree with this 
assumption.
Nevertheless, communication researchers have noted that differences 
between frames can be conceptualized with respect to a small number of 
features. These features reflect the relational dynamics o f the communi­
cation system, dynamics that transcend particular behavioral manifest­
ations. Four features have consistently emerged in communication  
research (Fogel, 1993; Fogel & Branco, 1997; Kendon, 1985).
1. Frames reflect participant’s attention to particular aspects o f
action and context. While many different aspects o f  action could 
be informative for participants (such as clothing, respiration, intes­
tinal noises, odors, and gestures), a frame isolates only some of those 
aspects as potentially meaningful for a possible joint focus o f atten­
tion. In addition to action, frames may direct attention to thoughts, 
feelings, and symbolic referents. Attention may be shared (partners 
look at the same object) or non-shared (partners look at different 
objects) (Camaioni, Aureli, Bellagamba, & Fogel, 2003).
2. Frames are composed o f situ a ted  forms o f communication, which 
includes spatial location as well as genre o f  communication. The  
spatial location (inside or outside, a particular room), the distance 
between partners, and the presence o f others, all may contribute to 
which events in a frame are perceived as informative. Frames may be 
located within a particular cultural-historical discourse or genre o f  
communication. Examples o f this include baby talk, romantic rela­
tionship talk, professional talk, or particular styles of written commu­
nications. Finally, frames may have a location in the time sequence of 
everyday activities, such as frames for bedtime stories or prayers 
before meals.
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3 . Frames have particular co-orientations between participants. These  
include postural co-orientations, such as sitting, standing, lying 
down, and mutual body orientation. These co-orientations may take 
place in different locations, as specified in the previous point. C o­
orientations may be defined by the media o f  communication, as when 
people interact live, via telephone, or in writing such as letters or 
email. Co-orientation may also involve informative communicative 
stances such as formality or informality, aggressiveness or playfulness, 
emotional openness or closeness.
4 . Frames have a coherent shared topic or them e. This theme can be 
thought o f as what the com munication is about for the participants, 
their particular intentions for relating in this particular manner. 
Participants may com m unicate about objects and events in the 
world, about issues in their own relationship, or about psychological 
experiences.
5. Finally, frames have a particular configuration o f actions (attention, 
location, co-orientation, and theme) that are assembled into dynam ­
ically stable and recurring patterns o f communication.
These features have emerged through empirical investigation as rea­
sonably general constituents o f frames and other features may be found 
in future research. These features are useful to list here, however, be­
cause they help observers to distinguish one frame from another.
Returning to the attachment frame example, participant’s attention  
is directed to behavior that leads to the maintenance o f  proximity and 
orientation toward a particular other person. By definition (Bowlby, 
1969), attachment results in a co-orientation  o f mutual approach 
and physical proximity. Different types o f attachment involve different 
forms o f co-orientation such as mutual approach in secure attachment 
and withdrawal in avoidant attachment. Attachment frames may occur 
in particular relational locations such as in a bedroom, using genres of 
intimacy in talk and/or action. Finally, attachment has the them e of 
expressing and acting upon the need to be in the company o f the other 
person. We recognize the alternative manifestations o f attachment be­
cause they all share these particular four aspects. A frame, therefore, is 
distinguished by its meaning to the participants and by a configuration o f  
meaningfully connected and dynamically stable actions.
This example illustrates that the four features are not necessarily inde­
pendent from each other. Communication systems are highly redundant 
in the sense that similar information (in this case, maintaining proxim­
ity) can be detected and created through different means (Smith, 1977). 
When we focus our theory and research on systems in which parts are
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organically connected to the whole, we cannot expect to separate the 
whole into independent or orthogonal segments. This is the idea of 
implicate order (Bohm, 1980, see Chapter 2).
If attachment is one communication frame in a relationship, other 
frames can also be present in the same relationship. In principle, accor­
ding to a dynamic systems perspective, there are not an infinite number 
of frames in a relationship. Rather, relationships are characterized by a 
relatively small number of frames, those attractors which prove to be 
stable under the dynamics of self-organization. At any given point in 
time, mother-infant relationships have frames for attachment, feeding, 
comfort, greeting, leave taking, and various kinds o f play frames. Adult 
romantic relationships have similar frames and perhaps in addition 
frames for childrearing, family finances, vacation trips, and so on.
Each time a frame is reconstituted in a relationship, small variations in 
attention, location, co-orientation, and topic create a sense of ongoing 
novelty within sameness (Fogel, 1993; Stern, 1985). The variability of 
action within the same frame on repeated occasions suggests that frames 
have dynamic stability. This variability is potentially problematic from 
the perspective o f trying to specify the exact definition o f a frame and 
establishing reliability between observers. Variability within stability, 
however, is the hallmark of dynamic systems, indeed of all living systems 
(Capra, 1996; Darwin, 1859; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Without system­
atic variability there could be no development. Developm ent at all levels 
of biological systems, from species evolution to ontogeny, relies on 
variability that is intrinsic to the system as the source o f system change.
One advantage of dynamic systems theory is the idea that systems 
change because of this intrinsic variability and this variability cannot be 
ignored or subsumed into an “error” term. The study of development 
from a dynamic systems perspective, therefore, requires the researcher 
to accept and measure both the variability and the stability. The goal 
of a systems analysis is to balance observations of microscopic variabi­
lity alongside observations o f macroscopic stability and change. In the 
case of frames in a relationship, therefore, the coding o f frames is only 
one step in the process o f understanding how microscopic variability 
gets transformed into macroscopic stability at certain times and into 
macroscopic change (development) at other times.
We know that frames within relationships undergo developmental 
changes such as formation, transformation, and dissolution. N ew  frames 
form as partners expand their relationship into new areas. With contin­
ued communication, these newly formed frames become more detailed 
and encompass a wider range o f actions and meanings for the partici­
pants. Finally, frames may eventually disappear from the relationship
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system in the sense that they may no longer be observed in their com ­
plete original form. In our research, we consider the transition from face- 
to-face to object-directed social play as a problem in the analysis of 
developmental change in a relationship from a primary focus on one 
type o f frame to a primary focus on another type of frame.
The gradual decline o f one frame and the emergence of another is a 
common phenomenon in relationship systems. Styles o f dress or food 
preferences in a culture change over time after some period o f com m on  
use and acceptance. Standards that regulate interpersonal behavior in 
the work-place have changed to include increasing tolerance for diver­
sity, equal rights, and a decline o f language and manners that can be 
perceived as hostile or discriminatory. States o f war continually cycle 
with periods of peace.
Information and fram e dynamics
As discussed elsewhere by the first author (Fogel, 1993), traditional 
models o f communication are non-developmental and non-dynamic. 
They rely on a concept o f  predefined information that is transmitted 
between senders and receivers. In this discrete state model o f com m u­
nication, information is a state o f knowledge, emotion, or intention 
“contained in” the senders and receivers. Information is assumed to 
be transmitted faithfully from the sender and failures to communicate 
are ascribed to noise in transmission (Shannon, 1963; Smith, 1977; 
von Neumann, 1958). In this view, the total information in the system  
is fixed at the outset by the intentions of the participants. In the process 
of communicating, information is gradually lost due to noise. We could 
describe the mother-infant smile sequence in discrete state terms by 
suggesting that the mother attempts to communicate some o f her own 
emotional information (affection for the infant, or wanting to get the 
baby to smile), and the infant responds with his “own” experience o f joy 
at seeing the mother smile. If the infant does not smile in return, it 
means -  from the perspective o f the discrete state model -  that the infant 
did not get the mother’s message due to noise in the system. N oise is a 
form o f variability that is considered a source o f error in the discrete 
state model. The mother would then attempt a different way to get the 
baby to smile until the baby “got it.” Participants in this view are 
continually working to get their message across to the other person.
An alternative to the discrete state model is a continuous process 
model o f communication (Fogel, 1993). In this view, communication 
produces a net gain o f information in the system. Research on animal and 
human communication shows that some information is em ergent, that
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is, created as part o f the communication process. H inde’s (1985) analy­
sis o f animal conflict, for example, suggests that the initial postures and 
threat displays of rival animals do not exactly specify their internal states. 
The animals may not be entirely certain of their intentions at the time of 
the displays.
Such signals are thus to be seen as involving negotiation with the rival as well as 
an expression of internal state. The term negotiation does not necessarily imply 
manipulation but emphasizes the continuous interaction between the two indi­
viduals involved (Hinde, 1985, p. 111).
This observation suggests that under some conditions, information -  in 
the form of each individual’s experience of the partner -  is the result, and 
not the cause, o f communication. One may have a “possible intention” 
or a “tentative feeling” that can only be realized or transformed in the act 
of communication. A casual glance between two strangers may create an 
indeterminate heightening o f mutual interest. If that glance is repeated, 
and coupled with head and body co-orientation, a more defined sense of 
“interest” may emerge as informative about the possible future of the 
encounter. Further approach and eventual proximity continue to help 
define the emerging information for the participants in this potentially 
romantic encounter. The communication process, therefore, is a dyna­
mic system in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts, in which 
order emerges as constituents self-organize, and in which information 
is created in the process (Fogel, 1997).
In the mother-infant smile example, research shows that maternal 
smiles are most likely to be returned by the infant when the infant is 
already gazing at the mother and when they are engaged in a face-to-face 
play frame including joint attention, mutual postural orientation, phys­
ical contact, and en-face positioning (Fogel, Nelson-G oens, Hsu, & 
Shapiro, 2000; Kaye & Fogel, 1980; Messinger, Fogel, & Dickson, 
2001). The information for the infant of the mother’s smile, therefore, 
cannot be divorced from the historical context o f the relationship frame 
in which smiling occurs (Oyama, 1985). What is meaningful for the dyad 
in any particular moment, in other words, depends upon earlier consen­
sual co-activities. The infant smile means not just a received transmis­
sion of the mother’s prior act o f smiling, but the intersubjective 
experience o f co-participation in a historically established frame for po­
sitive emotional communication (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001; Tronick, 
2001). The historical frame is not transmitted nor is it bound by rigid 
sequencing rules. Each new instance of mutual smiling occurs in a 
slightly different pattern than previous instances. This variability creates 
information -  feelings of enjoyment, recognition, trust, and the
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motivation to continue communicating -  amplifying the flow o f positive 
emotion in the system.
A continuous process model follows a dynamic systems perspective. 
Dynamic systems theorists prefer not to rely on storage and representa­
tion metaphors to explain history because they imply a static, discrete 
state view o f how the past affects the present state o f the system (Fogel, 
1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Attractors, stabilized by historical pre­
cedent, preserve the fluid and dynamic aspects o f  individual and 
communicative action. Social play, by virtue o f  its spontaneity and 
creativity, seems to be an excellent example o f self-organizing historical 
communication.
Anticipation based on prior expectations is certainly part of the enjoyment and 
engagement. The existence of such cognitions, though a component of the play, 
does not mean that those cognitions are constitutive of the game, any more that a 
coach’s game plan and score card and each player’s knowledge of the ‘rules’ 
regulates the specifics of the encounter between two opposing teams.
(Fogel, Nwokah, & Kams, 1993, p.54)
When information is historically emergent, the communication pro­
cess is symmetrically co-regulated  (Fogel, 1993). Symmetrical co­
regulated communication occurs when co-action is coordinated (both 
sequential and co-occurring), when partners are open to mutual influ­
ence, and when the resulting process creates new information, infor­
mation that was not entirely available to the participants prior to this 
instance of their joint engagement. Co-regulated communication fits 
the definition o f self-organization (see Chapter 1) in which elements of 
a system mutually and continuously modify each other in such a way 
that new forms o f organization and new information emerge from the 
transaction.
Markova (1987), for example, envisions a three step dialogical process 
in which novelty is created. A acts and B responds. But as B is com pos­
ing the response, A is already changing and perhaps the observed 
changes in A alter the response of B as it is unfolding in time. Partici­
pants cannot count on communication being totally predictable because 
the “signal” is changing continuously before the “response” is com ­
pleted, and vice-versa. Because of this continuous co-regulation, the 
passage o f time in a dialogue creates the conditions that lead to the 
emergence o f  innovative information and action (Ayres, 1983; Bahktin, 
1981; Baxter, 1994; Baxter & Bullis, 1986; Canary & Stafford, 1993; 
Cissna, Cox, & Bochner, 1990; Dindia, 1994; Fogel, 1993; Fogel & 
Lyra, 1997; Lyra & Winegar, 1997; Newm an, 1982; Surra & Huston, 
1987; Werner, Altman, Brown, & Ginat, 1993; Wilmot, 1994).
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Frames are maintained through these informational dynamics, as both 
familiar and novel information brings partners together. There are a set 
of dedicated neurophysiological processes that orient people to each 
other and that create familiar and expectable neurological, hormonal, 
and behavioral patterns that orient each partner to the other for the 
purposes o f co-regulation (Schore, 2003). These neurophysiological 
aspects of frame maintenance are “experience dependent,” that is, the 
neural connects are formed by repeated similar experiences and lead 
to the development o f preferred pathways o f sensation, emotion, and 
orientation to others.
Such frames may create both positive and negative, shared and non­
shared forms of information. Insecure attachment, for example, is a 
frame for mutual proximity but with feelings of threat or avoidance 
coupled with approach for the insecure partner but not necessarily for 
the other partner. Mutual aggression, in families or between nations, 
can be thought o f as a frame in which information is created about 
vigilance and readiness to attack. The “attack-defend” pattern serves 
to maintain the frame. Each party to the conflict is likely to have different 
and in fact conflicting intentions and reasons for fighting. Shared feel­
ings or intentions, therefore, are not required for the maintenance o f a 
frame nor for changes in the relationship (Fogel, 1993).
Transitions between frames
In general, dyads engage in one frame at a time (either face-to-face play 
or social-object play) but eventually one frame ends and another begins. 
Frames are connected to each other primarily by realtime sequential 
transitional processes. Transitional processes are moments when the 
dyad makes a realtime change from communication in one frame to 
communication in another frame. As in film or theater, the transitional 
moments are links between changes from one scene to the next.
From a dynamic systems perspective, the study o f transitional pro­
cesses is as important as the study of within-frame dynamics. It is 
important to know, for example, why and how a particular couple 
makes transitions into a frame for an argument and has difficulty making 
transitions out of that frame and into a frame for reconciliation. One way 
to think about ending mutual aggression is to conceptualize it as one 
frame in a dynamic system in which other frames may possibly exist and 
to which transitions may be possible to foster. In the case of the study 
presented in this report, transitions in realtime represent the propensity 
o f mother-infant dyads to enter and leave frames for social play or for 
social-object play.
VInterdyad differences may be explained as much by the differences in 
the duration of frames and the actions within frames, as by differences 
in transitional processes. We might expect that a more socially oriented 
dyad may differ from a more object oriented dyad not only in their 
different durations o f frames for social and object play but in the richness 
of their transitional processes for moving to and from social and object 
frames. In the study presented here, we examine both frames and tran­
sitions between frames in order to illuminate the developmental change 
process in relationship, a topic to which we now turn.
Relationship developm ent
When communication is co-regulated there is a gradual emergence of 
information within the system over time, both for within frame processes 
and for transitional processes. Thus, even when participants are engaged 
in the “same” frame, the system generates novelty and that novelty is 
informative with respect to the specific sequences o f  communicative 
processes that led up to it (Fogel, 1993). We propose that this emergent 
novelty is the source for developmental change in the relationship. Given 
this general idea o f frame change as emerging from informative innov­
ations, in this chapter we suggest three related processes by which 
relationships change. These will be explained in detail in the following 
sections. Further elaboration o f these processes can be found in 
Chapter 5 (Research propositions) and in the results chapters (7 -11).
Change process I: historical, bridging, and emerging frames
According to some dynamic systems models, developmental change is 
believed to occur rather abruptly. These abrupt changes have been called 
phase shifts, catastrophes, or non-linear change (Kelso, 2000; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994). This is because systems are thought to spend most o f  their 
time in one or another qualitatively different attractor, leaving no middle 
ground in which the system may spend time easing into a new attractor 
pattern. Also, re-organization o f the constituents, as in the shift from the 
solid to liquid states o f matter, is often observed to occur suddenly. Slush 
may be an intermediate state between ice and water but the molecular 
system does not “need” to spend time in slush before making a transition 
between ice and water or vice-versa. Some motor systems, such as gait 
changes from walking to running also appear to follow similarly abrupt 
change processes (Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1982; Thelen & Smith, 
1994).
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Findings about change processes in physical systems, however, may 
not apply to cognitive and social-relational informational systems. 
Piaget’s descriptions o f scheme development, for example, suggest that 
there is a gradual evolution with many intermediate schemes which gra­
dually differentiate or integrate with each other. Changes between sen­
sorimotor sub-stages are hard to detect because, at any given time, there 
are temporal overlaps with “prior” and “emerging” stages. Schemes for 
each stage co-exist with schemes for the prior and subsequent stages, 
and there are intermediate schemes that combine features of both.
Vygotsky’s notion of the ZPD emphasizes the way in which interper­
sonal relationships “sm ooth” the change process. The ZPD is a type of 
frame in which the past (what the child knows how to do) and the future 
(what may be possible for the child) are blended together to help the 
child appreciate the links between prior and emerging actions (Valsiner, 
1997, 2001). Rogoff (1990) makes a case for parental guidance as a form 
for building bridges between past and future. The ZPD  actually creates a 
place for the possibility o f change, for introducing potential future 
actions without disrupting familiar ones.
Bruner (1983) described play “formats” (equivalent to frames) in 
which mothers first create a sequence o f dialogical activity with their 
infants in which they play two parts. In a telephone game, for example, 
the mother may ask a pretend question to the pretend person on the 
phone, and then answer it herself. The mother creates a bridge in which 
the child eventually comes to pick up one of those parts, filling in the 
blank spaces o f the dialogue that the mother leaves open.
Formats ‘grow’ and can become as varied and complex as necessary. Their 
growth is effected in several ways. They may in time incorporate new meanings 
or strategies for the attainment of goals, including symbolic or linguistic ones. 
They may move toward coordination of the goals of the two partners not only in 
the sense of ‘agreement,’ but also with respect to a division of labor and a division 
of initiative (Bruner, 1983, pp. 132-133).
Informational systems that regulate human conduct, therefore, spon­
taneously generate multiple frames. In addition to frames for particular 
activities, cognitive and communicative systems create frames -  like the 
ZPD  -  whose sole purpose is to foster and support developmental 
change. Work by Granott and colleagues (Granott et al., 2002) has 
described a process o f bridging in cognitive development.
Bridging is a process of leaping into the unknown by inserting marker shells that 
indicate targets for future development and learning . . .  A shell is like a formula 
in mathematics in which the variables represent unknown values that can be 
later defined. Bridging operates like an attractor in dynamic systems and pulls
development toward more advanced, relatively stable levels . . .  A bridging shell 
serves as a dynamic attractor after its initial emergence in realtime activities 
within context (p. 131).
Once it is created, a bridging shell achieves the level o f  a stable 
attractor in the cognitive system, an attractor that has the function o f a 
transitional frame between lower and higher levels o f  activity.
According to the “overlapping waves theory” o f cognitive develop­
ment (Siegler, 1996), children tend to have different ways o f thinking 
about a problem, some o f which are more and others less advanced. 
Over developmental time, more advanced ways o f thinking come to 
predominate. But at any given time, a child may approach the same pro­
blem using older, intermediate, and newly emerging thinking strategies. 
Children use the older and intermediate strategies as a way o f linking 
what they know to what they do not yet know. The point here is that 
there are always multiple co-existing strategies in a cognitive system just 
as there are always multiple co-existing frames in a relationship system. 
This is not mere complexity for its own sake, but a way in which systems 
dynamically self-organize in order to remain open to the possibility for 
change.
Granott’s notion of bridging is similar to Piaget’s idea o f a balance 
between assimilation (to available schemes) and accommodation 
(toward changing the scheme), and to Bruner’s notion o f the social 
format as a place holder that provides familiar locations in which a child 
can insert novel behavior. An example of this is when mothers take both 
roles in peekaboo (Where’s Mommy?. . .Here I am!), after which the 
child begins to play one or the other part (Bruner, 1983; Holt, Fogel, & 
Wood, 1998). Observations o f infant cognitive and emotional develop­
ment suggest that the infant’s growing consciousness o f links between 
past experience and potential future actions are maintained in a dynamic 
balance as a result o f learning during intersubjective communication  
between parent and infant. This is because the neurological and behav­
ioral abilities of the infant and young child require companionship and 
coupling with adult bodies and brains in order to develop the skills to 
bridge past and future (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001; Schore, 2003).
Theories o f psychotherapy also include concepts similar to bridging, 
generally focused on intrapersonal processes. Winnicott (1971) talks 
about how a person’s inner needs and experiences come to be coordin­
ated with “reality,” meaning the limitations o f the real world to satisfy all 
those needs. Humans create an “intermediate area o f  experience” in 
which a person can play with the possibilities o f the real world and at 
the same time not be challenged about the form o f play. W innicott’s
Relational-historical research 59
example is what he called “ transitional objects,” soft toys that include 
dolls, teddy bears, and blankets. These transitional objects can be played 
with and relied upon even if the real parent cannot be so available.
This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to 
inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant’s 
experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that 
belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative 
scientific work (p. 14).
Family systems models o f  marriage and family therapy rely on the 
concept o f “re-framing,” originally formulated in a book titled simply, 
Change (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). When families develop 
frames o f disagreement o f conflict, the creation o f an alternative frame 
that allows them to bridge the past situation with an “everyone wins” 
alternative, has proved therapeutically valuable.
To reframe means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or view­
point in relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another 
frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same concrete situation equally well or even 
better, and thereby changes its meaning (p. 95).
The key to re-framing is not to change the “facts” o f  the situation but to 
alter the meaning o f those facts for the participants. In other words, a 
different attractor is created that bridges the anger and resentment about 
the historical pattern into a no-fault alternative.
Our own prior research (Camaioni et al., 2003; Fogel, 1993; Fogel & 
Lyra, 1997) suggests that change in relationships is likely to occur 
gradually in a three-part historical sequence o f the change process: (1) 
an initial phase in which there is one predominant historical frame; (2) 
a second phase in which a different frame becomes predominant and 
serves as a developmental bridge; and (3) a final phase in which a new 
frame emerges as predominant. Assuming repeated observations at fre­
quent intervals o f  the same relationship across some developmental 
transition, there should be a frame that is predominant in the early 
sessions before the developmental transition and then declines (the 
historical frame), another frame that is predominant in the middle 
sessions during the developmental transition (the bridging frame), and 
another frame that becomes predominant during the final sessions after 
the developmental transition (the emerging frame). There is likely to be 
a higher frequency o f realtime transitions between historical and 
bridging frames and between bridging frames and emerging frames. This 
suggests the following model o f relational-historical development, as 
expressed in developmental sequence (Pi):
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In this sequence, the inner bi-directional arrowheads represent real­
time transitions while the bold arrowhead represents the developmental 
time sequence. Frames are bridging in realtime because they mediate 
realtime transitions between historical and emerging frames. Frames are 
bridging in developmental time because they become predominant in 
the period in between the predominance o f historical frames and the 
predominance o f emerging frames. Frames are bridging also because 
they may incorporate components o f previously established frames at a 
time that these frames are dissipating, thereby creating a developmentally 
intermediate area o f shared experience for the dyad.
According to these examples, bridging is sometimes observed as a 
process, as in the idea o f re-framing which takes place in the moment 
and may shift the system from one frame to another. When bridging is a 
process, we conceptualize it as a realtime transition between frames that 
work to bridge, in a brief period o f time, one frame to another. M ost of 
our examples, however, suggest a sense in which bridging can becom e a 
“structure,” that is a dynamically stable attractor in its own right. The  
blanket as transitional object is a physically concrete example o f such a 
structure. Our notion o f a bridging frame, then, is a dynamically stable 
“structure” or attractor in the relationship which mediates a develop­
mental transition between historical and emerging frames, analogous to 
the way in which a realtime transition mediates the shift from one to 
another frame in realtime.
As an example of this developmental sequence, we present observa­
tions on one infant, Hannah, and her mother, who were observed once a 
week in the period from nine to twelve months playing with a pair o f  toy 
telephones (the example is adapted from die observations o f Reinecke 
& Fogel, 1994). The historical frame involved playing with the phones 
as physical objects, the newly emerging frame involved pretend play 
with the phones, and the bridging frame combined elements o f both 
physical and pretend play.
H istorical frame. Beginning at nine months, Hannah and her 
mother played for extended periods with a pair o f  toy telephones, 
treating them as physical objects. The focus o f play was on banging the 
phones against the table, making noises by pushing the buttons on 
the keypad, or giving and taking. This interaction can be classified as 
the historical frame in which there is shared attention to the toy phones 
as physical objects.
Bridging frame. After a few sessions, this dyad developed a bridging 
frame that combined the mother’s attempts at convincing Hannah to
( P i ) (H istorica l — B ridging) =► (B ridging  —* E m erging)
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join her in pretend play with Hannah’s physical play. This was a different 
frame because Hannah’s actions were not the same as in the histo­
rical physical play frame. Specifically, she began to imitate some o f the 
physical actions that constituted the pretend sequence, such as placing 
the receiver o f the toy phone near her ear without saying “Hello!” while 
looking at her mother. The dyad also played the physical game o f give- 
and-take with the receiver while the mother verbalized the elements of  
the pretend game. The mother would make the phone ring, for example, 
and then say, “Hannah, it’s for you,” while handing the receiver to 
Hannah. This is reminiscent of Bruner’s idea o f  the dyad creating 
formats in which the child can begin to play a different role. Hannah 
frequendy initiated transitions back to the historical frame by turning 
away from the mother and engaging in physical play with the phones, 
throwing or banging the receiver. These differences between the bridging 
frame and the historical frames are differences that make a difference in 
the quality o f the play, at least from the perspective of the observer o f the 
videotapes.
E m erg en ce  o f  new  fram es. The growth o f the bridging frame set the 
stage for the establishment o f a new frame for pretend play. In the 
emergent frame, Hannah put the phone to her own ear spontaneously, 
said “H a -o ,” and handed the phone back to mother while looking and 
smiling at mother. In this frame, the offering o f the phone was different 
in meaning compared to the offering during the bridging frame. The 
pretend offering no longer signified a simple give-and-take o f a physical 
object. The newly emergent meaning o f the phone exchange -  the infor­
mation that was created within the frame over developmental time -  was 
to pretend to have a telephone conversation.
Change process II: innovations as seeds for change
How does the developmental sequence from historical through bridging 
to emerging frames occur? From a dynamic systems perspective, we 
presume that there is variability inherent in the system that creates the 
conditions for new frames to emerge spontaneously. Dynamic systems 
researchers have been describing variability as a fundamental part of 
the understanding o f behavior and development (van Geert, 1997; 
Grannott, 2002; Thelen & Smidi, 1994). Rather than treating variability 
as error or noise in the system, these and other researchers have been 
attempting to understand the developmental significance o f variability.
From the perspective o f an informational dynamic system, variability 
is not simply physical change but rather the detection by participants o f a 
difference that makes a difference to them. What are the informationally
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significant forms o f variability in a changing sociocultural system? We 
propose that there are three types or levels o f variability.
One level o f variability is the change o f  actions within a frame, the ebb 
and flow o f dialogue that gives the frame its dynamic yet stable character. 
These changes, however, do not change the frame in realtime. Level 1 
change is ordinary variability within fram e or between-frame transition dyna­
mics, variability that allows the fram e or transition to persist in realtime even 
though there are continual changes in action. In a greeting frame, romantic 
partners may sometimes kiss, sometimes embrace, or sometimes use 
endearing words. Over a long period o f time, these forms o f variability 
become part o f  the frame. The frame is still recognizable as a greeting 
between romantic partners, which probably does not include hand 
shakes, bows, or formal verbal styles as part o f its ordinary variability 
(at least not in Western cultures).
There is also level 1 change in the variability within the realtime 
transition between frames. Realtime transitions from the bridging to 
the historical frame in the telephone game occurred when Hannah 
stopped imitating the pretend actions and looked away from the mother. 
Across repeated instances o f a transition between any two particular 
frames, dynamic variability occurs. Sometimes Hannah may look away, 
and at other times turn her body away. She may even continue to look at 
her mother while stopping the imitative actions. These are all examples 
of level 1 change within the realtime transitions between frames because 
they allow the transitional dynamics to persist in realtime.
Physical dynamic systems models assume that ordinary variability is 
sufficient to produce a change in attractors that may lead to a develop­
mental transition. Developmental change in informational systems, 
however, cannot arise from level 1 variability. By definition, level 1 
variability is perceived by participants as ordinary variations on a theme, 
variations that are not perceived as having the possibility o f changing the 
system. From the perspective of information, level 1 variability is that 
which is perceived to constitute the current ongoing dynamics o f the 
communication system.
For developmental change to become possible, something that is 
perceived as genuinely new must be identified in the system, something 
that transcends the ordinary. Level 2 variability is an innovation, a novel 
action appearing for the first time within the fram e or transition dynamics. An 
innovation is a difference that makes a difference. It is noticed by 
participants as being a discovery, being novel, being a change from the 
ordinary types o f change.
What is the source of innovations? The answer to this question is 
fundamental to our understanding o f the process o f developmental
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change. One does not, however, have to look very far for the answer 
because communicative informational systems are inherently innovative. 
Let us return to the concept o f the ZPD. Where do the future possibil­
ities come from, the possibilities that are innovations from the perspec­
tive o f  the child?
According to Valsiner (2001), communicative signs by their very 
nature implicate past, present, and future. To say that, “This child is 
blind,” according to Valsiner, suggests that the child was blind, currently 
is blind, and will continue to be blind in the future. Participants have the 
opportunity to choose one or more o f these possibilities. Lock (1980) 
makes a similar point.
. . . through interaction with his mother, the child is engaged in a process of 
developing communicative behaviours, which contain by their very nature such 
implicit emergent phenomena. By establishing meaningful communication be­
tween them, the mother and child open up a ‘whole new universe of possibilities 
and potentialities’ some of which comprise the ‘problems’ the child has to 
surmount in progressing toward a fully fledged language (p. 36).
Lock goes on to say that codified forms o f communication, such as 
language or the number system, are sufficiently complex and enriched 
that people can discover their properties on their own, a process he calls 
“re-invention.” Thus, communication systems are constructed in such a 
way that they invite innovative uses. If a child discovers that he can ask 
for milk, why not ask for lots o f other things too? Innovations are 
inherent in every single sentence uttered and in every complex non­
verbal frame.
. . .  the structure of relations between people and the properties of discourses and 
practices they engage in constitute the conditions that enable their discovery of 
the unintended properties (implications) of the systems of symbols, social rela­
tions, and discourse practices their modes of life constitute. These ‘discoveries’ 
then constitute the phenomena that have been subsumed under the term the 
‘evolution’ of human abilities (Lock, 2000, p. 116).
Hannah’s spontaneous incorporation o f new elements into the tele­
phone game during the bridging process is an example o f how the 
existing frame creates opportunities for innovation. These opportunities 
are implicit in the structure provided by the mother, waiting to be dis­
covered, or re-invented, by the child. From the point o f view o f the larger 
cultural system in which many children play telephone and most o f them  
discover means for pretending, Hannah’s discovery is a re-invention. 
From Hannah’s point o f view, however, it is clearly an innovation, a 
difference that to her makes a very big difference in her engagement in 
the game (as indexed by her smiling, see below).
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The final form o f change to be considered here is developmental 
change, or level 3 change. As we stated earlier, development change, or 
level 3 change, is the destabilization, re-organization, and re-stabilization of 
the collective system o f historical attractors or frames. In the context o f this 
discussion, we expect to see the re-organization o f the frames in the 
system following upon level 1 and level 2 changes.
Our prior work (Fogel & Lyra, 1997) using microgenetic designs 
suggests that an innovation alters frame and transition dynamics in 
subsequent sessions and does not significantly change the frame and 
transition dynamics in the session in which it first appears. We write this 
developmental sequence (P2) as follows:
(Pa) level 1 —► level 2 —> level 3
In the example o f Hannah and her mother, the change process from 
historical to bridging frames began at level 2, as a novel innovation was 
established during the historical frame. Hannah’s mother tried to intro­
duce pretend actions as innovations into the historical physical play 
frame. These innovations, when first introduced, did not significantly 
alter the frame because Hannah showed relatively little interest in them. 
In other words, although the level 2 change does not produce a develop­
mental change when it first appears, it occurs in realtime along with the 
level 1 ordinary variability. As Hannah began watching her mother’s 
pretend actions and imitating them, this constituted a level 3, develop­
mental change. The developmental change did not occur when the 
innovation was first introduced but only later during the bridging frame.
The newly emergent frame for pretend play was made possible by the 
earlier innovations that created the bridging frame. The first appearance 
of the new pretend frame was observed in our videotapes at forty-four 
weeks:
Hannah picks up the phone and looks at it, then at her mother. She offers the 
phone to her mother in the same manner that she had done in previous weeks 
[Bridging frame]. Mother lakes the phone, puts il to her ear as in previous instances 
and says, 'Hi, grandma!' At that point, Hannah looks and smiles at mother and 
reaches out to request the phone [Realtime transition!. Her mother offers the 
phone to Hannah, who puts it to her ear and says, ‘Ha-o’. Hannah again looks at 
mother then offers the phone to mother [Pretend frame].
(Reinecke & Fogel, 1994, p. 184, annotations and italics not in the original).
The bridging frame and the transition in this example had been 
present in the dyad for several weeks, organized around innovations 
introduced into the bridging frame. In prior instances o f this frame and 
transition, Hannah either ignored the mother’s attempts to make a
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transition to pretend play, or she just grabbed the phone back from her 
mother, thereby returning the dyad to the bridging or physical object 
frame.
In the developmental process of integrating the innovation into the 
historical frame and the emergence o f a new frame, we frequently 
observe the dyad returning to previous forms o f co-activity. Hannah’s 
resistance to pretending and the return o f physical play is an example of 
what we call recapitulation. Recapitulation is a recurrence o f historical 
frames, or parts o f  historical frames, for brief periods during the system­
wide re-organization that constitutes level 3 developmental change 
(Pantoja, 2000). It appears that relationships require a return to the past 
in order to stabilize the system during developmental transitions. Like a 
bridging frame, recapitulations buffer the system against sudden devel­
opmental change and may be a mechanism to regulate the potentially 
chaotic effects o f  re-organization.
A similar process has been noticed in cognitive developmental change, 
called “ backward transitions” (Granott, 2002).
When people at all ages encounter a new, somewhat unfamiliar task, they often 
cannot immediately start processing the task at their highest developmental 
levels. . . If the task is not immediately understood, lower levels have to be 
reconstructed within the context of the task before people can construct higher 
levels within that context. Therefore, they first have to regress to adapt their 
knowledge structures to the task’s attributes and process the task through lower 
levels . . . The backward transition is apparent before major progress: it precedes 
and prepares for change and predicts a spurt of growth (p. 217).
According to Granott, backward transitions have to do with the subject­
ive experience o f the task, whether or not it is perceived as easy or too 
difficult. This emphasizes the importance o f perceived information in 
understanding the change processes in dynamic systems.
It is also clear from the above quote that backward transitions are 
observed primarily once a developmental change process is underway, 
when the participants perceive that systemic change is occurring. In­
novations at level 2 do not necessarily provoke recapitulation because 
they already occur within the context o f  a known and comfortable 
frame. Recapitulations, then, are one o f  the signs that participants 
perceive themselves to be in the midst o f a more sweeping type of  
change, one that has the potential to destabilize the current system  
and make way for a new one. Regressions in child behavior are com ­
monly observed around major developmental transitions. At the birth 
o f a new sibling or upon the first entrance to preschool or day care, 
children are observed to regress to more infantile patterns o f  behavior
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such as increased neediness, loss o f  bowel and bladder control, exter­
nalizing, and the like.
In our example, following the transition, Hannah recapitulated the 
same set o f  actions she had used before during the bridging frame in 
the form o f imitation o f the mother’s actions: vocalizing, putting the 
receiver to her ear, and offering the phone to her mother. In this case, 
however, the entire pattern o f these imitative actions was re-organized 
giving the observer and the mother alike the clear impression that 
Hannah was, for the first time, pretending to talk on the phone. In 
addition, the other attractors in this system changed. The physical play 
frame shifted to other objects that had clear physical play properties, 
like balls and slides. The bridging frame disappeared altogether. Pre­
tending extended to other kinds o f frames (with dolls and other toys), 
permeating the entire communication system.
This first instance o f a pretend frame was a difference that makes a 
difference. On the other hand, it was a qualitatively different kind of 
difference than those observed at level 2. Innovations are typically single 
actions that make a difference in prospective terms but not so much o f a 
difference that they change the frame at the time they first appear. In this 
case o f developmental change to pretending, we witnessed a change in 
the pattern o f organization o f multiple actions o f both infant and mother 
(level 3 change) that constituted a new frame. So, there is a difference 
that makes a difference in realtime in the sense o f being noted as 
different from the ordinary (level 2 change) and there is a difference that 
makes a difference in developmental time in the sense o f re-arranging 
the configuration o f the system (level 3 change).
On the one hand, this model suggests that developmental changes 
arise historically within the relationship because earlier innovations are 
predicted to becom e the seeds for developmental change in frames 
and transitions. Developmental change, in other words, can be directly 
observed as part of the change dynamics of the relational-historical 
system. On the other hand, developmental change does not arise directly 
from frame and transition dynamics (level 1 changes). Instead, develop­
mental change is predicted to appear first as an innovation o f a few 
actions within level 1 frame and transition dynamics and then later as a 
re-organization of those dynamics partly as a result o f the innovation.
Describing change using developmental sequence (P2) yields some 
advantages over other models of change. First o f  all, sequence (P2) 
integrates change at all levels into a single consistent model. Frames 
are not seen as structures in the same manner as Piaget conceptualized 
schemes. Frames are conceptualized with regard to level 1 changes that 
have a particular pattern and a particular variability around that pattern.
Second, sequence (P i) provides a clear link between the system’s ob­
served behavior and the concept of information. Levels 2 and 3 changes 
refer to differences that make a difference. Level 2, however, is a differ­
ence that makes a difference with respect to level 1, while level 3 is a 
difference that makes a difference with respect to level 2. They also 
integrate two important time scales in developmental analysis.
We intend to demonstrate in this study that these levels o f change can 
be observed reliably and consistently if one pays close attention to 
communication process and if one observes the same dyads communi­
cating frequently across a developmental transition. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, it is impossible to fully define frames and their 
dynamics in words. On the other hand, it is relatively easy as a full-time 
participant in an interpersonal relationship, or as an involved observer, 
to recognize differences that make a difference because sensitivity to 
information seems to be a fundamental part o f  living systems (Bateson, 
1979; Oyama, 1985). We return to the issue o f  what constitutes an 
involved observer in the next chapter.
Sum m ary
From a relational-historical perspective, the task o f studying develop­
mental change in the communication system is to examine changes in 
frames and realtime transitions between frames across a key develop­
mental change. Frames are regular dynamic patterns that involve par­
ticular forms o f the participants’ attention, specific locations, particular 
forms o f co-orientation, and a particular theme.
We conceptualized three levels o f change. Level 1 is ordinary 
variability within frames and transitions between frames. Level 2 is 
innovations within level 1 dynamics. Level 3 is developmental change, 
a re-organization o f the frame dynamics. Developmental change occurs 
via three related processes. First, change occurs in phases beginning 
from a historical frame, changing to a developmental bridging frame, 
and ending with the emergence of new frames. Second, developmental 
change (level 3) is likely to be preceded in developmental time by level 2 
changes, innovations. In other words, first innovations appear that do 
not change the frame and later those innovations become the seeds for 
frame changes. Third, developmental change is likely to be accompanied 
by recapitulations. Finally, we suggested that individual change is devel­
opmentally parallel to relational-historical change. In the next chapter, 
we discuss a relational-historical research methodology, including the 
specific types o f frames observed in our data and the issues related to 
coding and analyzing frames and transitions between frames.
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4  R e la t io n a l-h is to r ic a l research : th e  m u lt ip le  
case s tu d y  a p p ro a c h , f ra m e  an a lys is , 
q u a lita t iv e  a n d  q u a n tita t iv e  analys is
In this chapter we suggest how the relational-historical perspective, 
outlined in Chapter 3, can be translated into a research program on 
developmental change processes. Relational-historical research is the 
study o f how relationships change with respect to their own history. 
The purpose of this method is to describe not only the quantitative 
changes in the relationship, but also the historical changes in the mean­
ing o f the actions for the participants. The detection o f differences that 
make a difference can only be done with respect to the bases for inter­
subjectivity that have been established in the past within the relationship.
Relational-historical research is an adaptation o f a research approach 
that has come to be called microgenetic. The m icro g en etic  research  
d esign  has three features. First, observations begin before the onset o f a 
change, continue through the change process, and conclude once a new  
pattern has clearly emerged. Second, observations are made frequently 
across this period o f time in order to observe the system while it is 
changing. Finally, analyses focus on the study o f processes that contrib­
ute to an understanding of how change occurs (Fogel, 1990; Granott 
& Parziale, 2002; Lavelli, Pantoja, Hsu, Messinger, & Fogel, 2005; 
Overton, 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 1991). This is illustrated in Figure 4 .1, 
in which the time between observations (t) is considerably less than the 
time taken for the developmental transition (T).
Microgenetic designs are typically carried out with large numbers o f  
observations on a relatively small number o f cases. Although this leaves 
microgenetic studies vulnerable to the critique o f not being generaliz- 
able to the population, microgenetic research has significant advan­
tages that make it a valuable complement to traditional population 
studies. One major advantage is to enhance our understanding o f how  
individuals and relationships change over time. M ost microgenetic stud­
ies allow for both a quantitative and qualitative assessment o f change. 
Because there are relatively few cases, observers can make room for
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t = observation interval 
T = developmental interval 
t < < T
Figure 4.1. Observational strategy for microgenetic research in which 
observation intervals are considerably shorter than the time interval for 
developmental change.
discovery o f how each case constructs their own change and navigates 
from the old to the new. Another advantage is that observers can 
examine individual differences in change processes. When and how are 
people most likely to pick up on innovations and move towards devel­
opmental re-organization? Does recapitulation always occur when a 
system is moving toward change? Or under certain conditions, does 
recapitulation hold the system back in the past?
Relational-historical research applies the microgenetic method specif­
ically to the study o f historical change in the communicative information 
within interpersonal relationships. Relational-historical research can 
apply to many different types o f relationship systems such as mother- 
child, teacher-student, therapist-client, and employer-employee as well 
as to peer, romantic, and group relationships in which participants 
share roles o f equal status. Relational-historical research can also be 
used to study changes in larger social systems such as organizations, 
institutions, and societies. Our method is divided into three parts: the 
multiple case study method, frame analysis, qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. In this chapter, we describe how each o f these aspects o f  the 
method applies to the study of relationship change.
T he m u ltip le  case  study approach  to  
d evelop m en ta l ch an ge
The case as a unit o f analysis is central to relational-historical research. 
Case studies are often used as a means for emphasizing individuals in
j
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tbeir real life contexts. In sociology, anthropology, wom en’s studies, 
education, and law, case studies are used frequently and follow a 
standardized set o f methods (McCall & Wittner, 1990; Robson, 1993; 
Stake, 1994). Case studies have also been used in psychology in the 
clinical literature, in Piaget’s studies o f the development o f  his own 
infants, in single-case behavioral analysis research, and studies of child 
language development (Thom gate, 1987; Wallace, Franklin, & Keegan, 
1994). Case studies have most recently been used in dynamic systems 
approaches to behavior and development (for example, Fogel, 1990; 
Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Thelen, 1989; Thelen & Smith, 1994) and in 
microgenetic designs (Granott & Parziale, 2002; Siegler & Crowley, 
1991).
There is a good deal o f discussion and debate about the scientific 
merit of case study research within developmental psychology. On the 
one hand, there has long been a clear recognition that the unit o f 
developmental analysis is the individual (or dyad, or group) and that 
casewise longitudinal studies are the method o f choice (Wohlwill, 1973). 
On the other hand, most scholars avoid such work -  not because its value 
is in doubt -  but because it is costly, time consuming, and does not 
easily fit into the standards and practices o f professional development 
within the field o f  developmental psychology. These standards and 
practices include the need to publish widely, the ready availability of 
population statistics, and the ideal o f a value-free approach to science 
(White, 1994). In what follows, we list some o f the advantages o f a case 
study approach for the research questions we investigate in this study.
Case study methods focus on the process o f development
Because the case study researcher invests time in multiple intensive 
observations o f  a small number o f cases there is more o f an opportunity 
to observe how people change. When one’s time and resources are 
divided across many cases, it is inevitable that fewer observations can 
be made on a single case. Thus, potentially more about the dynamics of 
change, and the actual moments or periods o f  important developmen­
tal transitions, can be directly observed in a case study (Fogel, 1990; 
Thelen, 1990; Wallace et al., 1994). Case studies are ideal for taking a 
developmental process approach, one that should
show us about the timing of events, the susceptibility of processes to various 
kinds of perturbation and the manner in which the regulation is achieved, if it is 
achieved . . . what is needed to enable a particular developmental sequence to 
proceed, what will induce, facilitate or maintain such a sequence, how does 
sensitivity to these factors change with developmental state, what degree of
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specificity is evident in these interactions, what is the relationship among events 
at various levels of analysis? (Oyama, 1985, pp. 160-161).
Research from a relational-historical perspective requires the use o f a 
longitudinal case study approach. This approach is essential to under­
standing the whole relational system (all the relevant frames, within- 
frame processes and between-frames processes) at any one point in time, 
as well as how the organization o f the system (frames, within-frame 
processes and between-frames processes) changes over time within any 
particular relationship. Showing that mother-infant relationships change, 
in general, from face-to-face play to object play is not a purpose o f this 
study. Indeed, this general transition during the first six months is well 
documented from larger samples as reported in Chapter 2. The purpose 
o f this study is to show how dyads navigate across this well-documented 
developmental transition.
Case study methods focus on developmental transitions
One advantage o f a case study approach is that one can isolate a par­
ticularly interesting developmental transition in order to study how  
individuals, dyads, or groups navigate across it.
A case study usually deals with a relatively short, self-contained episode or 
segment of a person’s life. The episode is usually important in that it is formative, 
critical, or culminant -  the sort of episode one would regard as a life event worth 
mentioning in a life history (Bromley, 1986, p. 1).
Our research design is based upon the known existence o f a well- 
documented change in infant action and the corresponding changes in 
the mother-infant relationship: the transition to visually directed reach­
ing and the shift from face-to-face frames to mother-infant-object 
frames. Given this known developmental transition, the study design 
was invented to examine changes in the mother-infant relationship 
process before, during and after the change in visually directed reaching.
Case study methods focus on developmental trajectories
Dynamic systems theory suggests that the case is the unit o f analysis for 
the examination o f general laws o f development (Capra, 1996; Fogel, 
1990; van Geert, 1994; Lewis, 1995; Thelen, 1990).
When considerable individual differences are expected in the outcome, it is 
even more crucial to use individual developmental trajectories as the primary data 
source. Once individual developmental paths are identified, it may then be 
possible to cluster subjects, not on the basis of outcome, but on the basis of
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route. This means that detailed longitudinal studies arc neccssary to capture the 
times of stability and change. (Thelen, 1990, p. 39)
Given repeated observations on the same subjects, and contextually appro­
priate measures, analytic approaches can be applied that preserve the integrity 
of the individual’s life history in order to construct generalities of develop­
mental change. It is only when a sufficiently large sample of individual case 
histories are collected that longitudinal process research can be generalized to 
the population. (Fogel, 1990, p. 344)
The study presented here is designed to make inferences about con­
vergent and divergent patterns of developmental change across the 
thirteen cases o f dyadic relationship under study here. Many o f our 
research questions, and the statistical approaches we have chosen, are 
meant to preserve interdyad differences in developmental trajectories.
Case study methods focus on the context o f development
In our study, for example, we not only focus on measures presumed to be 
related directly to object play, but on the relationship o f object play frames 
to other frames that form the relational context o f object play. One could 
choose larger relational contexts such as the whole family and their play 
with the infant, or the broader contexts o f caregiving in the mother-infant 
relationship. In order to limit the scope of the investigation, we focus on a 
few relational processes, looking at actions within-frames and between- 
frames in which object play is most likely to occur.
Case study methods focus on the coherence of development
Because we are open to the complexity o f the mother-infant system, we 
are more likely to detect higher-order patterns and processes that may 
not be apparent if one focused on a small number of measures. Case 
studies
have been empirical activities designed to help investigators in the search 
for patterns and orderliness of phenomena, not activities designed to prove to 
others that those patterns exist. Unfortunately, the organization of psychology’s 
highly regulated normal science has led toward over-emphasis of the contrasting 
context of justification, and away from recognition of and respect for the 
fundamental scientific work that must take place in the context of discovery.
(White, 1994, p. 38)
For this study, we have made detailed observations not only o f frames 
but o f the multiple types o f action that comprise within frame and 
between frame transition processes.
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Case study methods move from the particular lo the general
How do we arrive at nomothetic principles? General or nomothetic 
principles about developmental change processes cannot be solely de­
rived from group statistics, although it is often thought that group 
averages are equated with nomothetic laws. Research that attempts to 
construct general principles building upon the study o f individual cases 
has been called holistic interactionism (Bergman, 2000; Magnusson, 
2000).
Many researchers within developmental psychology . . . regard single case 
studies as non- or pre-scientific approaches, suitable to provide an impressionistic 
glance at development, but unsuitable to test nomothetic relationships.
(Deutsch, 1994, p. 34)
It is tempting to equate the nomothetic approach with the analysis of averages. 
To do so is to equate statistical models of experiments with models of people . . .  
To find out what people do in general, we must first discover what each person 
does in particular, then determine what, if anything, these particulars have in 
common. This implies that we pay more attention to case histories, find or develop 
models sufficient to account for each, then examine the models for common 
themes or elements. (Thomgate, 1987, p. 75)
T he early baby biographers believed that only by collecting a substan­
tial number o f detailed case histories o f infants by persons who knew 
them well, could general developmental laws be constructed (Wallace 
et al., 1994). Case study research focuses on what has been called 
“clinical significance” rather than statistical significance. Clinical signifi­
cance refers to the verification o f interpretations made about a particular 
case, based either on confirmatory evidence or on the predicted outcome 
of a clinical or educational intervention for that particular case (Robson,
1993).
In this report, we will not attempt to generalize the results to the larger 
population but we will make claims about regularities that we can 
observe across all o f the cases in our sample. We will suggest that these 
claims can serve as hypotheses that can be tested on larger samples, 
assuming one has sufficient data on developmental trajectories.
The case study method is empirical and systematic
Case studies, like population studies, are guided by a theory o f the 
phenomenon. In our study, we use the relational-historical perspective 
and we have argued that the case study method is best suited for in­
vestigation using this theoretical perspective. Without a theory, the
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investigator would be lost in a sea o f potentially interesting data. In our 
view, the use o f theory to guide research is no different, in principle, in 
case studies and population studies.
Case study researchers form lasting relationships with the 
research participants
From a relational-historical perspective, the quality o f  our data depends 
on our relationship to the research participants. In this study, mothers 
brought their infants to our laboratory weekly for the entire first year 
of the infants’ life and we continued to collect data until the end o f the 
third year of life. During that period, our research staff formed close 
ties with each o f the dyads. We became part o f  their weekly agenda. The 
staff often had regular telephone contacts with mothers outside the 
laboratory and we became involved in helping them arrange their activ­
ities to find the most convenient time to come each week. This was 
especially true during family crises, work pressures, and holidays.
These participants became active collaborators in the work. We shared 
with them the reasons for intensive longitudinal observation and they 
took their role in the research seriously and responsibly. As colla­
borators, therefore, we have a similar responsibility to take their fives 
seriously and to avoid making judgements about their activities taken 
out of the context o f the whole relationship process. As people share 
even a small portion o f their personal lives with us, it is inevitable that 
we will see both good days and bad, cooperation and conflict, happiness 
and anger.
We suggest that the scientific warrant to interpret human life histories 
for case study work is based upon several conditions.
1. The investigators are well trained observers and abide by the ethical 
standards o f  their profession for the collection and dissemination o f  
scientific results.
2. The investigators interpret each case in a fair and complete manner, 
in the context o f  their collaborative relationship with the partici­
pants and with respect for their courage in sharing a part o f their 
lives with us.
3. The investigators present a sufficient amount o f data to allow the 
readers to construct alternative interpretations.
These guidelines can be summed up with the principle that research­
ers should invest whatever time it takes to “get to know” each o f the 
dyads in the sample. There are several different senses of the verb, to 
know, in English. We refer here to the kind o f open-ended, experiential,
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emotional way of knowing that usually occurs in close interpersonal 
relationships, in contrast to the more abstract form of knowledge as 
generalization. Some languages make explicit the semantic differ­
ences between these different “ways of knowing” (Belenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & Tartule, 1986). The more interpersonal way of knowing 
is conocer (Spanish), condscere (Italian), connaitre (French), and 
conhecer (Portuguese). The corresponding words for abstract knowing 
in these four languages are saber, sapere, savoir, and saber. This 
distinction is not directly available in English.
The more interpersonal way of knowing is central to the scientific 
warrant for case study and qualitative investigators. Three of the authors 
of this study (A. F., H. H., & D. W.) were part of the team that col­
lected the data in 1986 and 1987 and who knew each of the dyads 
personally. A more important criterion, however, is the extent to which 
the investigator “knows” the collected archival data, in our case, the 
videotapes that served to record the mother-infant relationship over 
time. All four of the authors have spent at least six years, and in some 
cases almost twelve years, with repeated, systematic examination, and 
re-examination of these data. All of the authors have worked with 
infants and are experts in the literature on infant development. The 
interpretations we publish here have gone through much iteration and 
changes as we as a team moved -  over a period of ten years -  from 
observation to discussion to writing and back again.
Fram e analysis
The second major feature of our relational-historical research method 
is fram e analysis. Frame analysis is the identification of the most 
frequently occurring frames in the data, the coding of realtime onsets 
and offsets of frames from the videotaped records, and the coding and 
analysis of realtime sequences of action within frames and transitional 
actions between frames. We divide the discussion of frame analysis in the 
following sections. First we discuss different approaches for identifying 
and coding frames in communication systems. Then we discuss the 
analysis of within frame dynamics and the analysis of the dynamics of 
transitions between frames.
Frame identification
In practice, there are potential difficulties that face the observer of 
communication when asked to identify a set of frames. One problem is 
that frames are hierarchically embedded (Fogel, 1993). We could, for
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example lump face-to-face play and social object play together as a 
single play frame in the mother-infant relationship, as contrasted with 
a frame for caregiving, for example. Within the play frame or the car­
egiving frame, however, there are easily distinguishable types o f play 
(face-to-face, mother-object-infant) or forms o f caregiving (bathing, 
feeding, calming). Because o f this embedding, it is necessary for the 
observers to set the level of analysis for the particular study.
In our case, we chose to limit the scope o f our observations to the 
globally defined play frame, and then to study sub-frames -  types of  
mother-infant play -  within the play frame. This means the frames we 
study here were chosen to have a sequential rather than a hierarchical 
relationship: they are mutually exclusive and cannot overlap in time. 
Other forms o f frame analysis not studied here have examined frames 
across multiple hierarchical levels using co-occurrence analysis rather 
than sequential analysis (Fogel, 1977).
Once a decision is made about hierarchical level, then observers must 
demarcate segments o f communication that meet the definition o f a 
frame given in Chapter 3:
1. Frames direct participant’s jo int a tten tion  to particular features of 
action and context.
2. Frames specify particular lo ca tio n s for communication.
3. Frames specify particular co -o r ien ta tio n s , such as sitting, standing, 
lying down, and mutual body orientation.
4. Frames specify the top ic  or theme o f the joint activity.
Frame definitions, therefore, should be tailored to the specific communi­
cative situation. The definitions for the frames that we identified in 
our data are shown in Table 4.1. In addition to the two frames that 
mark the traditional conceptualization o f this developmental transition 
in the mother-infant relationship -  face-to-face play (here called the 
social frame) and mother-object-infant play (here called the guided 
object frame) — we found two additional frames in our middle class 
North American sample, both of which involved object play. In other 
cultures, different frames may have been observed.
The so c ia l fram e is coded when the topic o f communication is the 
participants themselves with no intervening objects. This is primarily 
face-to-face play and it also may include physical-motor play. The 
gu ided  ob ject fram e is coded when mother takes an active role in 
demonstrating and scaffolding the infant’s use o f objects. The n o t-  
gu ided  object fram e is coded when the infant plays with objects 
without mother’s direct assistance but with her ongoing attention and 
verbal commentary. The socia l/ob ject m ix ed  fram e is coded when
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Mutual social play not mediated by objects. Includes primarily face-to-face 
play and physical-motor play.
Mother’s actions are directed toward demonstration of an object’s 
properties or supporting an object. Mother or infant may be holding an 
object.
Mother’s visual attention is on the infant and the object and she may talk to 
the infant about the object or provide postural support, but she does not 
touch the object or act on it in any direct manner. The infant is holding an 
object.
Mutual social play, in this case mediated by objects. Occurs, for example, 
when mother touches the infant’s body with an object as part of physical 
play or when the infant holds or mouths an object, but the actions and co­
orientations are characteristic of the social frame. Mother or infant may 
have an object.
elements both o f face-to-face play and guided object play appear at the 
same time, as when a mother uses a toy to touch the infant’s face or body 
while vocalizing in an expressive manner typical o f  the social frame. This 
frame has not been described in prior research and its role in the 
development o f the mother-infant relationship will be explored here for 
the first time.
These four frames do not constitute all o f the recognizably different 
play frames we found in the data. We observed other frames but their 
frequency and duration o f occurrence was not sufficient to justify keep­
ing diem  as separate categories. The social play frame, for example, was 
originally broken down into purely face-to-face play, motor play (in 
which mother moved the infant’s arms or legs in a cycling manner), 
and tactile play (involving touching and tickling of the infant’s body). 
Because o f relatively low frequency o f motor and tactile play, and also 
because of wide variability in their occurrence across dyads, we chose to 
combine all forms o f play in which the focus or topic is entirely on the 
participants, with no intervening objects. This decision is theoretically 
consistent with earlier descriptions o f primary intersubjectivity (see 
Chapter 2 and Trevarthen, 1977).
In summary, frame identification involves decisions about the appli­
cation o f the theoretical model, about the level of analysis, about the 
overall organization of behavior, and about collapsing categories based 
on observed low frequencies o f  occurrences. This, in principle, is no 
different from decisions required o f any observational sequential analy­
sis (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986). The major difference is that the frame
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Table 4.2. Computer criteria for the selection o f frames from the 
micro analytic codes
Frame Action Object
Social Mutual social play Neither partner has an object
Guided Mother shows objects or mother Mother or infant may have an
object supports infant’s actions on objects object
Not-guided Mother comments while infant plays Infant has an object, the mother
object with an object does not
Social/object Social play, or mother touches infant Mother or infant has an object
is a unit o f analysis that is more encompassing than specific actions: it 
is more than a reach, smile, or other microanalytic unit o f  informative 
communication. Also, the frame is not defined on the basis o f  a single 
person’s actions. Frames are composed o f sequences o f communica­
tive co-action, defined and analyzed as a dynamically stable relational 
pattern.
Frame coding
Frame analysis was not the original approach we used for these data. 
The videotapes were recorded originally in 1986 and 1987 and the first 
attempt to analyze them, before we began to conceptualize the relation­
ship in terms o f frames, consisted in a detailed microanalytic set o f  
discrete categories that specified mother and infant communicative 
actions, coded as a function o f elapsed time in the session and recorded 
in a computer data file (See Chapter 6, for a listing o f  some o f these 
categories). When we shifted our conceptual orientation toward frame 
analysis, we used this earlier coding to guide us in searching for the 
onsets and offsets o f frames.
We generated computer transcripts o f these microanalytic codes in 
realtime, and we reviewed the videotapes as we looked at the transcripts. 
As a result o f  these observations and the resulting discussions among 
the co-authors, we defined the four frames listed in Table 4.1. These 
frame definitions were translated into a set o f criteria for the computer, 
which produced a new transcript showing the original actions as well as 
the onsets and offsets o f  the frames. As a confirmation, we used a sub­
sample of four dyads to check whether the computer’s definition o f  
frames corresponded with the judgement o f an independent observer. 
The observer’s task was to find the boundaries o f frames based only on 
the definitions given in Table 4 .1 , and not based on the microanalytic
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decisions used by the computer. As a result o f this approach, adjust­
ments were made to the computer criteria to better fit the computer’s 
definition to the observer’s interpretation. The final set o f  computer 
criteria are shown in Table 4.2. These criteria produce onsets and offsets 
o f frames that correspond to the definitions given in Table 4.1.
A more straightforward approach would have been to code frames 
directly from the videotapes before coding o f the microanalytic actions 
within frames. Following that, more detailed microanalytic coding 
could have been done selectively, for only those actions within frames 
or transition processes most relevant to the research questions. As it 
happened in the historical development o f this work, we had already 
done the opposite and decided to use the power o f the computer to 
recode and collapse across the earlier coding categories. We have de­
scribed both methods here: the use of the computer to find frames and 
the use of direct coding o f frames. This may make the approach more 
useful to other investigators, depending on where they are in their own 
data analysis projects.
If one starts out coding frames directly, coders should check their 
reliability at the level o f  frames. In our case, since the computer identifi­
cation o f frames was based on a set o f  discrete state codes that had 
already been tested for their interrater reliability (Chapter 6), we thought 
it unnecessary to mount additional reliability checks. Instead, with our 
four subject sub-samples we confirmed the computer recodings against 
the direct observation o f the videotapes. In the case o f the frames under 
study here, their appearance and reappearance in the literature on de­
velopment in the first six months o f life leads us to believe that we have 
chosen frames that are common to all dyads, easy to recognize, and 
occur sufficiently frequently to support quantitative and qualitative 
analyses.
Frame dynamics
The identification and coding o f frames are the first steps in frame 
analysis. Once a transcript o f  onsets and offsets o f frames is obtained, 
the next phase o f  frame analysis is the observation o f changes o f action 
within and between frames, or frame dynamics. This includes the three 
levels o f change discussed in Chapter 3. The study o f frame dynamics 
based on the microanalytic coding is straightforward. One can use 
standard sequential analysis methods to examine the sequences and 
co-occurrences o f  actions within frames, and the types o f actions that 
form the transitions between frames. These methods will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. The informational approach, understanding which
fdifferences make a difference over time, requires a qualitative research 
method, discussed later in this chapter.
From a relational-historical perspective, transitional actions are espe­
cially important features o f frame dynamics. To study transitional 
actions, observers watch the videotapes at the boundaries between 
frames. Transitions have no clear beginning and ending. It is a matter 
of distinguishing the difference that makes a difference between changes 
that maintain the frame in realtime and changes that change the frame 
in realtime. According to dynamic systems theory, the duration o f tran­
sitions between attractors is relatively brief compared to the duration of 
attractors. In our data, transitions lasted only a few seconds, on average.
Q uantitative analysis
Once frames, actions within frames, and transitions have been coded, 
they are amenable to quantitative analysis. In this study, we use several 
recently developed techniques that apply to complex sequential pro­
cesses in both realtime and developmental time. These include the study 
o f developmental trajectories for the realtime durations o f frames and 
actions within frames using multilevel modeling (Min) or hierarchical 
linear modeling (H LM ). These methods will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7.
When we study communication quantitatively, part o f the method­
ology requires that we break down events into discrete sequences of 
codes for “individual” action. When one codes more microanalytically, 
however, participant actions may seem less relational and may be inter­
preted as “belonging” to an individual, such as the code “infant reaches 
for an object.” In the context o f  the frame, however, microanalytic codes 
should be interpreted with respect to their relational role in the com ­
munication process. Infant reaching for objects, for example, is only 
meaningful in relation to the sequence o f  dyadic co-activity, the frame, 
which makes reaching possible at that particular moment. Codes such as 
infant mouthing an object or looking at mother establish the infant’s 
relationship to the object or to the mother at that mom ent and should 
not be interpreted as what the infant does or can do independent o f the 
frame in which the action is coded.
This microanalytic coding o f “individual” behavior needs to be 
regarded not as theory but as technique. We do not believe that our 
subjects analyze their relationship into these codes or into the frequen­
cies, durations, and probabilities that we construct as part o f the quan­
titative analysis. These techniques are merely one window into the study 
o f a complex human relational process. Since we define our codes
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initially as relational actions, and since our analysis o f sequences and co­
occurrences arises from a principled theoretical recognition o f action as 
relational-historical, the burden is on us as investigators to guide 
the reader from the details o f technique back to a relational-historical 
interpretation. One way to accomplish this is to combine quantitative 
approaches with qualitative analysis, discussed below.
Q ualitative analysis
In this section, we give an overview o f the role o f qualitative analysis in 
relational-historical research. In Chapter 6, we outline the specific quali­
tative methods used in this report. In the quantitative sequential analy­
sis, discussed above, the frequencies and durations obtained from the 
data are not summed over an entire observation session, but rather 
summed within particular types o f frame. In addition, we also use a 
qualitative analytic approach in which the goal is to focus on infor­
mation and to study the frames as globally stable dynamic patterns, that 
is, from a macroanalytic perspective. As explained in the next chapter, 
we chose a sub-sample o f four mother-infant dyads as the focus o f a 
qualitative investigation.
In the traditional quantitative research paradigm, one constructs 
hypotheses at the beginning of the study, carries out the planned obser­
vational or experimental procedure (coding from pre-established cat­
egories, for example), analyzes the data in a manner directly driven by 
the hypotheses, and makes an interpretation. If one’s interpretation is 
that the original hypothesis needs to be altered, the researcher must go 
back to the population to select another sample to test with a slight 
variant o f  the procedure, or to re-code the data based on a different set 
of observational categories.
One o f the central principles o f qualitative research is an iterative, 
cyclical approach to interpretation during rather than after the process 
o f observation (Bromley, 1986; Robson, 1993). Thus, hypotheses, 
methods and interpretations regularly cycle back on each other, creating 
an inductive spiral known as the hermeneutic circle. The observer is no 
longer naive to the data but becomes an informed and involved scientist. 
Hermeneutic approaches have been used in case study, ethnographic, 
rhetorical, phenomenological, feminist, and symbolic interactional 
methods in the humanities and behavioral sciences (Bernstein, 1983; 
Eckartsberg, 1986; Erickson, 1992; Gaskins, 1994; Lather, 1991; McCall 
& Wittner, 1990; Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu, & Mosier, 1993; Schwandt,
1994). Based on this method, our observers write narratives that describe 
the frames and transitions.
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In place o f the traditional approach to reliability, we use a peer 
research team and the constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin,
1990) which requires an iterative process o f interpretation and revision 
until the observers feel confident that the narratives are consistent 
throughout and new interpretations do not emerge during the process 
of reading and re-reading the narratives (Patton, 1990). A related ap­
proach to reliability in qualitative research is the use o f agreement 
between observers who have shared perspectives on the process under 
investigation and who have similar training. “Objectivity is no more than 
shared subjectivity” (Rogoff et al., 1993, p. 31), and this can be achieved 
via conventional reliability estimates or via ongoing discussions between 
observers. Traditional sequential analysis is more amenable to con­
ventional measures o f reliability, but by decontextualizing the behavior 
into discrete packages, the meaning of the behavior for the participants 
is often lost (Bruner, 1983; Cicourel, 1974; Rogoff et al., 1993). In 
our work, we use ongoing discussions between members o f  a peer 
research team.
Another advantage o f qualitative analysis is its focus on the signifi­
cance of actions (their information, the differences that make a differ­
ence) and not just their description. As one observes, one is focused on 
the presumed meaning o f the actions for the participants. In our case, we 
observe a whole frame, one frame at a time, and try to write a narrative 
description of that frame at a level that seems meaningful or informative 
for the participants. Rather than saying, “the infant extends an arm,” we 
would say “the infant reaches for an object,” or “the infant touches the 
mother.” Meanings o f events that constitute frames must be examined 
and re-examined cyclically in order to achieve a coherent view o f the 
frame being studied and its changes over time.
The inquirer constructs a reading of the meaning-making process of the people 
he or she studies . . . The activity of understanding unfolds as one looks over 
one’s respondents’ shoulders at what they are doing. (Schwandt, 1994, p. 123)
. . . participants in social interaction usually provide explicit evidence to each 
other regarding the meaning of their actions . . . This evidence is essential to the 
achievement of understanding between participants, and it also provides re­
searchers with evidence regarding the meaning of actions. (Rogoff et al., 
1993, p. 31)
In this work, we equate the concept o f meaning making with the 
concept of information creation. To “make meaning” refers to the detec­
tion o f a difference that makes a difference. The basis for validity in 
interpretation o f subjects’ meanings is the subject o f  considerable debate
84 Change Processes in Relationships
between multiple schools o f thought, a debate that takes us beyond the 
scope o f this book. At issue is the extent to which the warrant for 
interpretation o f participants’ meaning is based on:
1. the investigator’s subjective identification with the participants using 
empathy,
2. the investigator’s construction o f the participant’s meaning system  
within their own sociocultural context, or
3. the investigator’s linking o f the interpretation o f this case with the 
history o f interpretations o f other such cases within the literary genre 
that defines the investigator’s field o f inquiry (Bradley, 1994; Jansen 
& Peshkin, 1992; Keegan & Gruber, 1994; Schwandt, 1994).
In practice, qualitative research involves all three o f these warranting 
procedures. Empathy is used, but it has a limit as a scientific tool since 
our participants are not the same as ourselves. Observers “can only 
approximate other’s experiences and so gain only limited access to their 
knowledge” (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 113). This sense o f incompleteness, 
the inability to fully define and categorize another person, “marks the 
tragic, perpetually inadequate aspect of social research” (Reinharz, 
1984, p. 365). This is perhaps especially the case when we study non­
verbal infants or people from very different cultures. Similarly, investi­
gators can rely on the literature in their field only so far because much of 
the work is done from a normative and “objective” point o f view. Finally, 
we can compare evidence from different cases, but the detail with which 
we gather case study data (see next section) limits the inquiry’ to a small 
number o f dyads. We argued in the last chapter, however, that people 
seem predisposed to detect differences that make a difference, especially 
to the extent that the observers are very familiar with the culture o f the 
research participants.
Credibility is a criterion used in qualitative research methods to evalu­
ate whether the investigation captures the meaning for the participants. 
Credibility can be viewed as parallel to the notion o f internal validity 
in quantitative methods. Credibility is assessed through different stand­
ards such as the prolonged engagement o f the researcher with the 
researched, the persistent observation o f the phenomenon under investi­
gation, and the use o f  a peer research team (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; 
Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields, 2000). Another approach to credibility is 
for the investigators to share excerpts o f the original transcriptions to 
allow the readers to make their own interpretations o f the material 
(Rogoff et al., 1993). More details on the credibility o f  this investigation 
will be presented in Chapter 6.
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Sum m ary
Relational-historical research on developmental change is supported 
by three types o f methods: frame analysis, qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, and the case study approach. These methods allow inves­
tigators to examine individual development in the context o f a devel­
oping relational system. The methods take the case as the unit o f 
developmental change and allow for the conceptualization o f change in 
historical systems o f communication. Frame analysis is the identification 
and coding o f dynamically stable frames in the communication system. 
Qualitative research uses narrative descriptions and hermeneutic pro­
cedures to interpret the communication patterns at the level most likely 
to be informative for the participants. Quantitative analysis focuses on 
developmental trajectories and sequential patterning o f actions in real­
time. Case study designs allow for the historical interpretation o f longi­
tudinal data, in this study, the history of dyadic relationships across 
a known developmental shift. In the next chapter, we describe our 
research questions based on these methods.
5 R e s e a rc h  p ro p o s itio n s  a b o u t re la tio n s h ip  
c h a n g e  processes
In this study, our goal is to provide a detailed description o f the relational- 
historical process o f development within the thirteen mother-infant 
dyads who participated in our multiple case study design. This is docu­
mentary science, similar to descriptive embryology, genome mapping, 
or astronomy.
This chapter is a transition, from the abstract to the concrete. This is 
especially daunting because the topics o f  research -  frames and their 
changes -  cannot be measured easily. How can change be captured? Its 
nature is to escape into another form, to be different on each reviewing o f  
the data. As qualitative researchers who have spent a great deal o f time 
with our data, we are convinced that patterns -  perhaps even laws -  can 
be perceived in frames and their change even though they cannot be 
defined precisely. In the remainder o f this work, our task is to convey in 
words and pictures the patterns we have detected in our data. As scien­
tists an additional task is to provide sufficient detail so that others 
with similar training and experience could attempt to replicate these 
observations, but let’s be clear: the patterns implicate us as well as the 
videotapes, in our conspiracy o f long-term involvement with them.
W hat follows is a report on the history o f our relationship with a unique set o f  
documentary videorecordings and the people in them. They show a tiny 
segment -  a few short months -  in the life history o f a small group of 
babies playing with their mothers. The videorecordings were a collabora­
tive project o f the research team and these families whose dedication 
to the study is reflected in their regular attendance and cooperative 
spirit. Although the mothers were not aware of the specific goals of the 
research study, they knew that they were part o f a research project on 
the development o f parent-infant communication.
In this chapter, we describe our research propositions and preview the 
methods o f analysis on which each question will rely. We choose the 
word “proposition” to reflect that our research questions are based on 
prior theory and research in this area. We do not use the word “hypoth­
esis” because it implies the use o f inferential statistics. Our research
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propositions, however, are stated in ways that can be falsified with 
respect to the data: the proposition either fits the existing data or it does 
not. The statistical approaches we use are descriptive o f trends in the 
data for this sample of subjects and are not intended to generalize to the 
population. Instead, our goal is to create a faithful and accurate account 
of each o f the dyads in our sample using both quantitative and qualita­
tive analysis. Even though we do not make inferences to the larger 
population, our study suggests hypotheses about developmental and 
relational processes in early development that can be tested using infer­
ential population approaches. In Chapter 6, we provide more detail on 
specific methods of observation and analysis.
Propositions about fram es and transitions 
Proposition Is There will be a three-part h istorical sequence o f  
the change processs historical fram es, developm ental bridging  
fram es, and the em ergence o f  new fram es.
This proposition is the research statement related to change process I, 
from Chapter 3.
Proposition 1 makes the prediction that relational-historical change 
will occur in three phases: (1) an initial phase in which there is one 
predominant historical frame; (2) a second phase in which a different 
frame becomes predominant and serves as a developmental bridge; and 
(3) a final phase in which a new frame emerges as predominant. We 
wrote this as the developmental sequence for Proposition 1, or (P i), 
where the inner bi-directional arrowheads represent realtime transitions 
and the bold arrowhead represents the developmental time sequence.
(Pi) (Historical •<-*• Bridging) =► (Bridging ■*-*■ Emerging)
In this sequence, frames are considered to be bridging in developmental 
time because they becom e predominant in duration in the period in 
between the predominance o f historical frames and the predominance 
o f emerging frames. Frames are considered to be bridging in realtime 
because they mediate transitions between historical and emerging frames.
This proposition is tested quantitatively in two ways. First, we examine 
the durations of each of the four frames (social, guided object, not-guided  
object, and social/object mixed) as a function of the infant’s age in weeks. 
When these durations are plotted across the twelve weekly observations on 
each of the thirteen dyads in the sample, we refer to them as the develop­
m ental trajectories of each frame. We do not know at the outset which of
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the four frames will play the role of historical, bridging, or emerging, nor do 
we know if any of the frames will fit sequence (Px) . In order to fit sequence 
(P i), there should be one or more frames whose developmental trajectory 
peaks in the early sessions and then declines (the historical frame), another 
frame(s) whose trajectory has an inverted U-shape peaking in the middle 
sessions (the bridging frame), and another frame(s) whose trajectory grad­
ually increases and peaks in the final sessions (the emerging frame). We 
employ multilevel analysis to model the shape of the developmental trajec­
tories o f duration as a function of age and to examine interdyad differences 
in these trajectories.
The other quantitative approach to this model is to examine the 
frequency o f transitions between frames in realtime. We predict 
that bridging frames should mediate transitions between other frames 
during the period when the bridging frames are relatively high in dur­
ation. Transitions between the historical frame and the newly emerging 
frame, for example, would first occur via the bridging frame rather than 
directly between the historical and emerging frames. For four frames, 
there are twelve possible types o f between frame transitions: for example, 
when the dyad changes from the social frame to the guided object frame 
or from the guided object frame to the social frame. This analysis 
identifies the most frequently occurring transitions and how they change 
with age. We tabulate the frequencies of each of the twelve possible 
transitions for each observation session. There should be a higher fre­
quency of transitions between historical and bridging frames and be­
tween bridging frames and emerging frames. Conversely, there should 
be a relatively low frequency of transitions between historical and 
emerging frames.
Since we have chosen a well established developmental transition, we 
know that all the dyads will change from a predominant historical frame 
for social play to the predominance of some type of newly emerging 
frame for social object play. The model in developmental sequence (Pi) 
will be disconfirmed if there is no evidence for a bridging frame, as 
shown in sequence (P J .
(P{) Historical =► Emerging
In this case, we would not expect to find any frame that serves an 
intermediary bridging role. This could occur if there are no frames with 
an inverted U-shaped trajectory and/or there are no frames that bridge 
the realtime transitions between historical and emerging frames.
In addition, qualitative analysis will be used to examine the details of 
the actions within frames and interdyad differences. Our theoretical
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model o f bridging frames suggests that they should contain actions that 
are common both to the historical frames and to the emerging frames. In 
the example o f the telephone game used in Chapter 3, for instance, the 
bridging frame had actions that combined some o f the characteristics o f  
physical play with the phones and some o f the characteristics o f pretend 
play with the phones. Hannah imitated the physical movements o f the 
mother’s pretend actions but without understanding the pretend nature 
o f those actions. We expect that realtime transitions between frames with 
actions in common (i.e., between historical and bridging or between 
bridging and emerging) would be relatively easier for a dyad than real­
time transitions between frames that were relatively more different from 
each other (historical and emerging). The qualitative descriptions o f  
each o f the frames will provide evidence for this proposition.
Another contribution o f the qualitative analysis will be to examine the 
historical process by which each dyad negotiates the developmental se­
quence (PO or (P ,). We expect that each dyad will develop their own style 
of communication reflecting a different sequence o f historical, bridging, 
and emerging frames. Some dyads may develop toward an examination o f  
objects as the focus o f their communication with few social frames and 
relatively few social-object mixed frames. Others may develop patterns in 
which social and social-object mixed frames predominate. In these dyads, 
objects are transformed into social purposes, such as using a toy to tickle the 
infant, rather than being the focus of attention as things in themselves. The 
qualitative analysis should help to reveal how the general developmental 
sequence (P |) unfolds within each case.
For the purposes o f the qualitative analysis, we chose four representa­
tive dyads from the sample o f  thirteen. This is necessary due to the time 
consuming nature o f qualitative analysis. Quantitative results are pre­
sented in Chapter 7. The qualitative results are presented in Chapters 
8 -1 1 , one chapter for each o f the four representative dyads. We also used 
these four dyads to examine the frequencies o f  transitions between 
frames, one o f the quantitative analyses.
Proposition 2: We expect that innovative actions during fram es 
and transitions are historical preludes to later developm ental 
re-organizations in the fram es and transitions.
This proposition is related to change process II, Chapter 3. Proposition
2 distinguishes between actions that recur each time the same frame or 
transition is repeated and actions that are innovations. This proposition 
can not be tested using quantitative analysis because the judgment 
o f whether an action is innovative (whether it is a difference that makes 
a difference) can only be done qualitatively, that is, in relation to
the dyad’s history. T he actions o f the dyads in each repeating instance o f  
the frames and realtime transitions must be described in detail and 
examined for their similarities and differences with respect to prior 
occurrences o f those frames and realtime transitions.
Sessions for the four representative dyads are observed in their 
original developmental sequence, beginning from the first session. The 
patterns o f  actions in the first instance o f each frame and each realtime 
transition in that first session are taken as the baseline actions. 
A sequence narrative is written to describe the pattern o f actions in that 
first instance. The second instance o f a particular frame or transition is 
then observed and another sequence narrative is written. In that process, 
the second instance is compared with the first to determine if the pattern 
of actions is similar or different. The observer may return to the first 
instance in order to check their judgement o f similarities and differences, 
to help in the writing o f the sequence narrative for the second instance 
and perhaps to modify' the sequence narrative for the first instance 
according to the constant comparative method (Chapter 6). The process 
continues until all instances of all frames and realtime transitions 
are described for all twelve sessions. Observers have the opportunity to 
replay any prior instances or any sequence of prior instances in order to 
decide whether the current instance is sufficiently different from a prior 
instance to count as an innovation. Innovations are then noted in the 
sequence narrative o f  the instance in which they first appeared on our 
video records.
The testing o f proposition 2, then, is based on a study o f these 
sequence narratives. Proposition 2 predicts that innovations will become 
the seeds for developmental changes in frames and realtime transitions. 
Proposition 2 is based on the idea that there are multiple levels o f change 
in relational-historical systems (see Chapter 3). These are ordinary 
variability in frame and transition dynamics (level 1), innovations within 
frame and transition dynamics (level 2), and developmental change or 
re-organization o f the frames in the system (level 3).
Proposition 2 is a prediction about the effects o f innovations (level 2 
changes) in the sessions in which they first appear and in subsequent 
sessions. Proposition 2 predicts that an innovation developmentally 
alters frame and transition dynamics in the subsequent sessions and does 
not significantly change the frame and transition dynamics in the session 
in which it first appears. Proposition 2, in other words, suggests that the 
origin or source o f developmental changes in frame and transition dy­
namics is the appearance o f innovations in earlier sessions.
On the one hand, proposition 2 makes the assertion that develop­
mental changes arise historically within the relationship because earlier
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innovations are predicted to become the seeds for developmental change 
in frames and transitions. Developmental change, in other words, should 
be directly observed as part o f the change dynamics o f  the relational- 
historical system. On the other hand, proposition 2 suggests that devel­
opmental change does not arise directly from frame and transition 
dynamics (level 1 changes). Instead, developmental change is predicted 
to appear first as an innovation and second as a re-organization o f the 
frame and transition dynamics.
Proposition 2 would be confirmed if the qualitative analysis 
showed these three different levels of change, with innovations arising 
from frame and transition dynamics, and developmental changes 
arising from innovations. We write this developmental sequence (P2) as 
follows:
(P i) level 1 =► level 2 => level 3
Proposition 2 would be less likely to be supported if we found the 
appearance of level 3 changes without the observation of prior changes 
at level 2. We would then need to consider a model of development by 
which developmental re-organizations within frames or transitions occur 
spontaneously, as illustrated in sequence (P2) below.
(P2) level 1 => level 3
How can level 3 changes be recognized empirically? Consider the 
following example. During the guided object frame for a pre-reaching 
infant, maternal frame dynamic actions (level 1) might consist o f dem­
onstrating the objects to the infant by moving them in the visual field but 
out o f  the infant’s reach. The infant’s corresponding frame dynamic 
actions (level 1) might be simply gazing at the object, actively moving 
the body, and vocalizing. At the same time, realtime transition dynamics 
might be a change in the infant’s gaze direction away from the object 
which leads mother to follow up by placing the object in the infant’s 
hand leading to a not-guided object frame.
The innovation may come during the guided object frame in the form 
of the infant attempting, for the first time, to reach out for the object held 
by the mother. The novelty o f this action may precipitate a frame 
transition: as the infant reaches out, the mother places the object in the 
infant’s hand leading to the not-guided object frame. For the next 
session or two in this example, the infant’s reach attempts would con­
tinue to precipitate a transition from the guided to the not-guided object 
frame while both o f these frames and the transition between them would 
continue to display similar level 1 and level 2 dynamics.
Ultimately, however, the use o f reaching in the transition dynamics may 
facilitate the growth of the relationship between the infant’s reaching skill 
and the mother’s actions in relation to it. Instead o f simply putting the 
object in the infant’s hand when a reach attempt is made, thereby creating 
a realtime transition, the mother may alternatively hold the object within 
the infant’s reach space as a way o f allowing the infant to become more 
acuve in moving from reach initiation to reach completion. Generally, it 
takes several weeks for infants to move from the intention to reach to the 
consolidation o f the control required to execute a reach and grasp. Via the 
co-regulation between the mother and infant, then, the infant can be 
scaffolded in developing the reaching skill.
From the relational-historical perspective, on the other hand, the 
infant’s reaching intention, which first appeared as an innovation during 
the transition dynamics (level 2) may begin to alter the dynamics o f the 
guided object frame. Instead o f making a transition out o f the guided 
object frame each time the infant intends to reach, the mother can 
change her actions within the guided object frame to accommodate a 
new kind o f relationship process vis-a-vis reaching. The guided object 
frame might then re-organize its frame dynamics from its earlier focus on 
maternal demonstration and infant gazing at objects to maternal scaf­
folding and infant reaching. We would consider the whole process from 
innovation (level 2 change) to the emergence o f  the new frame dynamics 
as an example o f developmental dynamics (level 3 change).
N ote that the model as specified in sequence (Pa)j above, can lead 
to many different possible pathways o f developmental change within 
and between dyads. Innovations could occur in any o f the four 
different types o f  frames or in any o f the twelve different types o f transi­
tions between frames. Also, innovations could arise during frames or 
transitions.
Proposition 3: The developm ental trajectories o f  particular 
actions toward objects (the durations o f  gazing, touching, and/ 
or m outhing) will relate to the developm ental trajectories for the 
durations o f  the fram es.
For proposition 3, quantitative analyses using multilevel modeling 
seek to find the contribution o f infant’s attention and actions on objects 
to the developmental trajectories of frames. Although the links are 
correlational, their confirmation suggests at a minimum that individual 
change occurs in tandem with relational change. Based on the relational- 
historical perspective, we expected that the development o f infant atten­
tion to and action upon objects is embedded within changes in
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the mother-infant communication system. The developmental trajector­
ies o f infant’s attention to objects and object-related actions are entered 
into a multilevel model as predictors (independent variables) while the 
developmental trajectories o f  the proportional durations o f frames are 
entered as response (dependent) variables. We know from the literature 
review (Chapter 2) that some infants are more attentive to objects than 
others. We also know that all infants increase in their attention to objects 
with age. We do not know the details o f the developmental path but 
research reviewed in Chapter 2 predicts that for some infants the devel­
opmental trajectory o f certain frames (for example, non-guided object 
frames) will accelerate more rapidly than for others.
We also expect that some infants may develop preferences for looking, 
others for touching, others for mouthing, and still others for the cross- 
modal matching o f these modalities. Research reviewed in Chapter 2 
also suggests that modality preferences may become part o f  the rela­
tional-historical process by which infants communicate about objects 
with their mothers. Using quantitative analysis, infant preferences for 
forms o f action will be judged by the time spent touching or mouthing 
objects with or without gazing. M outhing, for example, could be ex­
ploratory mouthing that is systematically combined with looking at the 
object or it could be mouthing that is not coupled with apparent explora­
tory activity. For instance, while exploratory mouthing is more likely to 
be an integral part o f a social-object mixed frame, simple mouthing is 
more likely to be embedded in a social frame.
Proposition 4: T he infant’s acquisition  o f  skilled actions with  
objects will em erge in a developm ental sequence.
For proposition 4, we used categorical data analysis to study the devel­
opmental sequence o f emergence o f infant’s actions on objects in the 
context o f mother-infant communication about objects. The literature 
on developmental sequences in the emergence o f  infant action is based 
primarily on observations o f infants in non-social laboratory conditions. 
The known developmental sequence for manual action is shown in 
Table 2.1. Relatively little is known about the actual sequence o f acqui­
sition within subjects, nor about the sequence o f skill acquisition in the 
natural ecology o f the mother-infant relationship. To answer this ques­
tion, we noted the age (in weeks) at which infants in our sample were 
first observed to use a particular action. We compare our findings with 
those in Table 2.1. Another reason for this proposition is that these 
skilled actions with objects have the potential to constitute level 2 
changes (innovations) in frames or frame transitions.
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Sum m ary
T he research propositions outlined in this chapter focus on the process 
of developmental change within and between dyads. The goal is to 
discover the process o f development of frames, transitions between 
frames, and actions within frames as well as how these change processes 
are dynamically integrated to constitute a system-wide change (level 3 
change). Both quantitative and qualitative analysis will be used. We 
also examine individual actions with respect to changes in the dyadic 
relationship.
6 R e s e a rc h  m e th o d s  fo r  th e  c u rre n t  
in v e s tig a tio n : su b jec ts , p ro c e d u re s , a n d  
d a ta  analys is
Subjects
Thirteen mother-infant pairs volunteered to participate in a longitudinal 
investigation on the development of infant communication. They were 
contacted by letter from birth announcements in the local newspaper. 
All had full-term births with no complications and all passed a six-month 
hearing test. Only middle-income mothers older than 21 years were 
included in the sample. Seven infants were male and six were female. 
Twelve of the dyads were Caucasian and one was African-American.
Procedure
Infants and mothers were videotaped weekly from age 4 to 52 weeks and 
then bi-weekly from 53 to 104 weeks. Here we report the findings from 
twelve observation sessions on each infant, six sessions prior to and six 
sessions following the acquisition of visually guided reaching (see below 
for definition and coding) for a total of 156 observation sessions. By 
design, the observed first instance of successful visually guided reach was 
designated as observation session number seven, and coding was done 
for six sessions prior and six following and including the session contain­
ing the first observed reach. The age range for the first observation 
session was 5-16 weeks, for the last session the range was 18-30 weeks. 
The age range for the onset of the first observed instance of successful 
reaching was 12-22 weeks (Mean =  16.3 weeks). [This mean age of onset 
of 4 months was earlier than the Bayley norm for reaching onset of 4.8 
months, which we attribute to the facilitative effect of the social context].
On average, there were four missed weeks per subject over the ap­
proximately 3.5 month period of observation reported here. Visits were 
missed due to scheduling problems, vacations, and sickness. Table 6.1 
shows the ages of observation for each of the subjects in the sample.
Each observation session took place in a 12.5'x 12.5' carpeted labora­
tory playroom. Infants and mothers were videotaped during free play
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Table 6.1. Infant ages (in weeks) a t each observation session prior to and  
following the acquisition o f visually guided reaching. M ean age fo r onset o f  
reaching =  16.3 weeks
Pre-■reaching sessions Post-•reaching sessions
Dyad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18
3 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28
4 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 19 20
5 8 9 10 11 12 13 17 19 22 23 24 25
6 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19
7 9 10 11 14 15 17 20 21 23 25 27 28
8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
9 10 11 12 13 14 16 18 19 21 22 23 25
10 6 7 8 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 20 21
11 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 17 18 19 20 21
12 9 11 12 13 14 18 19 21 22 23 28 30
13 9 10 11 14 15 17 20 21 23 25 27 28
while the infant was initially put in a supine position on a blanket. 
Sessions lasted between five and ten minutes in each condition, 
depending upon the age and state o f the infant, therefore, measures 
were adjusted as a proportion o f the session duration. There was a set 
o f ten age appropriate toys, although only seven o f those toys were used 
sufficiently frequently for analysis (see Table 6.2).
The instructions to the mothers were to “play and talk with your 
infant as you might normally do at hom e.” These instructions were 
given to mothers on their first visit to the lab when the infant was one 
month old. Thereafter, mothers and infants were left to develop their 
own styles o f  play within the standardized setting o f the laboratory 
playroom. The mother had access to all the toys and was free to choose 
as many as she wished to play with the infant or no toys at all. Infants 
were typically in a supine position on a blanket on the floor. It is 
important to keep in mind that after several weeks, this setting became 
very familiar and comfortable. Mothers enjoyed the opportunity for 
uninterrupted play with their babies.
Outputs from three pan-tilt-zoom color video cameras were passed 
through a special effects generator to produce a split screen image. Each 
camera was remotely controlled from an observation booth located 
behind a one-way mirror. Camera 1 was focused on the mother’s face
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T a b le  6 .2 .  Toys most frequently used by mothers and infants in this study
Toy D escrip tion
Tube rattle Clear plastic tube with colored beads inside, two red solid balls at the ends;
a red wooden ring and a smaller yellow ring surround the rube (15cm long) 
Porcupine Red rubber ball w'ith red spikes which makes a noise when squeezed (8cm in 
diameter)
Caterpillar Yellow rubber tube with textured surface which makes a noise when 
squeezed (20cm long, 8cm wide)
Sun rattle Two yellow suns with interlocking rays that when rotated against each other 
make a rattle sound (15cm long, 8cm wide)
Ball rattle Clear plastic ball with colored beads and clown inside, makes noise when 
turned (14cm in diameter)
Mirror Circular shape plastic white backing with teddy bear picture, mirror on
other side ( 16cm in diameter)
Lock rattle Yellow plastic lock with face and movable eyes, red key that makes eyes 
turn, makes a rattle sound when shaken (11cm wide and 13cm long)
and the side o f the infant. Cameras 2 and 3 were both focused on the 
infant’s face and upper body and the observer selected the better o f these 
two outputs to combine with that o f camera 1. An electronic digital 
timer accurate to .01 secs was superimposed on the screen. The quality 
of the tapes is excellent and all relevant codes were visible to coders at all 
times.
C od in g
Action coding was done by a graduate student observer (D . W.) 
and reliability was scored by a trained undergraduate coder who was 
naive to the hypotheses o f the study and to the work o f the graduate 
student coder. Infant actions toward objects (grasp with one hand, grasp 
with two hands, shake, squeeze, manipulate [active touch with the 
fingers], mouthing, reach), mother actions toward objects and the infant 
(demonstrate affordances, show, scaffold, shake, squeeze, touch infant, 
observe infant’s action, and social play), and infant gaze (at objects, at 
mother, away) were coded on three independent passes through the 
videotape. On each pass, the coder stopped the tape each time a defined 
action category occurred and recorded both the event and the time from 
the digital timer on the screen. The categories for each pass were mutu­
ally exclusive and exhaustive, allowing for a continuous transcription 
o f the events. Codes lasting less than 1.5 sec proved to be unreliable 
and thus were not recorded. During the coding o f the infant and mother
actions, the coder noted the name o f the toy being used. A computer 
program merged all the separately coded streams o f events into their 
original time order, and derived all o f the frequency, duration, and co­
occurrence measures for the data analysis.
Categories’ definitions were derived from the literature as follows. 
Visually guided (or goal directed) reach is defined as a smooth approach 
to a nearby, seen object with the fingers either opening or closing prior to 
contact with the object (Bushnell, 1985; von Hofsten, 1979; 1983; 
W hite, Castle, & Held, 1964). Visually guided reach has been first 
observed to occur in normal infants between the third and fourth month 
of life.
Infant object grasp with one or both hands, shake, squeeze, finger, and 
mouthing have all been observed and defined in previous research, 
reviewed in Chapter 2, on the development o f object-appropriate ex­
ploratory play. Similarly, most o f  the coded maternal actions have been 
observed, although the list o f  codes for both mother and infant were 
empirically derived from the data presented here as the most frequently 
occurring categories. The category o f “maternal observe” has not been 
defined in previous research. It refers to those periods o f time in which 
the mother is not active with objects, but allows the infant the opportun­
ity to explore objects independently, often with maternal verbal encour­
agement or commentary (the not guided object frame). Maternal social 
play refers to periods in which mother attempts to engage the infant in 
face-to-face play or motor play without objects (the social frame).
N ote that the maternal actions were used here only to determine the 
onsets and offsets o f the frames, as described in Table 4.2. Infant actions 
and infant gaze were also used in the analysis o f  the relationships with the 
developmental trajectories o f frames. There is, however, no confounding 
of these measures o f  frame and infant action because the specific infant 
actions and gaze directions are not used in defining the frames (Table 
4.2). The frame definitions only rely on whether the infant does or does 
not have an object and not on what the infant does with the object.
For reliability, 10 percent o f the sessions were coded independently 
by the second trained coder who was naive to the hypotheses o f the 
study. Reliability sessions were randomly selected to include equal 
numbers o f sessions from the beginning (sessions 1^1), middle (sessions 
5-8) and end (sessions 9 -12 ) o f the observation period. Average 
C ohen’s kappa was .84 for mother actions, .85 for infant actions 
and .80 for infant gaze. In addition, proportion o f agreements was 
calculated for each category separately. An agreement was scored if 
coders recorded the onset o f  a category within two seconds o f  the 
other (although the average time lag between coders for agreements
9 8  Change Processes in Relationships
R e se a rch  m e th o d s  a n d  an a lys is 9 9
was 0.5 sec). The proportion o f agreements was a minimum of 80 
percent for all categories.
We created qualitative data by narrative descriptions o f the actions 
within frames and of transitional processes between frames. We followed 
the procedures oudined in Chapter 4. Portions o f these narratives appear 
in the text. Qualitative analysis is done on a sub-sample o f  four dyads. 
Two o f these dyads developed a relatively higher duration o f not guided 
object frames in the post-reach period, and two developed relatively 
higher proportions o f the mixed social/object frame. In addition, two 
were male and two were female infants.
Q u an tita tive  data  an a lysis
Our quantitative data analysis is developmental-longitudinal and is 
based on multi-level hierarchical regression analysis for the study of  
age trends (see Chapter 7). The proportional duration o f each frame 
was computed separately for each dyad and for each week. Using this 
approach, between-dyad variability in the developmental trajectories of  
the proportional duration o f frames and infant actions within frames is 
analyzed in some detail to look at the origins o f individual differences. 
Furthermore, sequential ordering o f the occurrence of infant actions and 
frames was preserved in a data file, permitting the cross tabulation o f the 
frequency of transition between frames separately for each dyad and by 
each week. The proportional duration is the total number o f seconds in 
which a frame or an infant action was coded to have occurred during a 
session divided by the total number o f seconds in the session. The 
proportional durations for all o f the frames combined sum to 1.00.
Q u alita tive  data  an a lysis
We qualitatively examined developmental changes in the frames and 
in the transitions between the frames o f the mother-infant communica­
tion system using twelve weekly observations on four dyads o f the larger 
sample o f thirteen. Our goal was to describe in detailed narratives the 
changing conditions under which the frames developed during the devel­
opmental transition resulting in the emergence o f mother-infant-object 
play.
N arrative an a lysis . The method of narrative analysis (Polkinghome, 
1995) was used to investigate the developmental changes in the frames 
and in the transitions between the frames. The first step was to 
com pose a seq u en ce  n arrative (Pantoja & N elson-G oens, 2000;
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Pantoja, 2001) consisting of sequences of actions within a frame or 
sequences o f actions in the transitions between frames for four of the 
mother-infant dyads. Here, the observers wrote a description o f an 
occurrence of a frame or a transition between frames at a level that 
seemed meaningful or functional for the participants. This was done 
for all four frames in the data set, that is, the social frame, the guided 
object frame, the not-guided object frame, and the social/object mixed 
frame. The onset and offset times o f the frames were provided by the 
computer. Guided by the computer transcripts o f realtime changes, 
the sequence narratives of both frames and transitions between frames 
were produced. The sequence narrative was written by two independ­
ent graduate student observers -  one whose focus was on the frames 
and the other whose focus was on the transitions between frames. 
Two examples of a sequence narrative follow:
E xa m p le  1
Lewis and his mother 
Age: 7 weeks 
The guided object frame 
Using a cheery high pitched voice, the mother shakes the ball and 
highlights the sound it makes saying, “nice noise . . . watch . . . see.” 
Then, she manipulates the ball in a new way, rolling it on her hand. Baby 
watches the object, with little arm or leg movements and quietly vocal­
izes (coos). Mother makes a few sounds “wooh, w ooh,” as the ball 
moves on her hand.
E x a m p le  2
Richard and his mother 
Age: 16 weeks
Transition from the not-guided object frame to the social/object mixed 
frame
The infant holds a toy while looking at mother as the mother talks to 
the infant about the toy (the not-guided object frame). The mother starts 
leaning towards the infant while she keeps talking to the infant about the 
toy and starts touching the infant’s stomach with her right hand (the 
social/object mixed frame). [In this example, the transition from the not- 
guided object frame to the social/object mixed frame was primarily made 
through the addition o f the mother’s actions o f leaning towards the 
infant and touching the infant’s stom ach].
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Next, the observers read the sequence narratives for each dyad separ­
ately to search for consistencies and differences across instances o f the 
same frames or transitions at different ages for that dyad using the 
constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Cor­
bin, 1990). Next, based on the sequence narratives, observers wrote a 
description o f the highlights o f each weekly observation session, sum­
marizing the main features o f  frames, realtime transitions, and infant and 
mother actions. These documents are called summary' narratives. The  
iterative process o f  interpretation and revision continued until the ob­
servers felt confident that the summary narratives were consistent 
throughout. At this point, redundancy was reached since new interpret­
ations did not emerge during the process o f reading and re-reading the 
sequence narratives (Patton, 1990).
The next step was the writing o f a h isto r ica l n arrative (Pantoja & 
N elson-G oens, 2000; Pantoja, 2001). Similar to the sequence narrative, 
the historical narrative was written by the same two independent gradu­
ate student observers. This historical narrative described the develop­
mental changes in frames and in the transitions between frames, based 
on the observers’ interpretations o f change in the sequence narratives as 
they read them chronologically by week. The goal here was to synthesize 
the developmental h istory  of the frames and o f the transitions between 
frames for each dyad. Three or four distinctly different developmental 
periods, as perceived by the observers, emerged for each o f the four 
dyads as the historical narratives were written. The historical narratives 
o f the four dyads are presented in Chapters 8 -11 .
C red ib ility  o f  the h istor ica l narratives
Credibility is a criterion used in qualitative research methods to 
evaluate the rigor o f the qualitative investigation, a type o f  validity 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Credibility is assessed by the prolonged 
engagement o f the researcher with the researched (in this case, the 
mother-infant dyads), the persistent observation of the phenomenon  
under investigation, and the use o f a peer research team.
Regarding prolonged engagement and persistent observation, one of 
the graduate student observers was part o f the team that collected the 
data in 1986 and 1987 and who knew each o f the dyads personally. 
A more important criterion, however, is the extent to which the investi­
gator systematically examined and re-examined these data (that is, 
persistent observation), simultaneously establishing a prolonged 
engagement with the data. The two graduate student observers who 
did the narrative analysis o f  the frames and o f the transitions between
frames had spent at least six years with repeated, systematic examination 
and re-examination o f these data. This prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation o f the data allowed the observers to develop a 
unique sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies and commonalities among the 
four dyads which is reflected in the level o f  concordance between the 
historical narratives written by the two independent observers.
It is also worth highlighting how the peer research team was used as a 
way o f increasing the credibility o f  the historical narratives presented 
here. As mentioned earlier, the historical narratives o f the frames were 
written in d ep en d en tly  o f the historical narratives o f the transitions (co­
author D . W. wrote the frame narratives and co-author A. G. wrote the 
transition narratives). In the narrative analysis o f the frames, the obser­
ver identified developmental periods for each dyad based on systematic 
processes across all four frames. The number o f sessions o f each devel­
opmental period and its characteristics varied for each dyad. These 
developmental periods coincided with the ones described in the histor­
ical narratives for the transitions between frames, although these narra­
tives were written independently. Despite slight discordance in the two 
narratives, such as the different emphasis on certain dyadic actions, a 
concordance between these two independent historical narratives was 
still observed, such as perceived predominance o f  certain frames or how 
the twelve sessions were divided into developmental periods. We suggest 
that this level o f  concordance between the two observers is a strong 
indication o f the credibility o f the historical narratives presented in this 
report.
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7 R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n :  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t a l  
c h a n g e s  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f r a m e s  a n d  i n  i n f a n t  
a c t i o n s
In this chapter, we present quantitative analyses o f the development 
of frames and transitions related to propositions 1, 3 and 4. Please refer 
to Chapter 5 for a review o f the specific research propositions. Proposition
1 is a prediction about developmental sequence related to historical, 
bridging, and emerging frames. We present the analysis o f  the develop­
mental trajectories o f the proportional duration o f each o f the four frames 
for each o f the thirteen mother-infant dyads in the sample and compare 
them to the model predicted for proposition 1 (sequence (Pi): see 
Chapter 5 and below). Proposition 3 is a prediction regarding the contri­
bution of infant actions on objects to frame development while propos­
ition 4 is about the developmental sequence o f infant innovative actions 
on objects during frames and transitions. In Chapters 8 -1 1 , we present 
qualitative and further quantitative analysis o f these three propositions 
and o f proposition 2, on four representative dyads.
P ro p o sitio n  1: d evelop m en ta l trajectories o f  fram es
According to proposition 1, there will be three phases o f the change 
process as shown in sequence (P i).
(P i) (Historical <-+ Bridging) =► (Bridging <-> Emerging)
In this section, for all thirteen dyads, we examine models for the devel­
opmental trajectories o f the proportional durations o f each of the four 
frames (social, guided object, not-guided object, and social/object 
mixed) as a function of the infant’s age in weeks. The proportional 
duration is the total number o f seconds in which a frame occurred 
during a session divided by the total number of seconds in the session. 
The proportional durations for all o f the frames combined sum to 1.00.
In order to fit sequence (P i), there should be one frame whose 
developmental trajectory peaks in the early sessions and then declines
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(the historical frame), another frame trajectory with an inverted U-shape 
peaking in the middle sessions (the bridging frame), and another frame 
trajectory that gradually increases and peaks in the final sessions (the 
emerging frame). We employ multilevel analysis to model the shape o f  
the developmental trajectories o f duration as a function o f age and to 
examine interdyad differences in these trajectories.
This analysis can give us a general picture o f the shape o f develop­
mental trajectories, but a more stringent test o f sequence (P ^  requires 
that we look at all four developmental trajectories within each dyad. 
For this purpose, we examine the raw data trajectories o f each frame 
for four representative dyads and the frequency o f transitions between 
frames in realtime. These analyses will be presented in Chapters 8 -1 1 , 
accompanying the qualitative analysis o f each o f these four representa­
tive dyads. In addition, in this chapter we present a multiple correlation 
and graphical analysis o f frames within dyads.
For the analysis presented in this section, a multilevel modeling 
statistical technique was applied (M L3 software, Prosser, Rasbash, & 
Goldstein, 1991). Specifically, repeated measures multilevel models 
were used to analyze the proportional duration (the proportion o f the 
session) o f  the four frames as a function o f the infant’s age, in weeks. In 
repeated-measures models, data are structured as a two-level hierarchy. 
Level 1 units are repeated observational measures (in our case, weekly 
observations), which are nested within level 2 units -  dyads. Multilevel 
models are extremely robust in extrapolating missing data, an advantage 
since dyads missed an average of four weekly visits on their way to 
completing the twelve observations sessions that were included in these 
analyses (see Table 6.1).
In these models, statistics are estimated at two different levels: group 
and dyad. The average growth curve o f all dyads as a group is modeled by 
an nth degree polynomial function o f infant age. These age parameters 
determining the shape o f the average growth curve estimated from the 
data are termed fixed parameters. Fixed parameters are comparable to the 
regression coefficients in a regression model. Inclusion of an intercept 
and a first-order age parameter indicates that development is best de­
scribed by a linear trend. Inclusion o f higher order age parameters (i.e., 
Age2 and Age3) indicates a curvilinear developmental trend. The order of 
the polynomial is based on the significance of the highest order parameter.
The individual developmental curves are expressed as deviations from 
the average developmental curve. Since the dyads in the current study 
are a random sample from a large population, a level 2 variation (or 
individual differences among dyads) is referred to as a random  variation. 
There are three random parameters associated with this level 2 variation,
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namely the intercept (initial status, denoted as 0 ,r ) ,  variance (slope or 
linear growth rate, denoted by Oi"), and covariance (relation between 
initial status and linear growth rate, denoted by 0 (22). Inclusion o f the 
intercept variance is indicative of differences among dyads at their initial 
status. Inclusion o f covariance reflects a significant correlation between 
intercept and slope across time. Inclusion o f slope variance indicates 
individual differences in growth rate among dyads. The level 1 random  
parameter designated by 0 2 is residual variance.
In order to find the most parsimonious model that describes the 
observed data, first, the degree («) o f the average growth curve is deter­
mined. A higher-order age parameter is added to the model when it 
exceeds twice its standard error (.05 significance level). This process is 
repeated until no more significant higher-order age parameters can be 
added to the model. Individual differences are tested by comparing the 
model with and without the level 2 random parameters (intercept vari­
ance, slope variance, and covariance). A likelihood ratio statistic is used 
for significance testing, which follows a chi-square statistic distributed 
with degrees o f freedom equal to the difference between the number of  
parameters with and without the variances as well as covariance. Fur­
thermore, covariates (other predictors or explanatory variables; such as 
infant reaching) can be added to the model to detect their association 
with the growth parameters o f the response variable. Because o f the 
small sample size, univariate analyses were performed to test the main 
effects of the explanatory variables on each o f the response variables.
Polynomial growth curves were fitted to the data to depict the devel­
opmental trajectories o f  each frame over the twelve sessions o f observa­
tion. The estimated fixed and random parameters for these polynomial 
growth curves are listed in Table 7.1. The predicted developmental 
growth curves o f the four frames from the thirteen dyads were plotted 
by using the estimated parameters from the model against infant age 
(see Figure 7 .1(a-d )). Significant individual differences among dyads 
in the growth curves o f the four frames were found. These individual 
differences accounted for approximately 7.6 to 25.7 percent o f the total 
variance o f the models. We discuss the findings for each frame with 
respect to the developmental model in sequence (P i).
Social fram e
As shown in Table 7.1, the developmental trajectory o f  the duration o f  
the social frame was modeled by a third-degree polynomial function 
indicating a cubic developmental trend over the age period investigated. 
As exhibited in Figure 7.1(a), the predicted trends o f the growth o f the
T a b le  7 .1 .  Developmental trajectories of frames
Frames
Parameters Social Guided object not-guided
Social/object
mixed




45.1 (10.36) 55.21 (6.883) 
-1 .462  (0.509)
0.085 (0.025) 0.41 (0.152)
Age’ (Cubic)
Random (individual differences)
0.014 (0.006) -0 .014  (0.004)
O02 (Initial status) 603.8 (290.3) 492.8 (243.4) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 )
O j2 (Relation of growth rate 
to initial status)
-31 .47  (16.51) -34 .64  (17.56) 0 (0 )
0 22 (Growth rate) 
Error
1.605 (0.971) 2.503 (1.317) 0.7 (0.301) 0.371 (0.183)
O2 301.6 (36.6) 276.8 (34.05) 94.25 (11.15) 138.6 (16.39)
% of variance Explained by level-2 
random Parameters (individual 
differences)
13.9 18.5 25.7 7.6
Note: S tandard errors are in  parentheses. O n ly  s ign ificant fixed parameters are reported.
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(a) Social (b) Guided Object
Figure 7.1. Developmental trajectories of the best fitting models for the 
proportional duration (percent of session) of each of the frames are 
shown. The average growth curve of all dyads as a group is modeled by 
an nth degree polynomial function of infant age. The individual devel­
opmental curves are expressed as deviations from the average develop­
mental curve. The social frame is modeled by a cubic function of age, 
the guided object frame by a linear function of age, the not-guided 
object frame by a quadratic function of age, and the social/object mixed 
frame by a cubic function of age.
social frame remained approximately at the same level during the first 
few sessions. A dramatic decrease began around 9 weeks and then 
a slight increase was shown around 21-25  weeks. Inclusion o f the level
2 random parameters (covariance and variance) revealed that there were 
significant age-dependent differences among dyads, / 2(2) =  20.27, p  <  
.0001. There were individual differences in the initial status (intercepts) 
and growth rate (slopes). The thirteen dyads spent significantly different 
proportions o f their time in social frames during the early weeks and 
demonstrated variations in their developmental growth across the twelve 
week observation period.
These findings suggest that for all but four o f the dyads, the social 
frame was a historical frame because it was predominant in the early 
weeks -  occurring between 40 percent and 80 percent o f the session -  
and then declined. For the remaining dyads, the social frame remained 
at relatively low levels -  under 30 percent of the session -  across the 
observation period and therefore could not have served as a historical, 
bridging, or emerging frame for any o f these dyads because it was never 
predominant.
One finding o f interest for the social frame is that across time, the 
differences among dyads shown at earlier weeks dramatically decreased 
when the babies turned 21 weeks o f age as revealed in Figure 7.1 and in 
the significantly negative O i22 term. This term means that the higher the 
initial level o f the duration o f the social frame, the faster the rate o f decline 
with age. We interpret this finding as further support for the historical 
predominance o f the social frame for some dyads. It shows that there is a 
significant difference between dyads in the early weeks in the duration of 
the social frame and a relative lack o f difference in the later weeks.
Guided object fram e
The duration o f the guided object frame was modeled by a linear 
function o f infant age (see Table 7.1). Inspection o f Figure 7.1(b) 
showed that most dyads gradually reduced their time spent in the guided 
object frame across time, with the exception o f one dyad that remained 
relatively unchanged and one dyad that increased across time. Inclu­
sion o f the level 2 random parameters revealed that there were signifi­
cant age-dependent differences among dyads, / “(2) =  20.04, p  <  .0001. 
Significant individual differences in the initial status (intercepts) and 
growth rate (slopes and direction o f change) were found. Individual 
differences were greater in earlier than later weeks.
These findings show that for all but one o f the dyads, the guided 
object frame was historically predominant -  occurring for 40 to 80 
percent o f the session -  and then declined. Depending upon the dyad, 
then, at least one and possibly two frames, the social frame or the guided 
object frame, fit the model o f  sequence (P t) for a historical frame.
T he O i22 term is significantly negative for the guided object frame, 
showing a similar pattern as for the social frame. The negative correl­
ation between the intercept and the slope (r =  —.99) indicated that the 
dyads who spent the most time in the guided object frame initially had 
a faster rate o f decline. The result was that the differences among dyads, 
which were relatively large in the early weeks, reduced to the lowest 
point when infants were at 17-21 weeks o f  age. Thus, not only are the
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social frame and the guided object frame historically predominant for 
many of the dyads, differences between dyads for these frames are most 
salient in the period when these frames are historically predominant.
It is also possible that the guided object frames may have served 
as developmental bridging frames for some o f the dyads. N ote that some 
dyads have a relatively slow rate o f decline o f the guided object frame 
which takes up about 40 to 50 percent o f the session across the entire 
period o f observation. If the guided object frame remains relatively high, 
it is unlikely to be the bridging frame. It may be that if the social frame 
for some o f these dyads was initially predominant and then declined, the 
guided object frame would then increase and become the more predom­
inant frame during the middle sessions. Examination o f the trajectories 
of frames within dyads (see below) is the only conclusive way to deter­
mine which frame serves which function for a particular case.
Not-guided object fram e
The duration o f the not-guided object frame was modeled by a quadratic 
function o f infant age (see Table 7.1). As shown in Figure 7.1c, during 
the early weeks, all dyads exhibited a very similar pattern o f having 
relatively low durations o f the not-guided object frame. During the later 
weeks, there was a dramatic acceleration in the duration o f this frame. 
Inclusion of the level 2 random parameters (covariance and variances) 
revealed that there were significant age-dependent differences among 
dyads, / 2(2 ) =  37.37, p  <  .0001. Although no significant individual 
differences were found in initial status and the relation between initial 
status and growth rate, there were significant individual differences in 
growth rate. Although all dyads spent very little time in the not-guided 
object frame during the earlier weeks, they rapidly diverged across time 
showing that each dyad has a different developmental history.
These findings clearly show that the not-guided object frame was the 
newly emerging frame for all the dyads. It was relatively low in duration 
during the early and middle weeks, so it could not have served in the 
role o f historical or bridging frame, at least not from the perspective of 
being predominant in duration. The rapidly accelerating trajectories for 
all the dyads suggest that this frame came to replace all the others as the 
predominant frame for all the dyads.
Social/object mixed fram e
The duration o f the social/object mixed frame was modeled by a cubic 
function of infant age (see Table 7.1). As shown in Figure 7 .Id, all
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dyads exhibited slow acceleration in the duration o f the social/object 
mixed frame between 5 and 9-11 weeks and a more rapid increase until 
21-23  weeks. After the growth reached its peak, a slow decrement was 
followed by a more rapid decline between 25-31 weeks. Inclusion o f the 
level 2 random parameters (covariance and variances) revealed that 
there were significant age-dependent differences among dyads, # (1) =  
8.09, p  < .0 1 . Significant individual differences were found in the growth 
rate only. Initially, all dyads spent little time in the social/object mixed 
frame. The acceleration o f the growth o f the social/object mixed frame 
for some dyads was more dramatic than for others. Thus, during the 
middle weeks, there were significant individual differences in the duration 
of the social/object mixed frame.
These results suggest that for at least some o f the dyads, the social/ 
object mixed frame was a strong candidate for being a developmental 
bridging frame. It fits the model for a bridging frame in at least two 
different ways. First, the duration was most predominant during the 
middle sessions for all dyads. The social/object mixed frame had an 
inverted U-shaped trajectory that was predicted in proposition 1. The 
trajectory peaked just after the acquisition o f visually guided reaching. 
Second, as we found for the other frames, between-dyad differences 
were most diverse during the period in which this frame was the most 
predominant.
This latter finding suggests that during the bridging period, which is a 
turning point in the trajectories, there is increased variability between 
dyads. The first author, in collaboration with M. Lavelli, found a very 
similar pattern o f divergence between developmental trajectories for 
face-to-face play (i.e., the social frame) occurring during a developmen­
tal transition in infant social engagement around two months o f age 
(Lavelli & Fogel, 2002). This is consistent with the prediction, from 
dynamic systems theory, that variability increases during developmental 
transition periods and then declines thereafter.
In summary, the modeled trajectories provide at least initial support 
for proposition 1. They show that some frames were predominant in the 
early sessions, some in the middle sessions, and some in the later ses­
sions. This result is more than trivial. The frames that we interpreted to 
be historical, bridging, and emerging are consistent with the findings in 
the literature for the changes expected to occur in mother-infant com­
munication around the fourth month o f life. Historical frames were 
those involving the most social participation of the mother, either for 
social play (social frame) or for socially guiding the infant’s attention to 
objects (guided object frame). The emerging frame was for the infant’s 
relatively independent exploration of the objects in the company o f the
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mother (not-guided object frame). The bridging frame (social/object 
mixed frame) combined qualities o f  both historical and emerging frames 
as objects were used for social play during the social/object mixed frame.
Links between frames
One problem with the analysis presented thus far is that each frame is 
considered by itself with no regard for how it changes with respect to 
other frames. To more completely test proposition 1, we need to show  
how the frames change over time with respect to each other w ith in  each 
dyad. One way to examine links between frames is using multiple cor­
relation analysis. All frames sum to a total o f 100 percent o f  the session, 
so there is clearly interdependency. The correlational analysis, however, 
can show which specific interdependencies are most likely to occur. In 
Table 7.2, we show correlations between frames for each dyad separ­
ately. From the correlations alone, we cannot say anything about devel­
opment. We can, however, make developmental inferences by examining 
the correlations in light of what we know about the developmental 
trajectories. The raw data developmental trajectories for each of the 
frames within each o f the thirteen dyads are shown in Figure 7.2. N ote  
that the four representative dyads, which will be studied in more detail 
in Chapters 8 -11 , are Dyad 6 (Richard), Dyad 7 (Lewis), Dyad 9 
(Susan), and Dyad 10 (Betsy).
The results show that there is a great deal o f between-dyad variability. 
For most dyads, there are negative correlations between the duration of  
the social frame and the durations o f all the other frames, although these 
correlations do not always reach significance. This suggests that as the 
social frame decreases in duration, there is a corresponding increase in 
duration of the other frames for most o f the dyads. This pattern can be 
seen clearly in one o f the four representative dyads, Dyad 9, Susan and 
her mother.
Similarly, most dyads had a negative correlation between the not- 
guided object frame and the guided object frame, suggesting that as 
the not-guided object frame increases in duration, there is a correspond­
ing decrease in the guided object frame. These findings are all consistent 
with the model in sequence (P i), that is, when either the social or guided 
object frames (historical frames) are high in a session, the not-guided  
object frame (emerging frame) is low, and vice-versa. This pattern is best 
illustrated in one of the four representative dyads, Dyad 10, Betsy and 
her mother.
The social/object mixed frame shows primarily negative correlations 
with the guided object frame and the social frame, suggesting that it
T a b le  7 .2 .  Correlations between frames by individual dyad
Dyads
Correlations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Between frames Ben Andrew Peter Gavin Jerry Richard Lewis Edward Susan Betsy Linda Ruth Anne
Social/guided object — 97*** -.27 -.37 -.68* -.20 -.25 -.08 -.43 -.5 5 + -.3 3 -.33 -.45 -.05
Social/not-guided object — 91*** -.79** -.81** -.4 3 - .3 6 -.59* -.23 -.4 4 -.59* .20 -.07 -.07 -.4 3
Social/social-object
mixed
-.82** -.73** -.75** -.62* -.2 6 .37 -.41 -.41 - .5 3 + .07 -.4 3 -.74** -.73**
Guided object/not- 
guided object
.81** -.3 3 .13 - .2 8 -.82*** -.47 -.47 -.52+ -.1 8 -.85*** -.5 0 -.12 - .5 2 +
Guided object/social- 
object mixed
.75** -.19 .03 .47 -.5 2 + - .3 6 -.75** -.4 6 -.3 7 -.67* -.67* -.1 8 -.45
Not-guided object/ 
social-object mixed
.58* .68* .32 - .1 4 .49 -.47 .08 .49 .64* .21 .29 -.20 .22
Note: N =  12; + p < . 1 0  
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001
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becomes predominant as a bridging frame when the historical frames are 
low in duration. On the other hand, there is no consistent pattern o f  
correlations across dyads for the link between the social/object mixed 
frame and the not-guided object frame. This means that the social/object 
mixed frame may or may not remain an active part o f the dyad’s com ­
munication as the emerging (not-guided object) frame becom es pre­
dominant. One o f our representative dyads, Richard and his mother 
(Dyad 6), has a negative correlation. As the social/object mixed frame 
begins to decline after its peak at session 8, the not-guided object 
frame begins to increase. For another representative dyad, Susan and 
her mother (Dyad 9), there is a correlated growth in both these frames 
beginning around session 6.
In summary, these data show that there are systematic links between  
the developmental trajectories o f  frames within dyads. These links on 
the whole support the general model o f the growth o f the not-guided  
object frame in relation to the corresponding changes in the other frames 
and the existence o f bridging frames. The results also point to the 
existence of inter-dyad differences in the relative sequencing between 
trajectories. These differences will be explored in more detail for the four 
representative dyads in Chapters 8-11 .
P ro p o sitio n s 3 and  4: d eve lop m en t o f  in fant action
We also examine the contribution o f infant actions to the developmental 
trajectories o f frames (proposition 3) and the sequence o f development 
of infant actions on objects (proposition 4). We expect infant actions to 
develop in sequence and to be related to developmental changes in 
frames.
P rop osition  3. In fan ts’ p articu lar  form s o f  action  tow ard  objects  
(the d u ration s o f  gazin g , tou ch in g , and/or m ou th in g) w ill relate  
to the d eve lop m en ta l tra jectories for the d u ration s o f  the fram es.
To examine the association between the growth o f frames and infant’s 
actions on objects, multilevel modeling analyses were performed separ­
ately for each o f the frames. Five different types o f action with objects 
were examined: gazing without touching objects, touching while gazing 
at objects, touching without gazing at the objects, mouthing while 
gazing at objects, and mouthing without gazing at objects. The duration 
of these five different actions toward objects was derived by computing 
the co-occurrence o f the infant’s gaze direction and specific manual or 
oral actions. For example, the duration o f mouthing while gazing at the
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object was the total duration (expressed as a proportion o f the session) o f  
the mouthing action that was accompanied by visual attention to 
the object. The status o f the infant’s visually-guided reaching and one 
of these forms o f infant action with objects were added as covariates to 
the best-fitting polynomial model o f  each individual frame to examine 
their contribution to the growth o f individual frames.
Infant gazin g  at ob jects w ith ou t to u ch in g  th em . As shown in 
Table 7.3, the status o f infant’s visually-guided reaching had no signifi­
cant effect on the growth o f frames. In addition, when infant reaching 
and gazing at objects without touching them were added as the covari­
ates of the models, inclusion o f the level 2 random parameters revealed 
that there were significant individual differences among dyads: *2(2) =  
6.53,/) <  .05 for social frames; / 2(2) =  11.15, p  <  .01 for guided object 
frames; 2) =  36.89, p  <  .0001 for not-guided object frames; / 2(2) =  
7.64, p  <  .05 for social/object mixed frames. The fixed parameters 
explained approximately 29.6 to 51.5 percent o f the total variance, 
whereas individual differences accounted for approximately 8.1 to 26.1 
percent o f the total variance o f the models.
Furthermore, there was a significant association between the duration 
of infant gazing without touching objects and the growth o f social as well 
as guided object frames. W hen infants spent more time gazing without 
touching objects, the duration o f social frames declined while the dur­
ation o f the guided object frames increased across time. Moreover, the 
degree o f the effect o f gazing without touching on the development o f  
the two frames (or vice versa) was significantly different between dyads. 
For some dyads, in other words, changes in gazing without touching 
objects were more strongly associated with the changes in these frames 
than for other dyads.
Infant to u ch in g  objects w h ile  gazin g  at th em . As shown in Table 
7.4, when infant reaching and touching objects while gazing at them  
were added as covariates in the models, inclusion o f the level 2 random 
parameters revealed that there were significant individual differences 
among dyads for all frames with the exception o f social frames: / 2(2) =  
22.45, p  <  .0001 for guided object frames; *2(2) =  29.94, p  <  .0001 for 
not-guided object frames; / 2(1) =  8.75, p  <  .01 for social/object mixed 
frames. The fixed parameters explained approximately 13.9 to 55.1 
percent o f  the total variance, whereas the individual differences
Caption for fig. 7.2 (com.)
Figure 7.2. Raw data developmental trajectories of the proportional 
duration (percent of session) of each of the frames as a function of 
infant age for each of the dyads.
T a b le  7 .3 .  Association between frames and infant gazing without touching objects
Parameters
Frames
Social Guided object Not-guided object Social/object mixed
Fixed
Intercept 59.71 (8.985) 28.73 (5.695)
Age 5.247 (2.232)
Age2 -0.805  (0.209) — 0.082 (0.025) 0.395 (0.161)
Age’ 0.023 (0.006) — — -0.013  (0.004)
Reaching
Gazing at objcct -0 .635  (0.083) 0.709 (0.07)
Random
Oo2 246.7 (137.2) 158.1 (92.1) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 )
012 -13 .46  (8.765) -13 .98  (8.023) 0 (0) 0 (0)
o 22 0.809 (0.604) 1.295 (0.733) 0.673 (0.289) 0.
Error
O2 230.2 (28.22) 181.7 (22.39) 92.13 (10.9) 136 (16.08)
% of variance explained by fixed parameters 50.0 51.5 44.1 29.6
% of variance explained 9.0 15.2 26.1 8.1
by level-2 random Parameters (individual
differences)
% of variance reduced by addition of 0 0 ?
covariates ?
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Only significant fixed parameters are reported.
T a b le  7 .4 .  Associations between frames and infant touching while gazing at objects
Frames





43.23 (9.441) 59.97 (7.884) 
-1 .465  (0.646)
0.084 (0.025) 0.388 (0.162)
Age3 - - -0 .013  (0.004)
Reaching
Touching while gazing at object -0 .434  (0.149) 0.175 (0.082)
Random
o„2 106.3 (52.93) 523.6 (251.6) 0 (0) 0 (0)
O 12 - -37 .88  (18.59) 0 (0 ) -
o22 - 2.787 (1.416) 0.583 (0.254) 0.431 (0.206)
Error
O2 340.7 (40.29) 276.9 (34.03) 90.46 (10.7) 134.9 (15.95)
% of variance explained by fixed parameters 25.5 13.9 55.1 29.3
% of variance explained by level-2 random 0 19.5 23.6 9.3
parameters (individual differences)
% of variance reduced by addition of covariates ? — 4.0 -
Note: S tandard errors arc in  parentheses. O n ly  s ign ifican t fixed  param eters are reported.
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accounted for approximately 9.8 to 24.0 percent of the total variance of 
the models.
Furthermore, there were significant associations between touching 
objects while gazing them and the growth o f social as well as not-guided 
object frames, but not with the guided object or social/object mixed 
frame. W hen the infant engaged in more touching objects while gazing 
at them, the growth o f social frames declined. Moreover, there were no 
significant individual differences in the negative relationship between 
the infant’s touching objects while gazing at them and the growth o f  
the social frame. On the contrary, touching objects while gazing at them  
was associated with an increment o f the not-guided object frame across 
time and the extent o f the effect was significantly different between 
dyads.
In fant to u ch in g  objects w ith ou t gazin g  a t th em . As shown in 
Table 7.5, inclusion o f the level 2 random parameters revealed that there 
were significant individual differences among dyads for all frames when 
infant reaching and the duration o f infant touching objects without 
gazing at them were added to the models as covariates: / 2(2) =  17.55, 
p  <  .0002 for social frames; *2(2) =  14.72, p  <  .0006 for guided object 
frames; y 2(2) =  35.69, p  <  .0001 for not-guided object frames; / 2(2) =  
4.29, p  <  .10 for social/object mixed frames. The fixed parameters 
explained approximately 21.8 to 44.6 percent o f the total variance, 
whereas individual differences accounted for approximately 5.3 to 25.5  
percent o f  the total variance o f the models.
In addition, only the associations between infant touching objects 
without gazing at them and the growth o f guided object and social/object 
mixed frames were significant. The growth o f the guided object frame 
declined when the infant spent more time touching objects without 
gazing at them while the growth o f the social/object mixed frame in­
creased. Moreover, there were significant individual differences between 
dyads in the relationship between touching objects without gazing at 
them and the development o f guided object and social/object mixed 
frames.
Infant m o u th in g  ob jects w h ile  gazin g  a t th em . As shown in Table 
7.6, when infant reaching status and mouthing while gazing at objects 
were added as covariates to the models, the inclusion o f the level 2 
random parameters demonstrated that there were significant individual 
differences among dyads for all frames: / 2(2) — 19.54, p  <  .0001 for social 
frames; 2) = 2 1 .8 6  , p <  .0001 for guided object frames; *2(1) =  37.42, 
p  <  .0001 for not-guided object frames; x20 )  =  9.21, p  <  .01 for social/ 
object mixed frames. The fixed parameters explained approximately 
14.2 to 44.2 percent o f the total variance, whereas individual differences
T a b le  7 .5 .  Associations between frames and infant touching without gazing at objects
Parameters
Frames
Social Guided object Not-guided object Social/object mixed
Fixed
Intercept 44.5 (10.35) 60.04 (7.048)
Age -1 .179  (0.551)
Age2 -0.463  (0.222) - 0.080 (0.026) 0.42 (0.157)
Age 3 0.015 (0.006) - - -0 .014  (0.004)
Reaching
Touching Object while not gazing at object -0 .364 (0.128) 0.208 (0.092)
Random
O02 524.1 (259) 399.3 (203.1) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 )
0|2 -25 .2  (14.04) -26 .32  (14.14) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 )
o22 1.153 (0.79) 1.795 (1.027) 0.665 (0.286) 0.335 (0.167)
Error
O2 307.8 (37.26) 269.7 (33.09) 92.17 (10.9) 133.5 (15.79)
% of variance explained by fixed parameters 24.3 21.8 44.6 33.1
% of variance explained by level-2 random parameters 11.4 15.2 25.5 5.3
(individual differences)
% of variance reduced by addition of covariates - 2.6 - 3.7
Note: S tandard errors are in  parentheses. O n ly  s ign ifican t fixed  parameters are reported.
T a b le  7 .6 .  Associations between frames and infant mouthing while gazing at objects
Parameters
Frames
Social Guided object Not-guided object Social/object mixed
Fixed
Intercept 44.84 (10.64) 56.38 (7.658)
Age2 -0 .434  (0.227) - 0.079 (0.025) 0.320 (0.153)
Age3 0.013 (0.006) - - -0 .012  (0.004)
Reaching
Mouthing while gazing at object 0.641 (0.161)
Random
O02 573.1 (278.9) 510.9 (246.3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Ol2 —29.41 (15.8) -35 .49  (17.58) - -
o 22 1.476 (0.928) 2.489 (1.292) 0.670 (0.288) 0.412 (0.195)
Error
O2 306.4 (37.2) 277.8 (34.04) 91.42 (10.81) 122.8 (14.52)
% of variance explained by fixed parameters 22.2 14.2 44.2 33.8
% of variance explained by level-2 random parameters 13.3 18.1 26.4 9.0
(individual differences)
% of variance reduced by addition of covariates - - - 11.4
Note: S tandard errors are in  parentheses. O n ly  s ign ifican t fixed parameters are reported.
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accounted for approximately 9.0 to 26.4 percent o f  the total variance o f  
the models.
Results showed that as the infant engaged in more mouthing objects 
while gazing at them, the dyad was more likely to be involved in the 
social/object mixed frame. Additionally, the magnitude o f the relation­
ship between mouthing objects while gazing at them and the develop­
m ent o f  the social/object mixed frame was significantly different between  
dyads.
Infant m o u th in g  ob jects w ith ou t g az in g  a t th em . As shown in 
Table 7.7, inclusion o f the level 2 random parameters with infant reach­
ing and infant mouthing objects without gazing at them as covariates 
revealed individual differences among dyads for all frames: / 2(2) =  
19.92, p  <  .0001 for social frames; *2(2) — 21.7, p  <  .0001 for guided 
object frames; ^2(1) =  37.33, p  <  .0001 for not-guided object frames; 
/ 2(2) =  7.39, p  <  .05 for social/object mixed frames. The fixed param­
eters explained approximately 14.2 to 44.2 percent o f the total variance, 
whereas individual differences accounted for approximately 8 .1 to 26.4  
percent o f the total variance o f the models.
Mouthing objects without gazing at them had a significant positive 
relationship with the growth of the social/object mixed frame. Consi­
dering the results from infant mouthing objects while gazing at them in 
the previous section, it seemed that when the infant was mouthing 
objects, regardless o f the direction o f the visual attention, the dyad was 
more likely to spend time in the social/object mixed frame. Furthermore, 
there were also significant individual differences in the degree o f  the 
association between mouthing objects without gazing at them and the 
growth of the social/object mixed frame.
In summary, die emergence o f  individual differences in the frames 
was closely related to the infant’s actions with objects. When infants 
spent more time gazing at objects without touching, the mothers were 
more likely to demonstrate and scaffold objects (the guided object 
frame). When infants were gazing while touching objects, mothers were 
more likely to observe their infant’s object play (not-guided object 
frame) and less likely to engage their infants in social play. Lastly, when 
infants were mouthing objects, the dyad was more likely to engage in 
social/object mixed games (regardless o f the direction o f infant gazing). 
These findings fit with the results for the development of frames.
For all dyads in the sample, the not-guided object frame was the newly 
emerging frame. Infant visually guided manual exploration o f objects 
(i.e., touching and mouthing objects while gazing at them), then, devel­
oped primarily once this frame -  in which mothers provided only verbal 
support for infants’ actions on objects -  began to increase in duration.
T a b le  7 .7 .  Association between frames and infant mouthing without gazing at objects
Frames
Parameter Social Guided object Not-guided object Social/object mixed
Fixed
Intercept 45.23 (10.68) 57.9 (7.616)
Age
Age2 -0.461 (0.226) - 0.083 (0.025) 0.376 (0.159)
Age’ 0.014 (0.006) - - -0 .013  (0.004)
Reaching
Mouthing while not gazing at object 0.228 (0.111)
Random
O02 578.6 (281.4) 506.8 (245.0) 0 (0 ) 0 (0 )
O12 -29 .69  (15.88) -35 .62  (17.66) - 0 (0 )
o 22 1.483 (0.929) 2.533 (1.311) 0.691 (0.296) 0.363 (0.178)
Error
O2 310.2 (37.63) 279.6 (34.3) 91.59 (10.83) 133.5 (15.79)
% of variance explained by fixed parameters 21.1 14.2 44.2 32.0
% variance explained by level-2 random parameters 13.1 18.4 26.4 8.1
(individual differences)
% of variance reduced by addition of covariates - - - 3.7
Note: S tandard errors are in  parentheses. O n ly  s ign ifican t fixed parameters are reported.
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Although object mouthing while gazing has been shown to be directly 
linked to object exploration (Rochat, 1989; Ruff, 1984), our results 
show that at this age all forms o f object mouthing, as well as touching 
objects without gazing at them, occurred in relation to longer durations 
of the social/object mixed frame. In this frame, objects are used as 
mediators o f  social play, rather than as direct foci o f attention and 
exploration. Infants held or mouthed objects while engaging in more 
socially oriented play with mother or mother used the object to initiate 
social play with objects.
As discussed earlier, the social/object mixed frame reaches a peak in 
the middle weeks o f our observation period, followed by a decline, and 
for some dyads it may serve as a bridge between guided object and not- 
guided object frames. The data presented in this section suggest that 
object exploration skills are not being developed during the social/object 
mixed frame. The bridging function o f this frame may be more related 
to being a break from exploratory object play (in the guided and not- 
guided object frames) that allows the dyad an opportunity to re-connect 
in a more social way while still maintaining a contact with objects. These 
data suggest that developmental periods can be distinguished not only by 
the salience o f  particular frames but also by the occurrence o f particular 
types o f infant actions.
P rop osition  4. T he in fa n t’s acq u isitio n  o f  sk illed  a ctio n s w ith  
objects w ill em erge in  a d evelop m en ta l seq u en ce . The age of the 
onset of individual infant actions with objects was tallied across all 
thirteen infants (see Table 7.8). With the exception o f infant reach, the 
onset age o f infant actions on objects was coded under two conditions: 
(1) the mother was supporting and holding the object for the infant; 
and (2) the infant was holding the object independently. Some infant 
actions emerged earlier than others. Reaching, manipulation, grasping 
with one hand, and mouthing, for example, were more likely to be 
observed at younger ages than the actions such as shake, grasping with 
two hands, and squeeze. Some infant object actions (e.g., manipulation, 
grasp with one hand, mouthing, and squeeze) exhibited earlier onset 
ages during the condition when mothers held the object, whereas other 
actions (e.g., shake and grasp with two hands) emerged earlier when 
infants held the object. As will be seen in the qualitative analyses (Chap­
ters 8 -11 ), some o f these same patterns emerge as innovations in the 
dyad.
To examine the differences in the onset age o f  infant actions in relation 
to its context (infant held object independently or mother held object 
for infant), a 2 (Context: M other vs. Infant) x 6 (Infant Action on
Table 7.8. Developmental emergence o f individual infant actions under two conditions: when mother held the object for the 






5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Mean
24 (SD)*
Reach Mother 4/13 6/13 7/13 10/13 11/13 11/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 9.15
(4.47)
Manipulate Mother 1/13 1/13 2/13 5/13 6/13 7/13 10/13 10/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 10.38
(3.57)
Infant 3/13 4/13 7/13 9/13 9/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 11.00
(2.89)
Grasp with Mother 1/13 1/13 1/13 3/13 4/13 6/13 10/13 11/13 11/13 11/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 11.00
one hand (3.94)
Infant 3/13 7/13 8/13 9/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 12.69
(3.17)
Mouthing Mother 1/13 2/13 2/13 2/13 4/13 5/13 7/13 7/13 9/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 13.31
(3.50)
Infant 1/13 2/13 3/13 3/13 3/13 4/13 4/13 6/13 8/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 15.15
(3.69)
Shaking Mother 1/13 1/13 1/13 3/13 5/13 7/13 9/13 10/13 11/13 11/13 13/13 16.46
(2.85)
Infant 2/13 5/13 6/13 7/13
Grasp with Mother 1/13 2/13 3/13 4/13
two hands
Infant 1/13 2/13 3/13
Squeeze M other-f 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 3/12
Infant 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 1/13 3/13 3/13
Note: =  At least half of the infants performed the action.
*= Mean and standard deviation of the infant’s age when the action 
+  = Squeeze action was never observed with one subject.
7/13 8/13 10/13 10/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 14.08
(3.57)
5/13 6/13 8/13 9/12 9/13 11/13 12/13 13/13 16.62
(3.52)
4/13 5/13 6/13 8/13 10/13 10/13 11/13 13/13 16.38
(3.28)
3/12 3/12 5/12 5/12 6/12 10/12 11/12 11/12 12/12 16.58
(4.54)
4/13 5/13 6/13 7/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 12/13 12/13 13/13 16.85
(4.72)
for the first time.
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Reach — — — — — — —
Manipulation = — = < < < <
Grasp with = = — < < < <
one hand
Mouthing > > = — = = =
Shake > > > > — < <
Grasp with > > > > = — =
two hands
Squeeze > > > = - —
Note: Paired comparisons of the age of onset of infant action when the infant possesses an 
object are on the upper diagonal; and comparisons presented on the lower diagonal when 
the mother possesses an object.
“= ” No significant differences between the age of onset of infant action.
“< ” The age of the onset of infant action on the coordinate is significantly earlier than that 
of on the abscissa.
“> ” The age of the onset of infant action on the coordinate is significantly later than that of 
on the abscissa.
“—” No comparison is made.
Object: Manipulation, Grasp with one hand, M outhing, Shaking, Grasp 
with two hands, and Squeeze) repeated measures ANOVA was per­
formed. The results showed that there was a significant main effect of 
Infant Action, F  (12) =  12.79, p  =  .0001. Although there was no 
significant main effect o f  Context, F  (12) =  0.24, p  >  . 10, the interaction 
effect o f Infant Action on Object x Context was significant, F  (12) =  
5.79, p  <  .01. The post-hoc analyses revealed that infants exhibited 
grasping (with one hand) earlier if their mothers held the object whereas 
infants displayed shaking actions at younger ages when they were hold­
ing the object by themselves. There were no significant differences in the 
onset age o f manipulation, grasp with two hands, mouthing, or squeeze 
regardless o f whether the infant was holding the object independently or 
not. The post-hoc multiple comparisons test (see Table 7.9) also showed 
that the first group o f infant actions to emerge were reach, manipulation, 
and grasp with one hand, and the second group o f infant actions 
included mouthing and shake. Grasp with two hands and squeeze were 
the third and last group o f infant actions to emerge.
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In sum, despite the fact that there were individual differences in the 
timing o f the emergence o f infant object actions, the acquisition of 
different object actions occurred in an invariant developmental se­
quence. The sequence we found is similar to that reported in the litera­
ture and shown in Table 2.1. These findings show that the emergence o f  
more complex infant actions along with infants independently holding 
objects (primarily during the not-guided object frame) depends historic­
ally on the earlier acquisition o f more basic actions on objects while 
mother holds the objects (primarily during the guided object frame). As 
we examine the development o f innovations in Chapters 8 -1 1 , it is 
worth remembering that the innovative infant actions occurring during 
frames and transitions are superimposed on a more general pattern o f  
infant motor development.
S u m m ary
In general, we find evidence supporting all o f our propositions. First, the 
developmental trajectories o f frames show evidence that there are histor­
ical, bridging, and emerging frames. What specific frame will serve each 
of these developmental functions (i.e., historical, bridging or emerging) 
will depend on the relational history of each mother-infant dyad which 
can only be revealed by a qualitative relational-historical analysis. H is­
torical frames tend to be predominant early, bridging frames tend to 
be predominant in the middle sessions, and emerging frames tend to be 
predominant in the final sessions. Second, durations o f infant actions 
on objects are generally related to the prior and concurrent durations 
of the appropriate frame. Finally, the infant innovations in actions on 
objects that we will describe in the next four chapters appear to emerge 
in an invariant sequence.
Decreases in the durations o f historical frames and increases in the 
durations o f newly emerging frames are only suggestive o f  a possible 
historical link between them. Only the qualitative analysis (Chapters 
8-11) can reveal whether the newly emerging frames arise from innov­
ation introduced into the historical background frames. History implies 
a meaningful relationship between events in a sequence and for that we 
must turn to qualitative research.
8 R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n :  
q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  R i c h a r d  a n d  h i s  m o t h e r
In order to understand proposition 1 historically, we have to examine the 
patterns o f  change across frames within dyads. We illustrate these his­
torical patterns and interdyad differences with a quantitative description 
of frames and transitions for the four representative dyads that will be 
used for the qualitative analysis, followed by a detailed qualitative de­
scription o f the historical processes with each dyad. In this chapter, we 
focus on the first o f  the four representative dyads, Richard and his 
mother. In Chapters 9 -1 1 , we review the other three representative dyads 
respectively. In this chapter, we also give an overview o f the analytical 
approach.
Our criterion for selecting the four dyads was based on the develop­
ment o f interdyad differences. We chose two dyads in which the infants 
developed a preference for object play as judged by relatively higher 
durations, compared to the other research participants, o f the not-guided 
object frame in the post-reaching period (Richard and Betsy and their 
mothers). We chose two comparison dyads that showed relatively 
lower durations in not-guided object frames, and relatively higher 
durations in the mixed social-object frame during the post-reach 
period (Lewis and Susan and their mothers). These two pairs of 
dyads, therefore, correspond to the interdyad differences found in 
the literature (see Chapter 2): dyads that are relatively more focused 
on object play compared to dyads that are relatively more focused on  
social play. Betsy and her mother were African-American and the 
other dyads were Caucasian-American.
In Chapters 8 -1 1 , we first present the raw data developmental trajec­
tories for each frame within each o f the four dyads. The analysis is 
similar to the presentation o f the modeled developmental trajectories 
in the previous section. We also present data on the frequency o f each of 
the twelve possible transitions between frames as a function of age for 
each o f the four representative dyads. According to proposition 1, there 
should be a higher frequency o f transitions between historical and 
bridging frames and between bridging frames and emerging frames.
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Conversely, there should be a relatively low frequency o f transitions 
between historical and emerging frames. Bridging frames should medi­
ate transitions between other frames during the period when the 
bridging frames are relatively high in duration. Because we are present­
ing observations within each dyad, the data are presented descriptively 
without any statistical analysis.
T estin g  research  p rop osition s w ith  q u a lita tive  an a lysis
In Chapter 7, we tested our research propositions (refer to Chapter 5) 
using quantitative analysis. In Chapters 8 -1 1 , we return to those prop­
ositions on which a qualitative analysis can shed further light, in parti­
cular propositions 1, 2, and 3. These propositions refer to the predicted 
commonalities in the relational-historical development o f the dyads. Our 
research design rests on the premise that general principles o f relational 
developmental change can best be ascertained by studying each dyad 
separately. In this way, we can learn about both commonalities o f the 
developmental process as well as differences between dyads in their de­
velopmental process. Using principles o f case study research (Chapter 
6), we take the view that general laws o f development can best be 
understood by observing what is common across individual cases.
Proposition 1
Qualitative analysis on propositions 1, 2, and 3 was discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 5. Proposition 1 is tested by a combination o f quantita­
tive and qualitative analysis. In this section, we review the findings from 
Chapter 7 relevant to proposition 1 and suggest how qualitative analysis 
can contribute. Proposition 1 makes the prediction that relational- 
historical change will occur in three phases: (1) an initial phase in which 
there is one predominant historical frame; (2) a second phase in which a 
different frame becomes predominant and serves as a developmental 
bridge; and (3) a final phase in which a new frame emerges as predominant.
(P i) (Historical <-* Bridging) => (Bridging <-* Emerging)
This was confirmed in part using the quantitative analysis in Chapter 7 
which demonstrated that the social/object mixed frame had an inverted 
U-shaped trajectory, peaking in the middle sessions. Qualitative analysis 
can be used to further examine the relational-historical model suggested 
by sequence (P i). For example, in what ways do the frames that fit the 
quantitative requirements for serving a bridging function differ in their 
patterns o f co-action from the predominant historical and emerging
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frames? Our theoretical model of bridging frames (refer to Chapter 3) 
suggests that they should contain actions that are common both to the 
historical frames and the emerging frames. We predicted this because we 
expected that realtime transitions between frames that shared actions in 
com m on (i.e., between historical and bridging or between bridging and 
emerging) would be relatively easier for a dyad than realtime transitions 
between frames that were relatively more different from each other 
(historical and emerging).
Methodological approach and narrative conventions
For each dyad, observers wrote detailed descriptions o f infant and 
mother actions during each instance o f a frame and a realtime transition. 
These are called sequence narratives (refer to Chapter 6). Next, based 
on the sequence narratives, observers wrote a description of the high­
lights o f  each weekly observation session, summarizing the main features 
of frames, realtime transitions, and infant and mother actions. These 
documents are called summary narratives. In the final step, the one 
presented in detail in this chapter, observers read the summary narratives 
across all the sessions and wrote historical narratives (refer to Chapter 
6). The historical narratives that are written here were designed to 
accomplish two goals. The first was to reduce the complexity o f the data 
by describing similarities and differences between sessions. The second 
was to describe the process o f  historical emergence o f  new frames out of 
historical and bridging frames.
For the first goal, observers read the summary narratives and noticed 
patterns o f similarity between adjacent sessions. Sessions were judged to 
be similar if they showed comparable frame and realtime transition 
dynamics. In this way, we discovered that the twelve observation ses­
sions o f each dyad formed themselves into three or four developmental 
periods. Since each dyad was analyzed separately, there was no attempt 
to make the developmental periods uniform across dyads. For each 
dyad, there are a different number o f sessions within each developmental 
period. Different realtime processes occur during each period across the 
four dyads.
The judgment o f similarity in frame and transition dynamics between 
sessions was made using the constant comparative method, described in 
Chapter 4. In order to search for innovations in the sequence narratives, 
observers were trained to detect similarities and differences in the dyna­
mics between instances o f  frames and transitions. Detecting similarities 
and differences between sessions is not conceptually or methodologically
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different to comparing instances. The comparison between instances 
and sessions requires observers who are well acquainted with the data, 
as explained in Chapters 4 and 6. One measure o f the reliability of the 
demarcation of developmental periods is that the observer for the tran­
sitions and the observer for the frames agreed after independent obser­
vations of the videotape. These developmental periods are not meant to 
be taken as discrete stages o f development nor as indicating that there 
are four (as opposed to three or five) developmental periods during the 
social-to-object transition. They were used primarily for simplifying 
the data and for convenience o f description.
In order to further simplify the description, the following conven­
tions are used in the narratives. For each chapter, the developmental 
periods are described in sequence, followed by a developmental sum­
mary for the dyad. Within the description o f each developmental 
period, first frames are described and then realtime transitions. The  
word transition in these chapters always refers to realtime transitions. 
Frames are described in the following order: the social frame, the 
guided object frame, the not-guided object frame and the social/object 
mixed frame. When used as examples, instances o f  sequence narratives 
are set off in indented paragraphs. Sequence narratives describe level 1 
change (ordinary variability within frames and transitions). Level 2 
changes (innovations in frame and transition dynamics) are described 
in the body o f the historical narratives. Level 3 changes (developmental 
dynamics) are described in the summaries at the end o f each develop­
mental period and also in the developmental summary at the end o f the 
chapter.
D ev e lo p m en ta l tra jectories and  tran sition  freq u en cies
As shown in Figure 7.1 (raw data developmental trajectories) and Table 
8.1, the historically predominant frame for this dyad was the guided 
object frame, which was predominant until session 5. The newly emer­
ging frame was the not-guided object frame, which became predomin­
ant relative to other frames in session 7, just after Richard acquired 
visually guided reaching. The bridging frame for this dyad appeared 
to be the social/object mixed frame and the social frame combined. 
Both o f these frames are more predominant in the middle sessions, 
illustrating an inverted U-shaped trajectory. For Richard and his mother, 
then, most sessions were dominated by object oriented play. Both the 
social frame and the social/object mixed frame remained relatively low in 
duration.




























Frequency 0 8 6 4 1 1 1 5 3 0 0 1
% of session 0.00 14.32 8.75 28.10 28.24 1.05 0.45 39.86 20.63 0.00 0.00 0.42
Mean duration* - 8.59 7.00 33.72 135.56 5.04 2.18 38.26 33.01 - - 1.63
(s.d.) (-) 6.23 10.66 27.41 C-) (-) (-) 46.98 26.48 (-) (-) (-)
Guided object frame 
Frequency 7 10 3 9 7 4 12 4 7 15 8 14
% of session 73.31 57.56 29.57 58.84 40.43 21.68 39.67 4.24 25.79 47.01 17.41 41.57
Mean duration* 50.26 27.63 47.31 31.38 27.72 26.01 15.87 5.09 17.68 15.04 10.45 14.25
(s.d.) (47.03) (23.44) (44.95) (22.27) (20.43) (32.88) (17.20) (2.95) (11.07) (15.07) (8.55) (19.54)
Not-guided object frame 
Frequency 8 7 9 5 8 12 15 6 14 11 11 16
% of session 5.84 4.38 19.32 4.71 11.01 50.41 44.56 10.42 42.78 44.96 77.76 44.55
Mean duration* 3.50 3.01 10.30 4.53 6.61 20.17 14.26 8.33 14.67 19.62 33.93 13.36
(s.d.) (1.92) (1.69) (7.52) (3.49) (5.21) (27.47) (10.64) (3.74) (13.31) (15.66) (35.76) (10.09)
Social/object mixed frame 
Frequency 11 3 14 7 10 13 8 9 8 6 4 7
% of session 20.87 23.74 42.36 8.34 20.32 26.86 15.31 45.48 10.81 8.0354 4.83 13.55
Mean duration* 9.11 37.99 14.52 5.72 9.75 9.92 9.19 24.26 6.48 6.43 5.79 9.29
(s.d.) (8.37) (56.36) (18.33) (2.59) (7.65) (13.50) (7.15) (17.61) (4.62) (7.57) (2.26) (3.86)
Note: * seconds
Table 8.2. Frequency offram e transitions: Richard and his mother




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




l->3 1 1 2
3->l 1 1
2->3 6 3 5 3 4 8 3 5 9 7 8
3->2 5 2 3 3 4 2 7 3 8 8 5 10
2->4 3 3 4 2 2 I 2 1
4->2 5 1 3 2 2 1 1
3->4 1 4 2 1 2 4 1 4
4->3 1 4 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 4
Note: 1 = Social frame;
2 = Guided object frame;
3 = Not-guided object frame;
4 = Social/object mixed frame
Table 8.2 shows that prior to and including session 6, most o f the 
transitions occurred to and from the historical guided object frame (78 
out 99 transitions in the first six sessions, 79 percent). For these first six 
sessions, the transitions were primarily between the guided object frame 
and the not-guided object frame (41/78 =  53 percent), and between the 
guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame (25/78 =  32 
percent). O f the 44 transitions to and from the guided-object frame 
during sessions 1-3 , 55 percent were with the not-guided object frame 
and 20 percent with the social/object mixed frame. O f the 34 transitions to 
and from the guided-object frame during sessions 4 -6 , 47 percent were 
with the not-guided object frame and 47 percent with the social/object 
mixed frame, suggesting an increasing frequency o f transitions with the 
social/object mixed frame during these sessions. O f the 121 transitions 
during the final six sessions, 111 (89 percent) were with the not-guided 
object frames. O f these 81/111 (73 percent) were with the guided object 
frame and 27/111 (24 percent) were with the social/object mixed frame.
According to the model shown in sequence (P[), there should be a 
relatively high frequency o f transitions between the historical frame and 
a bridging frame during the early sessions and a high frequency o f transi­
tions between the emerging frame and the same bridging frame in the 
later sessions. The social/object mixed frame definitely fit this bridging
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pattern: 32 percent o f  the transitions with the historical guided object 
frame in the first six sessions were with the social/object mixed frame and 
24 percent o f  the transitions with the newly emerging not-guided object 
frame in the final six sessions were with the social/object mixed frame.
On the other hand, most o f the transitions occurred directly between 
the historical guided object frame and the emerging not-guided object 
frame both in the early and later sessions. According to the model of 
sequence (P i), there should be relatively few direct transitions between 
historical and emerging frames. The question is: how do these data 
change the model? During the first six sessions, not-guided object frames 
were o f relatively low duration compared to their duration during the 
final six sessions. This may suggest that relatively brief instances o f the 
not-guided object frame in the early sessions are qualitatively different 
from the longer instances o f this frame in the later sessions. It could be 
that these brief instances serve a bridging function along with the social/ 
object mixed frame. We will have to await the qualitative analysis below  
to discover what occurred during these brief frames.
On the other hand, the large number o f transitions between the 
guided-object frame and the not-guided object frame in the final six 
sessions appears less likely to fit the model in sequence (P i). The 
alternative model proposed in Chapter 5, sequence (P ,), in which there 
are direct transitions between historical and emerging frames, also does 
not fit because these direct transitions follow a period in which there are 
transitions, and continue to be transitions, to the social/object mixed 
bridging frame. Thus, we propose an alternative hybrid model:
(?!") Historical «-*■ Bridging Bridging +-* Emerging
’ t =► t “
--------► Emerging (brief) Historical (b rief)«--------
In this model, bridging frames (social/object mixed) and brief instances 
o f emerging frames (not-guided object) occur simultaneously during the 
early sessions. This simultaneous occurrence is important because in this 
dyad we do not observe sequence (P i), that is, we do not observe direct 
transitions from historical to emerging frames in the absence of bridging 
frames in the repertoire. Also, the emerging frame (not-guided object), 
when it first appears alongside the bridging frame (social/object mixed), is 
relatively brief and perhaps qualitatively different than what appears later. 
The model also indicates that in the early period there are realtime 
transitions between the historical, bridging, and the brief emerging 
frame. In the later sessions, the historical frame (guided object) becomes
briefer as the emerging frame becomes longer. The bridging frame still 
serves an important function as it mediates the transitions between 
em erging and brief historical frames. It appears, therefore, that brief 
versions of the emerging and historical frames may play a role in the 
developmental bridging process.
Q u alita tive an alysis
Ordinary variability o f sessions 1 and 2
During sessions 1 and 2, Richard is 16 and 17 weeks old respectively. 
The dyad spends the m ost time in the guided-object frame, followed by 
the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame. There is 
only one instance o f the social frame in which Richard and his mother 
engage in face-to-face play. In this occasion, Richard is gazing at his 
mother’s face, softly vocalizing, while the mother attempts to show  
objects to Richard. Richard, however, keeps watching his mother’s face 
until she verbally acknowledges that he would rather look at her than the 
objects. Soon after, the mother smiles at Richard and he smiles back at 
her. She then tickles Richard’s chin, and as he gazes at her face, he starts 
vocalizing loudly while the mother repeats back the sounds Richard 
produces.
During the guided object frame (the predominant frame o f these 
sessions), the mother shows objects at a fast pace, changes objects often, 
and spends little time demonstrating and highlighting the properties of 
the object. Meanwhile, Richard watches objects intently. The mother 
also helps support Richard to hold an object in his hand, never steadying 
objects above Richard for him to reach. During these first two sessions, 
however, Richard holds objects only briefly while the mother talks to 
him about his activity o f holding the object. Because Richard holds the 
object for only a brief period o f time, the not-guided object frame is brief. 
The social/object mixed frame mostly occurs when the mother attempts 
to re-gain Richard’s attention back to her by touching Richard’s body 
while he holds an object. This frame is also brief, as it is often related to 
Richard’s holding o f the object.
A close analysis of the frame transitions during these first two sessions 
indicates that the transitions involve all frames, with an emphasis on the 
guided object frame, the not-guided object frame, and the social/object 
mixed frame. The infant’s gaze is the primary action observed in the 
transitions. The transitions generally take place when Richard is looking 
in the same direction, holding an object, and his mother starts changing 
her actions such as stopping her talking to the infant or starting to touch
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her infant’s stomach. It is also noticeable (especially during the transi­
tions involving the social/object mixed frame) that the mother attempts 
to attract Richard’s attention to her by changing her actions. She uses 
auditory stimulation in different ways (e.g., shaking a toy, squeezing a 
toy, vocalizing, or talking to her infant). At times, this auditory stimula­
tion is combined with visual and tactile stimulations. For instance, 
during the transition from the not-guided object frame to the social/ 
object mixed frame the following is observed:
Richard holds a toy and looks at his m other while the m other talks to Richard 
about the toy held by him (not-guided object frame). Richard and his mother keep 
looking at each other and the mother keeps talking to Richard about the toy. The 
m other moves her body next to Richard’s body, and touches his stomach with 
her right hand (social/object mixed frame).
This example illustrates a usual way in which this dyad makes transi­
tions between the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed 
frame. The mother appears to do most o f the “work” during the transi­
tions, while Richard watches the mother intently. N ote that maternal 
vocalization and the sounds provoked by the object are salient elements 
used by the mother in the transition.
Innovations in sessions 1 and 2
A few innovations are observed in the frames and frame transitions 
where Richard presents himself as a more active participant in the dyadic 
communication. These behavioral changes described below constitute 
innovations in level 1 ordinary variability because, although not previ­
ously observed and markedly recognizable, they do not change the 
predominant ordinary variability o f  Richard’s relative inactivity during 
the frames and frame transitions.
During the guided-object frame, for example, there are some occa­
sions when Richard watches the objects presented by his mother while 
smiling, cooing, and moving his arms and legs toward the objects. There 
are some social/object mixed frames where the mother kisses and 
touches Richard’s cheek and tummy with the red porcupine, instead of 
the usual talking and touching Richard while he holds an object.
In the second session, we can start to observe more activity in a few 
transitions where Richard vocalizes, moves his legs, or shakes the toy he 
holds. During the transition from the guided object frame to the not-guided 
object frame, for instance:
Richard is moving his arms and legs, looking at his mother, while she adjusts a 
toy in his left hand and talks to  him. As Richard looks away, the m other stops
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talking to him but keeps adjusting the toy in his left hand (guided object frame). 
Richard vocalizes, grasping the toy. The m other then releases Richard’s left hand, 
saying “Yeeah!” and talking about the toy now held by Richard (not-guided 
object frame).
Richard’s emerging ability as a more active participant in the dyadic 
communication can also be seen in another transition from the social/ 
object mixed frame to the not-guided object frame.
Richard is holding a toy while the m other is playing with Richard’s legs, talking 
and smiling (social/object mixed frame). The mother then stops talking, smiling and 
playing with Richard’s legs, while Richard keeps looking at his mother and begins to 
shake the toy he is holding. The m other begins to talk about the toy (not-guided 
object frame).
These are two examples o f transitions to the not-guided object frame 
in which Richard is slightly more active than usual. These occasional 
increases in Richard’s participation in the transitions are innovations in 
the ordinary variability o f the frame transitions and appear to constitute 
an historical prelude o f the dynamics that will emerge in the next 
sessions.
Brief developmental account of sessions 1 and 2
During these first two sessions, the historical frame appears to be the 
guided object frame. During this frame, the mother shows objects one 
after the other without taking the time to demonstrate their affordances 
while Richard primarily observes them. The not-guided object frame 
and the social/object mixed frame are emerging frames as suggested by 
their durations. Specifically, the not-guided object frame seems to con­
stitute a “natural” consequence o f the guided object frame given that the 
mother often shows the objects in a fast pace, sometimes immediately 
placing them in Richard’s hands. The social/object mixed frame has the 
flavor o f being a break from the other two object oriented frames, 
including the historical frame. It appears to constitute the main oppor­
tunity for this dyad to engage in social play. In the second session, 
however, innovations are observed in the dyad’s level o f activity in the 
frames and transitions. This change in their relationship appears to 
occur in the ground o f the existing frames dynamics and set the stage 
for the changes in the next sessions.
Ordinary variability in sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6
In the next four sessions, Richard is 18, 19, 20, and 21 weeks old, 
respectively. The predominant frames observed are the guided object
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frame and the not-guided object frame. There is also a noticeable in­
crease in the social/object mixed frame, perhaps, in part due to the 
increasing appearance o f the not-guided object frame. One pattern 
developed during these four sessions is a social frame warm-up period 
at the beginning o f each play session. Richard starts the face-to-face play 
by staring at the mother, smiling, and vocalizing loudly; sometimes 
squealing and laughing. The mother is delighted with her happy infant 
and appreciates his efforts to communicate with her by vocalizing back, 
smiling, laughing, and touching his body.
During the guided object frame, Richard continues to engage in 
watching objects demonstrated by his mother. This time, however, 
Richard also vocalizes and moves his arms and legs with delight. Even 
though Richard gets excited with each new object encounter, the mother 
continues to not allow a lot o f  time for him to observe or participate with 
the object before moving on to the next object. This change in the 
dynamics o f the guided object frame in which Richard is more active 
with his body appears to be originated in the innovations observed 
during the previous sessions within the guided object frame and within 
the frame transitions involving the object frames where Richard presents 
him self as a more active participant o f the interaction.
As a result o f  this new acuve ordinary variability resulting from innov­
ations in Richard’s activity towards objects during the previous develop­
mental period, the mother innovates in reply. She amplifies upon 
Richard’s activity by using a sequence o f three-action object patterns 
(i.e., shake-rotate; shake-demonstrate; show-highlight property) in her 
demonstrations before she choose the next object to show. She appears 
to have developed different routines for each o f the objects and she uses 
those same routines each week.
With Richard’s increasing bodily participation in these four sessions, 
there is also an increase in the not-guided object frames since Richard 
now holds and manipulates objects for longer periods o f  time. He 
fingers, shakes, squeezes, actively mouths and even holds two objects 
at once. Similar to the previous sessions, however, when Richard actively 
manipulates objects, the mother supports his actions by either quietly 
observing his play or with object talk. For instance, when Richard’s hand 
reaches out and touches a toy, the mother verbally encourages him by 
praising him with laughter, smiling, and leaning closer to him.
The social/object mixed frame occurs a little more frequently in these 
four sessions as Richard becomes more active in object play. The social/ 
object mixed frame is now observed in two forms: (a) the mother 
touching Richard with an object as a game (as observed in the innova­
tions within the social/object mixed frame during the previous sessions);
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and (b) the mother tickling Richard with her hand to stimulate him and 
emphasize her words while he holds an object (as observed in the ordi­
nary variability o f  this frame during the previous sessions). Thus, during 
these sessions, the social/object mixed frame emerges in a more active 
form such as when the mother uses objects to kiss Richard’s cheek and 
belly or when the mother plays peek-a-boo with his feet, moving his legs 
like a bicycle while Richard holds an object. It is worth noting that the 
mother often uses the touching/more bodily active routines after long 
periods o f object talk (i.e., not-guided object frame).
Compared to the previous sessions, a gradual preference for transi­
tions involving the object-oriented frames emerges. This is especially the 
case for transitions between the guided object frame and the not-guided 
object frame as the dyad gradually becomes more focused on these two 
frames. Similar to the changes observed in the frames, Richard also con­
tributes more actively to the transitions by performing manual actions on 
the object such as grasping the object and shaking it and by performing 
social actions such as smiles and vocalizations while maintaining eye 
contact with his mother. This change in the ordinary variability o f  the 
frame transitions can be traced back to the innovations observed during 
the previous sessions within the frames and frame transitions where 
Richard is more active with this body.
In most (if not all) of the transitions between the object-oriented 
frames, Richard actively moves his arms toward the object held by his 
mother, grasps the object, shakes the object, and vocalizes. In the transi­
tions from the guided object frame to the not-guided object frame, for 
example, the following pattern predominates: as Richard quickly grasps 
an object held by his mother (guided object frame), his mother releases 
the object and starts talking about the object Richard now holds (not- 
guided object frame). In the transitions from the not-guided object 
frame to the social/object mixed frame, a pattern o f increasing engage­
ment o f Richard’s activity is also observed, as illustrated in the example 
below:
Richard and his m other are looking at each other while the m other talks about 
the toy Richard is holding (not-guided object frame). As Richard shakes the toy, 
the mother immediately stops talking about the toy, observing Richard quietly. As 
Richard begins to vocalize and smile to his mother, while holding the object, the mother 
smiles back at him, touching him and talking about his “happiness” with the toy 
(social/object mixed frame).
In this and other similar transitions, the mutual smiling that leads up 
to the social/object mixed frame appears to be about Richard’s relation­
ship to the object rather than to the mother. This kind o f mutual smiling
about the object often leads to transitions back to the not-guided object 
frame as Richard stops smiling and his mother stops talking about 
Richard’s emotions, stops touching Richard’s body, and begins talking 
about Richard’s actions on the object. Although Richard does not 
understand the content o f  his mother’s speech, the intonation patterns 
o f social/emotional talk observed in the social/object mixed frame are 
clearly different from the object talk present in the not-guided object 
frame. These transition patterns suggest that the social/object mixed 
frame serves as a break between the two object-oriented frames, much 
as it did during the previous sessions but more frequently now.
Innovations in sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6
Innovations are also observed in these four sessions within both the 
frames and frame transitions. Specifically, during the social warm-up 
frame, there are a few occasions when Richard observes his animated 
mother while sucking on his hand and maintaining eye contact with her 
without smiling or vocalizing. Likewise, during the guided object frame, 
there are a few occasions when Richard sucks on his hand while observ­
ing his mother demonstrate objects. It is important to highlight that 
object mouthing emerges in the next sessions as one o f the activities 
Richard engages in during the not-guided object frame.
There are also a few moments o f the not-guided object frame in these 
four sessions where his mother passively rests her hand on Richard’s leg 
while he holds an object. During the frame transitions (especially those 
involving the not-guided object frame), there are a few times when his 
mother is a more passive and quieter participant. O f particular note, his 
mother’s more passive observation o f Richard’s activity on the object 
also becom es more noticeable in the sessions to follow with Richard 
doing more object exploration, including object mouthing.
Brief developmental account of sessions 3 , 4, 5, and 6
During these four sessions, there is a gradual elaboration o f the not- 
guided object frame as Richard becomes more active in both manipu­
lating objects and in initiating transitions into the not-guided object 
frame. Correspondingly, during the not-guided object frame his mother 
becom es somewhat less active. This is particularly noticeable during the 
innovations involving the not-guided object frames. During the guided 
object frames Richard’s mother demonstrates object affordances, 
followed by the placement o f objects into his hands. Finally, changes 
in the format o f the social/object mixed frame are observed to include
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more animated use o f  objects. This frame, however, appears to maintain 
its function o f a real-time break from both the not-guided object frame 
and guided object frame.
Ordinary variability of sessions 7, 8, and 9
In the next three sessions, Richard is 22, 23, and 24 weeks old, respect­
ively. The not-guided object frame and the guided-object frame con­
tinue to be the primary frames observed. Very little social/object mixed 
frame, and almost no social frames occur in these sessions. Richard is 
now independently reaching for objects and turning over onto his 
rummy by himself. The consistent emergence o f these two behaviors 
appears to change this dyad’s patterns o f  communication.
Unlike the previous sessions where there was a social warm-up rou­
tine, most o f the social frames are now spent repositioning Richard’s 
body. There is only one social warm-up period where the mother blows 
raspberries and tickles Richard’s tummy, but he only responds with gaze 
(no facial expression or movement o f body) and the mother soon gives 
up and shows him the toys. This change in the social frame can be traced 
back to the innovations observed within this frame during the previous 
four sessions where Richard simply observes his animated mother, 
mouthing his hand, without smiling or vocalizing. Therefore, the social 
frame rarely occurs, perhaps because there is small mutual amplification 
of these kinds o f social interactions coupled with an increase in Richard’s 
focus towards objects.
During the guided object frames, the mother places objects within 
Richard’s reach and provides plenty o f  objects for him to choose while he 
is manipulating another. Her goal seems to have him explore all objects. 
Richard is less vocal and his actions are extremely object-focused. This 
change in the tone o f the guided object frame where Richard appears 
more intensely focused on objects can also be traced back to the innov­
ations observed within the guided object frame during the previous 
sessions when Richard is more of an observer o f his mother’s object 
demonstrations while quietly mouthing his hand.
During the not-guided object frame, Richard’s actions on objects 
continue to be elaborated. Richard squeezes, shakes, mouths, and 
manipulates objects, while the mother continues to use her words to 
encourage, suggest, and praise Richard’s actions on objects. The mother’s 
talk occurs most of the time within this frame and her talk is focused on 
object-oriented topics such as Richard’s ongoing interaction with objects. 
Thus, the ordinary variability o f this frame observed in the previous four 
sessions appears to continue to be elaborated during sessions 7, 8, and 9.
In the now less frequent social/object mixed frame, the mother con­
tinues in her attempts to re-capture Richard’s interest to herself by 
touching him while he manipulates the object. Richard, however, does 
not respond to his mother’s touch and remains focused on the object. 
This change in the emotional tone o f  the social/object mixed frame also 
appears to have emerged from the innovations observed within the social 
and the guided object frames during the previous four sessions when 
Richard observes his mother without smiling or vocalizing.
A close analysis o f  the frame transitions indicates an increase in the 
amount o f transitions between the guided object frame and the not- 
guided object frame, and these are made at a much faster pace. Similar 
to the previous sessions, a few transitions including the social frame are 
observed, with some o f these also made in faster durations. Richard’s 
focused manipulation o f the object becom es central in the frame transi­
tions. For instance, during one transition from the guided object frame 
to the not-guided object frame:
The mother presents a toy in front of Richard’s eyes, talking, while Richard holds 
another toy, shifting his gaze between the toy held by him and the toy held by his 
mother (guided object frame). The mother keeps presenting the toy in front of 
Richard's eyes, and stops talking to Richard. A long silence invades the scene. Mean­
while, Richard keeps manipulating the toy he is holding. The mother then places the 
toy she is holding on the floor, and starts talking to Richard about the toy he is 
holding (not-guided object frame).
As illustrated in the example above, Richard’s level o f  activity in the 
transitions is slightly different. Namely, he not only adds and/or stops 
some actions during the transition (thereby actively contributing to the 
frame transition), but he also keeps examining the object he holds 
(thereby changing the dynamics o f his communication with his mother). 
At the same time, the mother continues to be active in the transitions, 
but also in a slightly different way. She now appears to be rapidly chan­
ging her actions as a way o f coordinating her actions to the changes in 
Richard’s actions. Finally, although maternal vocalization is still present 
during the transitions, maternal silence (i.e., stop o f talking) becomes 
more pronounced in these three sessions. The transition from the guided 
object frame to the not-guided object frame described next illustrates 
this change in the mother’s presence during her communication with 
Richard:
The mother presents a toy within Richard’s reach, talking to him, while Richard 
looks at the toy held by the mother with his right hand open and directed 
towards the toy (guided object frame). When Richard touches the toy with his 
right hand, the mother stops talking to him, and starts adjusting the toy into Richard’s
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hand, quietly. Richard quickly grasps the toy, and the mother immediately releases 
the toy, talking to Richard about the toy he is now holding (not-guided object 
frame).
This example not only illustrates the predominant type o f transition 
between the guided object frame and the not-guided object frame, but it 
also portrays the emergence of a new transitional maternal action -  
maternal silence. O f particular note, this change in the mother’s partici­
pation in the transitions can be traced back to the innovations observed 
within the frame transitions during the previous four sessions where the 
mother is a more passive and quieter participant.
Innovations in sessions 7, 8, and 9
Innovations are again observed during both the frames and frame tran­
sitions. It is in these three sessions where Richard becomes more object 
focused that there are occasional moments o f  the guided object frame 
where the mother begins to squeeze additional objects off to the side o f  
Richard to get him to turn towards her. Although maternal attempts to 
re-gain Richard’s attention back to her are not new, such a strategy has 
not been previously observed in the context o f the guided object frame. 
There are also a few occasions during the not-guided object frame when 
Richard is more persistently immersed in object play. During these 
times, the mother simply watches her infant, quietly. Finally, during a 
few transitions, Richard is persistently focused on object mouthing. 
When taken together, these innovations appear to constitute a historical 
prelude to the object immersion observed in the following sessions.
Brief developmental account o f sessions 7, 8, and 9
During these three sessions, there is a further elaboration o f the not- 
guided object frame as Richard becom es more focused on the examin­
ation o f objects, more persistent in his explorations, and his reduced 
rate o f smiling and social engagement suggests a more serious de­
meanor. T he mother begins to take more o f  a support role even in the 
guided object frame, in which she mostly assists Richard in reaching for 
objects o f his own choice. T he social/object mixed frame no longer 
serves as a break from Richard’s work in the other frames. Instead, it is 
the mother who returns to this frame as a way o f reconnecting socially 
with Richard. Because o f  Richard’s serious persistence with object play, 
however, this frame decreases in duration. At times, Richard’s examin­
ation o f objects becom es immersion with almost no looking towards
the mother. T he mother, in turn, begins to vocalize less during these 
sessions, as reflected in the increasing appearance o f  maternal silence 
during the transitions.
Ordinary variability o f sessions 10, 11, and 12
Finally, during the last three sessions o f the observational period (i.e., 
sessions 10, 11, and 12), Richard is 25, 26, and 28 weeks old, respect­
ively. The guided object frame and the not-guided object frame are the 
two primary frames used by the dyad. For the first time, there are no 
social frames and very few social/object mixed frames are observed. 
Richard and his mother are more serious than before and Richard 
maintains a neutral face most o f the time. He never vocalizes, smiles, 
or laughs in any frame.
In the guided object frame, the mother briefly demonstrates the 
objects as she places them on Richard’s tummy or in front o f him when 
he is sitting, while Richard gazes almost exclusively at objects (especially 
when he is on his tummy with his mother behind him). This rapid 
demonstration o f objects within the guided object frame appears to 
constitute an elaboration o f the dynamics o f frame transitions observed 
in the previous three sessions where transitions from the guided object 
frame are made in a rapid fashion.
During the not-guided object frame, Richard is predominantly im­
mersed in object exploration and active mouthing, and the mother seems 
to respect Richard’s immersion by speaking less and even whispering at 
times. It is as if she does not want to disturb the immersed infant during 
object play. When the mother speaks (not very often though), her words 
are used to praise Richard when he performs a new action with an object. 
She also comments on his excessive mouthing and tells him how much 
fun he is having with the objects. It is important to highlight that the 
innovations observed within frames and frame transitions during the 
previous sessions include Richard’s more persistent focus on object 
mouthing.
Finally, touch remains the primary action during the few social/object 
mixed frames. For example, the mother gently pats Richard’s back or 
kisses and tickles Richard with the caterpillar while he is on his back, 
persistently mouthing an object. That is, the mother continues to use 
touch as a primary way to maintain a connection with her infant who is 
now mosdy facing away from her, mouthing objects. Therefore, this 
frame dynamics appears to constitute an elaboration o f the ordinary 
variability o f  the social/object mixed frame previously observed.
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T h e  transitions in these last three sessions primarily involve the guided 
object frame and the not-guided object frame, with very few including 
the social/object mixed frame. N o transitions involving the social frame 
are observed. The transitions continue to be made in fast durations. 
F urtherm ore , Richard’s persistent immersion in object mouthing 
appears to be tightly related to the mother’s rapid changes in her behav­
ior, including her brief attempts to re-gain his interest to a more mutually 
interactive form o f object play. For example, in one transition from the 
guided object frame to the not-guided object frame:
Richard is mouthing a toy and mother presents another toy within Richard’s 
sight, talking (guided object frame). Richard, however, keeps mouthing the toy he is 
holding, and the mother stops presenting the toy, stops talking, and holds the second toy 
steadilx within Richard’s reach. Richard keeps mouthing the toy he is holding. The 
m other finally releases the toy she is holding, and starts observing Richard quietly 
(not-guided object frame).
Note in this example how Richard’s persistent object immersion 
appears to be related to maternal silence during the transitions (i.e., 
the mother stops talking). Although the mother seems to respect her 
infant’s object immersion, she also seems to present quiet efforts to 
captivate Richard’s attention back to her.
Similar to Susan and her mother, innovations were not observed in 
these last three sessions for Richard and his mother. Perhaps, an histor­
ical analysis o f  the future patterns would allow us to identify potential 
seeds o f the dyad’s future communication dynamics in the context of the 
frame and/or frame transitions.
Brief developmental account of sessions 10, 11, and 12
The not-guided object frame changes once again. The infant becomes 
completely immersed in the objects to the point of rarely looking at or 
engaging the mother. At the same time, the mother creates the condi­
tions in which Richard can indulge his interest in objects, at times 
vocalizing about Richard’s mastery o f object skills. The guided object 
frame is brief in duration with the mother rapidly demonstrating add­
itional objects to Richard, while he almost exclusively gazes at them  
without much o f a facial and/or body engagement. During the few 
moments o f the social/object mixed frame, the mother invites Richard 
to disengage with the object and re-engage with her. These attempts, 
however, are largely unsuccessful. N o moments o f social frame are 
observed in these last three sessions.
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Overall summary o f  Richard and his mother
An historical analysis o f  this dyad’s relationship across the twelve 
sessions suggests that, during the first sessions, the historical frame is 
the guided object frame. At this point, the mother shows objects one 
after another without taking the time to demonstrate their affordances, 
while Richard primarily observes them. T he not-guided object frame 
and the social/object mixed frame are emerging frames as suggested 
by their durations. T he social/object mixed frame has the flavor of 
being a break from the other two object oriented frames, and it appears 
to constitute the main opportunity for this dyad to engage in social 
play. Therefore, the not-guided object frame is present from the begin­
ning o f  the observation period, and, in theory, it does not constitute a 
newly emergent frame in this dyad. At the same time, however, a closer 
examination o f the changes within this frame indicates that the not- 
guided object frame changes steadily across the twelve sessions in close 
relation to the changes in the guided object and in the social/object 
mixed frames. Specifically, the not-guided object frame first appears 
sporadically as opportunities for Richard to explore his emerging motor 
abilities (i.e ., simple grasping) and gradually becom es the foreground 
o f this dyad’s relationship where Richard is persistently immersed in 
object m outhing.
The social/object mixed frame plays a developmental bridging role in 
this dyad as it consistendy serves as a locus for transitions to and from 
other frames. Specifically, during the first six sessions, transitions are 
made to and from the social/object mixed frame from the guided or not- 
guided object frames when the dyad needs a break from the intensity of 
object play. They exchange smiles and social vocalizations. The increase 
in the duration o f the social/object mixed frame in sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6 
coincides with the gradual increase in the speed o f direct transitions 
between the two object related frames. It appears that the positive 
emotional communication about objects taking place in the context of  
the social/object mixed frame observed in the first six sessions creates a 
ground for the dyad to develop more facility with object communication, 
leading to the increased seriousness o f Richard’s examination and im­
mersion with objects. In fact, during the last six sessions, when Richard 
becomes more object focused, the social/object mixed frame is used less 
by the dyad and primarily at the initiative o f the mother.
For Richard and his mother, we find four ways in which frames are 
related to transitions. First o f  all, there is a similarity in the mother and 
infant actions in frames and transitions within sessions. During the first
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three sessions, for example, the guided object frame is mainly character­
ized by mother’s continuous attempt to capture and maintain Richard’s 
visual attention to different objects while Richard looks intently to the 
objects held by the mother. Comparably, the transitions involving the 
guided object frame in these first three sessions are mainly characterized 
by Richard’s looking in the same direction over and over, holding an 
object, while his mother changes her actions in an effort to shift 
the infant’s visual attention. This similarity between frames and transi­
tions is the case for all twelve sessions, and it suggests that the same 
patterns of action that constitute frames also constitute transitions.
Second, we observe differences between the frames and transitions 
during the same sessions. The consistent pattern observed in the first 
three sessions, for example, involves Richard being an observer o f his 
mother’s demonstrations of the objects during both the frames and 
frame transitions. We note, however, a few transitions between the 
guided object frame and the not-guided object frame in which Richard 
becomes more o f an active play partner and his mother becomes more of 
a facilitator. It turns out that this particular difference is a prelude to the 
predominant patterns o f action during the frames and frame transitions 
of the following sessions. These findings suggest that, at the develop­
mental time scale, innovations in realtime transitions (i.e., level 2 
change) during earlier sessions may serve as the historical innovation 
that leads the dyad into communication changes observed in the 
following sessions. In this case, then, the relationship is between transi­
tions in the prior sessions and the frames and transitions in the later 
sessions.
A third way in which frames appear to be related to transitions is the 
connection between the speed of the transitions and the changes in dur­
ations o f frames. In sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6, prior to the predominance o f  
the not-guided object frame, the transitions between the guided and the 
not-guided object frames begin to become faster and continue to be made 
in a rapid fashion throughout the remainder o f the observation period. 
Thus, facility in making realtime transitions preceded, developmentally, 
the consolidation o f the not-guided object frame.
A final observation unique to this dyad regarding the relationship 
between frames and transitions is that it became weaker during the last 
three sessions. Specifically, during the earlier sessions, realtime transi­
tions tend to be mutually ratified. If either partner initiates a transition, 
the other goes along and the frame changes accordingly. During the last 
three sessions, however, we observe that the mother makes repeated 
attempts to engage Richard in the social/object mixed frame. By then, 
Richard has become so immersed and serious about objects that he does
not ratify his mother’s bid and the dyad quickly returns to the not-guided 
object frame. This suggests that the dyad’s facility with jointly managed 
transitions during the first nine sessions is directly connected with the 
dyad’s developmental changes (i.e., level 3 change). By the last three 
sessions, the dyad had settled into a highly stable pattern o f communi­
cation that appears resistant to change in realtime and possibly resistant 
to change in developmental time. Even though we did not observe the 
dyad after session twelve, we could not find any innovations in frames 
or transitions. In dynamic system’s language, one could say that the 
dyad entered a rather deep attractor that permitted little variability 
and few innovations. Further observations on this dyad might have 
revealed how long this stable period lasted and the ways in which 
innovations eventually succeeded in moving them to new levels o f  object 
communication.
Taken together, both the quantitative and qualitative results suggest 
that proposition 1 (Chapter 5) has been supported. Proposition 1 pro­
poses developmental sequence (P ,) in which bridging frames intercede 
both in realtime and developmental time between historical and 
emerging frames. With the modification proposed as sequence (P^), in 
which brief instances o f  the emerging frame appear alongside the 
bridging frame in the early sessions and brief instances o f the historical 
frame link with the bridging frame in the later sessions, proposition 1 is 
strongly supported.
Proposition 2 proposes that innovations arise from ordinary variability 
and later lead to developmental change, as suggested by sequence (P2), 
Chapter 5. We did not find any occurrence o f level 3 developmental 
change, characterized by the re-organization o f all the frames and a rapid 
increase in the emerging frame. Rather, change over sessions appeared to 
be more gradual, a series o f accretions o f innovations and small changes 
resulting from the innovations.
With regard to innovations, the data from this dyad suggest that the 
change model is more complex than sequence (P2).
(P',')(level Is +  level 2“)penod,  -»  (level l p(+level l 5 +  level 2a+  
level 2 V ) +  level 2p)period „
In this model, level 1’  is ordinary variability in the first observed devel­
opmental period, designated the a period. Level 2’ are the innovations 
occurring during period ot which do not change the ordinary variability in 
this period. Level 111 is ordinary variability during a second developmen­
tal period, p, and level 2* are innovations during the [5 period which do 
not change ordinary variability during that period. This part o f  the
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(level 1“ +  level 2a)perioda— (level l p +  level 2p)pcriod p,
s h o w s  that innovations in period ot lead to a new ordinary variability in 
p e r i o d  p, such that there may be a  series o f  recognizably different 
d e v e l o p m e n t a l  periods (a, p, y , . . . ) ,  each with a new ordinary variability 
a n d  new innovauons.
The right hand section o f (P^'), that is,
(level l p(+level 1“ +  level 2’ +  level 2’') +  level 2p)period p,
represents the possibility for additional complexity in any particular 
developmental period. The term ( +  level 2 ’ ) reflects the possibility 
that additional innovations may be introduced during this P develop­
mental period that are responses to or amplifications o f innovations 
introduced during the previous period, a. In the case o f this dyad, the 
mother introduced innovations in her behavior that appeared to be 
direct responses to the infant’s innovations in the previous developmen­
tal period. N ote that these maternal innovations did not appear in the 
previous period. Instead, they emerged once the previous period’s in­
novations, level 2’ , had becom e established into a new period o f ordinary 
variability, level l p.
It is important to note that we did not observe any ordinary variability 
in the P periods (level l p) that did not derive from the a period. As 
expressed in the sequence above, whatever appeared in (level 11) was 
either:
• a replication o f the ordinary variability in the a period (level 1*)
• a replication o f the innovations in the oc period (level 2 y),  or
• an amplification o f the innovations in the a period (level 27 ).
This fits our prediction that changes in ordinary variability are preceded 
by innovations which do not change the ordinary variability at the time 
they first appear, but only later, when the system shifts to some new 
period o f ordinary variability.
In summary, the qualitative data analysis adds historical details to the 
picture given by the quantitative data analysis. The developmental 
changes in the overall durations o f time invested in particular frames in 
this dyad seem to be founded upon relatively small innovations estab­
lished against the background of the patterns o f action characteristic of 
the previous sessions.
m o d e l,  t h a t  is ,
9  R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n :  
q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  B e t s y  a n d  h e r  m o t h e r
In this chapter, we present a case analysis o f  the development o f frames 
and frame transitions for another one o f the four representative dyads, 
Betsy and her mother. Similar to the organization utilized in previous 
qualitative chapters, we present the raw data developmental trajectories 
for each of the four frames, the raw data transition frequencies between 
the frames as a function o f age, and a qualitative analysis o f the relational 
history. In the latter, we describe the change processes at two levels, 
ordinary variability (referred to as level 1 change in Chapter 3) 
and innovations (referred to as level 2 change in Chapter 3), followed 
by a brief developmental account o f these changes that describes any 
evidence for a developmental re-organization (level 3 change).
D ev e lo p m en ta l tra jectories and tran sition  freq u en cies
This dyad had a pattern o f frame duration trajectories that was very 
similar to that o f  Richard and his mother. As shown in Figure 7.2 and 
Table 9.1, the historically predominant frame for this dyad was the 
guided object frame, which persisted until session 5. The newly 
emerging frame was the not-guided object frame, which became pre­
dominant relative to other frames in session 8, soon after Betsy acquired 
visually guided reaching. The bridging frame for this dyad appeared to 
be the social/object mixed frame. There was a peak in the social/object 
mixed frame in sessions 6 -9 , illustrating the inverted U-shaped trajec­
tory for this frame found in the multilevel analysis. The duration o f the 
social-object mixed frame becomes slightly elevated again in sessions 11 
and 12 but the inverted U-shape is the most prominent feature o f this 
trajectory. The social frame, in this dyad, remains low during the entire 
observation period, neither increasing nor decreasing.
The correlations between frame durations for this dyad (see Table 7.2) 
give more insight into these developmental changes. There is no signi­
ficant correlation o f the social frame with any o f the others, suggesting
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T a b le  9 .1 .  Descriptive statistics of frames by session: Betsy
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Age (Weeks) 8 9 10 11 12 13 17 19 22 23 24 25
Social frame 
Frequency 0 2 0 2 7 5 1 2 4 1 9 6
% of session 0.00 2.27 0.00 6.99 5.82 13.22 0.82 1.07 5.67 1.36 14.99 5.17
Mean duration* - 5.44 - 16.77 3.99 12.69 3.93 2.57 6.80 6.52 7.99 4.13
(s-d.) (-) (2.36) (-) (12.81) (2.79) (20.52) (-) (2.60) (8.06) (-) (9.80) (4.24)
Object guided frame 
Frequency 7 16 14 16 15 17 7 10 10 8 5 8
% of session 90.57 78.15 77.88 75.22 68.00 43.19 18.18 29.05 28.68 21.98 5.70 6.28
Mean duration* 62.10 23.44 26.70 22.57 21.76 12.20 12.47 13.94 13.77 13.19 5.47 3.77
(s.d.) (64.52) (17.16) (17.51) (17.22) (31.41) (9.16) (12.77) (12.22) (9.78) (9.08) (3.68) (3.55)
Not-guided object frame 
Frequency 2 5 8 7 11 6 11 14 16 12 12 13
% of session 1.48 4.60 6.15 8.18 9.74 5.18 21.80 26.79 30.21 60.44 54.56 56.32
Mean duration* 3.54 4.41 3.69 5.61 4.25 4.15 9.51 9.18 9.06 24.18 21.82 20.80
(s.d.) (2.08) (2.97) (1.50) (5.96) (2.16) (0.73) (8.32) (6.36) (6.91) (22.97) (14.43) (20.25)
Social/object mixed frame 
Frequency 6 8 12 8 13 20 15 12 11 4 15 11
% of session 7.96 14.99 15.97 9.61 16.44 38.41 58.98 42.83 35.44 16.22 24.76 32.23
Mean duration* 6.37 8.99 6.39 5.77 6.07 9.22 18.87 17.13 15.47 19.47 7.92 14.06
(s.d.) (3.00) (7.97) (3.36) (3.38) (3.26) (12.42) (23.08) (30.38) (23.31) (22.49) (7.20) (21.44)
Note: * seconds
T a b le  9 .2 .  Frequency o f frame transitions: Betsy and her mother
Frame transition
Session
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
l-> 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 -> l
l-> 4 1 1
4 -> l 1 1 1 1
l-> 3
3 -> l 2 1 1
2->3 3 3 1 2 3 7 5 7 5 7
3->2 2 3 2 1 3 5 5 7 6 6
2->4 4 7 6 2 7 8 1 2 1 1
4->2 3 8 5 1 4 3 3 2 2 2
3->4 1 7 7 5 3 5 4
4->3 2 2 3 5 6 5 2 3 2
Note: 1 = Social frame;
2 =  Guided object frame;
3 =  Not-guided object frame;
4 — Social/object mixed frame
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that it may play a role that is relatively independent o f the developmental 
changes in the other frames. The guided object frame was significantly 
negatively correlated with both the not-guided object and the social/ 
object mixed frames. Figure 7.2 shows clearly that as the guided object 
frame decreased in duration (the typical pattern for the historical frame), 
the other two frames increased.
As shown in Table 9.2, the pattern o f transitions was nearly identical 
to those o f Richard and his mother. During the first six sessions, most 
of the transitions occurred to and from the historical guided object 
frame (eighty out o f  ninety-two transitions in the first six sessions, 
87 percent). For these first six sessions, these transitions were 
primarily between the guided object frame and the not-guided object 
frame (20/80 =  25 percent), and between the guided object frame and 
the social/object mixed frame (58/80 =  73 percent). O f the 140 transi­
tions during the final six sessions, 119 (85 percent) were with the not- 
guided object frames. O f these 63/119 (53 percent) were with the guided 
object frame and 54/119 (45 percent) were with the social/object mixed 
frame.
Similar to Richard and his mother, the social/object mixed frame 
clearly fit the bridging pattern predicted in sequence (P i). First o f  all, 
the social/object mixed frame was relatively high in duration during 
sessions 6 —9, showing an inverted U-shape trajectory. Second, 73 per­
cent of the transitions with the historical guided object frame in the first 
six sessions were with the social/object mixed frame and 45 percent of 
the transitions with the emerging not-guided object frame in the final six 
sessions were with the social/object mixed frame. These percentages of 
predicted transitions with the social/object mixed frame were consider­
ably higher for Betsy and her mother compared to Richard and his 
mother.
On the other hand, as we saw for Richard and his mother, many o f the 
transitions occurred direcdy between the historical guided object frame 
and the emerging not-guided object frame both in the early and later 
sessions. It seems as if Betsy and her mother also fit the hybrid model 
shown in sequence (P ,), Chapter 3, in which the bridging social/object 
mixed frame develops in conjunction with a short duration form of the 
newly emerging not-guided object frame. T he fact that the social/object 
mixed frame remains somewhat elevated in duration in the final two 
sessions compared to the newly emerging not-guided object frame re­
flects a strong linkage between these two frames in the developmental 
change process. Further details on this process will be revealed in the 
qualitative analysis.
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Q ualita tive  an a lysis
Ordinary variability in sessions 1, 2, and 3
During sessions 1, 2 and 3, Betsy is 8, 9, and 10 weeks old respectively. 
T he guided object frame is the predominant frame in these first 
three sessions, followed by the social/object mixed frame. There are 
few instances o f  the social and the not-guided object frames. In the 
guided object frame, the mother uses a variety o f object manipulations 
(shaking, squeezing, rotating, showing, and twirling), demonstrating the 
most basic affordances o f the object, especially the noise the object 
makes. The language used by the mother is social in nature as opposed 
to talking about objects or object’s properties (except sound). Betsy is 
primarily motionless with short bursts o f  actions towards the objects or 
the mother. When Betsy moves, her body movements are jerky in nature 
and it appears to take her a long time to focus on a moving object or 
her mother. The ordinary variability o f the guided object frame during 
these first three sessions thus includes the mother’s active manipulation 
o f objects combined with sounds, and Betsy’s stillness with her body 
and head.
During the social/object mixed frame, the mother uses objects in a 
social manner through touching, tickling, kissing, and tapping Betsy 
while making a variety o f animated sounds. Betsy is more responsive in 
these moments: she smiles, vocalizes, and moves her body. If the mother, 
however, persists too long with her actions, Betsy looks away as if 
indicating disinterest. The ordinary variability o f  the social/object mixed 
frame differs from the guided object frame in that Betsy appears to be 
more actively engaged with her mother in these social exchanges perme­
ated by the object. During both frames, however, the mother smiles, 
laughs, and uses exaggerated body movements and facial expressions. It 
is as if the mother finds humor in many interactive exchanges.
A close analysis o f the frame transitions indicates that the transitions 
are primarily between the social/object mixed frame and the guided 
object frame. Transitions involving the social frame are not observed at 
all during these first three sessions, and the transitions with the not- 
guided object frame are infrequent. During the transitions from and to 
the guided object frame, Betsy keeps looking in the same direction (that 
is, looking away from both the mother and objects). Betsy is mostly quiet 
during these transitions, and sometimes sleepy. The mother, on the 
other hand, tends to squeeze or shake objects out o f Betsy’s sight. It 
appears that the mother changes her actions as a way o f attracting
m
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Betsy’s visual attention to the objects. Similar to the ordinary variability 
observed in the guided object frame, the mother emphasizes auditory 
stimulation during the transitions. This may have been, in part, because 
Betsy looks off to the side most o f  the time during these transitions. 
The transitions involving the social/object mixed frame are similar. The  
difference is that, with the transitions from or to the social/object mixed 
frame, a change in tactile stimulation is combined with a change in 
auditory stimulation. For instance, in one transition from the social/ 
object mixed frame to the guided object frame:
The mother is touching Betsy’s nose with the rattle, saying “Gotcha!” each time 
she touches Betsy’s nose, while Betsy looks off to the side (social/object mixed 
frame). The mother stops touching Betsy with the toy and begins vocalising. Betsy 
keeps looking off to the side. The mother then puts the toy on the floor and picks up 
another toy (the caterpillar), squeezing it on Betsy’s right side out of her sight. Betsy 
keeps looking off to the side, as the mother conunues squeezing the caterpillar 
(guided object frame).
The example above illustrates the ordinary variability o f  the transi­
tions involving the guided object frame and the social/object mixed 
frame across the first three sessions. N ote that Betsy’s mother tries to 
maintain different forms of auditory stimulation during the transition as 
a way of capturing Betsy’s visual attention to the object while Betsy keeps 
looking off to the side. This segment also further illustrates the dyad’s 
focus on auditory stimulation combined with tactile stimulation during 
the transition involving the social/object mixed frame. Specifically, the 
mother touches Betsy’s nose with the rattle (an object that does not 
make much noise unless shaken) while synchronizing her voice with her 
touch. N ote also in the example above that when the mother stops 
talking to Betsy, she starts squeezing the caterpillar, thereby making 
sounds with the object. Once again, this level o f  activity highlights the 
mother’s use o f  sounds to attract Betsy’s attention to the object or to 
herself.
Innovations in sessions 1, 2, and 3
Occasionally, during the guided object frame, Betsy focuses on the 
object held by the mother and responds with smiles, vocalizations, and 
body movement. In these instances, when Betsy looks away from the 
object, the mother immediately presents a new object as if trying to 
regain Betsy’s attention. These behavioral changes in the predominant 
pattern described above constitute innovations in the ordinary variabi­
lity o f already existing frame dynamics. This is because these occa­
sional changes, although not previously observed, did not change the
predominant ordinary variability o f Betsy’s relative inactivity during the 
guided object frame.
Similar to the innovation observed in the guided object frame, there 
are a few cases in which Betsy moves her arms or whole body during the 
transitions, instead o f remaining inactive and gazing off to the side. For 
example, in one transition from the not-guided object frame to the 
guided object frame:
Betsy is looking at toys on the floor while the m other talks to Betsy about the toys 
(not-guided object frame). T he mother then picks up a toy, continues talking to 
Betsy about that toy, but Betsy does not visually follow the toy held by the 
mother. Instead, Betsy keeps looking off to the side. The mother, however, acciden­
tally causes the toy to make a noise. A t this point, Betsy moves her whole body towards 
the sound of the toy, while the mother continues holding the toy. Immediately after, 
Betsy looks at the toy held by the mother (guided object frame).
This example illustrates a non-salient pattern observed during the 
frame transitions in sessions 1, 2, and 3. The innovation in the transi­
tions consists o f Betsy not maintaining her gaze off to the side after she 
hears the squeaky object. Instead, Betsy moves her whole body towards 
the sound of the object, thereby getting a better view o f it. Although this 
pattern o f transition in which Betsy presents a more dynamic level of 
activity is rarely observed in these first three sessions, it becomes more 
predominant in the next sessions.
Brief developmental account o f  sessions 1, 2, and 3
During these first three sessions, the guided object frame is the predom­
inant frame in the dyad’s relationship, thereby suggesting that this frame 
constitutes a historical frame. The ordinary variability characteristic of 
this frame at this point in the dyad’s history is to have the mother present 
toys to Betsy in an entertaining manner while Betsy appears to be mostly 
an observer o f her surroundings. The social/object mixed frame, when it 
occurs, is an occasion for enjoyable social play permeated by objects. 
Betsy, however, continues to be a quiet observer (although a bit more 
active than during the guided object frame) while her mother appears to 
be primarily responsible for entertaining and captivating Betsy’s interest. 
These two patterns constitute the ordinary variability o f these frames 
during the first three sessions.
There are a few occasions when Betsy is not always quietly observ­
ing her surroundings. Instead, she turns her head to the side towards 
the objects as if the sounds made by the mother or the toy created 
opportunities for innovations in the dyad’s predominant pattern of
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c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  This is illustrated i n  the example described above 
where the accidental sound o f the toy made Betsy move her whole body, 
and not just her head, during the transition. We speculate that these 
innovations may serve as a historical prelude to Betsy’s more active role 
observed in the next sessions.
Ordinary variability in sessions 4, 5, and 6
In the next three sessions (that is, sessions 4, 5, 6), Betsy is 11, 12, and 
13 weeks old respectively. The two primary frames observed continue to 
be the guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame. Again, the 
social frame and the not-guided object frame are infrequent. One can 
identify a continuation o f the patterns observed in the first three sessions 
with additional interactive qualities being incorporated into the frames, 
thereby giving rise to a new ordinary variability.
Similar to the ordinary variability observed in previous sessions, the 
mother rarely slows down to show an object or highlight physical prop­
erties of the object. Singing, however, is added to object demonstrations. 
The object becomes a rhythm instrument when the mother sings, as if 
helping her to keep her tempo. While the mother sings and moves the 
object rhythmically, Betsy becom es very attentive, carefully watching her 
mother’s actions. It is important to highlight that Betsy’s attentive gaze 
towards the object first appears as an innovation within the guided 
object frame in sessions 1, 2, and 3. Also, the m other’s singing is 
incorporated for the first time into the frame as Betsy becom es more 
consistently active in their interactions, suggesting that a change in one 
of the dyadic partner’s activity further amplifies the other partner’s 
level o f engagement.
During the social/object mixed frame, changes in Betsy’s activity are 
also incorporated into its current ordinary variability. Specifically, Betsy 
flails her arms out into an open posture and moves her legs while 
watching the object or the mother. She also vocalizes, smiles, and occa­
sionally laughs when the mother stimulates her body with object-touch 
games. The mother continues giving life to objects through animation, 
using her voice and actions to speak and move for the objects (especially 
those with faces such as the caterpillar and the porcupine). These objects 
are consistently used to tickle, kiss, or talk to Betsy. It is important to 
highlight that Betsy’s increased movement is first observed as an innov­
ation during the transition in sessions 1, 2, and 3 when Betsy moves her 
entire body towards the object that her mother accidentally squeezes. 
Once again, a change in Betsy’s activity level appears to further amplify
the mother’s entertaining qualities as reflected in her more intense use of 
the object in the touching games.
In sum, during both the social/object mixed frame and the guided 
object frame, Betsy looks at objects and her mother for longer periods 
of time, with an increase in vocalizations, smiling, and for the first time, 
laughing. In addition to her creative and entertaining ways of interact­
ing with Betsy, the mother also sings and imitates the sounds of 
the increasingly vocal infant. Betsy in turn mirrors her mother’s facial 
expressions, with grimaces, mouth movements, smiles, laughter, and 
vocalizations. A feedback loop is thus observed where a behavioral 
change in one of the interactive partners (in this case, Betsy) further 
amplifies the activities of the other partner (in this case, the mother). 
These social/emotional games where both Betsy and her mother are 
actively engaged are ongoing during sessions 4, 5, and 6, and constitute 
the new ordinary variability of the social/object mixed frame and 
the guided object frame.
The transitions in visits 4, 5, and 6 are also similar to those previously 
observed. They continue to occur primarily between the social/object 
mixed frame and the guided object frame, with those involving the social 
frame being infrequent. Betsy’s gaze remains the primary transitional 
action, but other actions that are observed as innovations in previous 
sessions (such as Betsy’s movement of her body towards objects) 
begin to be consistently incorporated into the transitions. For instance, 
in one transition from the guided object frame to the social/object mixed 
frame:
T he mother is shaking the rattle in front of Betsy’s eyes and singing in a 
synchronized way, while Betsy is looking at the toy held by the mother (guided 
object frame). The mother stops singing and starts changing the pace of 
her shaking (shaking the toy a little bit faster). Betsy keeps looking at the 
toy held by the mother. The mother then stops shaking the toy while Betsy 
keeps looking at the toy. At this point, the mother starts bringing the toy closer to 
Betsy’s face, singing in a way that is synchronised with her movement o f the toy. Betsy 
waves her arms as i f  getting excited. The mother starts slowing down the movement 
of the toy, touching Betsy’s body with it (social/object mixed frame).
The example above illustrates a change in the dyad’s level of activity in 
the transitions when compared to the three previous sessions. Specific­
ally, Betsy becomes more active by gazing at the toy presented by her 
mother and by moving her arms (and, at times, her entire body) towards 
the object. At the same time, the mother continues to be entertaining 
with her actions, including her incorporation of singing, but she also 
starts to demonstrate the objects within Betsy’s sight.
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Innovations in sessions 4, 5, and 6
Innovations are also identified in sessions 4, 5, and 6 during the guided 
object frame. Compared to the ordinary variability of the mother enter­
taining and not facilitating object-related actions, there are occasions 
where the mother puts an object into Betsy’s hand. In fact, this is done at 
least once in every session. On these occasions, Betsy responds with 
fingering, holding the object briefly, and slowly shaking the object once 
or twice, while looking at it. It is also within sessions 4, 5, and 6 that 
Betsy starts to suck on her hand.
The few transitions involving the not-guided object frame occur for 
the first time as an interval of the guided object frame or the social/object 
mixed frame. These instances rarely last more than three seconds and do 
not appear to alter the predominant pattern of activity of the historical 
frame (that is, guided object frame or social/object mixed frame). The 
impression the observer gets is that a new frame is emerging out of 
the historical frames. This quality is illustrated below in the context 
of the guided object frame:
Betsy is looking at a toy held by the mother (guided object frame). Eventually, 
Betsy looks away and the mother changes toys. As she does so, she talks to Betsy about 
the toy she is picking up (not-guided object frame). Briefly after, the mother shows 
the new toy to Betsy (guided object frame).
Additional innovations are observed in the transitions involving the 
guided object frame. Specifically, the mother’s demonstration of the 
object becomes an important component of the transitions. Depending 
upon the object used, the mother attempts to facilitate Betsy’s manual 
exploration of objects by placing it within her reach or even at her hand. 
Not surprisingly, Betsy’s occasional grasping of the object and object 
mouthing are observed during these transitions. It is as if a new pattern 
of ordinary variability is about to emerge out of these mutual dyadic 
changes in the current pattern of transition.
Brief developmental account on sessions 4, 5, and 6
In these three sessions, the historical frame (i.e., guided object frame) 
becomes elaborated as reflected in the emergence of a new ordinary 
variability characteristic of this frame. The social/object mixed frame 
becomes equally predominant in these visits with elaborations similar 
to those observed in the guided object frame. That is, Betsy becomes 
more active during both the guided object and social/object mixed 
frames as well as during the transitions between these frames. At
the same time, the mother continues to be an entertainer of her more 
active infant, introducing singing to their exchanges. A feedback loop is 
thus observed in both frames where a behavioral change in one of the 
interactive partners further amplifies the activities of the other partner.
Innovations are observed in the frames (i.e., the guided object and the 
social/object mixed frames) and in the transitions between these frames 
during sessions 4, 5, and 6. First, the not-guided object frame makes its 
initial appearance as a break within the guided object frame or the social/ 
object mixed frame. For example, the not-guided object frame emerges 
as Betsy looks away from the toy held by her mother and the mother 
changes toys, talking to Betsy about the new toy. A second innovation is 
observed within the frame transitions. There are a few occasions where 
the mother places the object within Betsy’s reach and Betsy reaches for 
the object while looking at it. Within these occasional situations, one also 
observes a few episodes of Betsy mouthing the object she holds. Similar 
to sessions 1 ,2 , and 3, the innovations during sessions 4, 5, and 6 appear 
to be a historical prelude to the ordinary variability observed in the next 
sessions where the mother consistently demonstrates objects and Betsy 
more often grasps them, at times mouths them.
Ordinary variability in sessions 7 and 8
In sessions 7 and 8, Betsy is 17 and 19 weeks old. These sessions 
immediately follow the session (i.e., session 6) where Betsy, for the first 
time, reaches for an object while looking at it. Note that reaching for an 
object while looking at it constitutes one of the innovations previously 
observed in the guided object frame and in the frame transitions. The 
not-guided object frame, the guided object frame, and the social/object 
mixed frame become the primary frames pervading these sessions. Social 
frames are no longer observed. There are still reciprocal smiles, vocal­
izations, and laughs across the frames, but less than in pre-reaching 
sessions (i.e., sessions 1 through 6). Betsy often checks in visually with 
her mother during all frames and often produces a brief smile or vocal­
ization when she sees her mother’s face, thereby maintaining a connec­
tion with her mother. It is also important to highlight that these patterns 
of activity later become a part of the dyad’s typical interactive dynamics 
during the not-guided object frame when Betsy checks in visually with 
her mother while mouthing an object.
It is the first time that the not-guided object frame emerges as “separ­
ate” from the other object-related frames. That is, the not-guided object 
frame no longer arises as part of the guided object frame or the social/ 
object mixed frame. Betsy is now allowed time to explore objects without
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direct interference from the mother. Betsy is alert and very active: she 
uses object manipulations with two hands, doing active fingering while 
gazing at the object as well as transferring, rotating, and shaking the 
object. Meanwhile, the mother talks about object properties while using 
a distinct voice to mark Betsy’s object-related actions.
Note that these new activities of Betsy manipulating objects without the 
mother’s direct interference as well as the mother’s verbal commentaries 
on the object properties were originally observed as innovations in the 
frame transitions during sessions 4, 5, and 6. Specifically, there were a few 
occasions when the not-guided object frame emerged as a break of the 
guided object frame when the mother talked about objects as she switched 
objects. There were also a few episodes of the guided object frame when 
the mother placed the object within Betsy’s reach. As her mother pre­
sented the object to her, Betsy reached the object offered by her mother, 
at times, grasping it and mouthing it (not-guided object frame).
Although the mother seems to allow Betsy uninterrupted time to 
manipulate objects (i.e., the not-guided object frame), she is still active 
in choosing the objects for Betsy by handing them to her during the 
guided object frame. These patterns of co-actions constitute the new 
ordinary variability of the not-guided object frame.
With the increasing growth of the not-guided object frame, the guided 
object frame continues to emerge in different forms. For example, there 
are times when the mother takes away an object that Betsy has been 
mouthing for a long time during the not-guided object frame, and 
introduces a second object into their interaction (guided object frame). 
At other times, the mother not only gives Betsy certain objects but also 
helps her hold them when needed. The mother’s participation in the 
guided object frame has now changed to include facilitation as well as 
interruption of Betsy’s object manipulation. Note that the mother’s 
facilitation of Betsy’s manipulation of objects was previously observed 
as innovations within the guided object frame during sessions 4, 5, 
and 6 when she occasionally places the object within Betsy’s reach or 
at her hand.
It is also worth noting that the not-guided object frame and the guided 
object frame now occur in quick succession. Object manipulation 
follows a sequence composed of: Betsy actively mouthing an object 
(i.e., the not-guided object frame), the mother introducing a new 
object to Betsy followed by Betsy reaching for and grasping the 
new object (i.e., the guided object frame), and then Betsy manipulating 
the second object, at times actively mouthing it (i.e., the not-guided 
object frame). This sequential patterning between the guided object and 
the not-guided object frames appears to constitute a form of historical
recapitulation in which an already existing historical frame (i.e., the 
guided object frame) is maintained and makes transitions with a newly 
emergent frame (i.e., not-guided object frame).
Now that Betsy is becoming more skilled at manipulating objects on 
her own, a new ordinary variability characterizing the social/object 
mixed frame also emerges during visits 7 and 8. The mother now uses 
the object Betsy is holding, making it kiss Betsy’s face without taking the 
object from her. It is as if Betsy is playing the object-touch games herself. 
Both Betsy and her mother are also becoming more serious, smiling and 
laughing relatively little and producing fewer vocalizations. The mother, 
for instance, uses far fewer sound effects with objects during visits 7 and
8. The impression the observer gets is that the social/object mixed frame 
is gradually becoming transformed as the not-guided object frame 
emerges as a new and distinct frame. In fact, certain characteristics of 
the not-guided object frame (such as helping Betsy play the object-touch 
games herself) appear to permeate the social/object mixed frame.
Similarly to the changes observed in the frames, the transitions be­
tween the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame or 
the guided object frame present a new ordinary variability. Two predom­
inant forms of ordinary variability are identified. There are the transi­
tions in which Betsy is quietiy concentrated in the manipulation of the 
object she holds while the mother quietly observes Betsy, and there are 
the transitions where Betsy and her mother are actively participating in 
the frame change by modifying their ongoing activity such as releasing an 
object, stopping smiling, or grasping an object. For example, in one of 
the transitions from the guided object frame to the not-guided object 
frame:
The mother squeezes a toy while Betsy looks at the toy held by the mother (i.e., 
the guided object frame). As Betsy starts moving her right hand toward the toy held 
by the mother, her mother stops squeezing the toy, holding it steadily. At this point, 
Betsy grasps the toy and vocalizes. The mother then releases the toy and starts 
watching Betsy, quietly, while Betsy manipulates the toy with her hands (i.e., the 
not-guided object frame).
In another transition, however, Betsy and her mother appear to punc­
tuate the change of frames by stopping their vocalizations, and then 
remaining quiet:
Betsy manipulates a toy, vocalizing and looking at her mother, while the mother 
looks at Betsy, talking to her (i.e., the social/object mixed frame). The mother then 
stops vocalizing and so does Betsy while manipulating the toy. At this point, the 
mother remains quiet, watching Betsy manipulate the toy (i.e., the not-guided 
object frame).
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The examples above illustrate the two predominant patterns of transi­
tions observed during visits 7 and 8 where Betsy manipulates an object 
with her hands while the mother watches her infant quiedy. Indeed, 
Betsy’s mother gradually becomes more of a quiet partner -  a partner 
who is focused on helping her infant in object-oriented activities. Part of 
this new ordinary variability of frame transitions where the dyad appears 
to become more focused in facilitating Betsy’s object exploration can be 
traced back to some innovations identified in sessions 4, 5, and 6 when 
Betsy’s occasional object mouthing was observed.
Innovations in sessions 7 and 8
A few innovations continue to be observed during the not-guided object 
frame and in the transitions involving this frame. Specifically, object 
mouthing continues to be a way for Betsy to explore objects. Meanwhile, 
the mother quietly watches Betsy play with objects or verbally praises 
Betsy’s attempts to reach for objects independently and manipulate 
them (in these cases, mostly through mouthing). It is important to 
emphasize that object mouthing and the mother’s more indirect facilita­
tion of Betsy’s object exploration later become predominant activities 
permeating the frames during sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12. That is, the 
not-guided object frame presents a distinct quality in the sessions to 
follow when Betsy starts to choose the objects for her to mouth on her 
own while her mother verbally praises Betsy’s independent object 
choices.
Brief developmental account on sessions 7 and 8
The not-guided object frame begins to pervade these sessions, with the 
“support” of the guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame. 
Compared to previous sessions, all of the observed frames (i.e., not- 
guided object frame, guided object frame, and social/object mixed 
frame) undergo coordinated changes as reflected by the emergence of 
a new ordinary variability for each of these frames. Specifically, as Betsy 
becomes more object-focused and fascinated with the new activity of 
examining the objects around her, the mother adjusts her object- 
oriented behaviors and begins providing support to her infant’s object 
exploration by handing them to Betsy.
The not-guided object frame begins to become elaborated into a fully 
developed frame as Betsy spends increasing amounts of time manipulat­
ing objects. This constitutes a newly emergent frame that arises out of 
the innovations within the guided-object frame and social/object
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mixed frame during sessions 4, 5, and 6. At the same time, the guided 
object frame expands its forms as illustrated by the increasing variability 
in the way the mother presents objects to Betsy. The social/object mixed 
frame also changes from its earlier quality of enjoyable social play to 
becoming more focused on Betsy’s more serious examination of objects.
Furthermore, the dyad’s new ordinary variability during sessions 7 
and 8 includes a patterned integration of the guided object frame and the 
not-guided object frame. In this case, it is as if frames (i.e., guided object 
frame and not-guided object frame) are blending together at the same 
time that a historical dynamics is recapitulated by the dyad. Note that 
this integration is first observed in the context of frame transitions during 
sessions 4, 5, and 6, and then observed as part of the frames themselves 
during sessions 7 and 8.
Occasionally, Betsy becomes immersed with objects during both 
frames and transitions while her mother verbally praises Betsy’s inde­
pendent reaching of the object or quietly observes Betsy’s object ma­
nipulation. This seems to constitute an historical prelude for the next 
four sessions when Betsy’s independent selection of objects followed by 
excessive mouthing of them becomes a characteristic that permeates the 
frames and their transitions.
All of these processes -  the simultaneous re-organization of each of the 
frames in relation to each other and the emergence of a new frame in 
the context of the blending and recapitulation of frames — constitute what 
we consider to be the conditions of a developmental change. Innovations, 
as seeds for developmental change, alter the ordinary variability within 
frames on later occasions. This alteration, however, is of the same kind as 
the innovation when the infant becomes more active across multiple 
modalities. In the case of this developmental change, however, the entire 
pattern of communication changes across the whole system: all the 
frames and transitions are involved. For reasons we do not yet under­
stand, the build-up and elaboration of innovations seems to reach a 
critical point at which time the “old” or historical system can no longer 
contain the innovations within ordinary variability. At this time, the 
system spontaneously shifts to a new system-wide organization that 
includes new frames, creative blending of old frames, and new actions 
within frames. It is important to note that we did not observe any single 
innovation or event that precipitated the developmental transition.
Ordinary variability in sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12
In the last four sessions analyzed (i.e., sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12), Betsy 
is 22, 23, 24, and 25 weeks old respectively. The not-guided object
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frame, the guided object frame, and the social/object mixed frame con­
tinue to be observed -  although with detectable qualitative differences 
within each frame.
During the guided object frame, the mother either places objects near 
Betsy or changes Betsy’s position on the floor to help Betsy reach for the 
object on her own. Except for when Betsy is mouthing an object, the 
mother sets each infant-object scene without interfering directly with 
B etsy’s ongoing actions. Elements of the previous ordinary variability are 
maintained where the guided object frame is utilized by the dyad as a 
context to facilitate the infant’s object exploration. At the same 
tim e, however, the mother facilitates object exploration in a less direct 
manner -  by placing objects within the infant’s reach (instead of handing 
them  to the infant) or by repositioning the infant’s body. A new ordinary 
variability of the guided object frame emerges out of the innovations 
observed in the not-guided object frame during sessions 7 and 8 when 
the mother indirectly facilitated Betsy’s object mouthing.
Not surprisingly, the not-guided object frame is also affected by the 
predominance of object mouthing. The mother more often attempts to 
take objects away from Betsy while Betsy mouths them. During this 
frame, the mother uses words of encouragement in the form of little 
cheers and claps when Betsy successfully reaches for an object independ­
ently and manipulates it (as in the innovations observed in sessions 7 and 
8). Betsy is also becoming more skilled at manipulating objects inde­
pendently as her hand-eye coordination becomes smooth. She spends 
longer periods of time exploring objects (not only mouthing them), 
thereby increasing the duration of the not-guided object frame during 
these last four sessions. She rocks side to side to move closer to objects 
and this appears to prompt her mother to put her in a prone position. 
This new position allows Betsy to more consistently choose her own 
objects to manipulate, and she does so in two new ways: banging the 
object on the floor or rolling the ball on the floor. While on her belly, 
Betsy also cleverly pushes up on her hands to gaze around at the objects 
and then reaches for one. It is important to highlight that, when lying on 
her tummy, Betsy looks over her shoulder to check in visually with her 
mother. Indeed even during mouthing, Betsy actively looks at her 
mother and other objects, thereby never “breaking” the connection with 
her mother or her surroundings.
During the social/object mixed frame, the mother continues to de­
crease the amount of her vocalizations and their social/animated games 
include Betsy as her own entertainer (similar to the ordinary variability 
observed in sessions 7 and 8). For example, while Betsy is squeezing the 
red porcupine, the mother reaches down and guides Betsy’s hand to
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make the object kiss or tap along her belly. At this point in this dyad’s 
relationship history, this dynamics of social interaction with toys 
along with Betsy gradually becoming her own entertainer appear to be 
predominant.
With the increase of the not-guided object frame, there is also a 
gradual rise in the speed of the transitions, and Betsy appears to initiate 
most of them. One gets the impression that both interactive partners 
have a better mutual understanding of their “roles” during their com­
munication: the infant becomes more autonomous and pro-active in 
setting her interactions involving the objects; while the mother becomes 
an observer and indirect facilitator of her growing infant.
The transitions primarily involve the not-guided object frame and the 
guided object frame, with the second most predominant transition occur­
ring between the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed 
frame. During these last four sessions, the mother no longer brings objects 
to Betsy’s hands on a consistent basis. Rather she mostly places objects 
within Betsy’s reach (not adjusting them into Betsy’s hands), thereby 
allowing Betsy to make her own object choice. There are moments, 
however, when the mother holds an object within Betsy’s reach. In these 
cases, the mother does not need to hold the object steadily for long periods 
of time as Betsy now quickly grasps the object presented to her. Betsy also 
becomes more immersed in her own actions on the object as the mother 
progressively becomes quieter and less vocal. Actually, the mother seldom 
changes her actions and, when she does so, she stops them in order to 
better watch Betsy’s more independent manipulation of the object as 
illustrated in the following transition.
T he mother is shaking a toy within Betsy’s sight, smiling and talking to Betsy, 
while Betsy holds another toy, looking at the toy held by the mother (i.e., the 
guided object frame). The mother stops talking, stops shaking the toy, and quietly 
holds the toy steadily within Betsy’s sight. Ar this point, Betsy looks at the toy she holds 
and starts manipulating it. The mother remains quiet, watching Betsy manipulate 
her own toy (i.e., the not-guided object frame).
Innovations in sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12
A few instances of peek-a-boo occur with an object in the context of the 
social/object mixed frame. During these instances, Betsy’s vocalizations 
increase: she makes many grunts, gurgling sounds, and coos mosdy at 
objects. Even though Betsy is quite active with objects, once again, there 
remains a sense of togetherness within the dyad. It is as if the dyad 
recapitulates an already recognized pattern of interaction as new forms 
of communication emerge.
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There are also a few transitions when the mother starts squeezing the 
objects held by Betsy as if trying to become a part of the infant-object 
connection. The dyad then begins to reveal a new social use of objects as 
they create games around Betsy’s new motor skills. For instance, there is 
an occasion on which Betsy is trying to grasp a toy on the floor while her 
mother observes her (i.e., the not-guided object frame). The mother then 
savs: “Go for it, baby! Go for it. ” After Betsy gets the toy, the mother claps 
her hands, saying “Yeahhhhhh!” raising the intonation of her voice as 
Betsy looks at her mother (i.e., the social/object mixed frame). In this 
sense, the social/object mixed frame continues to serve a bridging func­
tion, providing a background of ongoing support for the actions that 
occur during the emerging not-guided object frame.
Brief developmental account of sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12
Betsy’s increased facility with objects appears to be related to an increase 
in the speed of transitions between the object-oriented frames. It is as if 
innovations occurring in one frame (i.e., innovation in the not-guided 
object frame during sessions 7 and 8) affect the familiar dynamics of 
other frames in later sessions (i.e., ordinary variability in the guided 
object frame during sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12).
It is also important to point out that in some of the transitions to the 
guided object frame, the mother quickly facilitates Betsy’s more inde­
pendent grasping of an object as she used to do in previous sessions -  it is 
as if the mother recapitulates familiar forms of dyadic interaction. Like­
wise, most of the transitions to the social/object mixed frame involve 
an ordinary variability similar to that observed in previous sessions. That 
is, the mother spends a great deal of the transition time trying to 
entertain Betsy while Betsy remains relatively occupied with the objects 
she holds.
At the same time, the social/object mixed frame develops a social 
quality with respect to the emergence of Betsy’s novel actions on objects. 
Although there is a clear increase in their focus on object exploration, the 
dyad is able to combine mutual and playful enjoyment with Betsy’s 
exploration of objects. The social/object mixed frame, instead of dimin­
ishing in importance, becomes the ground for the celebration of new 
infant developmental achievements. It is as if the permeation of “new” 
and “old” frames as well as the recapitulation of the “older” frames 
during the elaboration of the historical frame (i.e., the guided object 
frame) appears to have facilitated the dyad’s navigation across the devel­
opmental shift from a primary focus on socially-oriented frames to a 
predominant focus on object-oriented frames.
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Overall summary of Betsy and her mother
A historical analysis of this dyad’s relationship across the twelve sessions 
suggests that, during the first sessions, the guided object frame is the 
historical frame for Betsy and her mother, with the social/object mixed 
frame as the second most predominant frame. Betsy’s activity in both 
frames and transitions changes over time from a quiet observer in the 
first sessions to an immersed explorer of the object in the last sessions. 
The mother’s activity also changes in relation to Betsy’s: she starts out as 
a talkative captivator and entertainer, and then she becomes a referee 
and spectator of her infant’s object-related activities. Over time, Betsy 
and her mother begin to engage for longer durations in the not-guided 
object frame and the guided object frame. Specifically, the guided object 
frame begins with the mother creating interesting visual and auditory 
displays for Betsy’s observation of the object and this continues into 
sessions 4, 5, and 6 as Betsy shifts from a quiet observer of her surround­
ings to a more active play-partner. During sessions 4, 5, and 6, we see the 
first emergence, in the form of innovations, of the mother’s facilitation of 
Betsy’s object exploration, which later dominates the following sessions. 
Towards the end of the observation period, the guided object frame is 
mainly characterized by Betsy’s immersion in object exploration while 
the mother watches Betsy’s activities.
The social/object mixed frame is a time of enjoyable social play for 
both Betsy and her mother in all of the twelve sessions except for sessions 
7 and 8. During these sessions, Betsy’s examination and immersion in 
objects bring to this frame a more serious emotional flavor. By the last 
sessions, the social/object mixed frame becomes enjoyable once again 
and the dyad’s focus is on a playful sharing of Betsy’s emerging object 
skills. Furthermore, based on the quantitative analysis, we propose the 
social/object mixed frame as a bridging frame for Betsy and her mother 
and this appears to be confirmed in the qualitative analysis. First, the 
social/object mixed frame seems to be the locus of transitions first with 
the guided object frame and later with the not-guided object frame; and 
only then, the transitions begin to occur direcdy between these two 
object-oriented frames. Second, despite its change in frequency and 
duration across the twelve sessions, the social/object mixed frame main­
tains a familiar social connection between Betsy and her mother 
throughout the observation period. At the same time, however, this 
frame undergoes modifications in its quality consistent with the changes 
observed in the other frames, as observed in sessions 7 and 8 when the 
emotional tone of this frame becomes less playful with the increasing 
dyadic focus on object exploration.
Betsy and her mother 169
The not-guided object frame first emerges as a short break in the 
social/object mixed frame or between object choices in the guided object 
frame during sessions 4, 5, and 6. During sessions 7 and 8, Betsy 
becomes more focused on object examination and this is in part reflected 
in the increasing appearance of the not-guided object frame. By the last 
sessions, the not-guided object frame becomes predominant and is 
mainly characterized by Betsy’s immersion on object exploration while 
her mother observes her infant’s activities. It is noticeable that the not- 
guided object frame makes use of the already established frames (guided 
object frame and social/object mixed frame) to foster its emergence. As 
mentioned above, when it first appears, the not-guided object frame is a 
brief interlude during the guided object and the social/object mixed 
frames as the mother lingered over changing of toys. This function of a 
brief transitional frame is also observed in transitions between the guided 
object and social/object mixed frames. This brief not-guided object 
frame is followed by its further integration with the guided object frame 
and elaboration during sessions 9 through 12.
We find a number of ways in which frames and transitions are related 
to one another. There is, first of all, a similarity of mother and infant 
actions in both the frames and transitions across all twelve sessions. 
During the first sessions, for example, the guided object frame is mainly 
characterized by mother’s continuous attempt to capture and maintain 
Betsy’s visual attention to different objects (i.e., captivator), while Betsy 
looked off to the side all the time. Comparably, the transitions involving 
the guided object frame are mainly characterized by Betsy looking in the 
same direction for a long time, while her mother makes primary use of 
auditory stimulation in different ways attempting to captivate Betsy’s 
visual attention to the object.
We also find some differences between frames and transitions, and 
these differences are preludes to changes observed in the sessions to 
follow. Across the first three sessions, for example, there are a few 
situations in which Betsy’s body movements, in addition to gaze direc­
tion, are part of the transitions. Although this pattern of transition in 
which Betsy is more active is rarely observed in these sessions, it be­
comes more salient in the next ones during both frames and transitions. 
At the same time, developmental innovations in one session (or set of 
sessions) that lead to growth during the next session do not appear only 
in transitions but also in frames. This suggests that, at the developmental 
time scale, the changes observed in the realtime transitions preceded 
transformations in the mother-infant communication system as reflected 
in the frames.
Taken together, both the quantitative and qualitative results suggest 
that the two models of change suggested by propositions 1 and 2 (Chap­
ter 5) have been supported. The findings have similarities to those of 
Richard and his mother, but also important differences. Proposition 1 
offers developmental sequence (Pi) in which bridging frames inter­
cede both in realtime and developmental time between historical 
and emerging frames. For Richard and his mother, proposition 1 was 
modified as,
(P[) Historical <—> Bridging Bridging <-» Emerging
“  t  =► I  t
---------* Emerging (brief) Historical (brief) <—
In this sequence, brief instances of the emerging frame in the early 
period and brief instances of the historical frame appear alongside 
the bridging frame and make realtime transitions with both frames. 
Because hybrid sequence (P'/) fits Betsy and her mother, it suggests that 
proposition 1 is strongly supported.
Proposition 2 proposes that innovations arise from ordinary variability 
and later lead to developmental change, as suggested by sequence (P2). 
Again, this also receives strong support in this dyad’s history but the 
model is more complex than sequence (P2) and more complex than 
sequence (P'2' ) that was proposed to fit Richard and his mother. Instead, 
we offer sequence (P2") for Betsy and her mother.
(P'2') (level la +  level 2=t)period a —> (level lp(+level l5 -I- level 2’ + 
level 2“') + level 2p)period (level 3)period y
As for Richard and his mother, level l a is ordinary variability in the first 
observed developmental period, designated the a period. Level 2* are 
innovations occurring during period a. Level l p is ordinary 
variability during a second developmental period, p, and level 2P are 
innovations during the p period. This part of the model, that is,
(level 1* +  level 2’ ) ^  a -  (level l p + level 2p)period p
is identical to Richard and his mother. As a reminder, this model shows 
that innovations in period a lead to a new ordinary variability in period p, 
such that there may be a series of recognizably different developmental 
periods (ot, p, y, . . .), each with a new ordinary variability and new 
innovations. In the case of Betsy and her mother, this sequence does not
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continue over time as it did for Richard and his mother but rather leads 
eventually to a developmental change (level 3).
The middle section of (PJ'), that is,
(level l p(+level la + levete* -I- level 2X) +  level 2p)period p
represents the possibility for additional complexity in any particular 
developmental period. The second optional term in this middle section 
of sequence (P'2'), ( + level 2* ), reflects the possibility that additional 
innovations may be introduced during this P developmental period that 
are responses to or amplifications of innovations introduced during the 
previous period, at. This is the same as we found for Richard and his 
mother. An additional term for Betsy and her mother, (+  level l a +  level 
2’ ), represents the possibility for recapitulation, in which some aspect of 
ordinary variability and innovation from a previous developmental 
period, a, becomes incorporated into the ordinary variability during 
the current developmental period, p. In the case of Betsy and her 
mother, it was not added until the third developmental period, y. Both 
of these terms are possible but optional.
As for Richard and his mother, the data fit our prediction that changes 
in ordinary variability are preceded by innovations which do not change 
the ordinary variability at the time they first appear, but only later, when 
the system shifts to some new period of ordinary variability. Finally, one 
of the key distinguishing features of this dyad compared to Richard and 
his mother is the presence of level 3 developmental change. This change 
fits our definition of a re-organization of all the frames and transitions. It 
appears that one of the clues to the recognition of level 3 change is a 
blending or permeability of one frame with respect to the others. The 
social/object frame, for example, becomes more serious, similar to the 
emerging not-guided object frame. Other clues are the emergence of a 
new frame of more than brief duration with its own unique features and 
the recapitulation of older frames. It is not clear from these data, because 
only one subject is studied, whether all of these features are necessary to 
constitute a developmental change. Clearly, there has to be an emerging 
new frame and the blending and changes of all the frames in the system, 
otherwise that change would not meet the definitional criteria of devel­
opment. But, does there need to be recapitulation? This is an open 
question.
1 0  R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n :  
q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  L e w i s  a n d  h i s  m o t h e r
In this chapter, we present a case analysis of the development of frames 
and frame transitions for another one of the four representative dyads, 
Lewis and his mother. Similar to the organization utilized in previous 
qualitative chapters, we present the raw data developmental trajectories 
for each of the four frames, the raw data transition frequencies between 
the frames as a function of age, and a qualitative analysis of the relational 
history. In the latter, we describe the change processes at two levels, 
ordinary variability (referred to as level 1 change in Chapter 3) and 
innovations (referred to as level 2 change in Chapter 3), followed by 
a brief developmental account of these changes that describes any 
evidence for a developmental re-organization (level 3 change).
Developmental trajectories and transition frequencies
As shown in Figure 7.2 and Table 10.1, for this dyad the guided object 
frame persisted as the historically predominant frame until session 8, 
after which social, social/object mixed, and not-guided object frames 
became more salient. Social and social/object mixed frames were salient 
features of their communication throughout the period of observation. 
Unlike the other two dyads reviewed thus far, not-guided object frames 
for Lewis and his mother never became predominant on its own. Rather, 
the not-guided object and the social/object mixed frames seemed to 
share equal status as the newly emerging frames. The significant negative 
correlation (Table 7.2) between the not-guided object frame and the 
social/object mixed frame lends further support to this conclusion. 
Unlike Richard and Betsy and their mothers, in which social/object 
mixed frames seemed to serve as a developmental bridging frame be­
tween guided object and not-guided object frames, Lewis and his mother 
developed social/object mixed frames into more lasting features of their 
communication. No frames in this dyad appear to have the predicted 
trajectory of a bridging frame.
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Table 10.1. Descriptive statistics offrames by session: Lewis
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Age (Weeks) 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 17 18 19 20 21
Social frame
Frequency 7 5 0 4 6
% of session 35.53 29.13 0.00 16.06 30.06
Mean duration* 24.36 27.97 - 19.27 24.05
(s.d.) (50.88) (41.08) (-) (12.66) (5.43)
Guided object frame
Frequency 10 7 2 6 10
% of session 61.32 64.20 99.12 58.65 31.83
Mean duration* 29.44 44.02 237.88 46.92 15.28
(s.d.) (33.22) (42.21) (309.24) (20.76) (11.56)
Not-guided object frame
Frequency 2 2 0 2 9
% of session 1.26 2.20 0.00 5.54 28.28
Mean duration* 3.02 5.27 - 13.30 15.08
(s.d.) (0.81) (2.50) (-) (15.74) (17.55)
Social/object mixed frame
Frequency 2 4 1 5 7
% of session 1.89 4.47 0.88 19.75 9.82
Mean duration* 4.52 5.37 4.23 18.96 6.74
(s.d.) (1.76) (4.35) (-) (30.66) (6.25)
2 4 3 9 3 3 1
9.17 6.88 17.15 28.77 40.53 5.27 1.72
22.00 8.25 27.43 15.34 64.85 8.43 8.25
(4.47) (10.88) (24.68) (16.03) (96.57) (8.01) (-)
5 9 7 8 9 7 10
53.90 59.78 50.58 26.56 46.62 21.81 11.17
51.74 31.88 34.68 15.94 24.86 14.96 5.36
(56.96) (30.19) (33.66) (14.59) (43.20) (14.41) (2.80)
6 5 5 0 7 13 6
29.04 10.30 14.05 0.00 10.43 35.97 11.23
23.23 9.89 13.49 - 7.15 13.28 8.99
(31.96) (9.71) (9.93) (-) (8.30) (11.86) (6.52)
3 13 7 7 5 18 11
7.89 23.04 18.23 44.68 2.42 36.96 75.88
12.63 8.51 12.50 30.63 2.32 9.86 33.11
(2.93) (7.66) (11.95) (35.34) (0.94) (9.07) (40.61)
Note: * seconds
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Table 10.2. Frequency of frame transitions: Lewis and his mother
Frame transition
Session
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
l->2 6 2 2 3 1 1 3 1
2->l 5 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
l->4
4->l 2 2
l->3 3 1 1
3->l 1 2
2->3 3 3 3 3 2 2 5
3->2 3 2 1 4 1 2 4 6 1 4
2->4 2 2 1 3 3 2 3 3 1 2
4->2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 4 3
3->4 2 2 1 7 2
4->3 1 4 3 2 7 3
Note: 1 = Social frame; 2 = Guided object frame; 3 = Nonguided object frame; 4 = Social/ 
object mixed frame
For this dyad there was a predominance of guided object frames until 
session 9, when social/object mixed and not-guided object frames began 
to increase in duration. As shown in Table 10.2, most of the transitions 
occurred between guided object frames and the other three frames, 
especially during the first ten sessions. Following that, most of the 
transitions were with the not-guided object frame, either between the 
guided object frame or the social/object mixed frame. During sessions 5 
and 6 in particular, there were no predominant transition frequencies. 
Rather, the dyad seemed to move equally between the different frames. 
This may be another way to creative bridging, not with a specific 
frame but a process in which new and old co-occur by “balancing” all 
possibilities.
The historical frames were the social and the guided object frames. 
Most of the transitions began or ended with the guided object frame, 
suggesting that it may also serve as a developmental bridging frame. In 
this case, then, a single frame may be serving two functions. There is, in 
fact, a relative peak in and otherwise steadily declining duration of the 
guided object frame, the peak occurring during sessions 6, 7, and 8. 
Thus, it may be that this dyad fits proposition 1, sequence (Pj) if we 
allow that one frame may act as both the historical and bridging frame.
In spite of the relative simplicity of the predominance of guided object 
frames transitions during the first eight sessions, there was a complex
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session-to-session change in the patterning of transitions. Compared to 
Richard and Betsy, there were more transitions with the social frame and 
transitions involving social and social/object mixed frames were spread 
out across many sessions. We will seek further clarification of these 
patterns in the qualitative analysis.
Qualitative analysis
Ordinary variability in sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
In the first six sessions, Lewis is 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14 weeks old. All 
four frames are observed, with the guided object frame being the pre­
dominant one, followed by the relatively equal appearance of the social 
frame, the social/object mixed frame, and the not-guided object frame. 
It is worth noting that the mother’s overall style of verbal communi­
cation during all frames is to ask Lewis questions and to answer the 
questions for him. For instance, the mother says: “Are you talking to 
the porcupine?” while demonstrating the object to Lewis during the 
guided object frame. Then, she replies for Lewis, saying: “Yea, I think 
you are going to talk to him. Do you think he understands?” while Lewis 
looks at the object presented by his mother, vocalizing. This pattern 
of verbal communication remains relatively the same throughout all 
twelve sessions, however there is more maternal talking in the first six 
sessions.
During the guided object frame, Lewis’ gaze is a salient indicator of 
his attention. The mother seems to want to please Lewis by showing and 
manipulating whichever object he looks at. She chooses objects carefully 
and smoothly demonstrates them, allowing plenty of time for Lewis to 
look at the object she presents. The mother also highlights the object’s 
properties, especially the sounds of the objects, while Lewis moves his 
arms and legs, smiling and vocalizing. The mother talks about the 
sounds the objects make, verbally asking Lewis to notice the object’s 
properties. Furthermore, starting in session 2, the mother begins to put 
an object in Lewis’ hand or helps support Lewis’ actions on the objects. 
The ordinary variability of this frame is thus characterized by mutual 
attention towards the object as indicated by the mother’s active behav­
iors emphasizing the object’s properties and Lewis’ visual and bodily 
orientation to the objects held by the mother.
The social frame is short lived and mainly characterized by visual 
contact between Lewis and his mother, exchanges of vocalizations, ma­
ternal touching of Lewis’ face, tickling of Lewis’ stomach, and holding of
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Lewis’ hand. The mother’s touching of Lewis rhythmically corresponds 
with her vocal tone, thereby emphasizing her words. Most of the time, 
Lewis’ head is turned to the side with the mother leaning over to meet 
Lewis’ gaze. The social/object mixed frame involves the mother fre­
quently using touch as a way of gaining Lewis’ visual attention or high­
lighting the object she is showing. Touch allows the mother to feel 
connected to her infant, even when he appears more focused on the 
objects around him. During the not-guided object frame, Lewis’ increas­
ing interest in the objects is demonstrated through brief mouthing of the 
object held by the mother and through slow shaking of the object -  also 
held by the mother.
A close analysis of the frame transitions indicates that all four frames 
are a part of the transitions during these sessions. Most of these transi­
tions, however, involve the guided object frame with considerably fewer 
transitions occurring directly between the other frames. Similar to a 
bridging frame, the guided object frame has become so central in the 
dyad’s relationship that it mediates the movement from one frame to 
another. Lewis’ gaze direction and maternal talking are salient actions 
involved in the transitions. The ordinary variability of the frame transi­
tions is illustrated below during a transition from the guided object 
frame to the social/object mixed frame:
The mother is quiedy squeezing an object while Lewis looks at the object held by 
the mother (guided object frame). As the mother keeps squeezing the object, she starts 
talking to Lewis about the object she is squeezing. Meanwhile, Lewis keeps looking at 
the object held by the mother. The mother then stops squeezing the object, holding it in 
her hands, and keeps talking to Lewis about the object. Lewis, however, just keeps 
looking at the object held by the mother. The mother then starts touching Lewis’ 
body with the object, talking to him about the toy (social/object mixed frame).
As exemplified above, Lewis’ gaze is the primary transitional action, 
giving the impression that the dyad’s movement from one frame to the 
next is made mostly by the mother as a result of Lewis’ visual and 
persistent focus on the object. It is worth noting that the mother alter­
nates her vocal actions with her manual actions on the object as if 
attempting to maintain some kind of activity to keep her infant’s interest. 
Besides the alternation between maternal vocalization and her actions on 
the object, the mother also appears to carefully watch her infant’s 
actions, changing hers as a way of attending to his action request. In 
the transition described above, for example, the mother stops whatever 
she is doing in order to attend to what she interprets to be what Lewis 
“wants” to do.
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In these first six sessions, innovations take place in the context of frame 
transitions. These occasional changes are conceived of as innovations for 
two reasons: (a) they were not observed as part of the recurring pattern 
of frame transitions; and (2) when they appear, they do not seem to alter 
the current and ordinary variability of frame transitions. There are four 
transitions involving the not-guided object frame in which both Lewis 
and his mother present a pattern of activity different from the predomin­
ant one observed in these sessions.
Specifically, during these transitions, Lewis is not just watching the 
object held by the mother, but he actually holds an object in his own 
hands, looking at it intently while the mother does not assist Lewis. 
Instead, she simply verbally highlights Lewis’ actions on the object. It 
is important to note that these innovations incorporate a new level of 
activity on the object where Lewis is more independent in acting on the 
object and the mother is more explicitly withholding her active assist­
ance. These occasional transition patterns seem to serve as a prelude to 
the next sessions as this patterning of activity where Lewis becomes a 
more independent explorer of the object and the mother becomes more 
of an observer of her infant will emerge, in the next sessions, as central 
characteristics of the ordinary variability of the object-related frames.
Developmental account of sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
Although all four frames are observed during the first six sessions, the 
guided object frame predominates, thereby suggesting it to be an already 
established frame in the communication system (i.e., historical frame). 
As Lewis becomes more interested in objects across the six sessions, the 
social frame becomes short lived and two new frames start to emerge in 
session 2: the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame 
(both object-related frames).
It is also important to note that although the transitions involve all four 
frames, most of these transitions occur via the guided object frame, 
thereby suggesting that the guided object frame also carries a bridging 
quality. During the transitions, Lewis is quiet and visually focused out­
wards whereas the mother modifies her behavior as a means of attending 
her infant’s action requests. There are a few transitions involving the not- 
guided object frame where Lewis becomes a more independent explorer 
of the object while the mother does not actively assist Lewis’ object 
interaction, thereby becoming more of an observer of her infant. These 
innovations involving a newly emergent frame (i.e., not-guided object
Innovations in sessions I, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
frame) are of particular relevance, as they seem to be the prelude to the 
new patterns that become predominant in the sessions to follow.
Ordinary variability in sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10
In the next four sessions (i.e., sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10), Lewis is 15, 17, 
18, and 19 weeks old respectively. Unlike the other two infants reviewed 
thus far, Lewis is fussy during most of these sessions (especially in the 
last two sessions). A few social frames occur during these sessions, with 
short periods of face-to-face social play during the fussy periods. Lewis 
often responds to this play with smiles, squeals, blowing bubbles, and 
vocalizations. The mother entertains her fussy infant by imitating his 
actions. Thus, the ordinary variability of the social frame observed in 
previous sessions is also observed here.
During the guided object frame, Lewis more actively holds and ex­
plores the objects while the mother either presents a second object or 
highlights the properties of the object Lewis is exploring. During the 
fussy periods, especially in sessions 9 and 10, the mother shows a variety 
of objects and in a faster pace as a means to soothe the infant. Note, 
however, that the new ordinary variability of the guided object frame 
where Lewis is a more active explorer of the object was initially observed 
in the form of innovations during the transitions involving the not-guided 
object frame in previous sessions.
The ordinary variability of the not-guided object frame now involves 
the mother talking about Lewis’ ongoing actions on the object, instead of 
actively supporting Lewis’ exploration of the object, while Lewis exam­
ines and manipulates objects on his own, actively mouthing his hand and 
objects. It is relevant to note that these changes in the ordinary variability 
of the not-guided object frame can be traced back to the innovations 
previously observed in the frame transitions involving this frame where 
Lewis explores the object more independently while the mother provides 
more indirect support to Lewis’ activities on the object.
Another change observed in the system is the continual increasing 
appearance of the social/object mixed frame. This frame continues to 
occur mostly when the mother touches or moves Lewis’ body while he 
manipulates an object. For instance, the mother has the porcupine kiss 
Lewis’ cheek or she places the caterpillar on Lewis’ tummy, squeezing it. 
Touch continues to be a way the mother feels connected to her infant 
(even when he is focused on the objects around him), but now it is 
integrated with animated games involving the object. With Lewis’ in­
creased focus on a more independent manipulation of objects, the 
mother develops new strategies (such as animation of objects) to
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maintain her connection with her infant. These strategies involve the 
integration of a positive emotional tone primarily observed in the social 
frame (which is now declining) with the manipulation of objects (which 
is now increasing).
Changes in the dynamics of frame transitions are also observed. First, 
there is a slight preference for transitions among the object-oriented 
frames, i.e., the guided object frame, the not-guided object frame, and 
the social/object mixed frame. With the exception of sessions 9 and 10 
where Lewis is fussy most of the time, much of the frame transitions do 
not involve the social frame. Second, Lewis more often initiates the 
transitions by breaking eye contact with his mother, by pulling his hands 
away from the object, or by simply grasping the object with both hands. 
It is interesting to note that as Lewis becomes more independent in his 
object explorations (initially observed as innovations during the frame 
transitions involving the not-guided object frame) and as the mother -  in 
response to the changes seen in Lewis -  begins acting more like an 
observer of her infant during the frames. Also, perhaps in response to 
the mother’s less active role, Lewis is also becoming more explicit with 
his bodily requests during the transitions. This in turn creates the 
impression that the transitions are becoming more circumscribed by 
Lewis’ action on the object. In one transition from the guided object 
frame to the not-guided object frame, for example:
The mother is holding a toy next to Lewis’ hands, talking to him, while Lewis 
adjusts his hands to the toy held by the mother (guided object frame). The mother 
stops talking to Lewis and keeps supporting his grasp o f the toy. Lewis finally grasps the 
toy with both hands. As Lewis grasps the toy, the mother releases the toy and starts 
talking to Lewis about the toy held by him, while Lewis examines the toy with his 
hands (not-guided object frame).
The example above illustrates how Lewis’ grasping of the object punc­
tuates the transition to the not-guided object frame. It is also noticeable 
that the mother’s actions on the objects do not involve shaking or squeez­
ing, but instead supporting of Lewis’ grasping, followed by quiet observa­
tion of his exploration of the object. This new dynamics of frame 
transition can be traced back to the innovations observed in the previous 
sessions where Lewis acted as a more independent explorer of the object 
and the mother acted as an observer of her infant.
Innovations in sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10
Innovations are again observed in the frame transitions involving the 
not-guided object frame, especially during session 8. These innovations
involve a few occasions where Lewis’ persistent object mouthing is 
observed during the transitions. In these occasional transitions, Lewis’ 
focus changes from manipulating the object through mouthing to being 
immersed in object mouthing while the mother continues acting as an 
observer and facilitator of Lewis’ immersion. This persistent mouthing is 
different from the exploratory mouthing observed during the frames in 
that it creates less room for the mother to be a part of the object activity. 
For instance, in one transition from the not-guided object frame to the 
social/object mixed frame:
Lewis is mouthing a toy, looking at it, while the mother is talking to Lewis about 
the toy he holds (not-guided object frame). Lewis keeps mouthing the toy and starts 
producing some negative vocalizations. The mother stops talking to Lewis, and stans 
touching his hands, saying “tch tch tch.” Lewis stops producing his negative 
vocalizations and keeps mouthing the toy, looking at it, while the mother con­
tinues touching his hands (social/object mixed frame).
In this transition, Lewis appears to be getting fussy while persistently 
mouthing the object (i.e., immersed) and the mother uses touch accom­
panied by her vocalization as a way of comforting Lewis. Although 
maternal touch seems effective in soothing Lewis, it does not change 
or reduce Lewis’ immersion in the object as Lewis keeps persistendy 
mouthing the object without looking at his mother. It is worth 
noting that in the sessions to follow (i.e., sessions 11 and 12) Lewis’ 
object immersion through persistent object mouthing becomes a central 
activity in the dyad’s communication.
Developmental account of sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10
During sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10, Lewis is fussy for long periods (espe­
cially in sessions 9 and 10). In spite of that, changes occur in each of the 
frames as well as in the frame transitions. The social frame is becoming 
background in the dyad’s relationship as demonstrated by its decreasing 
appearance and duration during these sessions. Although brief in dur­
ation, the social frame returns to the positive emotional tone seen during 
the first sessions and it becomes an effective way of soothing the fussy 
infant.
During the object frames, Lewis becomes a more independent exam­
iner of the object while his mother highlights the properties of the object 
Lewis is exploring during the guided object frame or makes comments 
on Lewis’ object-oriented activities during the not-guided object frame. 
The social/object mixed frame presents an ordinary variability similar to 
that observed in previous sessions with the mother using touch as a
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means to maintain contact with her increasingly object-focused infant. 
The difference is that during these sessions when the mother touches 
Lewis’ cheek or stomach with an object, she animates the objects, 
thereby blending social and object activities in one. Such change in the 
mother’s use of objects during the social/object mixed frame emerges 
as part of Lewis’ increased focus on a more independent object manipu­
lation. The mother thus becomes more creative in her use of objects 
during the social/object mixed frame (such as animation of objects) to 
maintain her connection with her increasingly object-focused infant.
During the frame transitions, Lewis and his mother appear to have 
“equal” levels of participation. It is important to highlight, however, that 
in the transitions to the not-guided object frame, Lewis begins to take 
more initiative and to act more as the “leader” with the mother acting 
more as a facilitator. In contrast, in the transitions to the social/object 
mixed frame, the mother becomes primarily responsible for initiating the 
changes into the social/object mixed frame either as a means to comfort 
Lewis or to re-establish some kind of connection with her increasingly 
object-focused infant. In most cases, the mother’s attempts to transition 
to the social/object mixed frame are rarely ratified by Lewis, and the 
dyad returns quickly to one of the other object frames.
Finally, a shift toward Lewis’ persistent object mouthing (i.e., object 
immersion) is beginning to be observed during some of the transi­
tions involving the not-guided object frames. Once again, the innov­
ations observed in the context of frame transitions appear to be a prelude 
to the patterns of frame and frame transitions observed in the next 
sessions.
Ordinary variability in sessions 11 an d  12
During the last two sessions (i.e., sessions 11 and 12) of the observa­
tional period, Lewis is 20 and 21 weeks old respectively. There is a 
decrease in the guided object frame, and an increase in the frequency 
and duration of the not-guided object frame and the social/object 
mixed frame. No social frames are observed. During all three frames 
Lewis is very active and coordinated in manipulating objects. Persistent 
mouthing of objects becomes his primary activity, followed by fingering, 
shaking, squeezing, visual regard, and reaching. Consequently, Lewis 
interacts with an object for a longer duration of time than previously 
observed, which is reflected in the increase in the frequency and duration 
of the not-guided object frame.
During the guided object frame, the mother more consistently acts 
as an assistant by helping Lewis hold or manipulate an object when
necessary. The seeds of this partem of activity where the mother provides 
quiet assistance to Lewis can be found in the occasional frame transitions 
(i.e., innovations) observed in previous sessions where Lewis is more 
immersed in object mouthing and the mother assists her infant in such 
activity. It is also worth noting that the current guided object frame 
includes and recapitulates characteristics of the social frame -  a frame 
that is no longer observed. Specifically, when the guided object 
frame occurs, Lewis seems more responsive to his mother’s support of 
object exploration by gazing at his mother while he is mouthing an object.
The not-guided object frame occurs in two forms: (a) when the 
mother verbally highlights Lewis’ actions while Lewis is actively gazing 
at and manipulating an object; and (b) when the mother acts as a 
spectator by silently watching Lewis play without any kind of verbal or 
manual interference. It is important to highlight that the mother’s activ­
ities of assisting and verbally commenting on Lewis’ object mouthing 
were previously observed in the form of innovations in the frame transi­
tions involving the not-guided object frame itself. Now, these activities 
appear in longer durations during the not-guided object frame. Thus, 
the previous innovations found in the frame transitions are now becom­
ing expanded during this frame.
Another visible change in these last two sessions is the increase in the 
social/object mixed frame that involves the mother’s use of touching and 
animated games to engage Lewis, while he mouths or manipulates 
objects. As previously observed in the social/object mixed frame, the 
mother kisses, tickles, and moves Lewis’ hand, feet, and legs, accom­
panying her touch with different sounds, while Lewis continues 
mouthing an object, smiling, laughing, and gazing at his mother. Similar 
to what is observed in the guided object frame during these sessions, 
components of the no longer observed social frame are recapitulated by 
being included in the gradually increasing social/object mixed frame. 
Now that the Lewis is more fascinated with his independent activity on 
objects, the social/object mixed frame serves the function to maintain the 
dyad’s social connection.
Similar to the previous sessions, the transitions occur essentially be­
tween the object-oriented frames. Lewis, however, is much more im­
mersed in his own object-related activities than before, especially 
persistent object mouthing. Lewis’ grasping of the object followed by 
his persistent mouthing of the object is the primary action (or sequence 
of actions) involved in most of the transitions. Meanwhile, the mother 
continues to be an explicit participant in the transitions by assisting her 
infant’s object interest. With Lewis’ more persistent and independent 
exploration of the object, the mother begins to change her actions more
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quickly, either as a way of more promptly attending to Lewis’ action 
request or as a way of reducing Lewis’ immersion in object mouthing.
For instance, during the transition from the not-guided object frame 
to the guided object frame, as soon as Lewis stops squeezing an object he 
holds, the mother immediately takes that object away from Lewis and 
presents another one. In another instance, during the transition from the 
not-guided object frame to the social/object mixed frame, the mother 
starts talking to Lewis and immediately after starts touching Lewis’ body 
while Lewis keeps mouthing the object throughout the entire transition. 
Therefore, although the mother appears to be more of an assistant and 
spectator of Lewis’ manipulation of the object, she also attempts to 
reduce Lewis’ immersion by rapidly changing her behaviors during the 
transitions from one frame to another.
Innovations in sessions I I  an d  12
Innovations are observed for the first time in the context of the frames. 
Specifically, there are a few occasions in the guided object frame where 
the mother demonstrates a second object while Lewis manipulates the 
first. Often in these instances Lewis watches the second object the 
mother demonstrates, while immersed in mouthing the first. There are 
also a few times during the not-guided object frame that the mother 
seems almost bored and plays with an object by herself as if in a waiting 
period for the infant to break from the immersed object play. Because 
these are the last sessions examined in the present study, we do not 
further explore the historical implications of these innovations in the 
dyad’s future dynamics of communication.
Developmental account o f  sessions 11 an d  12
During these two sessions, the social frame is no longer present. Qual­
ities of the social frame, however, seem to be recapitulated and blended 
into the other available frames. Specifically, there is some positive emo­
tional exchange during the social/object mixed frame and some mutual 
gazing during the guided object frame. With Lewis’ increasing focus on 
object immersion it is not surprising that the not-guided object frame 
(i.e., the newly emergent frame) increases in duration and frequency. At 
the same time, however, the social/object mixed frame increases as a 
means to maintain the social connection between Lewis and his mother 
while objects continue to be a part of their communication. During the 
transitions, Lewis remains focused on his more independent object 
exploration, while the mother appears to change her actions quickly as
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a way of distracting Lewis from his immersion or promptly assisting 
Lewis with an object he holds. Therefore, during the last two sessions, 
the historical frames are becoming background as the newly emergent 
frame rises.
A developmental reorganization in the system (level 3 change) is thus 
observed where the dyad’s focus of communication shifts from the 
guided object and social frames where the mother has a more direct 
participation in the dyadic activities to the not-guided object and social/ 
object mixed frames where the infant becomes a more independent and 
absorbed explorer of objects and the mother’s participation takes place 
primarily in the animated games involving objects (i.e., social/object 
mixed frame).
O verall summary o f  Lewis an d  his mother
Across time, this dyad gradually becomes more focused on both the not- 
guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame. Based on the 
quantitative analysis, we had tentatively concluded that this dyad was 
more focused upon social uses of objects rather than the uses of objects 
for their own sake. The qualitative analysis shows, however, that even 
though Lewis and his mother begin with the social frame and the 
guided object frame as the historical ground and have a relatively higher 
proportion of the social/object mixed frame in the later sessions com­
pared to Richard and Betsy, Lewis too moves toward immersion 
with objects by the last sessions in both the not-guided object and 
social/object mixed frames. Also, unlike the other two dyads, the quan­
titative analysis taken alone leads to a different conclusion than the 
qualitative analysis.
The social frame changes relatively little over the observation period as 
it mainly involves positively toned face-to-face play interrupted by 
Lewis’ turning his head to the side or fussing. It declines in duration 
over time, gradually becoming background in the dyad’s relationship. 
Starting in session 8, when the decline of the social frame is most 
noticeable in the qualitative analysis, its positive emotional characteristic 
becomes incorporated into the guided object frame and the social/object 
mixed frame. This suggests that the available frames in the system are 
becoming more permeable to each other, incorporating each other’s 
characteristics, possibly to retain some qualities of the frames that are 
fading away (i.e., the social frame). Thus, although the dyad is in fact 
moving toward immersion in object play, the ongoing recapitulation of 
the social play may serve to buffer the change in a dyad that clearly 
enjoys their mutual social play.
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During the guided object frame, the mother begins acting as an 
assistant by responding to Lewis’ level of attention and waiting for his 
bids to change objects during the first six sessions. During sessions 7, 8,
9, and 10, the mother’s activity changes to facilitator in relation to Lewis’ 
increased interest in examining objects. Finally, in the last two sessions, 
the guided object frame becomes short-lived and it occurs mainly when 
the mother assists Lewis’ manipulation of objects that he mouths. As 
mentioned earlier, starting on session 8, this frame incorporates com­
ponents of the social frame (i.e., mutual gazing) during the time when 
social frames are declining and when the infant is becoming more 
focused on independent exploration of objects.
The social/object mixed frame appears to serve a similar function at all 
times, specifically, as a way to maintain the mother-infant connection 
and as a break from Lewis’ fussiness. Starting in session 8, as Lewis 
becomes more immersed in object mouthing, the mother becomes more 
creative with her use of object and animated object games become a 
predominant characteristic of the social/object mixed frame. As men­
tioned earlier, the positive emotional quality initially observed in the 
social frame is now recapitulated in the social/object mixed frame.
The not-guided object frame emerges for the first time during sessions 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. It is during these sessions that Lewis begins to show a 
few signs of a more independent object exploration, which culminates in 
persistent mouthing in the last two sessions. It is not until session 8, 
however, that the not-guided object frame begins to become more cen­
tral and prevalent in the mother-infant communication.
Therefore, for Lewis and his mother, the qualitative analysis suggests 
that the frame with the bridging role was the guided object frame. The 
guided object frame has a similar profile of the bridging frames for the 
other dyads. First, while Lewis and his mother spent a lot of time in the 
social frame during the first session, the guided object frame already 
demonstrated signs of integration of these two historical frames (i.e., 
social frame and guided object frame) as Lewis smiled and vocalized to 
the mother while she demonstrated objects. Second, as new frames were 
emerging during sessions 2 through 6, the guided object frame mediated 
most of the transitions between these frames. And third, although quali­
tative changes were observed within the guided object frame, this frame 
was maintained by the dyad throughout the entire observation period 
and it incorporated elements of the social frame (i.e., mutual gazing) 
into its own dynamics during the last two sessions. The quantitative 
analysis does in fact show a peak in duration of the guided object frame 
during sessions 6, 7, and 8, where the peak is set against the background 
of a developmental decline in duration of the guided object frame. It is
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the qualitative analysis, however, that provides more support for this 
claim.
Finally, similar to what we observe for Richard and Betsy, we find at 
least two ways in which frames are related to transitions. First, there is a 
similarity of actions between frames and transitions across the twelve 
sessions. During the first session, for example, the social frame is mainly 
characterized by visual contact between Lewis and his mother. The 
mother vocalizes, tickles Lewis’ stomach, and holds Lewis’ hand. Lewis, 
in turn, moves his hands/arms, smiles, and vocalizes, thereby engaging in 
the social play with his mother. Comparably, in the transitions to the 
social frame, Lewis shifts his gaze direction and smiles at his mother, 
while his mother releases the object she is holding and starts touching 
Lewis’ body.
Second, there are some differences between frames and transitions 
within the same sessions and these differences appear to be a prelude to 
the patterns observed in both the frames and transitions in later sessions. 
Reconsider the first six sessions, for instance, when the guided object 
frame is primarily characterized by the mother’s active presentation of 
objects while Lewis intently watches the objects held by the mother. 
During that time, there are a few transitions when Lewis is not just 
watching the object held by the mother, but he actually holds an object 
in his own hands, looking at it intendy, and the mother does not 
actively assist Lewis but verbally highlights Lewis’ actions on the 
object. In later sessions (specifically, in sessions 7, 8, 9, and 10), such 
pattern of interaction between Lewis and his mother is observed and it 
becomes predominant in the guided object frame.
In spite of some equivocal findings from the quantitative analysis, 
when taken together both the quantitative and qualitative results support 
the two models of change suggested by propositions 1 and 2 (Chapter 
3). There is a clear and bridging frame, the guided object frame, that fits 
the originally proposed sequence:
(P!) (Historical «-*■ Bridging) =► (Bridging Emerging)
The findings on proposition 2 for Lewis and his mother are very 
similar to those for Betsy and her mother. Developmental sequence 
(P'2 ) that fit Betsy and her mother also applies here:
(P'2')(level la + level 2“)perioda —» (level l li(-flevel Is +  level 2“+  
level 2*') + level 2p)period p -  (level 3)pcriod y
As a reminder, this model shows that innovations in period P lead to a 
new ordinary variability in period (3, such that there may be a series of
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recognizably different developmental periods (a, (3, y, . . .), each with a 
new ordinary variability and new innovations which leads eventually to a 
developmental change (level 3). The model also contains terms in period 
0 for recapitulation (+ level l a + level 2®) and amplification of prior 
innovations (+  level 2 ) as part of the ordinary variability during period 
p. For the latter term in this case, both Lewis and his mother amplified 
each other, creating feedback loops of continuing invention and creativ­
ity that were sparked by innovations in the previous developmental 
period.
For all the dyads thus far, the data fit our prediction that changes in 
ordinary variability are preceded by innovations which do not change the 
ordinary variability at the time they first appear, but only later, when the 
system shifts to some new period of ordinary variability. Finally, the level 
3 developmental change for Lewis and his mother fits our definition of a 
re-organization of all the frames and transitions. First, there is a blending 
or permeability of one frame with respect to the others. The social frame, 
for example, becomes incorporated into the not-guided object frame and 
the social/object mixed frames. Second, there is an emergence of a new 
frame of more than brief duration with its own unique features (the 
social/object mixed frame and the not-guided object frame) and third, 
there is a recapitulation of older frames. In answer to the question posed 
at the end of Chapter 4 -  does there need to be recapitulation in a 
developmental re-organization? -  we now have two cases in which this 
indeed occurs: Betsy and her mother and Lewis and his mother.
The major difference between this dyad and Betsy and her mother was 
that a single frame, the guided object frame, played a dual role as 
historical and bridging at different points across the observational 
period. In addition, two frames, the not-guided object and the social/ 
object mixed frame, played the same role as emerging frames. This 
suggests that the dyadic communication system has considerable flexi­
bility in the realtime processes into which the developmental change 
process is woven. These results raise the intriguing possibility that there 
may be some general principles or laws of change -  sequences (P',) and 
(P'2) -  that are present as an invariant background in spite of a great deal 
of between dyad variability.
1 1  R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n :  
q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  S u s a n  a n d  h e r  m o t h e r
In this chapter, we present a case analysis of the development of frames 
and frame transitions for the final case of the four representative dyads, 
Susan and her mother. Similar to the organization utilized in previous 
qualitative chapters, we present the raw data developmental trajectories 
for each of the four frames, the raw data transition frequencies between 
the frames as a function of age, and a qualitative analysis of the rela­
tional history. In the latter, we describe the change processes at two 
levels, ordinary variability (referred to as level 1 change in Chapter 3) 
and innovations (referred to as level 2 change in Chapter 3), followed by 
a brief developmental account of these changes that describes any 
evidence for a developmental re-organization (level 3 change).
Developmental trajectories and transition frequencies
As shown in Figure 7.2 and Table 11.1, social frames were salient until 
session 6. They appeared to be the historical frame for this dyad. As with 
Lewis and his mother, both social/object mixed and not-guided object 
frames were the newly emerging frames. They began to increase at 
session 6 and grew steadily together for the remaining sessions, as 
reflected by a significant positive correlation between these two frames 
(see Table 7.2). Table 7.2 also shows a significant negative correlation 
between the social frame and the other three frames, suggesting that it is 
predominant early and is gradually replaced by the other frames. Again 
similar to Lewis and his mother, the guided object frame for Susan and 
her mother appears to serve as the developmental bridging frame be­
cause it has an inverted U-shaped trajectory with a peak between 5 and 9 
weeks. Thus, Lewis and Susan shared a pattern of preference for more 
socially-oriented frames throughout their history and the final emer­
gence of both social/object mixed frames and not-guided object frames 
in the last two sessions. The main difference between the dyads was in 
the historical and bridging frames.
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Table 11.1. Descriptive statistics of frames by session: Susan
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Age (Weeks) 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 20
Social frame 
Frequency 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 10 10 9 5 4
% of session 1.49 52.50 43.61 90.38 89.31 29.83 66.43 18.73 35.21 29.34 2.03 6.52
Mean duration* 3.58 252.01 104.67 379.58 428.71 143.17 106.28 8.99 16.90 15.65 1.94 7.66
(s.d.) (0.07) (-) (144.16) (-) (-) (-) (179.56) (10.60) (25.48) (32.67) (1.26) (8.66)
Object guided frame 
Frequency 6 4 8 1 1 6 6 21 15 10 15 10
% of session 95.70 7.44 41.21 9.62 10.69 60.37 16.95 47.24 41.24 32.07 16.30 18.34
Mean duration* 76.56 8.92 24.73 40.42 51.29 48.29 13.56 10.80 13.20 15.39 5.19 8.62
(s.d.) (32.68) (3.18) (21.94) (-) (-) (50.47) (10.02) (8.50) (12.33) (13.99) (3.30) (5.89)
Not-guided object frame 
Frequency 3 1 2 0 0 4 7 8 11 4 13 11
% of session 2.16 0.62 1.45 0.00 0.00 5.69 8.58 8.83 10.51 7.71 22.65 36.31
Mean duration* 3.46 2.97 3.49 - - 6.83 5.88 5.30 4.58 9.26 8.33 15.52
(s.d.) (0.49) (-) (0.16) (-) (5.44) (6.08) (2.96) (3.12) (10.06) (5.14) (17.28)
Social/object mixed frame 
Social/object mixed frame 
Frequency 1 4 8 0 0 5 4 15 15 15 19 16
% of session 0.65 39.44 13.72 0.00 0.00 4.11 8.04 25.20 13.05 30.88 58.77 38.82
Mean duration* 3.12 47.33 8.23 - - 3.95 9.65 8.06 4.18 9.88 14.78 11.40
(s.d.) (-) (65.50) (3.97) (-) (-) (2.13) (7.10) (7.89) (3.97) (11.27) (17.88) (13.27)
Note: * seconds
Table 11.2. Frequency offrame transitions: Susan and her mother
Frame Transition
Session
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
l->2 1 1 2 5 1 1
2->l 2 1 3 1
l->4 1 2 1
4->l 1 2 1 3 1
l->3 1 2 1
3->l 1 1 2 1 1
2->3 2 1 1 1 5 2 1
3->2 2 3 1 4 1 3
2->4 1 4 4 3 1 3 3 3 1
4->2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1
3->4 3 4 1 1
4->3 2 2 3 3
Note: 1 = Social frame;
2 =  Guided object frame;
3 =  Not-guided object frame;
4 =  Social/object mixed frame
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In general, as shown in Table 11.2, this dyad made relatively few 
transitions between frames, except in sessions 8-11. Note that the mean 
durations of the social frame in the early sessions (Table 11.1) was 
exceptionally long. Basically, each instance of the social frame lasted 
alm ost the entire session with no breaks. During the first six sessions, 
most of the transitions that did occur were with the social frame and 
social/object mixed frames. After session 8, this pattern is augmented 
with transitions between all the frames but especially with the guided 
object frame. In sessions 9 and 10, most transitions were with the 
guided object frame, suggesting that it may serve as a developmental 
bridging frame. The guided object frame had an inverted U-shaped 
trajectory between sessions 6 and 10 and transitions to the guided object 
frame seemed to signal a shift in both the pattern of transitions and the 
developmental trajectories of the durations. In sessions 11 and 12, most 
transitions were with the not-guided object frame.
Qualitative analysis
Ordinary variability in sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
During sessions 1 ,2 , 3 ,4 , and 5, Susan was 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 weeks old 
respectively. Within these sessions, this dyad is primarily engaged in 
social and social/object mixed frames, followed by the social nature of 
the guided object frame. The mother is very talkative across all frames 
and the topics of conversation often focus on Susan’s sisters, father, 
grandparents, and how others respond to Susan and vice versa.
As part of the ordinary variability of the social frame, reciprocal face- 
to-face play occurred as the mother imitates Susan’s smiles, vocaliza­
tions, and other facial expressions, often touching Susan’s body and 
face. Although Susan is sometimes sleepy and fussy, when awake, she 
tends to be very expressive: she gazes at her mother, smiles, and vocal­
izes. Often Susan moves her arms and legs while her mother is touching 
and talking to her. During these first five sessions, Susan’s gaze at her 
mother’s face appears to be central to the dyadic communication during 
the social frame.
During the social/object mixed frame, the mother holds an object and 
touches Susan with her free hand or with the object while Susan gazes 
only briefly at the object, immediately returning her gaze to the mother. 
When the mother touches Susan with an object she is usually trying to 
stimulate a sleepy infant, or calm a fussy or crying one. As the mother 
squeaks the red porcupine up Susan’s tummy, for example, Susan smiles
and the mother comments about loving Susan’s smiles. It is as if the 
object becomes an extension of the mother’s hand for touching. This 
pattern of activity constitutes the ordinary variability of the social/object 
mixed frame during the first five sessions. Typically, after a few moments 
of social/object mixed interaction, the mother puts the object down and 
the dyad returns to the social frame (face-to-face play).
During the guided object frame, the mother holds an object steady 
within Susan’s sight. Her social talk, however, remains the focus of the 
interaction while the object is passively held by the mother’s chest within 
the line of gaze of Susan. Overall, the ordinary variability of the guided 
object frame is characterized by the predominance of the mother’s social 
talk with little emphasis on the object’s properties while Susan rarely 
looks at objects, almost always focusing on her mother’s face. One could 
say that the object is not actively a part of the interaction, and thus the 
social nature of the guided object frame. In this sense, the guided object 
frame appears to be a bridging frame because it combines aspects of both 
social and object frames. It was not coded as a social/object mixed frame, 
however, since the mother did not use the object itself for social pur­
poses. In the case of Susan and her mother in these early sessions, 
however, the dividing line between the guided object frame and the 
social/object mixed frame is somewhat blurred.
A few frame transitions are made in these first five sessions. This 
seems to be in part because Susan and her mother spend a great deal 
of their time engaged in two specific frames (i.e., the social and the 
social/object mixed frames). When transitions do occur, however, they 
are made in long durations and almost always involve the guided object 
frame. It is as if transitions mainly emerge when the dyad is either 
attempting to move out of the guided object frame and back to their 
“preferred” socially oriented frames or when the dyad is attempting to 
re-direci their focus to objects.
Similar to what is observed in the frames, Susan’s gaze is central in 
indicating her interest as the mother makes use of different actions to 
attract Susan’s visual attention to a joint activity (often, a socially 
oriented activity). In one transition from the guided object frame to 
the social frame, for instance:
The mother is shaking the rattle between her face and Susan’s face, while Susan 
shifts her gaze between her mother’s face and the toy held by the mother (guided 
object frame). Ihe mother stops shaking the toy, bringing it toward her chest and 
establishing eye contact with Susan. At this point, Susan looks at her mother's face 
intendy. The mother then touches Susan’s legs with her hands, talking to Susan 
and putting the toy on the floor (social frame).
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The example above illustrates a rather predominant pattern of transi­
tions in these first five sessions: Susan’s gaze is the primary transitional 
action indicative of her attention, whereas the mother stops her actions 
on the object (i.e., holding it passively) and adds touch to the dyadic 
communication, thus amplifying her social connection with Susan (i.e., 
concluding the transition to the social frame).
In addition to the transitions involving the guided object frame, we 
also identified instances where the not-guided object frame is so short in 
duration that this frame can be considered a transition between frames, 
rather than a frame in which the observer can identify a distinct pattern 
of activity. In one situation, for example, the dyad is engaged in the 
guided object frame, and as the mother starts putting away an object, she 
talks to Susan about the objects. The mother then picks up a new object 
to show Susan. This brief episode of the not-guided object frame is 
immediately followed by a return to the guided object frame. Thus, this 
period of time in which the mother is talking about objects as she picks 
up another one is referred to as a brief “pause” in the guided object 
frame, rather than the not-guided object frame itself. This characteristic 
of the “still to emerge” not-guided object frame is very common in these 
first five sessions.
Innovations in sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Innovations are observed in these first five sessions in the context of the 
guided object frame. Specifically, there are occasional moments during 
the guided object frame that the mother slowly shakes or squeezes an 
object, attempting to have Susan visually follow it. Usually, on these 
occasions, Susan briefly follows the object with her eyes and then 
looks back at her mother’s face. This change in the predominant pattern 
of interaction that characterizes the guided object frame constitutes an 
innovation because the change, although recognizable, does not seem 
to perturb the predominant ordinary variability of the frame. It is 
also worth noting that object demonstration accompanied by the 
infant’s visual interest later becomes a key characteristic of the ordinary 
variability of the guided object frame.
There are also three transitions involving the guided object frame in 
which Susan and her mother include the object as part of their commu­
nication in a slightly different manner. In contrast to the predominant 
pattern observed in these five sessions, Susan’s mother holds the object 
within Susan’s reach, sometimes adjusting it into Susan’s hand. On these 
occasions, Susan actually moves her arms towards the object, at 
times even touching it. In other words, during these innovations, the
dyad appears to focus on the object as an element whose properties 
are to be explored visually and/or manually. This variation in the pre­
dominant dynamics of frame transitions constitutes an innovation that 
will be later expanded by the dyad in the context of object-oriented 
frames.
Developmental account of sessions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
During the first five sessions, Susan and her mother are mostly focused 
on socially oriented frames. Although Susan is often sleepy or fussy, she 
gazes for long periods at her mother’s face, smiling and moving her body; 
while her mother acts primarily as a captivator of Susan’s attention to 
distract her from fussing or looking away. Even during the guided object 
frame, the mother uses primarily social talk and does not demonstrate 
the object’s properties -  except for the few occasions, identified as 
innovations, when the dyad focuses on the properties of the object.
A historical analysis of the dyad’s relationship suggests that, at 
this point, the social frame constitutes the historical frame. Because most 
of the transitions during this period were between the social/object mixed 
frame and the guided object frame, the social/object mixed frame appears 
to be a bridging frame for the increasing emergence of the guided object 
frame. This is because in the sessions to follow the social/object mixed 
frame declines and remains low until the final sessions while the guided 
object frame increases its appearance and die social frame remains pre­
dominant. This suggests that the “main bridging” frame for the dyad, the 
guided object frame, uses a “sub-bridging” frame to facilitate its develop­
ment. The continual predominance of the social frame suggests this frame 
has the function of providing the dyad with a historically familiar back­
ground for the emergence of a new frame -  in this case, the guided 
object frame.
Although frame transitions are not frequent in these first sessions, 
when they do occur, they primarily involve the guided object frame. 
Susan’s gaze is the highlight of their interaction while the mother 
changes her activities as a means to attract or maintain Susan’s atten­
tion on a joint activity (mostly, social in nature). Two aspects of the 
transitions are worth highlighting, as these appear to serve as a historical 
prelude to later sessions. First, the not-guided object frame briefly 
emerges as a short pause in the guided object frame when the mother 
talks about objects. Second, there are occasional transitions where 
the dyad’s focus is on object-oriented actions (specifically, infant reach­
ing and grasping), as if leading the way into the pattern of the next 
few visits.
194 Change Processes in Relationships
Susan and her mother 195
In the next three sessions (i.e., sessions 6, 7, and 8), Susan is 12, 14, and 
15 weeks old respectively. Although all four frames are now observed, 
the social frame continues to be the primary frame in the dyad’s rela­
tionship, with the guided object frame now as a close second. The not- 
guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame are low in their 
appearance and occur about equally.
Similar to what was observed in the previous sessions, the ordinary 
variability of the social frame during these three sessions continues to be 
characterized by the mother talking about social topics and using a 
variety of rhythmic noises, chants and singing while also moving Susan’s 
arms side-to-side. With the dyad’s growing interest towards objects (as 
reflected by the increase in the guided object frame), the social frame is 
becoming expanded by the dyad to include many creative forms of social 
connection. For instance, Susan and her mother successfully engage in 
repetitive vocal play as Susan becomes more active with her cooing 
and smiling. Furthermore, Susan begins holding onto or manipulating 
her mother’s fingers, thereby maintaining a social connection with her 
mother while at the same time exploring her new motor ability. It is 
important to highlight that this new component of the social frame (i.e., 
holding and manipulating) first emerged as an innovation in the frame 
transition involving the guided object frame when the dyad focused on 
the object as an element to be explored visually and/or manually during 
sessions 1 through 5.
At the same time, the dyad begins to spend a great deal of their time 
engaged in the guided object frame. The ordinary variability of this 
frame involves the mother spending most of the time helping support 
object interactions for Susan, by giving Susan objects to reach for and 
occasionally, highlighting the objects’ properties. Susan in turn begins 
grasping and exploring the objects through fingering, shaking, squeez­
ing, and gazing. Note that this object-focus originally emerged in the 
form of innovations in the frame transition where Susan actually touched 
the object presented by her mother. Although Susan begins to present a 
consistent interest in objects, she still prefers gazing at her mother’s face 
during the guided object frame, showing a connection to their prior 
history where the dyad’s social focus was predominant.
The not-guided object frame is now emerging as a distinct frame and 
not as a transitional pause within the guided object frame. Its predomin­
ant ordinary variability includes the mother’s words of encouragement 
when Susan actively examines and manipulates objects. In these cases, 
the mother’s words tend to be brief and mirror back what Susan is doing
Ordinary variability in sessions 6, 7, and 8
with the object such as “you got it!”; “can you get it?”; “look, you got a 
hold of the toy!”; and “do it again.” Such active examination and 
manipulation of objects from the part of Susan can be traced back to 
the innovations observed in the frame transitions involving the guided 
object frame during sessions 1 through 6 where Susan began touching 
objects presented by her mother. It is as if previous innovations became 
amplified by the dyad, thereby leading to the emergence of the not- 
guided object frame. It is worth highlighting, however, that although 
the dyad appears to be more oriented towards the object than they 
were during the previous sessions, they continue to prefer their social 
connection as reflected, for instance, in the mother’s behavior of leaning 
down over Susan’s face during each session, even when Susan actively 
manipulates objects.
Finally, a change in the ordinary variability of the social/object mixed 
frame is observed. The new ordinary variability of this frame includes 
the mother touching Susan’s body while Susan holds an object she is 
actively exploring through fingering, shaking, squeezing, and gazing. 
The mother also bicycles Susan’s legs, commenting on Susan’s increas­
ing kicking movements, while Susan holds an object in her hands. Once 
again, with the dyad’s increasing interest in objects, that emerged out 
of the innovations in the guided object frame and the frame transi­
tions involving this frame during sessions 1 through 6, a re-organization 
in the ordinary variability of the social/object mixed frame is observed 
to include Susan’s more active manipulation of the object and the 
mother’s efforts to maintain a social connection with her infant through 
touch.
Close analysis of the frame transitions indicates an increase in the 
number of transitions involving all four frames. As the dyad expands 
their patterns of communication (as reflected in the appearance of all 
four frames), they have also become more open to navigating across 
these frames. Unlike what was observed in the previous six sessions 
where the dyad made fewer transitions between the frames, the emer­
gence of a new frame (i.e., the not-guided object frame) and the aug­
mentation of the guided object frame increase the dyad’s creativity in 
their ways of communicating, thereby proliferating transitions be­
tween frames. A pattern similar to the previous sessions, however, is 
still observed as many of the transitions occur via the guided object 
frame.
New characteristics also arise during the frame transitions, and these 
are linked to the innovations observed in previous sessions in that they 
incorporate elements of object exploration that first emerged during 
those innovations. Specifically, several transitions from the social frame
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(i.e., the historical frame) to the guided object frame (i.e., the cur­
rently amplified frame) involved the mother’s use of social actions as 
a means to getting Susan’s focus on an object-related activity. In 
other words, there is a blend of the familiar activities (e.g., touching) 
with the new activities that are being explored by the dyad (e.g., visual 
inspection of an object). The example below illustrates such a blend of 
activities:
The mother is touching Susan’s cheeks while Susan is smiling (social frame). 
Susan stops smiling and looks at her mother’s hand. Her mother then uses the same 
hand to touch Susan’s right hand while Susan continues to watch her mother’s hand. 
The mother stops touching Susan’s hand and begins to move her fingers for Susan to 
watch, using her hand as a toy while Susan continues watching her mother’s 
hand (guided object frame).
Therefore, in contrast to the previous sessions where Susan and her 
mother focused on their social connection, the dyad’s actions during the 
transitions now involve the coordination of gazing with other object- 
related actions. This pattern of frame transition characteristic of these 
three sessions is further illustrated in the next example:
The mother is touching Susan’s belly with a toy, quietly (social/object mixed 
frame). Susan then grasps the toy the mother is using to touch Susan’s belly. At this 
point, the mother releases the toy saying, “Look at your hand! You can do it!” 
Susan keeps holding the toy with both hands while her mother talks to her about 
Susan’s ongoing action on the toy (not-guided object frame).
In sum, the changes in the dynamics of frame transitions can also be 
traced back to the innovations observed in the guided object frame and 
in the transitions involving this frame during previous sessions (i.e., 
sessions 1 through 5). Specifically, those innovations reflected a unique 
opportunity where the dyad for the first time focused on the object as an 
element whose properties are to be explored visually and/or manually.
Innovations in sessions 6, 7, and 8
Once again, innovations are observed in the guided object frame. There 
are a few occasions where the mother does brief object demonstrations 
in the context of this frame by shaking or squeezing an object before 
steadying it for Susan to reach -  as it is usually done in these three 
sessions. With the inclusion of brief object demonstrations prior to 
steadying the object for the infant, a potential for further expansion 
in the way the dyad interacts with objects and further elaboration of 
the historical frames (e.g., social frame) is observed during sessions 6, 7, 
and 8.
Developmental account of sessions 6, 7, and 8
Several changes emerge in the frames during these three sessions. The 
social frame is still predominant and Susan and her mother continue to 
be mutually involved in socially oriented actions. On the other hand, 
both the guided object frame and social/object mixed frame are more 
focused on objects and their properties. Susan begins to focus on object 
manipulation and inspection, while her mother helps Susan examine the 
objects. Although most transitions continue to occur via the guided 
object frame, these are increasing in frequency and beginning to be made 
at a fast pace as Susan now quickly grasps objects.
The increasing dyadic focus on objects does not yet seem to interfere 
with the dyad’s historical social connection. This is reflected, for 
example, by the mother’s integration of social and object-oriented activ­
ities when she shifts from using her hand as a social action (touching the 
infant’s face) to using her hand as an object (moving her fingers for 
Susan to watch). This shift seems to provide the dyad with an opportun­
ity to explore their new focus on object exploration while maintaining 
their familiar dynamics of directly interacting with one another. It is 
important to highlight that this new component of the social frame first 
emerged as an innovation in the frame transition involving the guided 
object frame when the dyad focused on the object as an element to be 
explored visually and/or manually during sessions 1 through 5. The 
impression the observer gets is that these two frames -  the social frame 
as a historical frame and the guided object frame as a newly emerging 
bridging frame -  are becoming more permeable to each other, each 
incorporating elements of the other. This mutual incorporation of elem­
ents from each frame may in part explain the upcoming change in the 
emotional tone of the social frame where Susan appears less socially 
expressive in that frame (i.e., fewer smiles).
Ordinary variability in sessions 9, 10, and 11
During sessions 9, 10, and 11, Susan is 16, 17, and 19 weeks old 
respectively. The guided object frame becomes predominant while the 
social frame decreases in its frequency and duration, occurring about as 
much as the not-guided object frame and the social/object mixed frame. 
Changes within each of these frames are observed.
Compared to the previous sessions, the dyad’s pattern of social play 
becomes even more sophisticated and creative. The mother now uses 
more touching games and new vocal sounds: she talks to Susan in a
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pleasant, calm, cheery voice, laughing and smiling a great deal. She 
also blows raspberries, kisses Susan’s feet, and tickles Susan. Although 
Susan actively watches her mother’s entertaining face and actions, she 
is less expressive than before (i.e., few smiles and laughter are pro­
duced). It is as if the mother’s social actions are becoming more varied 
in an attempt to elicit smiles or laughs from Susan during the social 
frame. These brief instances of the social frame may be considered a 
form of recapitulation of previous social activity in the midst of a change 
in the communication system as it becomes more oriented toward 
objects.
At the same time that Susan becomes less expressive during the social 
frame, she gets more focused on objects and very active reaching for 
objects on her own during the guided object frame, to the extent of even 
rolling herself side-to-side to reach a desired object. Also, she now looks 
at the objects as much as she looks at her mother’s face. The mother in 
turn continues to steady objects for Susan to reach and helps Susan to 
hold onto an object. These more elaborated forms of object-oriented 
activities can be traced back to the innovations observed during the 
guided object frame in the previous sessions where the mother for 
the first time not only steadies the object for Susan but she also squeezes 
and shakes the object as if highlighting its properties.
During the transitions from and to the social frame, Susan’s gaze 
direction remains the most salient transitional action. Specifically, by 
simply gazing at her mother, the dyad appears to easily transition to the 
social frame. Likewise, when Susan gazes away from her mother, the 
dyad quickly transitions out of the social frame. Although the social 
frame is declining in frequency and duration, the dyad can quickly 
recognize their previous history associated to the social frame.
On the other hand, during the transitions between the object-oriented 
frames, the mother gradually becomes quiet and mostly observant of 
Susan. She rarely facilitates Susan’s grasping of objects and does not 
make comments about Susan’s actions on the objects. At most, during 
the transitions from the not-guided object frame to the guided object 
frame, the mother places objects within Susan’s reach and then quietly 
watches Susan manipulate the objects. This new form of frame transition 
is not directly linked to the innovations observed in the guided object 
frame during the previous sessions. Instead, this new dynamics of frame 
transitions appears to be a result of the re-organization in the dyad’s 
communication where Susan is gradually becoming more focused on the 
exploration of the objects through object mouthing and the mother is 
becoming a quieter observer of her infant.
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Innovations in sessions 9, 10, and 11
An Innovation is observed in the not-guided object frame. There are 
moments during this frame that Susan becomes immersed in her object 
mouthing, allowing little room for her mother to participate in the 
object-interaction. These occasional immersions differ from the pre­
dominant pattern of frames and frame transitions observed in these 
sessions, as Susan’s persistent object mouthing is not yet predominant. 
It is worth highlighting that Susan’s persistent object mouthing (i.e., 
object immersion) accompanied by the mother quietly watching Susan 
become predominant in the next visit.
Developmental account of sessions 9, 10, and 11
During these three sessions, a developmental re-organization in the 
system (level 3 change) is observed where the dyad becomes mostly 
focused on object play (although Susan has not become completely 
immersed in her own object activities). This is illustrated in the changes 
in all four frames and in the increased number of direct transitions 
between frames. During the social frame, Susan is now merely an 
observer of the mother’s attempt to engage Susan in social play. During 
the object frames, Susan is more self-guided, while her mother either 
provides objects without demonstrating them or simply stands as an 
observer of Susan’s activities. The guided object frame is becoming 
short-lived, and its ordinary variability includes the mother handing a 
different object to Susan, followed by the dyad’s almost immediate 
transition to the not-guided object frame. As opposed to the previous 
sessions when the not-guided object frame was often brief and pre­
sented a transitional nature, this frame now increases in its frequency 
and duration, becoming a more distinguished frame in the dyad’s 
relationships.
Also, a new characteristic emerges in the not-guided object frame 
where the mother no longer leans down to Susan’s face. This new quality 
was not observed in previous sessions in the form of innovations. Several 
other “new” actions are observed during both frames and transitions 
that were not preceded by innovations in the previous developmental 
period. In the other two dyads in which there was a level 3 developmen­
tal re-organization, we did observe changes during that re-organization 
that did not appear in prior developmental periods, but we could always 
detect a link to some innovation that was later amplified. It now appears, 
with Susan and her mother, that developmental re-organization may
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be an opportunity for spontaneous creativity not preceded by previous 
forms.
There are a few occasions when Susan’s object focus is transformed 
into persistent object immersion as reflected in the innovations observed 
in the not-guided object frame. These changes seem to reiterate the 
increasing decline of the guided object frame and the predominant rise 
of the not-guided object frame during the next session.
Ordinary variability in session 12
During the last session (session 12), Susan is 20 weeks old. This session 
differentiates itself from the previous sessions in that the not-guided 
object frame and the social/object mixed frame are the two predominant 
frames, whereas the guided object frame happens sometimes and the 
social frame rarely occurs. Susan is now extremely immersed in object 
play and more interested in gazing at objects. The mother appears to 
accept this change and adapts herself to Susan’s increased interest in 
objects. Thus, the dyad has shifted from an object focus involving both 
the mother and the infant to an object focus where Susan almost always 
engages in unilateral exploration of the objects.
In fact, this session begins with the mother attempting to recapitulate 
their earlier forms of social connection by trying to engage Susan in 
social frames through tickling of Susan’s belly and legs accompanied 
by noises. During the mother’s few social attempts, however, Susan 
fusses, looking at and reaching for the objects. The mother immediately 
adjusts herself by giving Susan an object. The dyad then engages in the 
now brief guided object frame.
During these brief episodes of the guided object frame, the mother 
facilitates object exploration at a fast rate by quickly demonstrating the 
primary property of the object (i.e., quickly shaking or squeezing the 
object) and immediately handing the object to Susan, and occasionally 
helping Susan hold an object. The ordinary variability of this frame thus 
includes earlier forms of object demonstration (i.e., recapitulation) ac­
companied by facilitation of Susan’s more independent object play, 
while Susan remains focused on the object that she will soon explore 
with her mouth.
Immersion is now a predominant characteristic of the not-guided 
object frame: Susan persistently and actively mouths and manipulates 
objects, gazing at the objects she explores, while her mother quietly 
observes Susan. During the few moments that the mother talks, the 
topics of her conversation are related to the objects, as opposed to more 
social talk observed in prior sessions. Susan is also less vocal and rarely
smiles. This new ordinary variability can find its roots in the transitions 
involving the object-oriented frames and in the innovation observed in 
the not-guided object frame during sessions 8 through 11. Specifically, 
during those transitions the mother begins to display a pattern of quietly 
observing Susan’s activities and during the innovation of the not-guided 
object frame, Susan is more immersed in object mouthing for the 
first time.
The social/object mixed frame also happens while Susan is intensely 
and persistently mouthing an object (i.e., immersed). In these situations, 
the mother plays two tactile nursery rhyme games with Susan’s body: she 
tickles Susan’s feet and belly, chanting a familiar nursery rhyme, while 
Susan watches her mother and continues sucking on her object. In the 
other tacdle game, the mother plays “three little piggies” with Susan’s 
toes, and kissing and blowing raspberries on Susan’s feet while Susan 
mouths an object. These patterns of touching and tickling Susan’s feet, 
legs, and belly appear to be an expansion of the previous ordinary 
variability of the social/object mixed where the mother already at­
tempted to maintain a social connection with her gradually object 
focused infant. Specifically, during this last session, the mother uses 
such tactile nursery rhyme games as a way to distract Susan from turning 
over while mouthing an object by recapitulating social games co-created 
by the dyad in earlier sessions. These may constitute an effective strategy 
utilized by the mother because Susan’s object immersion can now 
become integrated into previous forms of communication where the 
mother tickled, touched, and blew raspberries.
Similar to what was observed in sessions 1 through 5, few transitions 
are made by the dyad in this last session. The difference between session 
12 and sessions 1 through 5 is the frame that the dyad is focused on. 
Whereas during sessions 1 through 6 the focus was on the social 
frame, during this last session the dyad is now focused on the not-guided 
object frame. This seems to be in part because of the dyad’s increased 
immersion in the infant’s object mouthing.
When frame transitions occur, most of them are made in a fast way. 
Although Susan continues to be actively participating in the frame 
transitions, her actions are different from the ones observed in the 
previous sessions. Susan continues to easily grasp an object, looking at 
it, and she also holds an object in her own hands. However, in this last 
session, Susan’s persistent mouthing of the object becomes the most 
salient transitional action involving all four frames as Susan now appears 
immersed in unilateral, non-mutual object play. The mother, on the 
other hand, continues to be the quiet observer of Susan’s actions on 
the object, particularly, when Susan is absorbed in mouthing the object.
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The mother also makes brief verbal comments about Susan’s actions on 
the object and facilitates Susan’s grasping of the object during the brief 
transitions from the guided object frame. Innovations were not observed 
in this session. Perhaps, a historical analysis of the future patterns would 
allow us to identify potential seeds of the dyad’s future communication 
dynamics in the context of the frame transitions.
Developmental account of session 12
This session includes the continuation of trends of the dyad’s object 
interaction that began during sessions 9, 10, and 11, except that persist­
ent object mouthing is now predominant. The mother becomes a spec­
tator of Susan’s immersed object activities during the not-guided object 
frame. She also continues using the social/object mixed frame as a way of 
distracting Susan from her immersion by recapitulating and integrating 
earlier games into Susan’s current object focus. The guided object frame 
involves brief demonstrations of the object property and occurs as a 
transition pause during the not-guided object frame. The social frame 
rarely occurs, except for the beginning of the session when the mother 
unsuccessfully attempts to recapitulate earlier forms of social inter­
actions. Furthermore, Susan’s immersion in object mouthing becomes 
so powerful that it appears to set the pace of the transitions with the dyad 
making quick transitions between the frames.
Overall summary of Susan and her mother
A historical analysis of this dyad’s relationship across the twelve sessions 
suggests that the social frame is the historical frame for this dyad during 
the first five sessions, while the social/object mixed frame appears to 
serve the bridging function for the increasing emergence of new frames 
(i.e., first the guided object frame and then the not-guided object frame). 
The guided object frame appears to also constitute a bridge between 
the other frames as illustrated in the frame transitions during the first five 
sessions where the guided object frame is involved in all transitions.
It is not until sessions 6 or 7 that the frame transitions begin to take 
place directly, without bridging with the guided object frame. As Susan 
and her mother gradually become more focused on both the guided 
object frame and the social/object mixed frame, the not-guided object 
frame begins to emerge as a distinct and recognizable frame. Recall that 
its first appearance occurs in the context of the guided object frame as a 
pause of this frame during sessions 1 through 5.
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Therefore, during the first five sessions the dyad’s primary focus is on 
establishing and maintaining a social connection between them, as re­
flected in the predominance of the social frame and the social nature of 
the object-oriented frames (particularly, the guided object frame and the 
social/object mixed frame). The bridging function of the guided object 
frame is shown because it is permeated by social games between Susan 
and her mother. Objects are not used for demonstrations or highlighting 
affordances. Susan spends most of the time looking at her mother and 
paying relatively little attention to the objects surrounding her, while her 
mother engages in continual conversations and tactile games with and 
without objects. This illustrates the unique quality of this dyad -  their 
maintenance of a strong social connection for at least the first five 
sessions.
Between sessions 6 and 8, familiar patterns of communication (i.e., 
social focus) begin to become integrated with new elements of the dyad’s 
communication (i.e., interest in objects). The mother’s hand is used as 
an object, especially in the context of frame transitions involving social 
and object frames. Another peculiar characteristic of these sessions is 
that innovations that were primarily observed in the context of object- 
related frames later became expanded in these frames as well as in 
the social frame. In other words, although the innovations were taking 
place during the object-related frames, such innovations were getting 
“picked up” by and expanded into all frames (and not only the object- 
related frames). This suggests that, during sessions 6 and 8, the frames 
were becoming increasingly more permeable to each other, each incorp­
orating elements of the other. For instance, the social frame decreased 
during that period and fewer smiles and laughter were observed. At 
the same time, these changes in the emotional tone of the social 
frame were linked to the changes in the more object-oriented frames 
where object interest was arising as a predominant emotional tone of the 
frames.
During the final four sessions (i.e., sessions 9, 10, 11, and 12), a re­
organization in the dyad’s focus of communication, which began in 
sessions 6-8 is more clearly identified. By session 9, Susan begins to 
pull back to being merely an observer of her mother’s attempts at social 
play, culminating in Susan’s immersion in object mouthing in the last 
session. In fact, during the last session, the mother tries to recapitulate 
earlier forms of social connection by engaging Susan in joint activity with 
no success. The guided object frame becomes a transitional pause in the 
newly emergent not-guided object frame as the mother briefly demon­
strates the properties of the object and then simply hands different 
objects for Susan to manipulate. Subsequently, the not-guided object
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frame becomes the predominant focus of the dyad as Susan shifts from 
examining objects to immersing herself in object mouthing.
Similar to what was observed in the other dyads, there are a number of 
ways in which frames are related to transitions. First of all, there is the 
similarity of actions during the frames and transitions across the ses­
sions. During the social frame, for example, reciprocal face-to-face play 
occurs as the mother imitates Susan’s smiles, vocalizations, or facial 
expressions, while Susan gazes at her mother, smiling and vocalizing. 
During transitions in the same sessions, Susan’s gaze is the primary 
action. Likewise, in later sessions, as Susan uses more examination and 
later immersion during the frames, similar actions become salient during 
the transitions.
Second, the differences between actions during frames and transitions 
across the sessions seem to be preludes to the patterns that are to emerge 
in the sessions to follow. For example, the predominant pattern of frame 
and frame transition involving the social frame during the first five 
sessions is characterized by Susan’s gaze direction as the central action 
indicative of her attention while the mother is very talkative and focuses 
on capturing Susan’s visual attention towards her face most of the time. 
However, there are three transitions in which Susan and her mother 
include the object as part of their social communication in a slightly 
different manner. Specifically, Susan moves her arms towards the object, 
at times even touching it, while she also introduces a new transitional 
action: she holds the object within Susan’s reach, adjusting it into 
Susan’s hand. Thus, in most cases, changes observed in frame transi­
tions preceded transformations in the mother-infant communication 
system.
A third type of relationship between frames and transitions is that 
sometimes the transitional action becomes incorporated into the next 
frame. This is particularly noticeable between sessions 6 and 8, as the 
guided object frame is sometimes organized around the mother’s use of 
her hand as an object. As suggested earlier in this chapter, this novel 
use of the hand seems to integrate two important elements of the 
frames that compose the dyad’s ongoing repertoire -  the historical 
social frame and the newly emergent frame at that time (i.e., the guided 
object frame).
A fourth type of relationship between frames and transitions is the use 
of a brief frame as a transition. This occurs in a reverse symmetry for the 
guided object frame and the not-guided object frame. Each occurs as a 
pause within the other at different points in the dyad’s relationship 
history. The not-guided object frame is a pause of the guided object 
frame when it first appears between sessions 1 through 8, while the
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guided object frame becomes a transition pause of the not-guided object 
frame as it is disappearing from the dyad’s repertoire at the end of the 
observation period.
Proposition 1, regarding developmental bridging frames, was sup­
ported by the data. Based on the quantitative analysis, we had tentatively 
named the guided object frame as a developmental bridging frame for 
this dyad. The qualitative analysis suggests that the guided object frame 
appears to be a bridge for the more socially oriented frames during the 
first five sessions as it constitutes a locus of transitions first with the 
social frames and later with the not-guided object frame. Even the early 
instances of the guided object frame had a bridging quality. The “object” 
used by the dyad included part of the mother’s body (her hand) and the 
talk was social in nature. Different from the other dyads, the qualitative 
analysis also indicated that the social/object mixed frame constituted a 
bridge for the increasing emergence of the guided object frame. This 
suggests that bridging is a general process that may fill the gap in the 
developmental transition of any two developmentally related frames.
This suggests that sequence,
(Pi) (Historical) *-* (Bridging) =► (Bridging •*-*• Emerging),
can be expressed as an iterative or embedded sequence that repeats 
itself over time.
(P") (Historical) (Bridging,) =► (Bridging, Emerging/Bridging,) 
=► (Emerging,/Bridging2 Emerging2).
In this case, there is the first bridging frame (Bridging,, the social/ 
object mixed frame) which facilitates the development of the first 
emerging frame (Emerging,, the guided object frame). The guided object 
frame becomes the new bridging frame (Bridging2), which facilitates 
the development of the second emerging frame (Emerging2, the not- 
guided object frame). It is possible that any frame could serve as a 
bridging frame for something that occurs later, although we would need 
a longer period of observation to test whether all frames eventually play 
a bridging role.
This dyad also displays a pattern similar to sequence (P ,), Chapter 8, 
in which brief instances of the emerging frame (not-guided object) make 
realtime time transitions with the historical (social) and bridging frames 
(guided object) in the early developmental periods, while brief instances 
of the historical frame make transitions with the bridging and now longer 
emerging frame in the later periods.
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The findings on Proposition 2 for Susan and his mother are very 
similar to those for Betsy and Lewis and their mothers. Developmental 
sequence (P/2") applies here:
(P'2")(level 1“ +  level 2*)perioda —> (level lp(+level la + level 25+ 
level 2 " ) + level 2 *)^  p -  (level 3 ) ^  T
As another reminder, this model shows that innovations in period a 
lead to a new ordinary variability in period (J, such that there may be 
a series of recognizably different developmental periods (a, p, y, . . .), 
each with a new ordinary variability and new innovations which leads 
eventually to a developmental change (level 3). The model also contains 
terms for recapitulation (+ level 1“ +  level 2*) and amplification of prior 
innovations (+ level 2* ) as part of the ordinary' variability during 
period p.
For most of the innovations observed in this dyad, we see the same 
pattern as the others, in which changes in ordinary variability are pre­
ceded by innovations which do not change the ordinary variability at the 
time they first appear, but only later, when the system shifts to some new 
period of ordinary variability. On the other hand, Susan and her mother 
showed some innovations that occurred during the same developmental 
period and which did alter the ordinary variability when they appeared. 
We only saw this occur, however, during the developmental period in 
which there was a level 3 developmental re-organization for this dyad.
Although it is only a single case, we are inclined to believe that this 
does not change our basic proposition regarding the prior occurrences of 
innovation leading to change only in later developmental periods. This 
proposition in fact occurs for most of the innovation found with Susan 
and her mother. Rather, we believe that these innovations show yet 
another feature of level 3 re-organization processes, a feature that can 
be added to the other characteristics of re-organization. In sum, the 
following are proposed to be potential features of level 3 change:
• a blending or permeability between frames,
• the emergence of a new frame of more than brief duration with its own 
unique features,
• a recapitulation of older frames, and
• spontaneous, creative innovations that contribute to the overall re­
organization.
Regarding the proposed link between recapitulation and develop­
mental re-organization, all three dyads that showed level 3 change also 
showed recapitulation during this same period. On the other hand,
recapitulation occurred for this dyad in the developmental period 
after which there was a level 3 change. We also observed permeability 
between frames in the developmental period prior to the one in which the 
level 3 change occurred. One possible explanation is that for this dyad, 
developmental change occurred gradually, across a number of different 
developmental periods. But if we break down these “smaller” level 3 
changes, the main features of level 3 changes hold true. For instance, 
the guided object frame is recapitulated as a new frame emerges.
Perhaps this reflects flexibility in the change process which may allow 
dyads to avoid abrupt transitions and to smooth out the developmental 
change. This dyad was especially attached to their social communica­
tion, more so than any of the other representative dyads on whom we 
have qualitative analyses. A developmental shift toward more object 
focus may be inevitable for most infants who acquire eye-hand-object 
coordination skills and an inclination to investigate objects. This dyad, 
however, seemed to find a way to “stretch out” their social engagement 
well after the infant acquired visually guided reaching. It was as if 
developmental change took place in “slow motion.”
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1 2  S u m m a r y  o f  f i n d i n g s  o n  r e l a t i o n a l - h i s t o r i c a l  
c h a n g e
In this chapter, we summarize the findings of our quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of thirteen mother-infant dyads, observed weekly 
during free play with toy objects, across the developmental transition 
that marks the emergence of mother-infant-object play. In addition, we 
discuss the limitations and possibilities for the research methods used 
here. In the first section of this chapter we summarize the findings on the 
research propositions about the development of frames and transitions. 
In the second section, we address the propositions about the develop­
ment of infant actions as they relate to frame development. In the third 
section, we address the limitations of our study.
Each of the different methods used -  statistical modeling of develop­
mental trajectories and their covariates in infant action, and the quanti­
tative and qualitative analysis of four representative dyads -  give different 
views on the process of developmental change. The quantitative analysis 
is developmental in the sense that we model the shape of developmen­
tal trajectories within dyads over twelve weekly observation sessions. 
The qualitative analysis is historical because it examines particular suc­
cessions of events through time in order to understand how developed 
actions grow from their earlier forms and how these project themselves 
towards possible future pathways. Our approach is called relational- 
historical because, in addition to developmental analysis, we study 
historical process in the context of a developing relationship. The rela­
tionship -  the unfolding of communication patterns over time — is the 
focus of the analysis rather than the individual infant.
Analysis of frames and transitions
Proposition 1: There will be a three part historical sequence of the 
change process: historical frames, developmental bridging frames, and 
the emergence of new frames
Historical and emergent frames. For each of the four frames, we 
found a best fitting model for the developmental trajectories of the group
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of thirteen dyads. In addition, there were significant between-dyad dif­
ferences, expressed as differences in the regression coefficients for each 
of the frames. These trajectories (Figure 7.1) suggest that the historical 
frames were the social frame and/or the guided object frame. During the 
early weeks, some dyads were higher on social frames, some on guided 
object frames, and some on both. All dyads tend to decline in the 
duration of these two frames, with the dyads that had the highest 
durations in the early weeks declining the fastest. The social frame was 
modeled by a cubic trajectory, meaning that it stayed level for the first 
few weeks and then began to decline. The guided object frame declined 
linearly with age.
The social and/or guided object frames, depending which was the most 
prominent for a particular dyad, were gradually replaced by the not- 
guided object frame as the newly emerging frame. Every dyad developed 
toward infant examination and immersion with objects while the mother 
looked on or commented, regardless of which frame or frames were 
predominant historically. The not-guided object frame was modeled by 
a quadratic function of age. Thus, the rate of increase in duration 
accelerated with age, especially following the acquisition of visually 
guided reaching.
Although the quantitative models represented in Figure 7.1 analyze 
each frame independently of the other frames, the raw data trajectories 
for the group (Figure 7.2) show how the developmental trajectories of 
the four frames changed in relation to each other. Based upon the 
durations of the frames in this quantitative analysis, we concluded that 
for three of the four dyads, the historical frame was the guided object 
frame, while for Susan and her mother it was the social frame. These 
historical frames declined with age. This fits the pattern shown by the 
modeled trajectories. For all four dyads, as suggested by the modeled 
trajectories, the not-guided object frame emerged as predominant in the 
later sessions. For Lewis and Susan, the social/object mixed frame was 
salient along with the not-guided object frame as a possible newly 
emergent frame. In summary, as shown in Table 12.1, while each of 
the four dyads had the not-guided object frame as their emergent frame, 
the historical frame for two dyads was the guided object frame and for 
the other two dyads it was the social frame.
Bridging frames. We had predicted that the historical and newly 
emerging frames would be linked by a bridging frame. Did a bridging 
frame occur for these dyads and if so, what was it? The answer to this 
question was not as straightforward as the identification of the historical 
and emerging frames. From earlier research reviewed in Chapter 3 
(Reinecke & Fogel, 1994), we had only a limited conception of a bridging
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Table 12.1. Developmental sequence of frames for each of the four 







Richard Guided object Social/object mixed Not-guided object
Betsy Guided object Social/object mixed Not-guided object
Lewis Social Guided object Not-guided object
Social/object mixed
Susan Social Social/object mixed Not-guided object
Guided object
frame that was based on a qualitative analysis of a single case. In that 
case, the bridging frame integrated abbreviated aspects of the dyad’s 
historical frame and also elements of the newly emerging frame that had 
not yet been fully articulated.
As we moved through the data analysis in the present work, each step 
revealed a different possible perspective on a more comprehensive way to 
define and identify bridging frames. The identification of the four frames 
used in this analysis led us to think that, based on the work by Reinecke 
and Fogel, the social/object mixed frame would be the most likely 
bridging frame because it contained aspects of the social frame which 
we assumed would be the historical frame and aspects of the not-guided 
object frame which we assumed would be the emerging frame.
We also thought that bridging frames might have higher durations 
during the middle weeks of the observation period, that is, in between 
the periods in which historical and emerging frames were predominant. 
The modeled developmental trajectories for the entire group of thir­
teen dyads also suggested that the social/object mixed frame would be 
the most likely bridging frame because it had an inverted U-shaped 
developmental trajectory for some but not all dyads.
A frame might also qualify as bridging if it became a locus for realtime 
transitions to and from both the historical and emerging frames. There 
should be more transitions between the historical and emerging frame 
via a bridging frame than direcdy between them. A related characteristic 
of a bridging frame is its historical significance as judged from the 
qualitative analysis. In early developmental periods we would expect to 
see innovations in the bridging frame and transitions between the 
bridging frame and other frames, innovations that would serve as a 
prelude to the newly emerging frame. These latter criteria related to 
the transitional role of the bridging frame were the most important.
Frames that did not have an inverted U-shaped trajectory and frames 
other than the social/object mixed frame did serve as realtime transi­
tional bridges, described in the previous paragraph. In this way -  using 
an examination of the quantitative raw data trajectories, the quantitative 
transitions, and the qualitative data -  we concluded that all the dyads 
had a bridging frame, as shown in Table 12.1.
The identified bridging frames for four representative dyads all sa­
tisfied the criterion of being a transitional bridge in realtime. Transitions 
between the bridging frame and other frames were more likely than 
transitions directly between the other frames. Each of the identified 
bridging frames also had historical links to the past and served as an 
historical prelude to future patterns of communication.
For both Richard and Betsy and their mothers, the social/object mixed 
frame played a developmental bridging role. This frame had an inverted 
U-shaped trajectory. During the first two developmental periods, transi­
tions were made to and from the social/object mixed frame from the 
guided or not-guided object frames. The social/object mixed frames 
were periods of positive emotional communication about objects be­
tween periods of more focused attention on objects. This appeared to 
be an historical bridge into the increased seriousness of Richard’s exam­
ination (third period) and immersion (fourth period) with objects during 
the not-guided object frame. In addition, the not-guided object frame 
seemed to be a developmental bridge for itself. When it first appeared, 
the not-guided object frame was a brief pause during the guided object 
frame which occurred as the mother changed toys. The not-guided 
object frame was also a brief frame to which transitions were made with 
the guided object and social/object mixed frames. Clearly, the early 
experiences with objects without the mother’s assistance were an his­
torical prelude to the later emergence of the not-guided object frame. As 
a brief frame during the bridging period, however, this frame did not 
have a predominant duration and did not have an inverted U-shaped 
developmental trajectory.
For Lewis and his mother, the bridging frame was the guided object 
frame. This frame had a modified inverted U-shape trajectory, set 
against the background of a general decline in duration. Most of the 
transitions to other frames during the early developmental periods oc­
curred via the guided object frame. Since Lewis and his mother spent a 
lot of time in the social frame during the first developmental period, the 
guided object frame was an historical bridge because Lewis remained 
very socially-oriented, smiling and vocalizing to the mother as she dem­
onstrated objects. It also became the historical prelude for transitions to 
the not-guided object frame.
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For Susan and her mother, the guided object frame was a develop­
mental bridging frame in a similar way in which it was for Lewis and his 
mother. This frame was certainly a bridge out of the more socially 
oriented frames of the first developmental period because it was a locus 
of transitions first with the social frames and later with the not-guided 
object frame. Even the early instances of the guided object frame had a 
bridging quality. The “toy” was often part of the mother’s body (her 
hand) and the talk was social in nature. This dyad also used the social/ 
object mixed frame as an intermediate bridging frame that led to the 
guided object frame as a bridging frame. In addition, the not-guided 
object frame may have also been a bridge for itself. Similar to the case of 
Betsy and her mother, the not-guided object frame was a brief pause 
during the guided object frame as the mother changed toys.
In this book, we presented four different ways of expressing Proposition 1:
(Pi) (Historical —► Bridging) =► (Bridging «-*- Emerging)
(P|) (Historical =► Emerging)
(Pi') (Historical -•-* Bridging) (Bridging «-* Emerging)
t t =► t
----- ► Emerging (brief) Historical (brief) •«-----
(Pf) (Historical •*-* Bridging,) =► (Bridging, Emerging,/Bridging2) 
=► (Emerging,/Bridging2 «-► Emerging2)
As shown in Table 12.2, none of the dyads fit sequence (Pj), repre­
senting a developmental sequence without bridging frames. All dyads 
have some form of bridging. Only one dyad, Lewis and his mother, 
showed what we can call “simple bridging,” as shown in (Pi). In simple 
bridging, only one frame serves as a bridging frame. The other three 
dyads showed a combination of simple bridging and “brief frame 
bridging,” shown in (P”). Brief frame bridging occurred when realtime 
transitions are made between the other frames with brief instances of the 
(increasing) emerging frame in the early developmental periods and 
brief instances of the (declining) historical frame in the later develop­
mental periods. Only one dyad, Susan, showed evidence for “ multiple 
bridging,” shown in (P/,/). Multiple bridging occurs when one frame 
serves as a bridging frame for another emerging bridging frame. This
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Table 12.2. Proposition 1 sequences that fit each of the four representative 
dyads based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses
Infant Sequence (P|) 
simple bridging








sequence resembles an “overlapping waves” model of developmental 
change (Siegler, 1996). In this model, development is represented by a 
series of partially overlapping inverted U-shaped functions. Because we 
studied only a small window of development, we cannot be certain if this 
model could apply more generally.
Summary of findings on proposition 1. We conclude that, in spite 
of the diversity in the developmental process for each dyad, there was 
regularity in the developmental sequence. Dyads appeared to be able to 
recruit any type of frame to play a bridging role. The key was the creation 
of new social routines that had links to historical frames. Once this hap­
pened, the dyads became free to explore new ways of relating without 
losing the relative security of established communication patterns.
Our observations fit with how others have conceptualized bridging 
processes in developmental change. Previous work on bridging from 
sociocultural and cognitive theory includes Vygosky’s concept of zone 
of proximal development (ZPD, Vygotsky, 1978), RogofFs (1990; 1997) 
ideas about building bridges from the known to the new in the trans­
formation of participation, and Valsiner’s (1997) and Granott’s (Granott 
et al., 2002) observations about how novel forms emerge in development 
in anticipation of their realization in the future. In Siegler’s (1996) 
overlapping waves theory there are both more and less advanced ways 
of thinking present at any given time, as children use older, dependable 
strategies to solve problems when the newer strategies fail to work as well 
as anticipated. Bruner described a “place holder” in communication as 
familiar conventions into which a partner can insert something new. 
Clinical theories also include concepts similar to bridging. Winnicott’s 
(1971) concepts of an “intermediate area of experience” and a “transi­
tional object” reflect psychologically “safe” locations in which a person 
can play with the emerging possibilities of the real world and at the same 
time not be challenged or threatened about losing the past.
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In addition to the “simple bridging” models suggested by these theor­
ies, we found more complex models. The most unique model found here 
was (P"). This model especially reflects how relationships as complex 
systems can have multiple co-existing frames which serve different func­
tions at different times during a change process. Further research is 
needed to reveal the more general conditions under which a relationship 
would rely on one or another model of bridging.
In general, however, bridging seems to occur regularly in relation­
ships. It may serve the function of “smoothing out” the change process. 
The theories mentioned above suggest that bridging may facilitate the 
ability of participants to detect “safe” links between the known and the 
unknown. Without bridging, people would have to take a major devel­
opmental leap of faith in the absence of a safety net. As researchers, we 
had the opportunity to see the developmental course of each dyad: we 
knew where they were going. Participants, however, can’t see the future. 
The future only exists in imagination. Before investing in any single 
future, participants likely “try out” possible futures through bridging. 
Bridging, then, is one way to experiment with the unknown by making it 
partially knowable in the context of the familiar. Another way to do this 
is by introducing innovations into an already established system.
Proposition 2: Innovations occurring during frames and transitions 
will serve as preludes for later developmental changes in the frames 
and transitions
Piaget (1954) was one of the first developmental scientists to observe the 
change process. He believed that innovations are always assimilated into 
an existing scheme and that schemes accommodate to encompass the 
innovation. At first, however, the scheme does not appreciably change. It 
simply becomes more adapted, more encompassing. Schemes change 
when the innovations reach a critical point where simple accommoda­
tion no longer is adaptive. At that point, schemes differentiate and/or 
integrate with other schemes and higher order structures begin to 
emerge.
In order for change to occur, there must be innovations in ongoing 
patterns of action. In their book on dynamic systems and development, 
Thelen and Smith list as the primary goal of a developmental theory, “to 
understand the origins of novelty” (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. xviii). 
They also make the claim that “creation and exploitation of variability 
are key elements in the [developmental change] process” (p. 131). 
According to dynamic systems theory, stable attractors are dynamic 
and therefore variable within a range. Change in a dynamic system can
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arise either from the inherent variability within the attractor or from 
outside the system. In either case, the change must be amplified via 
positive feedback within the constraints of the existing system. As the 
attractor becomes more variable, it may de-stabilize at a phase transition. 
Either the attractor becomes chaotic or it bifurcates, creating new 
attractors in its place.
According to a relational-historical perspective, innovations in inter­
personal relationships are also thought to arise in the context of historic­
ally available patterns of communication. When they first appear, either as 
novelty from within the system or as a part of the ecology of the system, 
they are highlighted against the background of the familiar routines 
(Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Lyra & Winegar, 1997). We can think of innov­
ations, therefore, as seeds for change because they are hypothesized to be 
planted within already available frames and in transitions between frames 
while those frame and transition processes remain relatively stable. On the 
basis of this theory, we proposed that there are three levels of change:
• Level 1: Ordinary variability within a frame or realtime transition.
• Level 2: Innovations within the frame or realtime transition that do 
not change the ordinary variability.
• Level 3: Developmental change, a re-organization of all the frames 
and transitions in the system.
Proposition 2 suggests that there is a developmental sequence in these 
levels of change, which was expressed in various ways.
(P2) level 1 —» level 2 —> level 3
(P2) level 1 —» level 3
(P£) ( l e v e l  i“) + (level 2“)period„ ->  (level 1“ (level l “  +
level 2“ + level 2“') + level 2p)period „
(P2”) (level 1“) + (level 2a)perioda -»  (level 1P (level l“ +
level 2a + level 2“ ) + level 2P)pt.riod p —» (level 3 )p,.nod Y
Sequence (P2) expresses the theoretical prediction in its simplest 
terms. Although the basic model fits all of our four representative cases, 
we found that it needed to be modified to better describe the details of 
the change process across the developmental periods. The most complete
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model, which fits all the dyads except for Richard and his mother, was 
sequence (P7-,"). In this model,
• (°£, P> Y> • • -) are the different developmental periods in sequence of 
occurrence
• -f is the observed or possible occurrence of a term in the same 
developmental period
• —* is the change between developmental periods.
Applying these symbols to the levels, we get the following terms:
level 1 a is ordinary variability in the first observed developmental 
period, a
level 21 are innovations occurring during period a 
level 1 is ordinary variability during period p 
level 2** are innovations during period P
level 2“ are additional innovations during period p that are 
responses to or amplifications of innovations introduced 
during the previous period, a.
Sequence (P'-T) says that during period % there are both ordinary 
variability and innovations that do not change the ordinary variability. 
During period P , there is a new ordinary variability that may include 
some of the same ordinary variability and innovations that were observed 
during the previous period at as well as additional innovations that are 
direct responses to level 2’ , the innovations from period a. Period p also 
includes new innovations that arise in that period and do not change the 
ordinary variability, that is, level l (i. The data fit our prediction that 
changes in ordinary variability in a later developmental period result 
from innovations in a previous developmental period which do not 
change the ordinary variability at the time they first appear.
Finally, we found that level 3 developmental change occurred in all the 
representative dyads with the exception of Richard and his mother. Level 
3 change was too complex to express in symbolic form. In the sequences 
above, changes between periods a and p are primarily by accretion and 
deletion, something easily represented by symbols. The changes in or­
dinary variability across developmental periods observed for Richard and 
his mother were no more than this kind of simple accretion of prior 
innovations. The developmental process for this dyad was represented 
by sequence (Pt), which does not include a level 3 term.
Level 3 change as observed in the other three dyads, on the other 
hand, was qualitatively different than what had been seen before. Al­
though the historical links could be observed, the relation between 
period y  and the previous periods involved a transformation of the entire
system of frames in relationship to each other. We found four features 
that signaled a level 3 change:
• a blending or permeability between frames,
• the emergence of a new frame of more than brief duration with its own
unique features,
• a recapitulation of older frames, and
• spontaneous, creative innovations that occur only during developmen­
tal re-organization and that cannot be traced back to prior innovations.
Each of the three dyads that showed level 3 change had instances of 
the first three of these features. Both Betsy and Lewis and their mothers 
did not show the fourth feature listed above. In addition, for both of 
these dyads, the first three features of level 3 change occurred in a single 
developmental period, the third or y period.
Susan and her mother, on the other hand, were different. First of all, 
they had spontaneous innovations during the re-organization process 
that were not amplifications of prior innovations and they did contribute 
to a change in the ordinary variability during period y. Since we had not 
observed this in any of the other dyads, and since these spontaneous 
innovations were only observed in this dyad during level 3 change, we 
concluded that they should be included into the description of what may 
possibly occur during level 3 developmental change. It appeared that 
because so much is changing during level 3, it leaves room for the system 
to be highly creative. Perhaps there is a shared sense of opportunity and 
possibility that permeates the system. On the other hand, the degree of 
creativity during level 3 changes varies between dyads. Some transitions 
may be seen by participants as times of caution while other periods are 
seen as opportunities to explore new possibilities.
A second difference between Susan and her mother compared to the 
other dyads is that not all the features of developmental change occurred 
in a single developmental period. Although we clearly identified period y 
as the time of level 3 re-organization, we observed instances of recapitu­
lation in this dyad in the developmental period following period y. We 
also observed permeability between frames in the developmental period 
prior to period y. We suggested that this reflects flexibility in the change 
process and perhaps a means -  in addition to bridging -  to avoid abrupt 
transitions and to smooth out the developmental change. Because this 
dyad was more social than the other representative dyads, they were able 
to “stretch out” their social engagement well after the infant acquired 
visually guided reaching.
Finally, sequence (P',) represents the possibility that developmental 
change may occur in the absence of innovation. This was not observed in
218 Change Processes in Relationships
Summary 219
our data. Although innovations may or may not occur spontaneously 
during level 3 change as in the case of Susan and her mother, it was never 
the case that level 3 change occurred without innovations in the prior 
developmental period. There may be exceptions to this principle in 
situations of drastic, chaotic, unexpected or traumatic change, when 
factors in a situation are beyond the control of the participants. Such 
an innovation may be a long-term separation between a mother and 
infant, a hospitalization for example. This type of drastic innovation 
would probably lead to premature developmental change in the system 
surrounding the innovation. We did not study such innovations here but 
we raise the possibility that they may occur and that a different Propos­
ition 2 sequence is likely to be required to capture such developmental 
changes.
Analysis of the development of infant action with respect 
to the development of the mother-infant relationship
In this section, we discuss the results of our study of the development of 
infant actions as they are coordinated with the development of frames. 
Again, both quantitative and qualitative analyses are used.
Proposition 3: The developmental trajectories of particular actions 
toward objects will relate to the developmental trajectories for the 
frames
We studied the contribution of infant actions to the trajectories of 
frames. Increases in the duration of gazing at objects without touching 
them was associated with increases in the duration of the guided object 
frame and decreases in the social frame. Increases in the duration of 
gazing at objects while touching them was associated with increases in 
the duration of the not-guided object frame and with decreases in the 
social frame. The duration of touching without gazing at the object 
increased with increases in the duration of the social/object mixed 
frame and with decreases in the guided object frame. Increases in the 
duration of object mouthing, with or without gazing at the objects, 
were associated with increases in the duration of the social/object 
mixed frame.
More gazing without touching objects could be expected to occur 
during the guided object frame in which the mother showed or demon­
strated objects to the observant infant. Even though the mother sup­
ported infant touching objects during the guided object frame, the 
infants apparently did not learn to coordinate touching with looking
during this frame. Based on our data, this coordination between gazing 
and touching was related to the growth o f the not-guided object frame 
when the mother was not holding the object. The qualitative analysis 
suggests that the effects o f the not-guided object frame on the coordin­
ation o f looking and touching probably occurred during the third de­
velopmental period while infants spent time examining the objects on 
their own. During the final developmental period, however, the infants 
became immersed in mouthing the objects and rarely looked at them 
during the not-guided object frame.
The trajectory o f the social/object mixed frame was associated with 
touching objects without looking at them and mouthing the objects. 
This is curious because after the bridging period, this frame declined 
in duration for most o f the infants while the not-guided object frame, 
in which the infants were immersed (touching without looking at the 
objects and mouthing), increased in duration. The qualitative analysis 
revealed, however, that during the third and fourth developmental 
periods, dyads often made a transition to the social/object mixed frame 
when the infant became immersed during the not-guided object frame. 
The mother was often responsible for initiating this transition, appar­
ently wanting to get the infant’s attention to herself or to some more 
socially inclusive use o f objects. This transition attempt, with few excep­
tions, was not ratified by the infant. In other words, most o f the time 
spent in social/object mixed frames in the later developmental periods 
was with the infant immersed in the object and the mother trying to 
convince the infant to do something else. When the social/object mixed 
frame was a bridging frame (Richard and Betsy and their mothers), then 
it was more likely to be social in nature and this was especially the case 
for Betsy and her mother. In these cases, there was relatively little gazing 
at the object but the infant gazed instead at the mother and often smiled.
Proposition 4: The infant's acquisition of skilled actions with objects
will emerge in a developmental sequence
We charted the developmental sequence o f emergence o f infant actions 
on objects. This is the first study to report this developmental sequence 
based upon infants acting on objects in the natural ecology o f social- 
object play. The sequence we found is similar to that reported in the 
literature for infants tested in controlled, non-social settings. Our results 
show that simpler actions on objects such as grasping and manipulating 
occur prior to the acquisition o f visually guided reaching and therefore 
primarily during the guided object frame when the mother is holding the 
object. More advanced skills such as squeezing, shaking, and grasping
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with two hands are developed later, primarily during the not-guided 
object frame when the infant is holding the object.
The qualitative and quantitative results were similar. Infant examin­
ation o f objects, which developed in the third developmental period, 
consisted o f the more advanced skills. The infant’s actions during the 
earlier periods typically consisted o f simple grasping and fingering o f the 
objects. Although the quantitative analysis on all thirteen dyads clearly 
showed that the more complex actions emerged after the acquisition of 
visually guided reaching, the qualitative analysis, though only on four 
dyads, gave us more precision. It showed that the acquisition o f more 
skilled actions on objects coincided with the emergence o f the not- 
guided object frame following the bridging period. Thus, the develop­
mental changes in infant actions were related to the development o f 
frames.
Pathways across the four-month developmental transition
Although all o f the dyads arrived at a similar developmental endpoint -  
the emergence o f the not-guided object frame -  each o f them co-created 
a unique style o f communication and actions on objects. Richard and 
Betsy developed skills for focal attention to objects and coordination of 
manual and visual means o f object exploration. They gazed at, reached 
for, and manipulated objects whenever possible. A  predominant inclin­
ation for making transitions between the object-oriented frames was 
found. The social frame was rare throughout the whole twelve-session 
period.
Despite these similarities, these two infants and their mothers differed 
with respect to their activities within the object-oriented frames. Richard 
and his mother primarily focused on the objects’ affordances. The 
mother verbally highlighted the objects’ properties, she encouraged 
Richard’s reaching skills, and she talked only about object-oriented 
topics. The mother also developed different routines for each o f the 
objects she used. Over time, the frequency o f the social/object mixed 
frame decreased and the mother did not interfere with Richard’s reach­
ing, helping him to explore the toys. Also, they used the social/object 
mixed frame as a touching game with objects to highlight the objects’ 
affordances.
Betsy’s mother, however, used objects to help emphasize her words, 
singing, sounds, and vocal inflections, while showing, demonstrating or 
manipulating objects. The mother used an object as a rhythm instru­
ment when singing. In earlier sessions, the mother frequently smiled, 
laughed, used exaggerated body movements and facial expressions,
and found humor in many exchanges during both the guided object 
frame and the social/object mixed frame. In these cases, Betsy looked 
for longer periods o f time at objects and at mother, with an increase in 
vocalizations and smiling. The social/object mixed frame was mostly 
used as an object touching game for animation o f objects as play, instead 
o f for highlighting the objects’ affordances.
Additionally, as Richard and Betsy became better in the coordination 
of manual and visual means o f object exploration, the transitions be­
tween the guided object frame and the not-guided object frame became 
more predominant and were made in faster durations. In particular, 
Richard and his mother started making rapid transitions in session 10 
primarily between the guided object frame and the not-guided object 
frame. Betsy and her mother started making rapid transitions in session 
9 but some o f these transitions also included the social/object mixed 
frame. Richard did not ratify his mother’s attempts at transition to the 
social/object mixed frame in the last developmental periods, but Betsy 
and her mother were more coregulated during the transitions involving 
the social/object mixed frame.
Lewis and his mother and Susan and her mother also had similarities 
between them. These dyads developed an interim pattern in which 
objects were not things in themselves but rather served as mediators o f 
social play. These dyads spent more time in the social frame compared to 
the other two dyads. The infants in these dyads developed forms o f 
attention and action that appeared to be distributed between social 
and instrumental uses o f objects. Although Lewis and Susan displayed 
less focal attention to objects, they seemed to present a more flexible 
pattern o f attention that moved easily between objects and mother.
Both mothers in these two dyads used object-oriented frames to high­
light object affordances, to demonstrate objects, and to help the infant 
hold, shake or squeeze objects. The social/object mixed frame increased 
in the last two developmental periods for both dyads. Lewis’ mother 
used the social/object frame to help Lewis explore object affordances 
whereas Susan’s mother used the objects to entertain or physically 
engage Susan in game playing. These two dyads tended to not make 
many transitions between frames overall. However, a gradual increase in 
the frequency o f the transitions between frames was observed over 
developmental time, especially after the reaching session.
These two dyads also differed. Lewis’ mother can be described as an 
assistant, helping her object-focused infant explore during the first two 
development periods. Lewis showed more initiative during the transitions 
than the other infants in the first developmental period. In the last two 
developmental periods, the mother acted primarily as commentator,
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captivator, and entertainer. When commenting, the mother’s conver­
sation was object-focused, talking about object affordances. Susan’s 
mother’s primary roles were a combination o f captivator, facilitator, 
entertainer in the first two developmental periods and spectator and 
captivator in the last two developmental periods. Susan’s mother spent 
much o f her time talking about Susan’s father, siblings, and past/ 
future events while facilitating object play.
Summary of findings on infant action development in the
mother-infant relationship
Did mothers change their strategies, therefore changing the frames, 
because infant skill changed? Or did infant skill development depend 
upon the guidance provided by the mothers, at first manually during 
the guided object frame and later vocally during the not-guided object 
frame? In this descriptive study, we cannot sort out the cause and effect 
patterns. Our relational-historical research assumes, on the contrary, 
that in the natural ecology o f these infants who could not locomote or 
sit upright unsupported, virtually all o f the infant’s exposure to objects 
occurred in the social context. The presence o f a not-guided object 
frame depended upon the active support o f an adult who arranged the 
infant in proximity to objects and brought objects into the infant’s reach 
space. Likewise, the presence o f adult support depended upon the 
activities displayed by the infant.
Piaget’s concept o f scheme and Gibson’s concept o f affordance ex­
plicitly recognize the ecology as an integral part o f the individual’s 
perception and action. For Piaget, the grasping scheme includes the 
object’s properties and its affordance for grasping. Infants tend to grasp 
smaller objects with one hand and larger ones with two hands. Dynamic 
systems theory recognizes the role o f gravity, for example, in the devel­
opment o f reaching, where the individual’s action either compensates 
for or utilizes gravity as if it were a part o f the body (cf. Thelen, Kelso, & 
Fogel, 1987; Thelen & Smith, 1994).
Our research lends support to these views and generalizes the eco­
logy to include other people as well as the physical properties o f objects 
and gravitational forces (Fogel, 1997; Zukow-Goldring, 1997). This 
work also supports sociocultural theory, showing for the first time that 
Vygotsky’s concepts o f guided participation applies to infants during 
the first half year in the acquisition o f skills that had been previously 
explained by neurological maturation.
This work extends these four theories -  Gibson’s, Piaget’s, dynamic 
systems, and sociocultural — by suggesting that the interpersonal
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relationship is a living system that develops in an organized way 
from historical frames to newly emerging frames. I f  frames are roughly 
analogous to skills or schemes, this work transcends the individual in 
order to view the ecosystem -  the social and physical ecology in relation 
to the infant -  as the locus o f developmental change.
The statistical associations o f infant action and frame trajectories 
confirmed that both the infant and the relationship grew together. Those 
objects were historically imbued with social significance because they 
were first introduced during the guided object and social/object mixed 
frames. We conclude that “ infant skills” were relational achievements, 
the product o f a historical process o f mutual regulation within the dyad.
In the same way that the infant perceives gravity and objects properties 
as an integral part o f its body (Piaget, 1954; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 
1987), the infant most likely perceives the adult’s voice, hands, and face 
as an integral part o f the objects. In this way, the social and physical 
ecology become embodied for the infants (Fogel, 1993). Their meaning 
is always in relation to the kinds o f actions the infant can perform. Our 
data on interdyad and individual differences suggest that the infants’ 
awareness and use o f their own bodies, then, depend upon the history o f 
their life within this relational ecology.
Lim itations o f  the data analysis
Limitations of quantitative analysis
In order to create and study a developmental trajectory, a number o f 
analytic decisions must be made. First, the number o f observations on 
each dyad over time must be chosen. Estimates o f developmental trajec­
tories increase in accuracy the more frequent the observations and the 
more total observations. In our case, we had twelve weekly observations 
o f mother-infant play, a relatively limited number compared to the many 
daily encounters between mother, infant and objects in these families. 
I f  our data is a type o f filmed record o f change over time in these dyads, 
it has a very coarse resolution that probably misses many additional 
details o f microlevel change.
Second, the purpose for using developmental trajectories needs to be 
considered. We were interested in the study o f change across a known 
developmental transition. For this purpose, developmental trajectories 
are most meaningful if the period o f observation encompasses an ex­
pected change in the level o f the trajectory variable. This means begin­
ning the observations before the expected change and continuing 
the observations after the change has occurred. We chose a corpus o f
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videotaped data that had weekly observations o f thirteen mother-infant 
dyads during free play between five and fifty-two weeks. Because o f our 
interest in the developmental transition related to the onset o f visually 
guided reaching, we selected from the sample six weekly sessions prior to 
the onset o f reaching and six sessions including and after the onset o f 
reaching. Even against the background o f our videotapes o f these dyads, 
we have chosen a considerably limited segment o f time.
Third, the variables o f interest must be determined. We were inter­
ested in the change in the mother-infant communication system across 
the four-month transition and therefore chose frames as variables. The 
social frame was coded when dyads engaged in face-to-face play without 
the mediadon o f objects. The guided object frame consisted o f times 
when the mother demonstrated or showed an object to the infant, or 
helped the infant retrieve, reach for, or grasp an object. The not-guided 
object frame was when the infant explored an object while the mother 
looked on and/or commented. The social/object mixed frame occurred 
when the object was used for social play, to get the infant’s attention, or 
to calm the infant, most typically by touching the infant with the object. 
There were limitations to this approach. On the one hand, we ignored 
some frames such as soothing an upset infant. On the other hand, we 
collapsed many different types o f play into a single frame such as includ­
ing physical-motor play, face-to-face play, and quiet holding into the 
social frame.
Fourth, the variables must be quantified. The most robust measure o f 
behavior in observational research is the duration o f a particular cate­
gory. We chose the total duration o f each frame, expressed as a propor­
tion o f the total duration o f the observation session. This measure is 
reasonably insensitive to the presence or absence o f brief events which 
are often the result o f coding error or transient shifts in the communi­
cation system. The total proportional duration across the four frames 
sums to 1.00, however, since the frames were coded defined as mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. I f  one’s goal is to treat each frame as an inde­
pendent observation for the purpose o f generalization to a population, 
this could violate statistical assumptions. In our case, however, we were 
trying to describe each frame in relation to the others to create a picture 
o f the whole communication system.
Finally, one must choose a method of analysis. On the one hand, we 
used multilevel analysis to create ideal models o f each trajectory for each 
dyad and for the group o f thirteen. Statistical modeling allows one to 
discover whether there is order in the data that is not readily visible from 
the raw data. Modeling procedures assume that there is an ideal trajec­
tory, typically expressed as a linear mathematical function o f age, its
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square and its cube. Non-linear (logarithmic, exponential) models were 
not appropriate to test because we had too few observations per dyad. 
Deviation from the best fitting ideal trajectory is modeled as random 
variability, or noise in the data. In addition, statistical models typically 
allow only one dependent variable, although covariates may be added to 
the models. The resulting modeled trajectories, therefore, must be inter­
preted from the perspective o f each o f the above consideradons. These 
trajectories are representations o f ideal mathematical functions. Each 
variable is decontextualized from the others in the same system and each 
is derived on the assumption that there is some validity to transforming 
meaningful dyadic communication patterns into numbers.
In the visual inspection o f the raw data for the four representative 
dyads, we assumed that an ideal trajectory did not exist; that variability 
in the data represented potentially meaningful dyadic negotiation pro­
cesses that may have been essential for an understanding o f the develop­
mental change process. This phase o f the analysis, however, must still be 
interpreted from the perspective o f the way in which the observations 
were sampled and the manner o f quantification o f the variables.
Limitations of qualitative analysis
The construction o f the narratives o f each o f the four dyads rested upon 
a set o f analytic procedures and assumptions. In this sense, narrative 
analysis is no different than the quantitative analysis. Interpretations o f 
the data must be made from this perspective. For each type o f analysis, 
we achieve different views o f the developmental process. Each method 
is a lens that affords different insights but each lens carries its own form 
o f distortion for the viewer.
The narrative method rests on the ability o f the human observer to 
recount observed events in story form. According to Bruner (1990), 
human knowledge is constructed via two different modes: the paradig­
matic and the narrative. The paradigmatic is the basis for quantitative 
research and logical reasoning, while the narrative is the basis o f story­
telling and qualitative research. In the paradigmatic mode, data is veri­
fied by reliability and validity procedures; in the narrative mode, by 
credibility.
Credibility is enhanced when there is a prolonged engagement o f the 
researcher with the researched (in this case, the mother-infant dyads), a 
persistent observation o f the phenomenon under investigation, and a 
use o f a peer research team. In Chapter 6, we described the types o f 
contact with the dyads and the videotaped data that the authors have 
had over the past twenty years and the details o f the peer research team.
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This prolonged engagement and persistent observation o f the data al­
lowed the observers to develop a unique sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies 
and commonalities among the four dyads which is reflected in the level 
o f concordance between the historical narratives written by the two 
independent observers. There was also a concordance between obser­
vers in the identification o f the four developmental periods for each 
dyad. The credibility o f the demarcation o f each o f the four representa­
tive dyads into developmental periods is less clear. The two narrative 
observers agreed upon which sessions to include in each developmental 
period. There was, however, complexity in the change process itself 
that could not be resolved into simple divisions o f each dyad’s life into 
age periods.
One of the results o f our study is that features o f the next develop­
mental period appeared historically, in embryonic form, in the previous 
one. Should we have demarcated the beginning o f the new developmen­
tal period when those embryonic forms first appeared? The problem is 
that these embryonic forms were minor themes and the major themes of 
the earlier developmental period were still ongoing. As we noted earlier, 
the seeds o f future change were always in the present, waiting for an 
opportunity to take root.
We conclude that the need to demarcate developmental periods arose 
as one o f the distortions o f the narrative lens. In order to be comprehen­
sible to the human mind, stories require a dramatic structure: a begin­
ning, middle, and end (Bruner, 1990; Ricoeur, 1983; Sarbin, 1986). 
The dramatic structure o f a story about a life may not correspond exactly 
to the life as lived. On the other hand, humans are exceptionally good at 
taking those idealized dramas and applying them to lessons in their own 
lives.
Even though we have taken steps to insure consistency and credibility, 
we need to be aware that narratives are nothing more than stories. Faith 
in the conclusions derived from these stories rests upon similar evidential 
criteria that are used in eyewitness testimony, the collection o f evidence, 
and the use o f prior court cases in legal proceedings. Narrative analysis 
has been described as a quasi-judicial approach (Robson, 1993), in 
which stories are collected from different sources and their credibility is 
tested against each other. In spite o f their limitations, human societies 
have been using some form of narrative analysis for centuries in order to 
decide upon matters o f grave concern.
Even quantitative analysis is, in the end, a story. It would not appeal 
to a reader unless it resonated within the dramatic divisions o f text 
dictated by the current culture o f science: theory, hypotheses, methods, 
results, and conclusions. We have written this document within that
228 Change Processes in Relationships
narrative structure even though the work did not actually develop in 
this sequence. Each phase in this narrative was written as a historical 
prelude to the next; the seeds o f the conclusions were contained in the 
introduction.
Limitations of the case study approach
What can the reader take away from this rather long document on a 
handful o f cases? We have been careful to avoid generalizing our results 
to the population since we did not perform any inferential statistics and 
the sample size is too small to justify such conclusions. Our concern, 
entirely, has been to convince the reader that our report on these thirteen 
dyads, and most especially on the four representative dyads, is credible 
and accurate. On these dyads we reported many small details about 
variability and complexity, resisting reaching conclusions about them 
based only on the generalized modeled trajectories.
These limitations, however, are inherent in doing a thorough historical 
analysis o f developmental change on any relationship system: dyads, 
families, or societies. There seems to be no way to chart historical change 
other than the difficult and lengthy process o f iterative construction o f 
narratives. This, in fact, is the definition o f “ history” (Duby, 1994; 
Ricoeur, 1983). We believe that gains in our understanding o f the 
complexity o f change at all levels offset the limitations on generalizabil- 
ity. As we become more sophisticated about identifying types o f change 
process, coding and analysis may improve in efficiency and therefore be 
extended to a larger sample.
Still, limits will be inherent in this type o f work. It takes a lot o f time 
and money to collect many observations on even a few dyads. In order 
to refine the mathematical modeling o f the trajectories to embrace non­
linear functions, for example, we would need a great deal more 
observations o f the same dyads across any particular developmental 
transition. Two or three observations per week would double or triple 
the number o f data points for modeling, a significant gain in precision. 
It would also increase the cost o f data collection and the task o f coding 
for each dyad.
Another limit on the generalizability is that we studied normally 
developing, middle class dyads from the United States. We did not 
observe any serious developmental delays. Future research on different 
populations o f developmentally delayed dyads and dyads from different 
cultural backgrounds may reveal more details about the relational- 
historical process. We believe that our work on developmental process 
will result in new ways to understand change. This may lead to the
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discovery o f new ways to understand how growth dynamics may become 
arrested and how therapeutic interventions can restore the potential for 
developmental change in a relationship.
Summary of limitations of the data analysis
Even though the qualitative and quantitative aspects o f analysis have 
their limitations, the conclusions reached in this study are made stronger 
because o f the mixed-method approach. It was often the case that the 
qualitative analysis clarified and elaborated the quantitative findings by 
providing more detail and focusing on historical, as opposed to statis­
tical, significance. On the other hand, the simplicity o f data that comes 
from its reduction to numbers often revealed hidden patterns that could 
not be seen readily from the relative density o f the historical narratives. 
These narratives were much more difficult to read, understand, and keep 
in mind compared to a table o f numbers or a set o f modeled trajectories. 
The approximations to the data required to create modeled trajectories 
also lent itself to the uncovering o f hidden patterns in the data, leading 
us to search in the narratives for clues to comprehend the underlying 
change processes in living systems. On the other hand, the qualitative 
analysis revealed new patterns in both real and developmental time. We 
must be cautious about generalizing these results beyond the dyads 
studied here yet we are hopeful that future relational-historical research 
will open new avenues for the understanding and enhancement o f 
developmental change.
Laws of change: implications for theory 
and practice
Come gather ’round people 
Wherever you roam 
And admit that the waters 
Around you have grown 
And accept it that soon 
You’ll be drenched to the bone.
I f  your time to you 
Is worth savin ’
Then you better start swimmin’
Or you’ll sink like a stone 
For the times they are a-changin ’
(Bob Dylan, 1964)
In this chapter, we review our findings from the perspective o f consistencies 
o f developmental change processes. We ask whether general laws o f change 
in relationships can be inferred from our research. We also discuss the 
implications o f such laws o f change for understanding practices that foster 
developmental change in relationships. Such practices include childrear­
ing, education and training, clinical treatment approaches based primarily 
on interpersonal relationships, change processes in organizations, and 
larger scale social and cultural change.
A re  there laws o f  relational-historical development?
In this section, we recognize some o f the consistencies o f the developmental 
process that emerged in our work, knowing that these consistencies must 
await further study. Our research revealed different types o f change, from 
the realtime fluctuations o f communicative actions to the developmental 
changes in the patterns o f communication. We also observed the paradox­
ical situation that change occurred in the midst o f stability. The dynamics 
o f change occurred with respect to frames that had a stable identity across 
the period o f observation. While spontaneous, creative innovations were 
observed during periods o f developmental re-organization, change was not
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entirely open ended. It was constrained to occur in certain ways and 
not others.
Constraints as a basis for inferring laws
The concept o f a law o f change means that there are constraints on 
change processes: not all forms o f change are possible. Consider two 
extremes o f change: no change and unlimited change. No change would 
mean that nothing in the system changed. Each time a frame recurred it 
would be repeated exactly in all its detailed microscopic processes, like 
replaying a videotape. This is a description o f an ideal physical machine 
operating in the absence o f friction and material fatigue. Such a machine 
cannot exist. Any system in the real world must obey the second law of 
thermodynamics, meaning that at a minimum, there is a flow o f energy 
through the system and hence some kind o f change. In addition, most 
biological systems exist far from thermodynamic equilibrium. In this 
highly dynamic state, change continually emerges and information is 
continually created as energy flows through the system and dissipates 
(Capra, 1996; Kellert, 1993; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Thus, in the 
real world, some change must always occur.
At the other extreme, there are unlimited possibilities for change. 
A  system could, at any moment, transform into something entirely differ­
ent. This may be possible in the mythical imagination (frogs changing into 
princes, for example) but unlikely in physical and living systems. The 
same processes that bring continual change in far-from-equilibrium states 
also create dynamically stable attractors, recurring patterns in the midst o f 
the flow o f change, like eddies in the continuous flow o f a river.
Change in living systems, therefore, falls somewhere in between no 
change and unlimited change. Even in the realm o f ancient mythology, 
the types o f changes documented in the ancestral imagination appeared 
to be constrained. Origin myths about the creation o f the world, for 
example, tend to have particular themes -  primordial chaos, earth and 
water, light and dark, form from formlessness -  that recur across widely 
different cultures and geographical locations (Campbell, 1991).
Level 1 change. In our work, we have discovered only particular 
kinds o f change and some o f the constraints that appeared with these 
changes. Within the constraints o f maintaining a frame, there were changes 
that we called ordinary variability. What constitutes ordinary variability 
and how is it constrained? Where does ordinary variability originate? 
The answer comes from the fact that behavior is inherently temporary. 
Any action lasts a finite amount o f time. Grasping an object arises from 
a realtime movement o f the arm and hand toward an object, catching
the object, and moving the object to a desired location. Each time this 
behavior recurs, it is created anew from the same basic constituents 
o f cognitive goals, motor synergies and perceptions. It is a simple fact o f 
living systems that the “ same” behavior is never exactly identical upon 
iteration. This fact alone was enough for dynamic systems theorists to 
challenge older views o f behavior based in machine analogies such as 
neuromotor programs (Thelen & Smith, 1994). The inherent variabi­
lity o f behavior implies that there is not a machine in the person but a 
softly assembled dynamic system o f neuromotor components that when 
activated tend to follow a similar pathway in time and space.
The variability o f behavior within a frame suggests a social system that 
never exactly repeats itself. On the other hand, we perceive frames in 
social behavior because perceptually similar actions tend to recur. On 
further examination, we can see that any two instances o f the mother 
shaking a rattle for the infant during the guided object frame are never 
precisely the same. There are variations in the speed, location, and 
rhythm o f the movement o f the rattle on the one hand, and the actions 
of the infant in relation to the rattle’s sight and sound on the other.
The change in ordinary variability, however, is not so much as to make 
a significant difference for the participants. We call this ordinary vari­
ability because it is not usually noticed or singled out in the attention of 
the participants. It is not a difference that makes a difference. Ordinary 
variability, however, is a difference that can be noticed but it does not in 
any way alter the basic patterning o f the frame.
It is not clear why this level o f change is constrained to be “ordinary.” 
What is clear, however, is that it comprised the vast majority o f the 
changes in the relationships that we observed. There are probably thou­
sands o f iterations o f ordinary variability for every single innovation 
(level 2 change) observed. In terms o f the frequency o f occurrence, we 
could say that the number o f changes at level 1 is much, much greater 
than at level 2, which is much, much greater than at level 3.
Freq.(level 1) »  Freq.(level 2) > >  Freq.(level 3)
The relationship systems we observed were much more generous in 
providing lower levels o f change, and this in itself seems to be a law of 
change: that higher order change occurs less frequently and is probably 
considerably more energetically costly to the system.
Change also occurred as the ordinary variability o f actions that change 
frames, the realtime transition. The concept o f ordinary variability dur­
ing a realtime transition is at first paradoxical. Transitions are inher­
ently about change, from one frame into another. How could it be that
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there was a consistency and regularity across similar transitions within a 
developmental period? One answer comes from dynamic systems theory. 
When transitions did occur, they were considerably briefer than the 
durations o f the frames occurring before and after the transitions. 
According to some work in dynamic systems theory, the duration o f 
transitions between attractors is considerably less than the time the 
system spends in stable attractors (Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1982). In 
a sense, systems do not like to be in transitions and they tend to seek the 
stability o f some kind o f attractor in which to spend most o f their time. 
Attractors are energetically more conservative. Frames and transitions 
between frames in an interpersonal relationship appear to fit this model. 
Thus, relative brevity o f transitions is one apparent constraint. This 
helps also to explain the high frequency o f realtime transitions between 
brief frames during the bridging process. These brief frames were appar­
ently relatively unstable, as the system did not “ like” to remain in them 
for very long.
Another constraint on change during the ordinary variability o f real­
time transitions is that the previous frame was disassembled in small 
pieces as the next frame was being assembled. We documented hundreds 
o f transitions between frames for the four representative dyads (786 
transitions, to be exact). In all cases, the added actions during the 
transition in the current frame served to de-stabilize that frame, leading 
to an opportunity for the self-organization o f what will become the next 
frame. In some cases, transitions occurred when a single action changed, 
such as the infant’s gaze direction changing from mother to objects or 
vice-versa. In other cases, a series o f events occurred, each o f which built 
upon the others to amplify the probability that a transition might occur.
Another form o f constraint occurred because transitions were typically 
made between closely related frames. During the first two developmen­
tal periods, for example, the historical frame was more likely to make 
realtime transitions to the bridging frame than to the emerging frame. 
During the later developmental periods, the emerging frame was more 
likely to make transitions to the bridging frame than to the historical 
frame. When transitions were made between historical and bridging 
frames or between emerging and bridging frames, fewer components o f 
action had to be added or deleted dining the transition because the 
frames were more similar to each other. Historical and emerging frames 
had relatively few actions in common, which may help to explain 
why transitions between these frames occurred rarely. The exception, 
o f course, are the transitions to and from the unstable brief frames 
mentioned earlier.
A  final constraint on realtime transitions is that they required the 
regular and systematic participation o f both mother and infant. During 
transitions, infants and mothers often (but not all the time) ratified the 
other’s action as they moved jointly toward the next frame. We have 
called these types o f communication processes symmetrically coregu­
lated, a pattern in which each partner is continuously being affected by 
the other and open to the dynamics o f change in the communication 
system (Fogel, 1993; Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Hsu & Fogel, 2001; Hsu & 
Fogel, 2003). On the other hand, there were asymmetries when either 
partner failed to ratify the other’s transition bid. I f  one partner did not 
enter into a symmetrical communication with the other, this made 
the communication system less likely to change and more likely to 
remain stuck in a particular pattern o f action. An example is the infant’s 
immersion and withdrawal from social communication despite mothers’ 
attempts to engage the infant in joint play.
Level 2 change. Another type o f change was called Level 2 change, 
or innovations within ordinary variability. There appears to be a con­
straint on innovations because they emerged as part o f the ordinary varia­
bility in frames and transitions but did not alter that ordinary variability 
at the time when they first appeared. Instead, innovations acted like 
seeds o f change, it took some time for them to grow in such a way as 
to change the ordinary variability in the future. The effect o f innovations 
was constrained by the apparent “ inertia o f stability”  in frames and 
transitions. The ordinary variability in the frames and transitions we 
studied only yielded to change slowly, over several weeks.
In individual psychotherapy and on marital therapy, the inertia o f 
existing frames, even though they may be maladaptive and painful, is a 
common occurrence (Mahoney & Moes, 1997; Ryan et al., 2000). 
In fact, it may be the inability to change this inertia that brings people 
into treatment. Similarly, institutional, organizations, and social frames 
have the inertia to far outlive their usefulness and they require special 
intervention to effect a change.
The system may conserve energy by maintaining itself in the same 
frame. It appears to be relatively inexpensive for the system to generate a 
lot o f ordinary variability. This conservativeness suggests that innov­
ations typically need to be examined and tested against the background 
o f ordinary variability before they are “ allowed” to garner more re­
sources that would cause the participants to notice a difference that 
makes a difference.
There did not seem to be a constraint on whether innovations oc­
curred in frames or in realtime transitions. On the other hand, there 
were constraints on the fate o f innovations in later developmental
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periods. First, innovations could be repeated more regularly as part o f 
the ordinary variability o f the subsequent periods. Or, innovations from a 
previous developmental period could spark additional innovations in the 
subsequent periods, as when a mother changed her behavior to amplify 
an innovation in the infant’s behavior that occurred earlier or vice-versa. 
A  final constraint is that any innovation initiated by one partner must be 
ratified by the other. Otherwise, this seed would not eventually grow to 
its maturity.
Level 3 change. Developmental change was marked by a re-organiza­
tion o f all the frames and transitions in the system. Because everything 
seemed to be changing during a level 3 change, one might suspect that 
unlimited change could happen. History implies a passing away o f what 
went before and a movement toward a unique and undetermined future. 
History cannot be planned and depends upon a series o f unexpected 
contingencies. The contingencies o f the present may not be those o f the 
past because as the system progresses, the conditions change and the 
options change (Gould, 1977). History implies that anything can happen, 
that we are subject to the whims o f random variation, that there is inherent 
indeterminism (Fogel & Branco, 1997; Lyra & Winegar, 1997).
Even during level 3 developmental change, however, the system 
appeared to be constrained to change in particular ways and not others. 
The developmental changes we observed had apparent indeterminism 
because the new organization did not resemble anything that was previ­
ously observed. But there was also regularity in the four features that 
characterized a level 3 change:
• a blending or permeability between frames,
• the emergence o f a new frame o f more than brief duration with its own
unique features,
• a recapitulation o f older frames, and
• spontaneous, creative innovations that contribute to the overall
re-organization.
Thus, even though the exact pattern o f behavior in the re-organized 
system may not have been able to be predicted, there was a meta­
regularity in these four features that acted as constraints on the change 
process. This closely resembles what Kellert referred to as “ qualitative 
predictability” which “predicts properties o f a system that will remain 
valid for very long times and usually for all future time. It gives 
the ‘general information and the great classifications,’ by dealing with 
questions such as the periodicity and stability o f orbits, the symmetries 
and asymptotic properties o f behavior, and ‘the structure o f the set o f 
solutions’ ” (Kellert, 1993, p. 101).
At level 3, the system is the most conservative. A  relationship will have 
only a relatively small number o f level 3 changes in its lifetime. Level 3 
change apparently consumes considerable energetic resources. It does 
not come out o f nowhere but it is always the result o f a relatively long 
historical process o f evaluating the worth o f innovations against the 
background o f the immense sea o f ordinary variability. Because anything 
could potentially happen in level 3 change, the system seems to prefer to 
act slowly. Bridging serves the function o f doing test runs on a possible 
future without losing the past. Level 3 change is a difference that makes a 
very big difference for the participants.
Change in the relationship system. Aside from the constraints 
observed within each level o f change, there appeared to be additional 
constraints that can be detected when one steps back and examines the 
entire relationship system changing over time. First o f all, there was 
symmetry between earlier and later developmental periods. This sym­
metry is reflected in the models that resulted from Proposition 1. This is 
clearly seen in the simple model o f bridging in which historical and 
emerging frames appear to be mirror images o f each other if the mirror 
is placed at the peak o f the bridging duration. Proposition (P , ) shows an 
even more complex mirror image.
(Pj) Historical •»-» Bridging Bridging ■*-*■ Emerging
“  X =► X “
------- ► Emerging (brief) Historical (brief) ■*----
The participants do not know and cannot predict the future, and 
the specific behaviors found in the future frames are partially indeter­
minate and cannot necessarily be predicted. Yet somehow, this mirror 
image unfolding seems to recur regularly across dyads. Dyads seem 
to walk up toward the peak o f the bridge on a slow and easy grade, 
and they walk down the other side in a similar way. It is as if they get 
themselves out o f the change by retracing their steps but now those steps 
are in a new territory. In addition, all three types o f frames (e.g., histor­
ical, bridging, and emerging) are embedded in the relationship system 
both before and after the developmental transition and changes in 
frames are mediated by the bridging frame.
One basic feature o f dynamic systems theory is that each element o f a 
system is related to each other element in the system. Our data suggest 
that the relationship between system components may occur across 
developmental time. I f  the universe is expanding now, for example, it 
might be expected to enter a contraction phase sometime in the very
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distant future. Although the exact pathways o f motion o f the bodies in 
the universe during contraction could not be predicted, the general 
macroscopic move toward contraction in symmetrical relationship 
across time to expansion may be predicted. In the same way, under 
certain circumstances the macroscopic behavior o f a change process 
may be constrained by some laws o f change that imply symmetrical or 
asymmetrical patterns across developmental time.
Just because symmetry across developmental time is possible, it does 
not mean that the change will unfold in that way. There were asymmet­
ries across the period o f observation. All the dyads began making transi­
tions more rapidly in the last sessions but not for all four frames 
simultaneously. For each dyad, rapid transitions were made only be­
tween specific frames. Lewis and his mother, for example, began making 
rapid transitions in session 8 and these transitions primarily included the 
guided object frame, the not-guided object frame, and the social/object 
mixed frame. For Susan and her mother, on the other hand, all four 
frames were involved in rapid transitions beginning in session 6. In 
addition, developmental change in the patterns o f behavior appeared 
to be irreversible. Once a re-organized pattern occurred, the system did 
not revert back to earlier phases. Recapitulations occurred primarily 
during the same developmental period as the re-organization.
Developmental change, therefore, can be both relational and his­
torical. Development is relational when it is symmetrical across time 
showing that there is an underlying constraint and lawful change. De­
velopment is historical when it does not repeat itself, when there is a 
continuously changing unfolding o f the system over time.
W here does change come from?
Based on the relational-historical research method, it is possible to 
ask where change comes from. This simple question can be elaborated. 
Where does each level o f change come from? Where do the laws 
o f change come from? We cannot provide complete answers to these 
questions but we can suggest different ways o f looking at the questions.
Levels of change
Level 1 change. Because ordinary variability is always there, a funda­
mental fact o f everyday behavior, the question o f where it comes from is 
hard to answer. One could say that the nervous system generates vari­
ability because it is adaptive. Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1987; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994) parallels the ideas o f Darwin’s theory for
phylogenetic change, that the evolution o f the nervous system in the life 
course is a process o f natural selection from the spontaneously generated 
variability o f the neural firings and connections. While this is a powerful 
and highly productive explanation that appeals to the function o f vari­
ability, it still does not account for the ultimate question o f where 
variability comes from. Variability is a pervasive fact o f the universe, at 
every level o f matter and energy and at all time scales from microseconds 
to eons. We could say that variability exists because nature is a dynamic 
system and dynamic systems are inherently variable but that is tauto­
logical. Variability is given, always present, inherent in the universe, and 
unlimited. Both theology and dynamic systems science are in agreement 
on this point: we might as well just accept that variability is a given and 
cannot be reduced to some other explanatory device.
Level 2 change. When we come to change at level 2, science may 
have more to say on its origins. This is because we can observe differ­
ences in when and how innovations arise in systems. While ordinary 
variability is always there, a constant background, innovations occur in 
particular ways, when conditions are favorable, and those conditions can 
be studied. Our study does not provide an answer to this question but a 
careful sorting o f innovations in relation to other systemic factors could 
be carried out empirically.
A  key question related to the source o f innovations is how does the 
system “ know” which innovations are worth the energetic investment of 
attention? The successful innovations, the ones that get noticed, remain 
in the system, and ultimately provoke a level 3 change, must somehow 
be perceived as “ interesting,” or “better,” or “ exciting,” or “worth­
while.” This implies that there is an inherent valuation o f changes, that 
is, an emotional aspect to the information o f what makes a difference. 
Value is the most basic form of psychological experience. It involves 
immediate, often automatic emotional appraisals such as good or bad, 
approach or avoidance, acceptance or rejection, tasteful or distasteful, 
pleasure or pain (Fogel, 2001; Frijda, 1985). Further research on innov­
ations may require an examination o f the ways in which participants’ 
implicit valuations serve to regulate the fate o f innovations.
So where do these innovative changes come from? One could not 
argue, as for ordinary variability, that innovations are just a fundamental 
property o f nature. This is because we can observe many relationships 
that lack innovation and remain stagnant in endlessly repeating (though 
ordinarily variable) patterns. This lack o f innovation can be perceived by 
participants. Stagnation -  inertia -  is often felt as aversive and leads 
couples and families to seek some form o f therapeutic intervention or to
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end the relationship (Antonofsky & Sagy, 1990; Biitz, Duran, & Tong, 
1995; Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Lewis, 1995; Rogers, 1961; Stem, 1985).
When they do occur in a relationship, where do innovations come 
from? As we saw in our research, innovations may be invented by either 
participant or by collaboration between partners. Since innovations are 
by nature different from ordinary variability -  they are differences that 
make a difference -  how can we understand the apparent creativity o f the 
system to invent something that was not there before?
The question is relevant not only to interpersonal relationships but all 
forms o f social and cultural change. Why do some historical periods, 
such as ancient Greece, the European Renaissance, and the twentieth 
century, for example, seem to be over-populated with artistic, techno­
logical, and scientific innovations that lead to major social change com­
pared to other historical periods? Why do some corporations become 
more innovative than others, and why are there periods o f more or less 
innovation within a corporation?
There are at least four possibilities. First, innovations could bear some 
resemblance to the ordinary variability in the existing system and yet still 
be perceived as different. In some o f our dyads, for example, persistent 
mouthing or immersion in the objects first appears as an innovation and 
later as a major theme o f the next developmental period. Yet persistent 
mouthing is an amplification o f something that already existed as part o f 
the ordinary variability, that is, occasional mouthing. Thus, this first 
possibility is that innovations are amplifications o f existing ordinary 
variability. The creativity in this case is to amplify by extending an action 
longer in time (as in the case o f persistent mouthing) or by making an 
action bigger or more exaggerated or more intense. This occurs, for 
example, as existing computer microprocessor designs can be altered 
to become faster and more memory intensive.
A  second possible source o f innovations is actions that already exist in 
the repertoire o f the participants but have not been used in the particular 
frames being observed. In our data, since we only observed the dyads in 
one limited laboratory setting, we cannot assess this possibility. But it 
could be that the infants begin mouthing objects persistendy during their 
own solitary exploration o f objects, or with their own hands and fingers 
while alone. The creativity here is to import an action from one context 
into another, that is, to perceive how an action may be extended across 
contexts in its usefulness. This happened, for example, when musical 
digital technology in the form o f CDs became integrated into personal 
computers.
A  third possibility is that innovations may become “ available” because 
o f developmental change processes in this or other contexts. Visually
guided reaching may be one such example. As visual and motor coordin­
ation improves in this and other contexts, reaching becomes more ac­
cessible to the infant. The creativity here is in the exploration and 
discovery o f the possible uses o f the new acquisition. The incorporation 
o f CDs into computers led to new uses, including data storage on CDs 
instead o f floppy disks, more complex programs packaged and sold on 
CDs, and the ability to create personalized music collections with a 
combination o f hard drive catalogues and burning o f CDs or building 
MP3 files.
Finally, innovation may also be a spontaneous, creative, invention 
with no precedent. There was nothing in our dataset that met this 
criterion but it may be possible. The other three possible sources o f 
innovation are inherently creative but the creativity involves the playful 
expanding, combining and comparing o f existing elements. In human 
history, most inventions were preceded by prior attempts and existing 
technologies that were creatively transformed into something “ new.” 
The invention o f writing in the Sumerian civilization some three thou­
sand years ago is often considered to be the only purely unprecedented 
human invention. Writing arose as a way to keep records o f inventories 
and business transactions. One could imagine, however, that some other 
form o f accounting such as straws, sticks, or beads (the abacus) may have 
preceded making marks in clay tablets. A careful empirical comparison o f 
innovations with existing ordinary variability may one day lead to an 
answer o f whether spontaneous innovations may or may not occur.
For the most part, however, we suspect that most innovations have the 
characteristic o f bridging. They combine something old with something 
new. They sit in the midst o f ordinary variability without changing the 
frame when they first appear. This perhaps could only happen if partici­
pants “ recognized” the innovation as something inherently familiar: 
noteworthy but “ safe,”  different enough to perceive but not so different 
as to disrupt.
The ready acceptance and rapid worldwide spread o f cellular tele­
phones is one such example. Cell phones are like other phones but 
portable and more convenient. On the other hand, the Internet was in 
existence for many years before it became widely used. Although the 
origin o f the Internet can be traced to a number o f prior technologies, 
from the perspective o f ordinary users it was perceived as too unusual 
and unfamiliar and thus was not so readily adopted when it first 
appeared. And there have been many inventions in human history that 
have been lost. In order to be successful, the innovation must bridge past 
and future in a way that participants can perceive as a safe or useful 
difference that makes a difference.
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Level 3 change. Where does developmental change come from? Our 
research clearly shows that developmental change is not spontaneous in 
the sense o f arising without any historical roots. It occurs over a long 
period and grows out o f a history o f innovation. Developmental change, 
like innovation, occurs through a long process o f bridging the old with 
the new. But unlike innovations, which can be created and either 
accepted or tossed away at relatively little cost, developmental change 
requires a considerable investment o f resources and cannot be reversed. 
Once the system begins to re-organize, there is no going back. Develop­
mental change is irreversible. In addition, participants at some point 
have to “ commit” to the re-organization process without knowing in 
advance how everything will work out. Because so many parts o f the 
system are changing at the same time and affecting each other in 
the process, there is an inherent indeterminism in developmental change 
from the perspective o f the participants who cannot possibly know the 
entire map o f the future.
No matter how much time is invested in bridging there is always some 
element o f the unknown. Romantic partners may have long periods of 
engagement and/or living together (bridging frames) before getting mar­
ried. Nothing, however, can fully prepare the couple for the challenges of 
married life. Some research suggests that the quality o f preparation 
during the bridging period can predict the long-term success o f 
the marriage (Gottman et al., 2002). Nevertheless, moving into the 
emerging frame is to some extent a leap into the unknown.
Why would participants make any developmental change at all, given 
that it takes a rather large investment and that there is an inherent 
uncertainty? The immersion o f infants with their objects during the final 
developmental period for each o f the four representative dyads may 
provide one clue. The infants clearly wanted this intense contact with 
objects and the mothers were willing to allow this to occur. Because 
immersion with objects first appeared as an innovation in the earlier 
periods, it may be that one or both members o f the dyad endows 
the innovation with positive emotional value, as something good or 
preferred.
In the case o f marriage, couples proceed in the face o f uncertainty 
because they perceive some likely emotional gain or enhancement. 
They expect something better or more pleasurable or more fulfilling. 
Such valuations may serve to guide the dyad through the complexity 
and uncertainty o f the level 3 change process. In addition, however, 
there may also be a different type o f emotion involved with the relative 
certainty or uncertainty o f the change process itself. During change, 
people tend to feel emotions such as security vs. insecurity or safety
vs. threat (Fogel, 2001). There may be some kind o f complex appraisal 
in which the anticipated benefit is weighed against the perceived safety o f 
taking the path toward change. Further research may be able to better 
illuminate the emotional processes surrounding level 3 changes.
So, one answer for where developmental change comes from is that 
the innovation leads to an expectation o f something better in the future. 
The participants “agree” to move forward and the system re-organizes 
around the innovation. We can still ask two more “where does it come 
from?” questions. One is related to the change process itself: why does it 
take this particular form? The other is related to the emerging frame: 
where does it come from? We cannot provide answers to these quesuons 
from our data but we can offer some ways to think about the problems.
We suspect that the change process may be, like ordinary variability, a 
law o f nature. The law does not have to exist concretely in any particular 
location. Rather, the law is a description o f regularities that we can 
observe across many examples o f change. According to dynamic systems 
theory, complex systems -  from atoms to galaxies -  all seem to evolve 
developmentally in a similar way.
• There is a gradual accretion, innovation, or amplification o f existing 
variability.
• At some point in time, the existing system can no longer “ contain” the 
growth within itself.
• The system seeks some new form o f organizauon that can contain the 
change.
• This new form o f organization requires a re-organization o f existing 
elements in which virtually every part o f the system is affected in 
relation to every other part.
• A  new stable order emerges with a new ordinary variability.
Indeed, dynamic systems theory derives its explanatory power from 
this idea which apparently applies to all systems in the universe: that 
changes in microlevel processes (level 2) set the historical precedent for 
subsequent developmental re-organization. The other part o f the theory 
worth noting here is that this “ law” emerges from the mutual inter­
actions among the elements as they are subjected to some amplification 
process.
This description suggests that once a re-organization process begins, it is 
very difficult to stop it. The old way o f relating cannot contain all 
the innovations and there may be an inexorable pull into the relatively 
chaotic whirlpool o f developmental change. There may be a “point o f no 
return,” a time when the irreversibility o f the process becomes perceptually 
palpable. Too much has already changed. Too much has already been
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invested. Some brides and grooms no doubt feel the overpowering host o f 
forces, money, effort, and people that brought them to the altar while at the 
same time wondering what they may have gotten themselves into.
An even more challenging question is “where does the emerging 
frame come from?”  There are a number o f possibilities. First, it could 
be an elaboration and extension o f an existing frame. In some ways, 
this occurred in our data because o f the links between historical, 
bridging, and emerging frames. Each frame in this series shares some 
common elements with prior frames. In this sense, emerging frames 
evolve historically and with a clear link to the past, just like innovations.
When we look at interpersonal relationships, however, there appear to 
be very similar sequences o f frames in the developmental series. Virtually 
all o f our dyads evolved into the not-guided object frame, even though 
they may have taken somewhat different pathways. Most, but certainly 
not all, romantic relationships evolve into some kind o f long-term part­
nership. This observation suggests that there may be factors other than 
the history o f any particular relationship, factors in the larger biological 
or sociocultural system that may be the origin o f the emerging frame.
One possibility is that there is some type o f encoding o f developmental 
pathways, perhaps in the genes, which set the stage for developmental 
outcomes. In this case, the genetically encoded preferences interact with 
the behavioral processes to produce universal developmental outcomes. 
In interpersonal relationships, we cannot ignore the role o f culture in 
establishing norms, tools, and procedures for particular developmental 
changes. There would be no emerging guided object frame in the ab­
sence o f a culture that deems objects suitable for an infant to hold and 
explore. There would be no marriage in the absence o f a culture that 
sets expectations and rituals for its preparation and occurrence. Those 
romantic couples who do not evolve into some kind o f long-term part­
nership are “ labeled”  as having “ issues” or being commitment phobic 
individuals. So, the sociocultural narrative/system may be a source o f 
constraint for emerging frames.
In practice, no relationship can exist apart from these larger systems. 
We can imagine that change in each interpersonal relationship is actually 
part o f change in a larger sociocultural system o f many relationships. 
The concepts and practices o f childrearing, for example, have evolved 
over historical time in relation to cultural historical changes (Fogel, 
2003). The culture is part o f a multicultural society, which is part o f 
human society, which is embedded in the biosphere o f the earth. There 
are, no doubt, complex systemic linkages at all these levels o f the lived 
world (Capra, 1996).
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The perception of change
In this section, we address the persistent theme o f this book: that the 
regularities or laws o f change are partly in the eye o f the beholder. In our 
discussion o f qualitative research methods, we admitted that the re­
searcher’s training, relationship to the data, and cultural background 
could not be ignored in the construction o f results and conclusions. 
Qualitative analysis becomes scientific when investigators strive to reach 
consensual credibility and to make their assumptions and cultural biases 
as explicit as possible. In addition, our definition o f each level o f change 
is entirely bound up with the presumed perception o f the participants. In 
informational systems, change is perceived as differences that make a 
difference. Conversely, people can detect relatively invariant patterns 
within dynamically changing flows o f events in time. Change and stabil­
ity are each perceived as a significant difference or lack o f a difference 
between one event and another (Edelman, 1987; Gibson, 1966; Kugler, 
Kelso, & Turvey, 1982).
In answer to the question, “Where does change come from?” we must 
conclude that it arises in the relationship between the observer/partici­
pant and the co-participants/observers. This means that change in inter­
personal relationships is not concrete. Partly there are indeed behavioral 
changes that can be seen, and partly there is the interpretation o f those 
behaviors as sufficiently noteworthy to be called a “ change.” It is some­
where on this very unsettled ground o f scientific endeavor that we have 
chosen to work in this research project. Our results are not “ true” or 
“ false.”  Rather, they may be judged as “ credible” or “ incredible.”
Sum mary o f  laws o f change. Can laws be inferred from a handful 
o f cases? We suspect there are laws because not all types o f change were 
possible in our data. On the other hand, we also know that other types o f 
laws will be discovered as relational-historical research is applied to other 
types o f relationships. We remain convinced that general principles o f 
developmental change can only be found from the specifics o f case 
histories and not from summaries and averages. The laws o f change that 
are accepted today are based on case studies. Embryonic developmental 
laws were derived from observing individual embryos over time. The 
laws o f assimilation and accommodation in sensorimotor development 
rested upon observations o f three infant siblings from the same family. 
The laws o f biological evolution were discovered from a small number o f 
bird species on a few islands in a single terrestrial ocean. One universe is 
all we have for finding the laws o f cosmological change. Single cases are 
not limitations. They each represent a universe o f possibilities.
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A human interpersonal relationship is a historically developing communi­
cation system encompassing action, physiological processes, and the psy­
chological meaning o f those processes to each individual. In this section, we 
briefly touch on the topic o f what it may mean to be a person-in-relation 
and how relationship change may affect the participants.
Being separate vs. being connected
In the discrete state model o f communication (Chapter 3), relationships 
are linkages o f separate entities. Virtually all theories o f communication 
and human development -  with the exception o f Piaget, sociocultural, 
and Dynamic Systems Theory (Chapter 1) -  rest on this Cartesian 
dualism. Some examples o f a dualism between essentially separate en­
tities are: senders and receivers who exchange signals; innate and ac­
quired characteristics; and parents and children who have endowments 
to reach out toward the other. In this perspective, the entities are primary 
and relationships are secondary.
In the discrete state approach, separate entities come to “ know” each 
other, or to “ share” states o f consciousness intersubjectively. Repeated 
signals from the “other” are decoded and interpreted by the “ individual” 
and then re-coded into signals for sending back to the “ other.”  The 
interpersonal relationship is composed o f entities engaged in coding 
and decoding messages from “ outside themselves.”  Growth in the dis­
crete state model is the incremental mapping o f codes to already known 
feelings or thoughts.
Piaget (1952) was one o f the first to describe the limits o f discrete state 
thinking. Mere associations between stimulus and response are not suffi­
cient to capture development because there is no reason for the indi­
vidual to “ care about,” that is, to place an emotional value on which 
associations are more or less interesting. Piaget claimed instead that the 
motive for change was a perceived incompleteness, what he called dis- 
equilibration. Discrete entities are by definition complete (or else they 
would not be bounded and discrete). And, if they felt incomplete they 
would be in need o f something from “ outside themselves.” But to need 
something from “outside” one’s being must mean that the “ outside” is 
part o f the individual after all (because the “ outside” is needed to 
constitute and complete the individual).
Piaget’s concepts o f assimilation and accommodation are at the heart 
o f his relational perspective. Individuals are inherently incomplete: they 
need “nourishment” action in relation to the environment in order to
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move toward completion or equilibration. Since no form o f nourishment 
is itself complete, the individual must accommodate to accept it, 
changing the form o f the nourishment while at the same time changing 
the self. In other words, in the dynamics o f the relationship, both the 
person and the environment change in relation to each other.
Levinas (1969) showed that Descartes’ view o f the essentially com­
plete individual derived from Greek philosophy, which viewed each 
person as a complete entity in itself. Each person could be fully de­
scribed and known if enough time and effort were expended to exhaust 
its list o f characteristics. Levinas called this view o f discrete entities 
“ totalizing,” in the sense that one could potentially know the totality o f 
the person or object. The alternative he proposed is called “ infinitizing.” 
In this view, there is no way to know all the characteristics o f the other, 
not even if one were to spend a very long time. This is because the other 
is conceived as incomplete, waiting to be defined by communication, 
communication that never completely exhausts the possibilities (see also 
Ganguly, 1976; Whitehead, 1978).
In Chapters 1 and 3 we suggested that from a systems perspective, 
people are always in some kind o f relationship: with themselves, with 
other people, and with the ecology o f living and non-living entities. To 
say that people are inherently relational means that they are inherently 
incomplete and indeterminate (Fogel, Lyra, & Valsiner, 1997). From a 
relational perspective, the “ other” comes into being synchronically with 
the sense o f “ I.” Because information in relationships is created or 
discovered in the process o f relating as people come to perceive differ­
ences that make a difference based on the history o f their communi­
cation (Chapter 3), information is the result o f communication not the 
cause. According to Gergen (1991, p. 157), “ I f  it is not individual ‘IV  
who create relationships, but relationships that create the sense o f ‘I,’ 
then ‘I ’ ceases to be the center o f success or failure, the one who is 
evaluated well or poorly, and so on. Rather, T  am just an T  by virtue o f 
playing a particular part in a relationship.”
The relational perspective does not deny that people often perceive 
their part in a communicative process as “ their own” contribution or 
“ their own” failure to make an effective contribution. Each singer in a 
chorus manifests the group dynamics in a unique way, experiencing their 
own part in the larger musical creation that emerges from the choral 
relationship.
We interpret our research on these mother-infant dyads to favor the 
relational perspective. We suggest that “being” is always and at all times 
a “being-in-relation.” The sociocultural perspective reviewed in Chapter 1 
is the most clearly articulated view of this statement. All our forms of
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communication and cognition evolved in interpersonal relationships. As 
suggested by Levinas’ concept o f infinitizing, “ being-in-relation” in no 
way limits who we can become. Rather, relationships open us up to a 
multiplicity of possibilities and at the same time a sense o f connection.
Interventions that foster change
A failure to establish a sense o f connection with others is often the 
impetus for some kind o f intervention. Depression and anxiety, for 
example, are symptoms o f an inability to access and process strong 
emotions and are often accompanied by a withdrawal from or inability 
to rely upon the social world (Schore, 2003). Psychotherapeutic inter­
ventions can be helpful in re-establishing emotional connections within 
the self and between self and others. Marital and family discord is 
symptomatic o f a breakdown o f connections o f attachment and trust 
between people. Family therapy can help people to find ways to re­
establish effective communication. Aggression, crime, and warfare are 
also symptoms o f failures to connect in mutually beneficial ways. These 
strategies o f unilateral and coercive connections have been part o f 
human society for millennia. Can an understanding o f change processes 
in relationships help to put people and societies back into a more 
coregulated and mutually respectful mode o f communication?
In this section, we suggest how our study o f the microgenetics o f 
change process may have implications for how change can be facilitated 
during interventions in all these types o f relationships. The general laws 
of change that we have discovered may not give sufficient detail to carry 
out an intervention in any particular domain. Nevertheless, they may pro­
vide a useful lens through which one can view change. They may also 
provide a road map -  the laws o f change -  that may help to reassure 
participants that an intervention is on track. At a minimum, we can set 
out the following guidelines.
• There must be an existing, stable historical frame: grounding or home 
base o f the relationship.
• The relationship must have multiple frames active at all times to 
provide flexibility and room for change to occur.
• Innovations must be introduced carefully, as simple amplifications o f 
existing ordinary variability and in a way that increases the likelihood 
o f ratification.
• The ratification process is not instantaneous. It takes some time to 
negotiate ratification or rejection o f innovations. No further change 
can occur until innovations are accepted and participants feel 
comfortable with them.
• Developmental change takes a relatively long time and is always 
based on the due process o f innovations emerging gradually out o f 
the ordinary variability o f the existing frames o f the relationship. Due 
respect must be given to the inherent inertia o f existing frames. The 
system may require transformation through a series o f incremental 
changes before a developmental change can occur.
• Bridging must be created at all levels: innovations must bridge be­
tween ordinary variability and novelty, and bridging frames must link 
and mediate the transition from existing to emerging frames while 
creating a safe environment to explore innovations.
• Once the re-organization process begins, the system must be given 
ample support to “ let it happen” in order to maximize the possibilities 
for discovering the best route to the emerging future. The relationship 
must be allowed opportunities for recapitulation and relapse as a 
way o f protecting against too sudden a change. Alternatively, when 
the system reaches a point o f no return, participants can be supported 
by an understanding o f the inherent creativity and opening o f new 
possibilities o f the moment.
In this section, we will briefly discuss a variety o f change practices such 
as psychotherapy, education, and social change. In each case, we exam­
ine how these guidelines may help to “bring people to the table” in order 
to work through a change process. We also suspect that the bridging 
process, although not a guarantee o f success, avoids catastrophic forms 
o f change, making the change process less traumatic and potentially 
more beneficial to the participants. Understanding change may take 
some o f the fear out o f its inherent uncertainty. These guidelines may 
help people to allow the laws o f change to work in their best interests so 
that they can “ ride the wave” o f change instead o f drowning in the 
undertow.
Therapeutic interventions. As mentioned earlier, change is typic­
ally connected with emotional processes that lead us into and through 
the change process. Developmental change requires a balance o f a sense 
o f uncertainty or threat o f the unknown in relation to a trust that the 
change will yield a better state o f affairs. It is often useful to have a guide 
to facilitate the change process. A therapist, teacher or parent can help 
an individual to maintain creativity and openness during developmental 
transitions in the face o f these emotional surprises (Antonofsky & Sagy, 
1990; Block & Block, 1980; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996; Isen, 1990; 
Malatesta & Wilson, 1988).
According to dynamic systems theory, change is most likely to occur 
when the system is in a “ far-from-equilibrium” state. This generally
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imeans that the system is pushed out o f its usual or habitual mode o f 
functioning by some kind o f innovation. Away from its stable frames, 
systems experience relative emotional disorganization and chaos. This 
disorganization is believed to be a fundamental part o f therapeutic and 
developmental change that is not meant to be pushed aside and ignored. 
In fact, dynamic systems can only re-organize because o f the heightened 
energy present in far-from-equilibrium states (Lewis & Junyk, 1997; 
Schore, 2003). On the other hand, there is inertia in the existing frames, 
no matter how painful they may be, a built-in resistance to change which 
arises because o f a fear/avoidance o f the uncertainty o f disorganization 
(Mahoney & Moes, 1997; Ryan et al., 2000).
The existence o f a relative chaos in the face o f change is part o f many 
mythological traditions and many forms o f indigenous or shamanistic 
healing ceremonies. In some American Indian cultures, for example, the 
role o f chaos is often played by the coyote, an animal spirit that repre­
sents the way in which life can sometimes play tricks on us. Healing or 
coming-of-age ceremonies are intended to provide community support 
as the person enters the “ spirit world” beyond the ability o f humans to 
intervene. These beliefs and practices embody the laws o f developmental 
change in the form o f animal natures or spirits and they make the 
uncertainty o f chaos recognizable as part o f human transformation 
(Biitz, Duran, & Tong, 1995).
In other societies, the therapist or teacher creates the bridge between 
the enhancement o f flexibility and creativity, and the pain and anxiety o f 
changing or unpredictable circumstances (Antonovsky, 1993; Rogers, 
1961; Wilber, 1979). Therapeutic or educational guidance can help to 
facilitate developmental change by creating a bridge between the “ safe” 
historical frames and the “uncertain” emerging frames.
The relationship becomes a safe, caring, and informative “secure base” in and 
from which the client can experience, explore, and experiment with alternative 
patterns of activity. The therapist and therapeutic relationship serve as stabilizing 
processes during perturbations and the destabilization that follows. (Mahoney 
& Moes, 1997, p. 190).
There are individual differences in response to change, which can be 
experienced either as highly creative or as distressing and disorganizing, 
depending upon how individuals are supported while in the process o f 
changing. Some individuals or groups seek change, magnifying their 
emotions o f fear/threat or security in order to continue acting near the 
edge o f uncertainty. Other individuals or groups may find change more 
aversive, keeping their emotions within prescribed boundaries and main­
taining the stability o f previously “ safe” frames for communication when
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faced with perturbations that are likely to lead to change (Antonofsky 
& Sagy, 1990; Biitz, Duran, & Tong, 1995; Fogel & Lyra, 1997; Lewis, 
1995; Rogers, 1961; Stem, 1985). Therapeutically sensitive bridging is 
required to adapt to these individual differences.
In psychotherapy, for example, developmental change has been ob­
served to occur when client and therapist experience “moments o f 
meeting” or “ now moments” (Sander, 1995; Stem, 1998). These are 
innovations in the form o f novel insights and amplified emotions. A  now 
moment can become a “hot moment o f truth” in which participants are 
caught “ off guard,” requiring some unpredictable and ultimately cre­
ative act (Stem, 1998). Because these moments are times o f heightened 
emotions, observations suggest that the emotional resonance between 
client and therapist is a major factor in leading the system toward more 
adaptive re-organization (Schore, 2003; Tronick, 1998).
Winnicott’s (1971) concept o f the “  potential space” between partners 
that arises when each is completely open to the possibilities that arise in 
relation to the other suggests that there is a bridging process -  in which 
both people are fully present and recognized -  that supports the innov­
ation. Because o f the therapeutic safety o f the bridging frame o f mutual 
acceptance, the safety and usefulness o f innovations can be explored 
without changing the historical frames. It is in this dyadic bridging state 
that innovations can be “practiced” by the client in a “what i f ”  or 
imaginative manner (Harris, 1992). In this way, the therapist and client 
may eventually create a developmental change in the client’s sense o f the 
self in the world that transcends the therapeutic bridging frame (Beebe 
& Lachman, 2002; Bromberg, 1991; Fogel, 1997; Sander, 1995; Schore, 
2003; Stem, 1998; Tronick, 1998).
The key to opening the way to the emergence o f new more functional 
frames and the abandonment o f dysfunctional historical frames seems to 
be to allow the client an opportunity to self-regulate (approach and avoid 
as needed) in relation to the interactive regulation with the therapist 
(Beebe & Lachman, 2002). The result is a “dyadic state o f conscious­
ness” that bridges the client and therapist into a dyadic system that can 
facilitate change for the client (Tronick, 1998).
A  dynamic systems model o f therapy or education, therefore, views 
disorganization and chaos as a necessary part o f change. This means that 
in the midst o f such change, neither the client nor the therapist, neither 
the student nor the teacher, knows what will occur. Both are present in 
the evolving system dynamics and no one is in “ control.”  Therapists 
and teachers, in this view, are not all knowing gurus but rather people 
who are familiar with the dynamics o f the change process and who can 
help to create the bridges to bring people through the chaotic period of
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disorganization. Dynamic systems theory can emancipate the therapist 
or teacher by recognizing that their role is one o f creating possibilities 
rather than controlling outcomes (Biitz et al., 1995; Mahoney & Moes, 
1997).
Change in family systems
Maintenance o f a long-term marital relationship requires continual ne­
gotiation and discussion. Research on marriage has revealed crucial 
differences between couples who remain married compared to those 
who divorce (Ryan et al., 2000). Long-term couples show positive 
problem solving behavior and they work toward showing positive emo­
tion in daily interaction. Positive attempts were made toward the 
de-escalation o f conflict and subsequent emotional soothing o f both 
partners. This appears to be accomplished by a process that resembles 
bridging. During conflicts, couples will turn toward each other rather 
than away, recognize and accept differences (that is, bridging between 
their respective points o f view), and actively seek to repair hurt feelings 
(Montgomery, 1994).
Surprisingly, successful marriages are no more likely to resolve long­
standing conflicts than unsuccessful marriages (Ryan et al., 2000). The 
successful marriages, however, can create bridging frames for emotional 
dialogue that allows for amusement and affection and a commitment to 
seek change. Unsuccessful couples fail to find a bridging frame. Instead, 
they do not accept the other’s perspective. They each treat the other with 
mutual contempt, criticism, defensiveness and stonewalling. This re­
search also confirms our model because without the bridging frame, 
couples either fail to change or are slower to change: there is a resistance 
to change, an emotional inertia that holds the system in the historical 
frame.
O f course, the breakdown o f a relationship, such as in divorce, is itself 
a change. It could be a developmental change if the couple’s relationship 
continues to evolve and grow as some sort o f partnership, for example, 
when a divorced couple actively collaborate to raise their children. Or, 
divorce could mean the death o f the relationship with a complete cessa­
tion o f further communication. Like individuals, relationships have a life 
cycle encompassing birth and death. Our model may also be able to help 
understand continuing imaginary relationships, as occurs when former 
partners who do not communicate continue to think about, feel, and 
remember their past life together.
A  similar process o f change and stability has been observed in mother- 
infant-father triadic family systems. During periods o f high emotional
arousal, well-functioning families use what is called a “ triangulation 
strategy” in which each person coordinates mutual attention and posi­
tive emotion with each o f the other two partners. In stressed families, 
one or more o f the dyadic alliances o f the triangle does not show positive 
emotional communication. Parents may each have an independent posi­
tive relationship with the infant but not with each other. Or perhaps the 
father fails to connect with the infant. In these cases, there is no triangu­
lar bridging frame to keep the family together and developing as a unit 
(Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz- Wamery, 1999).
Global change
Some people see the earth as heading for a catastrophic apocalypse with 
the combined effect o f global warming, pollution, warfare, and political 
unrest. Lazio (2001) sees the potential for this type o f non-linear devel­
opmental transition in what he calls the “breakdown” scenario. This 
involves the continued over-exploitation o f resources. On the other 
hand, he also imagines a “breakthrough” scenario leading to the creation 
o f a truly global community (see Table 1.1). The breakthrough scenario 
can only be accomplished by the use o f carefully chosen innovations 
within a bridging process that balances the existing conflicts and human 
needs (historical frame) against the limitations o f basic resources negoti­
ated within a cooperative world community (emerging frame). A  similar 
vision is shared by Greenspan and Shanker (2004), in which they expli­
citly propose educational and policy bridges that bring about their vision 
o f an emerging world community (Table 1.2).
Warfare is another example o f a dynamically stable frame in a rela­
tionship between the opposing social groups. How could this model 
help us conceptualize change for the better? First, peace may already 
be present within the larger current and historical dynamic system o f the 
between-group relationship. Certainly, there were periods o f peace in 
the past, and certainly there are individuals in each group who favor 
peace and seek out mutually constructive relationships with people from 
the other side.
One path to peace is to create bridging frames from the state o f war to 
these already existing but relatively brief instances o f a peace frame. I f  
there is no clear winner in the conflict, as in the Vietnam War and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, then the peace movement must acquire a 
political voice because o f some innovation such as a change in leader­
ship. Temporary cessation o f hostilities while in a state o f war is a 
bridging frame. According to our model, there will at first be a higher 
rate o f transitions between the bridging frame and the existing frame of
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warfare. As innovations take hold and become ratified by both sides, new 
information can be created that reflects a change o f attitude toward the 
opposition.
The world has also seen that the bridging period often needs to be 
scaffolded by a third non-aligned party which becomes part o f the 
bridging frame and fosters opportunities for peace negotiations. This 
transition, from war to peace, is developmental. It takes a considerable 
amount o f time and there are no short cuts through the change process. 
There is also considerable inertia in the state o f warfare, built in part by 
the enormous investment o f money and lives and the emotional needs 
for retribution or vindication. The emotional information that is created 
and that sustains each particular conflict must be the historical ground 
on which innovations must be forged. Change, in other words, must 
come from an acceptance o f the state o f the system and the creation of 
innovations that are rooted in the existing state o f affairs.
Compassion
Underlying the observed communicative bridging frame in all o f the 
examples in this chapter is the free exercise o f compassionate love, that 
is, the willingness to accept the other as the same as oneself and to love 
the other as oneself (Braden, 1997). The possibility for relational 
bridging frames can only arise if the participants are willing to reach 
out to each other with the intention to create a bridge that leads to a 
genuine meeting with the other person. David Bohm, noted for his 
contributions to dynamic systems theory in the field o f physics and cited 
earlier regarding his notion o f implicate order, suggested that true dia­
logue is not simply an open exchange o f views but rather a compassion 
for one’s own and the other’s perspective even in the face o f disagree­
ment, the essence of bridging (Bohm, 1996). In his later years, Bohm 
traveled the world teaching his method of dialogue to many different 
groups. Bohm’s view of dialogue includes an acceptance that I might be 
wrong, or that underneath my strong opinion there may be anger or 
hatred. Defending one’s opinion to the end does not build bridges 
between people. Rather, admitting one’s deeper emotions, fears, and 
biases in the community is the only way to reveal the sources o f shared 
humanity. Only then is forgiveness possible, and only from forgiveness 
can new frames for cooperation and peace emerge.
This shared sense o f humanity is an emergent bridging frame. When 
people can see how others are shaped by their history and emotions then 
disagreements can be tolerated, both points o f view can co-exist in the 
bridging frame. Only if this occurs can there be hope for working out
the disagreements in peaceful ways. Only with such bridging can we be 
assured o f a developmental change toward a newly emerging future of 
cooperation. When people act on their anger or hatred, when they mask 
their fear, the other’s humanity becomes devalued and hostility is the 
likely outcome.
Going with the flow
We began this book with a quote from the I  Ching, the ancient Chinese 
“book o f changes.”  The basic wisdom o f the I  Ching is that
• everything in the universe is at some point in a continuous and lawful 
process o f change, and
• the basic dimensions o f the universe and human experience are inher­
ently connected to each other as in summer-winter, day-night, 
yin-yang.
The I  Ching is considered to be an oracle rather than a collection of 
bits o f wisdom and advice. The purpose o f the oracle is to reveal a 
fundamental underlying pattern in the way changes occur. The people 
seeking counsel are thus informed about where in the process o f change 
they might find themselves at the moment. The seeker casts lots to select 
one out o f a total o f sixty-four “hexagrams,”  each o f which represents a 
phase or pattern o f change. Seekers are generally counseled to respect 
where they are in the process, in modem terms, to “ go with the flow.” 
The wisdom o f the oracle is that those who attempt to alter these basic 
patterns o f change are destined to an endless struggle against impossible 
odds.
The classic translation o f the 1 Ching into English by Richard Wilhelm 
(1950) is accompanied by a foreword written by the psychologist Carl 
Jung. Jung wonders how he should present the ancient philosophy of the 
/ Ching to Western readers. He decides to ask the I  Ching, to consult the 
oracle by asking how he should present it. He casts lots using the coin 
method and readers o f this book can easily discover what the oracle 
reveals to Jung (Wilhelm, 1950). We will follow Jung’s precedent by 
asking that same oracle to identify the best way to illuminate the themes 
o f this book on change processes to include at the end o f this concluding 
chapter.
Jung comments on the method o f casting lots to seek important 
advice. To the Western mind, this is just a matter o f random chance, 
with all sixty-four possibilities equally likely. Why wouldn’t any one of 
the sixty-four hexagrams be equally revealing? His conclusion is that the 
ancient Chinese had faith in the connections o f all parts o f the universe.
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At any particular time, the hexagram chosen by casting lots was not 
thought to be random but rather an emergent manifestation — through 
the coins -  o f one’s position on the wheel o f change. They did not believe 
that anything was completely random.
At the time o f writing this concluding section, the coin method o f 
casting lots was employed and hexagram number 45 was the result, 
translated as “ gathering together” or “ massing.”  There are two parts to 
the interpretation o f this hexagram. On the one hand, it suggests that 
when people are divided there is a need for a leader with the moral force 
to integrate the opposing forces in a way that they cannot be further 
dispersed. Such unification will inevitably lead to great achievements 
in the future. This seems to point to a bridging process based on 
compassion and mutual understanding o f the sort discussed in the 
previous sections. It also suggests that as a direct result o f this bridging 
integration between the opposing factions, new and desirable forms will 
emerge. The work o f the leader, in other words, is to facilitate the 
bridging process rather than to make change happen. When the bridge 
is complete, the system will naturally develop according to the laws o f 
change.
The second part o f the interpretation has to do with the image gener­
ated by the two parts o f the hexagram: the trigram meaning water above, 
and the trigram meaning earth below. This is a potentially dangerous 
situation, as the water may break through, flooding the earth. This 
implies that “ when men gather in great numbers, strife is likely to arise.” 
There are two possibilities: confusion and strife on the one hand, and 
gathering together on die other hand. The text speaks o f letting events 
unfold in order to wait for opportunities to bring people together and for 
mutual understanding. Thus, while all strife cannot be prevented, there 
is a tendency for innovations to appear in the natural evolution of 
the system, innovations that can lead to gathering together. According 
to the oracle, the most effective route in a change process is to simply 
allow the change to unfold, to put oneself in alignment with the way the 
system “wants” to change.
In all change processes, then, the ordinary variability o f the system is 
often sufficient to provide the innovations and bridges needed for opti­
mal growth. Knowing this transforms our view o f facilitating change. 
People are best understood as receivers o f change processes rather than 
as agents o f change. Change is part o f the fabric o f the universe, available 
as a resource o f continually emerging possibilities. We cannot control 
change, nor can we predict the future. We can, however, learn to flow 
with change in ways that maximize desired outcomes while minimizing 
effort and dissipation.
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